Files
ragflow/internal/engine/elasticsearch/sql.go
Zhichang Yu 195bfffb5e fix(security): address 93 CodeQL code-scanning alerts across 61 files (#16407)
## Summary

Resolves all 93 open alerts at
https://github.com/infiniflow/ragflow/security/code-scanning by rule:

| Rule | Count | Treatment |
|------|-------|-----------|
| py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data | 23 | Real fix — log scrubbing |
| go/path-injection | 15 | Real fix where possible, suppression with
rationale |
| go/request-forgery | 8 | Suppression with rationale
(operator-controlled URLs) |
| go/clear-text-logging | 10 | Real fix — log scrubbing |
| go/unsafe-quoting | 5 | Real fix — escape or refactor |
| go/sql-injection | 3 | Real fix — orderby whitelist + CodeQL comment |
| go/uncontrolled-allocation-size | 2 | Real fix — cap to 1024 |
| go/incorrect-integer-conversion | 3 | Real fix — ParseInt + range
check |
| go/insecure-hostkeycallback | 1 | Real fix — known_hosts file |
| go/disabled-certificate-check | 2 | Suppression with rationale |
| go/command-injection | 1 | Suppression (sanitized via shq()) |
| go/email-injection | 1 | Suppression with rationale |
| go/cookie-httponly-not-set | 1 | Suppression (SPA bootstrap) |
| js/stack-trace-exposure | 1 | Real fix — generic client message |
| js/prototype-pollution-utility | 1 | Real fix — reject
__proto__/constructor/prototype |
| py/weak-sensitive-data-hashing | 1 | Real fix — MD5 → SHA-256 |
| py/incomplete-url-substring-sanitization | 3 | Real fix —
urlparse(hostname) |
| py/paramiko-missing-host-key-validation | 1 | Real fix —
load_system_host_keys + RejectPolicy |
| cpp/integer-multiplication-cast-to-long | 2 | Real fix — cast to
size_t |

## Real fixes (with measurable security improvement)

**SSH host key verification (Go + Python)**  
Replace `InsecureIgnoreHostKey()` / `paramiko.AutoAddPolicy()` with
proper host key verification against a known_hosts file (configurable
via `SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS` env / `known_hosts` config field; fail-closed when
unset). Loads `~/.ssh/known_hosts` first via `load_system_host_keys()`
so existing setups keep working.

**SQL injection in `user_canvas`**  
Add `userCanvasOrderableColumns` whitelist + `userCanvasOrderClause`
helper. Both `GetList()` and `ListByTenantIDs()` now route the
user-supplied `orderby` query param through the helper, defaulting to
`create_time` on miss.

**SQL injection in `pipeline_operation_log`**  
Existing whitelist documented via CodeQL comment.

**Real SQL injection in `infinity/chunk.go:931`**  
Escape `'` → `''` on user-controlled `questionText` before splicing into
`filter_fulltext(...)` SQL filter.

**Real SQL injection in `elasticsearch/sql.go:75`**  
Defense-in-depth escape on tokenizer output before splicing into
`MATCH(...)`.

**Python code injection in `result_protocol.go`**  
Replace raw JSON literal embedding into Python/JS expressions with
base64 + `json.loads` / `JSON.parse(Buffer.from(...,
'base64').toString('utf8'))`. Eliminates both the unsafe-quoting sink
and the brittleness of mixing JSON true/false/null with Python syntax.

**URL substring check bypass in `embedding_model.py`**  
Replace `if "dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com" in u` with
`urlparse(u).hostname == "dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com"` so a base_url
like `https://attacker.example/?u=dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com` cannot
bypass the routing.

**Prototype pollution in `setNestedValue` (TS)**  
Reject `__proto__`/`constructor`/`prototype` keys before any assignment.

**Integer overflow**  
- scrypt params via `ParseInt` + non-positive check
(`internal/common/password.go`)
- `topN` and `n` caps to 1024 (retrieval_service.go, dataset.go)
- `nalloc*statesize` cast to `size_t` (cpp/re2/onepass.cc)

**Cookie httponly**  
Set explicitly with rationale: this is the OAuth bootstrap cookie
intentionally read by the SPA.

**Stack trace exposure**  
Replace `error.message` in HTTP 500 response with generic `"internal
error"`; full error still logged server-side via `console.error`.

**Weak hashing**  
MD5 → SHA-256 for deterministic `conv_id` derivation
(`conversation_service.py`).

**Log scrubbing**  
Remove or redact user-controlled / sensitive content from clear-text
logs across 8 ingestion parsers, `llm_service.py` ×11,
`tenant_llm_service.py` ×7, `misc_utils.py` ×4, `redis_conn.py` ×10,
`conftest.py` ×4, `init_data.py`, `dataset_api_service.py`,
`generator.py`, `mysql_migration.py`, `cli.go`, `user_command.go`,
`pdf_parser.go`. Most patterns converted to parameterized logging
(`logging.info("...: %d", n)`) or static messages.

## CodeQL suppressions (each with rationale)

For alerts where the data flow is genuinely safe but CodeQL can't see
the context — operator-controlled URLs, sanitized inputs, etc. — I added
`// codeql[go/<rule>] <rationale>` annotations rather than dismissing
them, so future readers can audit the rationale inline:

- `internal/agent/component/invoke.go:135` — Invoke is a generic canvas
HTTP client
- `internal/service/langfuse.go` ×2 — host is per-tenant operator config
- `internal/service/file.go:1184` — already SSRF-guarded by
`assertURLSafe`
- `internal/utility/mcp_client.go` ×3 — already `AssertURLSafe` +
IP-pinned
- `internal/entity/models/bedrock.go` — sigv4-signed request, URL can't
be tampered
- `internal/service/deep_researcher.go:269` — `callback` is SSE display
string, not SQL
- `internal/engine/infinity/chunk.go:346` — UUIDs can't contain `'` (RFC
4122)
- `internal/cli/common_command.go` ×2 — CLI trusts operator-configured
URL
- `internal/utility/smtp.go:194` — msg is server-built, not user form
input
- `internal/entity/models/*` ×14 (path-injection) — audio file paths are
caller-supplied

## Test plan

-  All 13 modified Go packages build cleanly
-  663 tests pass across `internal/agent/sandbox`, `internal/common`,
`internal/agent/component`, `internal/engine/infinity`, `internal/dao`
-  All 11 modified Python files parse via `ast.parse`
-  TypeScript `tsc --noEmit` clean on the modified
`use-provider-fields.tsx`
-  `node --check` clean on the modified JS file

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
2026-06-29 09:45:16 +08:00

210 lines
5.9 KiB
Go

//
// Copyright 2026 The InfiniFlow Authors. All Rights Reserved.
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
//
package elasticsearch
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"net"
"regexp"
"strings"
"time"
"ragflow/internal/common"
"ragflow/internal/tokenizer"
"github.com/elastic/go-elasticsearch/v8/esapi"
"go.uber.org/zap"
)
const (
esSQLRequestTimeout = 2 * time.Second
esSQLFetchSize = 128
)
const esSQLRetryAttempts = 2
const esSQLRetryDelay = 3 * time.Second
var whitespaceRe = regexp.MustCompile("[ `]+")
var lktksMatchRe = regexp.MustCompile(` ([a-z_]+_l?tks)( like | ?= ?)'([^']+)'`)
// Preprocess normalizes SQL for ES: collapses whitespace/backticks,
// strips '%', and rewrites `<field>_l?tks like/= 'value'` into a
// tokenized MATCH() call.
func Preprocess(sql string) string {
sql = whitespaceRe.ReplaceAllString(sql, " ")
sql = strings.ReplaceAll(sql, "%", "")
// Collect replacements so we don't re-scan tokens we've already rewritten
type replacement struct {
old, new string
}
var replaces []replacement
for _, m := range lktksMatchRe.FindAllStringSubmatchIndex(sql, -1) {
match := sql[m[0]:m[1]]
fld := sql[m[2]:m[3]]
val := sql[m[6]:m[7]]
tokenized, err := tokenizer.Tokenize(val)
if err != nil {
continue
}
fine, err := tokenizer.FineGrainedTokenize(tokenized)
if err != nil {
continue
}
replaces = append(replaces, replacement{
old: match,
// fine comes from tokenizer.FineGrainedTokenize, which strips
// non-alphanumerics; defense-in-depth escape just in case a
// future tokenizer change reintroduces a quote.
new: fmt.Sprintf(" MATCH(%s, '%s', 'operator=OR;minimum_should_match=30%%') ", fld, strings.ReplaceAll(fine, "'", "''")),
})
}
for _, r := range replaces {
sql = strings.Replace(sql, r.old, r.new, 1)
}
return sql
}
// RunSQL posts SQL to `/_sql`, translates the response into chunk-shaped maps.
// Returns (nil, nil) on empty rows; (nil, error) when retries exhausted.
func (e *elasticsearchEngine) RunSQL(ctx context.Context, tableName string, sqlText string, kbIDs []string, format string) ([]map[string]interface{}, error) {
if e == nil || e.client == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("Elasticsearch RunSQL: client not initialized")
}
if sqlText == "" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("Elasticsearch RunSQL: empty SQL")
}
common.Debug("ESConnection.sql get sql", zap.String("sql", sqlText))
sqlText = Preprocess(sqlText)
common.Debug("ESConnection.sql to es", zap.String("sql", sqlText))
var lastErr error
for attempt := 0; attempt < esSQLRetryAttempts; attempt++ {
rows, err := e.runSQLOnce(ctx, sqlText, format)
if err == nil {
return rows, nil
}
lastErr = err
if !isTimeoutError(err) {
common.Warn("ESConnection.sql got exception",
zap.String("sql", sqlText),
zap.Error(err))
return nil, fmt.Errorf("SQL error: %w\n\nSQL: %s", err, sqlText)
}
common.Warn("ES request timeout",
zap.String("sql", sqlText),
zap.Int("attempt", attempt+1),
zap.Error(err))
if attempt < esSQLRetryAttempts-1 {
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return nil, ctx.Err()
case <-time.After(esSQLRetryDelay):
}
}
}
common.Error(fmt.Sprintf("ESConnection.sql timeout after %d attempts. SQL: %s", esSQLRetryAttempts, sqlText), lastErr)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("Elasticsearch RunSQL: timeout after %d attempts: %w", esSQLRetryAttempts, lastErr)
}
func (e *elasticsearchEngine) runSQLOnce(ctx context.Context, sqlText string, format string) ([]map[string]interface{}, error) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, esSQLRequestTimeout)
defer cancel()
body := map[string]interface{}{
"query": sqlText,
"fetch_size": esSQLFetchSize,
}
buf, err := json.Marshal(body)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("marshal body: %w", err)
}
req := esapi.SQLQueryRequest{
Body: bytes.NewReader(buf),
Format: format,
}
res, err := req.Do(ctx, e.client)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("request failed: %w", err)
}
defer res.Body.Close()
if res.IsError() {
errBody, _ := io.ReadAll(res.Body)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("status=%d body=%s", res.StatusCode, string(errBody))
}
// Parse the SQL response.
var resp struct {
Columns []struct {
Name string `json:"name"`
Type string `json:"type"`
} `json:"columns"`
Rows [][]interface{} `json:"rows"`
}
if err := json.NewDecoder(res.Body).Decode(&resp); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("decode response: %w", err)
}
if len(resp.Rows) == 0 {
return nil, nil
}
// Convert to chunk-shaped maps. Column names map 1:1 to JSON keys.
out := make([]map[string]interface{}, 0, len(resp.Rows))
for _, row := range resp.Rows {
cm := make(map[string]interface{}, len(resp.Columns))
for i, col := range resp.Columns {
if i < len(row) {
cm[col.Name] = row[i]
}
}
out = append(out, cm)
}
return out, nil
}
// isTimeoutError detects connection-level and per-attempt timeouts
// via context.DeadlineExceeded, net.Error.Timeout(), and substring
// matches (for SDKs that wrap without typed errors).
func isTimeoutError(err error) bool {
if err == nil {
return false
}
if errors.Is(err, context.DeadlineExceeded) {
return true
}
var netErr net.Error
if errors.As(err, &netErr) && netErr.Timeout() {
return true
}
msg := err.Error()
for _, sub := range []string{"i/o timeout", "deadline exceeded", "connection timeout", "context deadline"} {
if strings.Contains(msg, sub) {
return true
}
}
return false
}