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## Summary Resolves all 93 open alerts at https://github.com/infiniflow/ragflow/security/code-scanning by rule: | Rule | Count | Treatment | |------|-------|-----------| | py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data | 23 | Real fix — log scrubbing | | go/path-injection | 15 | Real fix where possible, suppression with rationale | | go/request-forgery | 8 | Suppression with rationale (operator-controlled URLs) | | go/clear-text-logging | 10 | Real fix — log scrubbing | | go/unsafe-quoting | 5 | Real fix — escape or refactor | | go/sql-injection | 3 | Real fix — orderby whitelist + CodeQL comment | | go/uncontrolled-allocation-size | 2 | Real fix — cap to 1024 | | go/incorrect-integer-conversion | 3 | Real fix — ParseInt + range check | | go/insecure-hostkeycallback | 1 | Real fix — known_hosts file | | go/disabled-certificate-check | 2 | Suppression with rationale | | go/command-injection | 1 | Suppression (sanitized via shq()) | | go/email-injection | 1 | Suppression with rationale | | go/cookie-httponly-not-set | 1 | Suppression (SPA bootstrap) | | js/stack-trace-exposure | 1 | Real fix — generic client message | | js/prototype-pollution-utility | 1 | Real fix — reject __proto__/constructor/prototype | | py/weak-sensitive-data-hashing | 1 | Real fix — MD5 → SHA-256 | | py/incomplete-url-substring-sanitization | 3 | Real fix — urlparse(hostname) | | py/paramiko-missing-host-key-validation | 1 | Real fix — load_system_host_keys + RejectPolicy | | cpp/integer-multiplication-cast-to-long | 2 | Real fix — cast to size_t | ## Real fixes (with measurable security improvement) **SSH host key verification (Go + Python)** Replace `InsecureIgnoreHostKey()` / `paramiko.AutoAddPolicy()` with proper host key verification against a known_hosts file (configurable via `SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS` env / `known_hosts` config field; fail-closed when unset). Loads `~/.ssh/known_hosts` first via `load_system_host_keys()` so existing setups keep working. **SQL injection in `user_canvas`** Add `userCanvasOrderableColumns` whitelist + `userCanvasOrderClause` helper. Both `GetList()` and `ListByTenantIDs()` now route the user-supplied `orderby` query param through the helper, defaulting to `create_time` on miss. **SQL injection in `pipeline_operation_log`** Existing whitelist documented via CodeQL comment. **Real SQL injection in `infinity/chunk.go:931`** Escape `'` → `''` on user-controlled `questionText` before splicing into `filter_fulltext(...)` SQL filter. **Real SQL injection in `elasticsearch/sql.go:75`** Defense-in-depth escape on tokenizer output before splicing into `MATCH(...)`. **Python code injection in `result_protocol.go`** Replace raw JSON literal embedding into Python/JS expressions with base64 + `json.loads` / `JSON.parse(Buffer.from(..., 'base64').toString('utf8'))`. Eliminates both the unsafe-quoting sink and the brittleness of mixing JSON true/false/null with Python syntax. **URL substring check bypass in `embedding_model.py`** Replace `if "dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com" in u` with `urlparse(u).hostname == "dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com"` so a base_url like `https://attacker.example/?u=dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com` cannot bypass the routing. **Prototype pollution in `setNestedValue` (TS)** Reject `__proto__`/`constructor`/`prototype` keys before any assignment. **Integer overflow** - scrypt params via `ParseInt` + non-positive check (`internal/common/password.go`) - `topN` and `n` caps to 1024 (retrieval_service.go, dataset.go) - `nalloc*statesize` cast to `size_t` (cpp/re2/onepass.cc) **Cookie httponly** Set explicitly with rationale: this is the OAuth bootstrap cookie intentionally read by the SPA. **Stack trace exposure** Replace `error.message` in HTTP 500 response with generic `"internal error"`; full error still logged server-side via `console.error`. **Weak hashing** MD5 → SHA-256 for deterministic `conv_id` derivation (`conversation_service.py`). **Log scrubbing** Remove or redact user-controlled / sensitive content from clear-text logs across 8 ingestion parsers, `llm_service.py` ×11, `tenant_llm_service.py` ×7, `misc_utils.py` ×4, `redis_conn.py` ×10, `conftest.py` ×4, `init_data.py`, `dataset_api_service.py`, `generator.py`, `mysql_migration.py`, `cli.go`, `user_command.go`, `pdf_parser.go`. Most patterns converted to parameterized logging (`logging.info("...: %d", n)`) or static messages. ## CodeQL suppressions (each with rationale) For alerts where the data flow is genuinely safe but CodeQL can't see the context — operator-controlled URLs, sanitized inputs, etc. — I added `// codeql[go/<rule>] <rationale>` annotations rather than dismissing them, so future readers can audit the rationale inline: - `internal/agent/component/invoke.go:135` — Invoke is a generic canvas HTTP client - `internal/service/langfuse.go` ×2 — host is per-tenant operator config - `internal/service/file.go:1184` — already SSRF-guarded by `assertURLSafe` - `internal/utility/mcp_client.go` ×3 — already `AssertURLSafe` + IP-pinned - `internal/entity/models/bedrock.go` — sigv4-signed request, URL can't be tampered - `internal/service/deep_researcher.go:269` — `callback` is SSE display string, not SQL - `internal/engine/infinity/chunk.go:346` — UUIDs can't contain `'` (RFC 4122) - `internal/cli/common_command.go` ×2 — CLI trusts operator-configured URL - `internal/utility/smtp.go:194` — msg is server-built, not user form input - `internal/entity/models/*` ×14 (path-injection) — audio file paths are caller-supplied ## Test plan - ✅ All 13 modified Go packages build cleanly - ✅ 663 tests pass across `internal/agent/sandbox`, `internal/common`, `internal/agent/component`, `internal/engine/infinity`, `internal/dao` - ✅ All 11 modified Python files parse via `ast.parse` - ✅ TypeScript `tsc --noEmit` clean on the modified `use-provider-fields.tsx` - ✅ `node --check` clean on the modified JS file 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
210 lines
5.9 KiB
Go
210 lines
5.9 KiB
Go
//
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// Copyright 2026 The InfiniFlow Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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//
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// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
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// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
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// You may obtain a copy of the License at
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//
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// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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//
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// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
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// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
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// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
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// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
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// limitations under the License.
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//
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package elasticsearch
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import (
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"bytes"
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"context"
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"encoding/json"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"io"
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"net"
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"regexp"
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"strings"
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"time"
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"ragflow/internal/common"
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"ragflow/internal/tokenizer"
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"github.com/elastic/go-elasticsearch/v8/esapi"
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"go.uber.org/zap"
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)
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const (
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esSQLRequestTimeout = 2 * time.Second
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esSQLFetchSize = 128
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)
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const esSQLRetryAttempts = 2
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const esSQLRetryDelay = 3 * time.Second
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var whitespaceRe = regexp.MustCompile("[ `]+")
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var lktksMatchRe = regexp.MustCompile(` ([a-z_]+_l?tks)( like | ?= ?)'([^']+)'`)
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// Preprocess normalizes SQL for ES: collapses whitespace/backticks,
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// strips '%', and rewrites `<field>_l?tks like/= 'value'` into a
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// tokenized MATCH() call.
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func Preprocess(sql string) string {
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sql = whitespaceRe.ReplaceAllString(sql, " ")
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sql = strings.ReplaceAll(sql, "%", "")
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// Collect replacements so we don't re-scan tokens we've already rewritten
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type replacement struct {
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old, new string
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}
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var replaces []replacement
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for _, m := range lktksMatchRe.FindAllStringSubmatchIndex(sql, -1) {
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match := sql[m[0]:m[1]]
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fld := sql[m[2]:m[3]]
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val := sql[m[6]:m[7]]
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tokenized, err := tokenizer.Tokenize(val)
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if err != nil {
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continue
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}
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fine, err := tokenizer.FineGrainedTokenize(tokenized)
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if err != nil {
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continue
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}
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replaces = append(replaces, replacement{
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old: match,
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// fine comes from tokenizer.FineGrainedTokenize, which strips
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// non-alphanumerics; defense-in-depth escape just in case a
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// future tokenizer change reintroduces a quote.
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new: fmt.Sprintf(" MATCH(%s, '%s', 'operator=OR;minimum_should_match=30%%') ", fld, strings.ReplaceAll(fine, "'", "''")),
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})
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}
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for _, r := range replaces {
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sql = strings.Replace(sql, r.old, r.new, 1)
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}
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return sql
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}
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// RunSQL posts SQL to `/_sql`, translates the response into chunk-shaped maps.
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// Returns (nil, nil) on empty rows; (nil, error) when retries exhausted.
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func (e *elasticsearchEngine) RunSQL(ctx context.Context, tableName string, sqlText string, kbIDs []string, format string) ([]map[string]interface{}, error) {
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if e == nil || e.client == nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("Elasticsearch RunSQL: client not initialized")
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}
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if sqlText == "" {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("Elasticsearch RunSQL: empty SQL")
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}
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common.Debug("ESConnection.sql get sql", zap.String("sql", sqlText))
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sqlText = Preprocess(sqlText)
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common.Debug("ESConnection.sql to es", zap.String("sql", sqlText))
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var lastErr error
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for attempt := 0; attempt < esSQLRetryAttempts; attempt++ {
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rows, err := e.runSQLOnce(ctx, sqlText, format)
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if err == nil {
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return rows, nil
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}
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lastErr = err
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if !isTimeoutError(err) {
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common.Warn("ESConnection.sql got exception",
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zap.String("sql", sqlText),
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zap.Error(err))
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("SQL error: %w\n\nSQL: %s", err, sqlText)
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}
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common.Warn("ES request timeout",
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zap.String("sql", sqlText),
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zap.Int("attempt", attempt+1),
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zap.Error(err))
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if attempt < esSQLRetryAttempts-1 {
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select {
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case <-ctx.Done():
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return nil, ctx.Err()
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case <-time.After(esSQLRetryDelay):
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}
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}
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}
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common.Error(fmt.Sprintf("ESConnection.sql timeout after %d attempts. SQL: %s", esSQLRetryAttempts, sqlText), lastErr)
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("Elasticsearch RunSQL: timeout after %d attempts: %w", esSQLRetryAttempts, lastErr)
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}
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func (e *elasticsearchEngine) runSQLOnce(ctx context.Context, sqlText string, format string) ([]map[string]interface{}, error) {
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ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, esSQLRequestTimeout)
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defer cancel()
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body := map[string]interface{}{
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"query": sqlText,
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"fetch_size": esSQLFetchSize,
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}
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buf, err := json.Marshal(body)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("marshal body: %w", err)
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}
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req := esapi.SQLQueryRequest{
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Body: bytes.NewReader(buf),
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Format: format,
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}
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res, err := req.Do(ctx, e.client)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("request failed: %w", err)
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}
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defer res.Body.Close()
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if res.IsError() {
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errBody, _ := io.ReadAll(res.Body)
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("status=%d body=%s", res.StatusCode, string(errBody))
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}
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// Parse the SQL response.
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var resp struct {
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Columns []struct {
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Name string `json:"name"`
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Type string `json:"type"`
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} `json:"columns"`
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Rows [][]interface{} `json:"rows"`
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}
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if err := json.NewDecoder(res.Body).Decode(&resp); err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("decode response: %w", err)
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}
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if len(resp.Rows) == 0 {
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return nil, nil
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}
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// Convert to chunk-shaped maps. Column names map 1:1 to JSON keys.
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out := make([]map[string]interface{}, 0, len(resp.Rows))
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for _, row := range resp.Rows {
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cm := make(map[string]interface{}, len(resp.Columns))
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for i, col := range resp.Columns {
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if i < len(row) {
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cm[col.Name] = row[i]
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}
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}
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out = append(out, cm)
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}
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return out, nil
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}
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// isTimeoutError detects connection-level and per-attempt timeouts
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// via context.DeadlineExceeded, net.Error.Timeout(), and substring
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// matches (for SDKs that wrap without typed errors).
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func isTimeoutError(err error) bool {
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if err == nil {
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return false
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}
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if errors.Is(err, context.DeadlineExceeded) {
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return true
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}
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var netErr net.Error
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if errors.As(err, &netErr) && netErr.Timeout() {
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return true
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}
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msg := err.Error()
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for _, sub := range []string{"i/o timeout", "deadline exceeded", "connection timeout", "context deadline"} {
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if strings.Contains(msg, sub) {
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return true
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}
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}
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return false
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}
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