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ragflow/internal/dao/user_canvas.go

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//
// Copyright 2026 The InfiniFlow Authors. All Rights Reserved.
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
//
package dao
import (
feat(agent): Go port — canvas engine, 22 components, DSL v2, 13 endpoints (#15952) Ports the agent canvas subsystem from Python to Go. ## What's included ### Canvas Engine (Phase 0/1) - State engine, scheduler, variable resolver, Redis checkpoint store, cancel protocol - **209 tests** across canvas / component / io packages ### 22 Components (P0–P4) | Tier | Components | |---|---| | P0 T1+T2+T3 | LLM, Agent, ExitLoop, Switch, Categorize, Begin, Message, Invoke | | P1 T3 | VariableAggregator, VariableAssigner, StringTransform, ListOperations, DataOperations | | P2 T3 | Iteration, IterationItem, Loop, LoopItem | | P3 T3 | UserFillUp, Fillup | | P4 T5 | Browser, ExcelProcessor, DocsGenerator | ### DSL v2 Schema (Phase 2.5) - Typed v2 in-memory model with v1-to-v2 auto-detect converter - v1 legacy field stripping per plan §2.11.7 ### HTTP Endpoints & Bug Fixes (Plans PR1–PR3) - **DELETE SQL bug fix**: gorm v2 `Where("id = ?", id).Delete(...)` pattern - **CreateAgent validation**: title/DSL required, duplicate check, 103 envelope - **13 new endpoints**: templates, prompts, tags, sessions CRUD, chat/completions (SSE + non-stream stubs), rerun, test_db_connection, logs, webhook/logs - **756 Go unit tests** (745 → 756, +18) - **17 → 0 Python integration test failures** (test_agents.py + test_session_management/) ### Tools 21 eino tools: HTTPHelper, search tools, financial/data tools, mandatory stubs ### Infrastructure OTel observability, NATS message queue, DeepDoc gRPC client, SSRF guards, IDOR mitigation
2026-06-12 22:58:28 +08:00
"errors"
"regexp"
"strings"
feat(agent): Go port — canvas engine, 22 components, DSL v2, 13 endpoints (#15952) Ports the agent canvas subsystem from Python to Go. ## What's included ### Canvas Engine (Phase 0/1) - State engine, scheduler, variable resolver, Redis checkpoint store, cancel protocol - **209 tests** across canvas / component / io packages ### 22 Components (P0–P4) | Tier | Components | |---|---| | P0 T1+T2+T3 | LLM, Agent, ExitLoop, Switch, Categorize, Begin, Message, Invoke | | P1 T3 | VariableAggregator, VariableAssigner, StringTransform, ListOperations, DataOperations | | P2 T3 | Iteration, IterationItem, Loop, LoopItem | | P3 T3 | UserFillUp, Fillup | | P4 T5 | Browser, ExcelProcessor, DocsGenerator | ### DSL v2 Schema (Phase 2.5) - Typed v2 in-memory model with v1-to-v2 auto-detect converter - v1 legacy field stripping per plan §2.11.7 ### HTTP Endpoints & Bug Fixes (Plans PR1–PR3) - **DELETE SQL bug fix**: gorm v2 `Where("id = ?", id).Delete(...)` pattern - **CreateAgent validation**: title/DSL required, duplicate check, 103 envelope - **13 new endpoints**: templates, prompts, tags, sessions CRUD, chat/completions (SSE + non-stream stubs), rerun, test_db_connection, logs, webhook/logs - **756 Go unit tests** (745 → 756, +18) - **17 → 0 Python integration test failures** (test_agents.py + test_session_management/) ### Tools 21 eino tools: HTTPHelper, search tools, financial/data tools, mandatory stubs ### Infrastructure OTel observability, NATS message queue, DeepDoc gRPC client, SSRF guards, IDOR mitigation
2026-06-12 22:58:28 +08:00
"gorm.io/gorm"
"ragflow/internal/entity"
)
feat(agent): Go port — canvas engine, 22 components, DSL v2, 13 endpoints (#15952) Ports the agent canvas subsystem from Python to Go. ## What's included ### Canvas Engine (Phase 0/1) - State engine, scheduler, variable resolver, Redis checkpoint store, cancel protocol - **209 tests** across canvas / component / io packages ### 22 Components (P0–P4) | Tier | Components | |---|---| | P0 T1+T2+T3 | LLM, Agent, ExitLoop, Switch, Categorize, Begin, Message, Invoke | | P1 T3 | VariableAggregator, VariableAssigner, StringTransform, ListOperations, DataOperations | | P2 T3 | Iteration, IterationItem, Loop, LoopItem | | P3 T3 | UserFillUp, Fillup | | P4 T5 | Browser, ExcelProcessor, DocsGenerator | ### DSL v2 Schema (Phase 2.5) - Typed v2 in-memory model with v1-to-v2 auto-detect converter - v1 legacy field stripping per plan §2.11.7 ### HTTP Endpoints & Bug Fixes (Plans PR1–PR3) - **DELETE SQL bug fix**: gorm v2 `Where("id = ?", id).Delete(...)` pattern - **CreateAgent validation**: title/DSL required, duplicate check, 103 envelope - **13 new endpoints**: templates, prompts, tags, sessions CRUD, chat/completions (SSE + non-stream stubs), rerun, test_db_connection, logs, webhook/logs - **756 Go unit tests** (745 → 756, +18) - **17 → 0 Python integration test failures** (test_agents.py + test_session_management/) ### Tools 21 eino tools: HTTPHelper, search tools, financial/data tools, mandatory stubs ### Infrastructure OTel observability, NATS message queue, DeepDoc gRPC client, SSRF guards, IDOR mitigation
2026-06-12 22:58:28 +08:00
// ErrUserCanvasNotFound is returned by GetByIDForUser when the canvas is
// missing or the caller has no read access. We deliberately do not
// distinguish "missing" from "forbidden" so the response cannot be used
// to enumerate other users' canvas ids — see plan §4.8 (IDOR mitigation).
fix(security): address 93 CodeQL code-scanning alerts across 61 files (#16407) ## Summary Resolves all 93 open alerts at https://github.com/infiniflow/ragflow/security/code-scanning by rule: | Rule | Count | Treatment | |------|-------|-----------| | py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data | 23 | Real fix — log scrubbing | | go/path-injection | 15 | Real fix where possible, suppression with rationale | | go/request-forgery | 8 | Suppression with rationale (operator-controlled URLs) | | go/clear-text-logging | 10 | Real fix — log scrubbing | | go/unsafe-quoting | 5 | Real fix — escape or refactor | | go/sql-injection | 3 | Real fix — orderby whitelist + CodeQL comment | | go/uncontrolled-allocation-size | 2 | Real fix — cap to 1024 | | go/incorrect-integer-conversion | 3 | Real fix — ParseInt + range check | | go/insecure-hostkeycallback | 1 | Real fix — known_hosts file | | go/disabled-certificate-check | 2 | Suppression with rationale | | go/command-injection | 1 | Suppression (sanitized via shq()) | | go/email-injection | 1 | Suppression with rationale | | go/cookie-httponly-not-set | 1 | Suppression (SPA bootstrap) | | js/stack-trace-exposure | 1 | Real fix — generic client message | | js/prototype-pollution-utility | 1 | Real fix — reject __proto__/constructor/prototype | | py/weak-sensitive-data-hashing | 1 | Real fix — MD5 → SHA-256 | | py/incomplete-url-substring-sanitization | 3 | Real fix — urlparse(hostname) | | py/paramiko-missing-host-key-validation | 1 | Real fix — load_system_host_keys + RejectPolicy | | cpp/integer-multiplication-cast-to-long | 2 | Real fix — cast to size_t | ## Real fixes (with measurable security improvement) **SSH host key verification (Go + Python)** Replace `InsecureIgnoreHostKey()` / `paramiko.AutoAddPolicy()` with proper host key verification against a known_hosts file (configurable via `SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS` env / `known_hosts` config field; fail-closed when unset). Loads `~/.ssh/known_hosts` first via `load_system_host_keys()` so existing setups keep working. **SQL injection in `user_canvas`** Add `userCanvasOrderableColumns` whitelist + `userCanvasOrderClause` helper. Both `GetList()` and `ListByTenantIDs()` now route the user-supplied `orderby` query param through the helper, defaulting to `create_time` on miss. **SQL injection in `pipeline_operation_log`** Existing whitelist documented via CodeQL comment. **Real SQL injection in `infinity/chunk.go:931`** Escape `'` → `''` on user-controlled `questionText` before splicing into `filter_fulltext(...)` SQL filter. **Real SQL injection in `elasticsearch/sql.go:75`** Defense-in-depth escape on tokenizer output before splicing into `MATCH(...)`. **Python code injection in `result_protocol.go`** Replace raw JSON literal embedding into Python/JS expressions with base64 + `json.loads` / `JSON.parse(Buffer.from(..., 'base64').toString('utf8'))`. Eliminates both the unsafe-quoting sink and the brittleness of mixing JSON true/false/null with Python syntax. **URL substring check bypass in `embedding_model.py`** Replace `if "dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com" in u` with `urlparse(u).hostname == "dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com"` so a base_url like `https://attacker.example/?u=dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com` cannot bypass the routing. **Prototype pollution in `setNestedValue` (TS)** Reject `__proto__`/`constructor`/`prototype` keys before any assignment. **Integer overflow** - scrypt params via `ParseInt` + non-positive check (`internal/common/password.go`) - `topN` and `n` caps to 1024 (retrieval_service.go, dataset.go) - `nalloc*statesize` cast to `size_t` (cpp/re2/onepass.cc) **Cookie httponly** Set explicitly with rationale: this is the OAuth bootstrap cookie intentionally read by the SPA. **Stack trace exposure** Replace `error.message` in HTTP 500 response with generic `"internal error"`; full error still logged server-side via `console.error`. **Weak hashing** MD5 → SHA-256 for deterministic `conv_id` derivation (`conversation_service.py`). **Log scrubbing** Remove or redact user-controlled / sensitive content from clear-text logs across 8 ingestion parsers, `llm_service.py` ×11, `tenant_llm_service.py` ×7, `misc_utils.py` ×4, `redis_conn.py` ×10, `conftest.py` ×4, `init_data.py`, `dataset_api_service.py`, `generator.py`, `mysql_migration.py`, `cli.go`, `user_command.go`, `pdf_parser.go`. Most patterns converted to parameterized logging (`logging.info("...: %d", n)`) or static messages. ## CodeQL suppressions (each with rationale) For alerts where the data flow is genuinely safe but CodeQL can't see the context — operator-controlled URLs, sanitized inputs, etc. — I added `// codeql[go/<rule>] <rationale>` annotations rather than dismissing them, so future readers can audit the rationale inline: - `internal/agent/component/invoke.go:135` — Invoke is a generic canvas HTTP client - `internal/service/langfuse.go` ×2 — host is per-tenant operator config - `internal/service/file.go:1184` — already SSRF-guarded by `assertURLSafe` - `internal/utility/mcp_client.go` ×3 — already `AssertURLSafe` + IP-pinned - `internal/entity/models/bedrock.go` — sigv4-signed request, URL can't be tampered - `internal/service/deep_researcher.go:269` — `callback` is SSE display string, not SQL - `internal/engine/infinity/chunk.go:346` — UUIDs can't contain `'` (RFC 4122) - `internal/cli/common_command.go` ×2 — CLI trusts operator-configured URL - `internal/utility/smtp.go:194` — msg is server-built, not user form input - `internal/entity/models/*` ×14 (path-injection) — audio file paths are caller-supplied ## Test plan - ✅ All 13 modified Go packages build cleanly - ✅ 663 tests pass across `internal/agent/sandbox`, `internal/common`, `internal/agent/component`, `internal/engine/infinity`, `internal/dao` - ✅ All 11 modified Python files parse via `ast.parse` - ✅ TypeScript `tsc --noEmit` clean on the modified `use-provider-fields.tsx` - ✅ `node --check` clean on the modified JS file 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
2026-06-27 19:48:29 +08:00
// userCanvasOrderableColumns whitelists the columns that may appear in an
// ORDER BY clause. Keeps user-supplied `orderby` query params from being
// spliced straight into SQL.
var userCanvasOrderableColumns = map[string]struct{}{
"id": {},
"user_id": {},
"title": {},
"permission": {},
"canvas_type": {},
"canvas_category": {},
"create_time": {},
"create_date": {},
"update_time": {},
"update_date": {},
}
func userCanvasOrderClause(orderby string, desc bool) string {
if _, ok := userCanvasOrderableColumns[orderby]; !ok {
orderby = "create_time"
}
if desc {
return orderby + " DESC"
}
return orderby + " ASC"
}
func userCanvasQualifiedOrderClause(orderby string, desc bool) string {
if _, ok := userCanvasOrderableColumns[orderby]; !ok {
orderby = "create_time"
}
order := "user_canvas." + orderby
if desc {
return order + " DESC"
}
return order + " ASC"
}
func escapeSQLLike(s string) string {
replacer := strings.NewReplacer(`\`, `\\`, `%`, `\%`, `_`, `\_`)
return replacer.Replace(s)
}
func splitUserCanvasTags(raw string) []string {
parts := strings.Split(raw, ",")
tags := make([]string, 0, len(parts))
for _, tag := range parts {
tag = strings.TrimSpace(tag)
if tag != "" {
tags = append(tags, tag)
}
}
return tags
}
func applyUserCanvasTagFilter(query *gorm.DB, tags []string) *gorm.DB {
if len(tags) == 0 {
return query
}
tagQuery := DB.Session(&gorm.Session{NewDB: true})
hasTag := false
for _, tag := range tags {
tag = strings.TrimSpace(tag)
if tag == "" {
continue
}
pattern := "(^|,)[[:space:]]*" + regexp.QuoteMeta(tag) + "[[:space:]]*(,|$)"
cond := DB.Where("user_canvas.tags REGEXP ?", pattern)
if !hasTag {
tagQuery = tagQuery.Where(cond)
hasTag = true
} else {
tagQuery = tagQuery.Or(cond)
}
}
if !hasTag {
return query
}
return query.Where(tagQuery)
}
feat(agent): Go port — canvas engine, 22 components, DSL v2, 13 endpoints (#15952) Ports the agent canvas subsystem from Python to Go. ## What's included ### Canvas Engine (Phase 0/1) - State engine, scheduler, variable resolver, Redis checkpoint store, cancel protocol - **209 tests** across canvas / component / io packages ### 22 Components (P0–P4) | Tier | Components | |---|---| | P0 T1+T2+T3 | LLM, Agent, ExitLoop, Switch, Categorize, Begin, Message, Invoke | | P1 T3 | VariableAggregator, VariableAssigner, StringTransform, ListOperations, DataOperations | | P2 T3 | Iteration, IterationItem, Loop, LoopItem | | P3 T3 | UserFillUp, Fillup | | P4 T5 | Browser, ExcelProcessor, DocsGenerator | ### DSL v2 Schema (Phase 2.5) - Typed v2 in-memory model with v1-to-v2 auto-detect converter - v1 legacy field stripping per plan §2.11.7 ### HTTP Endpoints & Bug Fixes (Plans PR1–PR3) - **DELETE SQL bug fix**: gorm v2 `Where("id = ?", id).Delete(...)` pattern - **CreateAgent validation**: title/DSL required, duplicate check, 103 envelope - **13 new endpoints**: templates, prompts, tags, sessions CRUD, chat/completions (SSE + non-stream stubs), rerun, test_db_connection, logs, webhook/logs - **756 Go unit tests** (745 → 756, +18) - **17 → 0 Python integration test failures** (test_agents.py + test_session_management/) ### Tools 21 eino tools: HTTPHelper, search tools, financial/data tools, mandatory stubs ### Infrastructure OTel observability, NATS message queue, DeepDoc gRPC client, SSRF guards, IDOR mitigation
2026-06-12 22:58:28 +08:00
var ErrUserCanvasNotFound = errors.New("user_canvas: not found or access denied")
// UserCanvasDAO user canvas data access object
type UserCanvasDAO struct{}
// NewUserCanvasDAO create user canvas DAO
func NewUserCanvasDAO() *UserCanvasDAO {
return &UserCanvasDAO{}
}
// Create user canvas
func (dao *UserCanvasDAO) Create(userCanvas *entity.UserCanvas) error {
return DB.Create(userCanvas).Error
}
// GetByID get user canvas by ID
func (dao *UserCanvasDAO) GetByID(id string) (*entity.UserCanvas, error) {
var canvas entity.UserCanvas
err := DB.Where("id = ?", id).First(&canvas).Error
if err != nil {
feat(agent): Go port — canvas engine, 22 components, DSL v2, 13 endpoints (#15952) Ports the agent canvas subsystem from Python to Go. ## What's included ### Canvas Engine (Phase 0/1) - State engine, scheduler, variable resolver, Redis checkpoint store, cancel protocol - **209 tests** across canvas / component / io packages ### 22 Components (P0–P4) | Tier | Components | |---|---| | P0 T1+T2+T3 | LLM, Agent, ExitLoop, Switch, Categorize, Begin, Message, Invoke | | P1 T3 | VariableAggregator, VariableAssigner, StringTransform, ListOperations, DataOperations | | P2 T3 | Iteration, IterationItem, Loop, LoopItem | | P3 T3 | UserFillUp, Fillup | | P4 T5 | Browser, ExcelProcessor, DocsGenerator | ### DSL v2 Schema (Phase 2.5) - Typed v2 in-memory model with v1-to-v2 auto-detect converter - v1 legacy field stripping per plan §2.11.7 ### HTTP Endpoints & Bug Fixes (Plans PR1–PR3) - **DELETE SQL bug fix**: gorm v2 `Where("id = ?", id).Delete(...)` pattern - **CreateAgent validation**: title/DSL required, duplicate check, 103 envelope - **13 new endpoints**: templates, prompts, tags, sessions CRUD, chat/completions (SSE + non-stream stubs), rerun, test_db_connection, logs, webhook/logs - **756 Go unit tests** (745 → 756, +18) - **17 → 0 Python integration test failures** (test_agents.py + test_session_management/) ### Tools 21 eino tools: HTTPHelper, search tools, financial/data tools, mandatory stubs ### Infrastructure OTel observability, NATS message queue, DeepDoc gRPC client, SSRF guards, IDOR mitigation
2026-06-12 22:58:28 +08:00
if errors.Is(err, gorm.ErrRecordNotFound) {
return nil, ErrUserCanvasNotFound
}
return nil, err
}
return &canvas, nil
}
// GetByIDForUser fetches a canvas and enforces ownership visibility:
//
// - canvases with permission="me" or owned by the requesting user are
// always returned;
// - canvases with permission="team" are returned when the canvas owner
// is a tenant the requesting user belongs to (the team membership
// predicate mirrors user_canvas.ListByTenantIDs).
//
// Any other case — missing row, foreign private canvas, foreign team
// canvas — yields ErrUserCanvasNotFound. The single error type stops
// callers from leaking "exists but not yours" vs "doesn't exist" via the
// HTTP status code.
func (dao *UserCanvasDAO) GetByIDForUser(canvasID, userID string, tenantIDs []string) (*entity.UserCanvas, error) {
if canvasID == "" {
return nil, ErrUserCanvasNotFound
}
if userID == "" {
return nil, ErrUserCanvasNotFound
}
// owner=userID is allowed regardless of permission, matching the
// ListByTenantIDs predicate used by GET /api/v1/agents.
ownerOrTeam := DB.Where("user_id = ?", userID)
if len(tenantIDs) > 0 {
ownerOrTeam = ownerOrTeam.Or(
"user_id IN ? AND permission = ?", tenantIDs, "team",
)
}
var canvas entity.UserCanvas
err := DB.Where("id = ?", canvasID).Where(ownerOrTeam).First(&canvas).Error
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, gorm.ErrRecordNotFound) {
return nil, ErrUserCanvasNotFound
}
return nil, err
}
return &canvas, nil
}
// Update update user canvas
func (dao *UserCanvasDAO) Update(userCanvas *entity.UserCanvas) error {
return DB.Save(userCanvas).Error
}
// Accessible reports whether canvasID is reachable by userID under
// the same owner-or-team rule used by GetByIDForUser. Used by
// downstream authorization gates (e.g. the sandbox-artifact
// download endpoint introduced by PR #16169) to confirm a caller
// may reach a given canvas before exposing its runtime artifacts.
// Returns false on any error (not found, DB failure, or empty
// inputs) so callers can treat a denial as a 404-equivalent and
// avoid leaking whether the canvas exists at all.
//
// Tenant scoping (PR review round 5, security review #1): unlike
// the previous form, a `permission = "team"` canvas is only
// reachable when userID is a member of one of the owner's tenants.
// Passing a nil/empty tenantIDs list effectively disables the
// team-canvas branch (no team canvas can match), which is the
// safe default — a caller that forgot to plumb the tenant list
// cannot accidentally bypass team-membership scoping.
//
// Callers that don't have a tenant list handy (rare; most
// handlers derive it from the user context) should call
// GetTenantIDsByUserID first and pass the result.
func (dao *UserCanvasDAO) Accessible(canvasID, userID string, tenantIDs []string) bool {
if canvasID == "" || userID == "" {
return false
}
// Owner can always access their own canvas regardless of permission.
// Team-permission canvases are reachable only when the caller is a
// member of one of the owner's tenants — mirrors the predicate in
// GetByIDForUser / ListByTenantIDs.
ownerOrTeam := DB.Where("user_id = ?", userID)
if len(tenantIDs) > 0 {
ownerOrTeam = ownerOrTeam.Or(
"user_id IN ? AND permission = ?", tenantIDs, "team",
)
}
var canvas entity.UserCanvas
err := DB.Select("id").
Where("id = ?", canvasID).
Where(ownerOrTeam).
First(&canvas).Error
if err != nil {
return false
}
return canvas.ID == canvasID
}
// Delete delete user canvas
func (dao *UserCanvasDAO) Delete(id string) error {
feat(agent): Go port — canvas engine, 22 components, DSL v2, 13 endpoints (#15952) Ports the agent canvas subsystem from Python to Go. ## What's included ### Canvas Engine (Phase 0/1) - State engine, scheduler, variable resolver, Redis checkpoint store, cancel protocol - **209 tests** across canvas / component / io packages ### 22 Components (P0–P4) | Tier | Components | |---|---| | P0 T1+T2+T3 | LLM, Agent, ExitLoop, Switch, Categorize, Begin, Message, Invoke | | P1 T3 | VariableAggregator, VariableAssigner, StringTransform, ListOperations, DataOperations | | P2 T3 | Iteration, IterationItem, Loop, LoopItem | | P3 T3 | UserFillUp, Fillup | | P4 T5 | Browser, ExcelProcessor, DocsGenerator | ### DSL v2 Schema (Phase 2.5) - Typed v2 in-memory model with v1-to-v2 auto-detect converter - v1 legacy field stripping per plan §2.11.7 ### HTTP Endpoints & Bug Fixes (Plans PR1–PR3) - **DELETE SQL bug fix**: gorm v2 `Where("id = ?", id).Delete(...)` pattern - **CreateAgent validation**: title/DSL required, duplicate check, 103 envelope - **13 new endpoints**: templates, prompts, tags, sessions CRUD, chat/completions (SSE + non-stream stubs), rerun, test_db_connection, logs, webhook/logs - **756 Go unit tests** (745 → 756, +18) - **17 → 0 Python integration test failures** (test_agents.py + test_session_management/) ### Tools 21 eino tools: HTTPHelper, search tools, financial/data tools, mandatory stubs ### Infrastructure OTel observability, NATS message queue, DeepDoc gRPC client, SSRF guards, IDOR mitigation
2026-06-12 22:58:28 +08:00
// gorm v2 treats the first non-int inline arg as a column name, not a
// primary-key value — passing `id` verbatim produced WHERE ID = ?
// and made MySQL complain about an unknown "AGENT_ID" column. The
// explicit Where+Delete form is the same pattern used by
// API4ConversationDAO.Delete (see api_token.go:142-144).
return DB.Where("id = ?", id).Delete(&entity.UserCanvas{}).Error
}
// UpdateTx is the transactional variant of Update. Callers wrap a sequence
// of *Tx calls in dao.DB.Transaction(func(tx *gorm.DB) error { ... }) so
// multi-step writes (e.g. publish-agent, delete-agent) are atomic.
func (dao *UserCanvasDAO) UpdateTx(tx *gorm.DB, userCanvas *entity.UserCanvas) error {
return tx.Save(userCanvas).Error
}
// DeleteTx is the transactional variant of Delete. The canvas must
// already be loaded and access-checked by the caller.
func (dao *UserCanvasDAO) DeleteTx(tx *gorm.DB, id string) error {
// See Delete() above for the rationale on Where("id = ?", id).
return tx.Where("id = ?", id).Delete(&entity.UserCanvas{}).Error
}
// GetByUserAndTitle returns the canvas matching user_id + title (and
// optional canvas_category), or (nil, nil) when no such canvas exists.
// Used by service.AgentService.CreateAgent to enforce the "title
// already exists" rule that the Python agent API mirrors with
// UserCanvasService.query(user_id=..., title=...).
func (dao *UserCanvasDAO) GetByUserAndTitle(userID, title, canvasCategory string) (*entity.UserCanvas, error) {
q := DB.Where("user_id = ? AND title = ?", userID, title)
if canvasCategory != "" {
q = q.Where("canvas_category = ?", canvasCategory)
}
var row entity.UserCanvas
if err := q.First(&row).Error; err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, gorm.ErrRecordNotFound) {
return nil, nil
}
return nil, err
}
return &row, nil
}
// GetList get canvases list with pagination and filtering
// Similar to Python UserCanvasService.get_list
func (dao *UserCanvasDAO) GetList(tenantID string, pageNumber, itemsPerPage int, orderby string, desc bool, id, title string, canvasCategory, canvasType string) ([]*entity.UserCanvas, error) {
query := DB.Model(&entity.UserCanvas{}).
Where("user_id = ?", tenantID)
if id != "" {
query = query.Where("id = ?", id)
}
if title != "" {
query = query.Where("title = ?", title)
}
if canvasCategory != "" {
query = query.Where("canvas_category = ?", canvasCategory)
}
if canvasType != "" {
query = query.Where("canvas_type = ?", canvasType)
}
// Order by
fix(security): address 93 CodeQL code-scanning alerts across 61 files (#16407) ## Summary Resolves all 93 open alerts at https://github.com/infiniflow/ragflow/security/code-scanning by rule: | Rule | Count | Treatment | |------|-------|-----------| | py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data | 23 | Real fix — log scrubbing | | go/path-injection | 15 | Real fix where possible, suppression with rationale | | go/request-forgery | 8 | Suppression with rationale (operator-controlled URLs) | | go/clear-text-logging | 10 | Real fix — log scrubbing | | go/unsafe-quoting | 5 | Real fix — escape or refactor | | go/sql-injection | 3 | Real fix — orderby whitelist + CodeQL comment | | go/uncontrolled-allocation-size | 2 | Real fix — cap to 1024 | | go/incorrect-integer-conversion | 3 | Real fix — ParseInt + range check | | go/insecure-hostkeycallback | 1 | Real fix — known_hosts file | | go/disabled-certificate-check | 2 | Suppression with rationale | | go/command-injection | 1 | Suppression (sanitized via shq()) | | go/email-injection | 1 | Suppression with rationale | | go/cookie-httponly-not-set | 1 | Suppression (SPA bootstrap) | | js/stack-trace-exposure | 1 | Real fix — generic client message | | js/prototype-pollution-utility | 1 | Real fix — reject __proto__/constructor/prototype | | py/weak-sensitive-data-hashing | 1 | Real fix — MD5 → SHA-256 | | py/incomplete-url-substring-sanitization | 3 | Real fix — urlparse(hostname) | | py/paramiko-missing-host-key-validation | 1 | Real fix — load_system_host_keys + RejectPolicy | | cpp/integer-multiplication-cast-to-long | 2 | Real fix — cast to size_t | ## Real fixes (with measurable security improvement) **SSH host key verification (Go + Python)** Replace `InsecureIgnoreHostKey()` / `paramiko.AutoAddPolicy()` with proper host key verification against a known_hosts file (configurable via `SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS` env / `known_hosts` config field; fail-closed when unset). Loads `~/.ssh/known_hosts` first via `load_system_host_keys()` so existing setups keep working. **SQL injection in `user_canvas`** Add `userCanvasOrderableColumns` whitelist + `userCanvasOrderClause` helper. Both `GetList()` and `ListByTenantIDs()` now route the user-supplied `orderby` query param through the helper, defaulting to `create_time` on miss. **SQL injection in `pipeline_operation_log`** Existing whitelist documented via CodeQL comment. **Real SQL injection in `infinity/chunk.go:931`** Escape `'` → `''` on user-controlled `questionText` before splicing into `filter_fulltext(...)` SQL filter. **Real SQL injection in `elasticsearch/sql.go:75`** Defense-in-depth escape on tokenizer output before splicing into `MATCH(...)`. **Python code injection in `result_protocol.go`** Replace raw JSON literal embedding into Python/JS expressions with base64 + `json.loads` / `JSON.parse(Buffer.from(..., 'base64').toString('utf8'))`. Eliminates both the unsafe-quoting sink and the brittleness of mixing JSON true/false/null with Python syntax. **URL substring check bypass in `embedding_model.py`** Replace `if "dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com" in u` with `urlparse(u).hostname == "dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com"` so a base_url like `https://attacker.example/?u=dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com` cannot bypass the routing. **Prototype pollution in `setNestedValue` (TS)** Reject `__proto__`/`constructor`/`prototype` keys before any assignment. **Integer overflow** - scrypt params via `ParseInt` + non-positive check (`internal/common/password.go`) - `topN` and `n` caps to 1024 (retrieval_service.go, dataset.go) - `nalloc*statesize` cast to `size_t` (cpp/re2/onepass.cc) **Cookie httponly** Set explicitly with rationale: this is the OAuth bootstrap cookie intentionally read by the SPA. **Stack trace exposure** Replace `error.message` in HTTP 500 response with generic `"internal error"`; full error still logged server-side via `console.error`. **Weak hashing** MD5 → SHA-256 for deterministic `conv_id` derivation (`conversation_service.py`). **Log scrubbing** Remove or redact user-controlled / sensitive content from clear-text logs across 8 ingestion parsers, `llm_service.py` ×11, `tenant_llm_service.py` ×7, `misc_utils.py` ×4, `redis_conn.py` ×10, `conftest.py` ×4, `init_data.py`, `dataset_api_service.py`, `generator.py`, `mysql_migration.py`, `cli.go`, `user_command.go`, `pdf_parser.go`. Most patterns converted to parameterized logging (`logging.info("...: %d", n)`) or static messages. ## CodeQL suppressions (each with rationale) For alerts where the data flow is genuinely safe but CodeQL can't see the context — operator-controlled URLs, sanitized inputs, etc. — I added `// codeql[go/<rule>] <rationale>` annotations rather than dismissing them, so future readers can audit the rationale inline: - `internal/agent/component/invoke.go:135` — Invoke is a generic canvas HTTP client - `internal/service/langfuse.go` ×2 — host is per-tenant operator config - `internal/service/file.go:1184` — already SSRF-guarded by `assertURLSafe` - `internal/utility/mcp_client.go` ×3 — already `AssertURLSafe` + IP-pinned - `internal/entity/models/bedrock.go` — sigv4-signed request, URL can't be tampered - `internal/service/deep_researcher.go:269` — `callback` is SSE display string, not SQL - `internal/engine/infinity/chunk.go:346` — UUIDs can't contain `'` (RFC 4122) - `internal/cli/common_command.go` ×2 — CLI trusts operator-configured URL - `internal/utility/smtp.go:194` — msg is server-built, not user form input - `internal/entity/models/*` ×14 (path-injection) — audio file paths are caller-supplied ## Test plan - ✅ All 13 modified Go packages build cleanly - ✅ 663 tests pass across `internal/agent/sandbox`, `internal/common`, `internal/agent/component`, `internal/engine/infinity`, `internal/dao` - ✅ All 11 modified Python files parse via `ast.parse` - ✅ TypeScript `tsc --noEmit` clean on the modified `use-provider-fields.tsx` - ✅ `node --check` clean on the modified JS file 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
2026-06-27 19:48:29 +08:00
// Route orderby through userCanvasOrderClause above so user-supplied
// query params can never reach Order() verbatim. The helper validates
// against userCanvasOrderableColumns (a closed allowlist) and falls
// back to "create_time" on any miss, so the string spliced into the
// SQL fragment is always one of a fixed set of column names.
query = query.Order(userCanvasOrderClause(orderby, desc))
// Pagination
if pageNumber > 0 && itemsPerPage > 0 {
offset := (pageNumber - 1) * itemsPerPage
query = query.Offset(offset).Limit(itemsPerPage)
}
var canvases []*entity.UserCanvas
err := query.Find(&canvases).Error
return canvases, err
}
// GetAllCanvasesByTenantIDs get all permitted canvases by tenant IDs
// Similar to Python UserCanvasService.get_all_agents_by_tenant_ids
func (dao *UserCanvasDAO) GetAllCanvasesByTenantIDs(tenantIDs []string, userID string) ([]*CanvasBasicInfo, error) {
query := DB.Model(&entity.UserCanvas{}).
Select("id, avatar, title, permission, canvas_type, canvas_category").
Where("user_id IN (?) AND permission = ?", tenantIDs, "team").
Or("user_id = ?", userID).
Order("create_time ASC")
var results []*CanvasBasicInfo
err := query.Scan(&results).Error
return results, err
}
// UserCanvasListItem is the joined row returned by ListByTenantIDs.
type UserCanvasListItem struct {
ID string `gorm:"column:id"`
Avatar *string `gorm:"column:avatar"`
Title *string `gorm:"column:title"`
Description *string `gorm:"column:description"`
Permission string `gorm:"column:permission"`
UserID string `gorm:"column:user_id"`
TenantID string `gorm:"column:tenant_id"`
Nickname *string `gorm:"column:nickname"`
TenantAvatar *string `gorm:"column:tenant_avatar"`
CanvasType *string `gorm:"column:canvas_type"`
CanvasCategory string `gorm:"column:canvas_category"`
Tags string `gorm:"column:tags"`
CreateTime *int64 `gorm:"column:create_time"`
UpdateTime *int64 `gorm:"column:update_time"`
}
// ListByTenantIDs lists agent canvases accessible to the given owner IDs with optional
// keyword filter, tag filter, pagination, and ordering.
// Mirrors Python UserCanvasService.get_by_tenant_ids (list route only).
func (dao *UserCanvasDAO) ListByTenantIDs(ownerIDs []string, userID string, page, pageSize int, orderby string, desc bool, keywords, canvasCategory, canvasType string, tags []string) ([]*UserCanvasListItem, int64, error) {
if len(ownerIDs) == 0 {
return nil, 0, nil
}
// Canvases owned by any of the ownerIDs that are "team"-permission, plus all owned by userID.
base := DB.Model(&entity.UserCanvas{}).
Select(`user_canvas.id,
user_canvas.avatar,
user_canvas.title,
user_canvas.description,
user_canvas.permission,
user_canvas.user_id,
user_canvas.user_id AS tenant_id,
user.nickname,
user.avatar AS tenant_avatar,
user_canvas.canvas_type,
user_canvas.canvas_category,
user_canvas.tags,
user_canvas.create_time,
user_canvas.update_time`).
Joins("LEFT JOIN user ON user_canvas.user_id = user.id").
Where(
DB.Where("user_canvas.user_id IN ? AND user_canvas.permission = ?", ownerIDs, "team").
Or("user_canvas.user_id = ?", userID),
"user_canvas.user_id IN ?",
ownerIDs,
).Where(
DB.Where("user_canvas.permission = ?", "team").
Or("user_canvas.user_id = ?", userID))
if canvasCategory != "" {
base = base.Where("user_canvas.canvas_category = ?", canvasCategory)
}
if canvasType != "" {
base = base.Where("canvas_type = ?", canvasType)
}
if keywords != "" {
like := "%" + keywords + "%"
base = base.Where("user_canvas.title LIKE ?", like)
}
base = applyUserCanvasTagFilter(base, tags)
var total int64
if err := base.Count(&total).Error; err != nil {
return nil, 0, err
}
order := userCanvasQualifiedOrderClause(orderby, desc)
fix(codeql): close remaining 44 CodeQL alerts post-merge (#16408) ## Summary After #16407 merged, 44 of the original 93 CodeQL alerts were still open on the default branch. This PR closes the remaining ones by: 1. **Moving 32 existing `// codeql[...]` directives** so they sit on the line **immediately before** the suppressed statement. The original multi-line suppression blocks had the directive as the first line, with the rationale on subsequent lines. After line shifts (refactors, linter reformat), the directive ended up several lines above the alert location — CodeQL only recognizes the suppression when it appears on the line directly above. (32 alerts across 27 files.) 2. **Adding 9 new `// codeql[...]` suppressions** for alerts that had no suppression in the preceding lines at all — mostly real-fixes that CodeQL conservatively still flags (filepath.Base, bounded slice sizes, model-identifier strings, the MD5-legacy-migration lookup in `conversation_service.py`). ## Files changed - `api/db/services/conversation_service.py` — add `py/weak-sensitive-data-hashing` suppression (MD5 for backward-compat legacy row lookup; not used for auth) - `api/db/services/llm_service.py` — 3× `py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data` suppressions on the lines that log `llm_name` in warnings/info - `common/misc_utils.py` — 2× `py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data` suppressions on the redacted `current_url` log sites - `internal/agent/component/invoke.go` — moved existing `go/request-forgery` directive - `internal/agent/sandbox/ssh.go` — moved existing `go/command-injection` directive - `internal/agent/tool/retrieval_service.go` — added `go/uncontrolled-allocation-size` suppression (`topN` is bounded to 1024 above) - `internal/cli/common_command.go` — moved 2× `go/disabled-certificate-check` directives - `internal/cli/user_command.go` — added `go/clear-text-logging` suppression (filepath.Base already strips user-identifying path) - `internal/dao/pipeline_operation_log.go` — moved 2× `go/sql-injection` directives - `internal/dao/user_canvas.go` — added `go/sql-injection` suppression in `GetList` (the new `userCanvasOrderClause` call path) - `internal/engine/infinity/chunk.go` — moved existing `go/unsafe-quoting` directive - `internal/entity/models/*` — moved `go/path-injection` directives (15 files) - `internal/handler/oauth_login.go` — moved existing `go/cookie-httponly-not-set` directive - `internal/handler/tenant.go` — moved existing `go/path-injection` directive - `internal/service/deep_researcher.go` — moved existing `go/unsafe-quoting` directive - `internal/service/dataset.go` — added `go/uncontrolled-allocation-size` suppression (`n` bounded to 1024 above) - `internal/service/file.go` — moved existing `go/request-forgery` directive - `internal/service/langfuse.go` — moved 2× `go/request-forgery` directives - `internal/utility/mcp_client.go` — moved 3× `go/request-forgery` directives - `internal/utility/smtp.go` — moved existing `go/email-injection` directive - `rag/prompts/generator.py` — added `py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data` suppression - `web/.../use-provider-fields.tsx` — added `js/prototype-pollution-utility` suppression (FORBIDDEN_KEYS guard is on the line above) ## Why the previous PR left alerts open `// codeql[query-id] explanation` must be on the line **immediately before** the suppressed statement per the [GitHub CodeQL suppression spec](https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/code-scanning/automatically-scanning-your-code-for-vulnerabilities-and-errors/customizing-code-scanning-with-codeql/suppressing-code-scanning-alerts). The original suppression blocks were 4-5 lines, with the directive as the **first** line. After linter reformat / line shifts, the directive ended up too far above the actual alert line to be recognized. The fix is to put the directive on the line directly above the suppressed statement, with the rationale above it. ## Test plan - All 9 modified Python files `ast.parse` clean - All 4 modified Go files `gofmt` clean - 36/44 expected alert suppressions in place - 8 remaining CodeQL alerts are the originals (#3485851828, #3485851831, #3485869759, #3485869766, #3485869768, #3485869771, #3485885962, #3485895527) which were resolved by the corresponding commit comments; these should close on the next scan when the suppression comments match the alert lines. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
2026-06-27 20:49:06 +08:00
// codeql[go/sql-injection] False positive: `order` was just derived
// from userCanvasQualifiedOrderClause above, which validates `orderby`
fix(codeql): close remaining 44 CodeQL alerts post-merge (#16408) ## Summary After #16407 merged, 44 of the original 93 CodeQL alerts were still open on the default branch. This PR closes the remaining ones by: 1. **Moving 32 existing `// codeql[...]` directives** so they sit on the line **immediately before** the suppressed statement. The original multi-line suppression blocks had the directive as the first line, with the rationale on subsequent lines. After line shifts (refactors, linter reformat), the directive ended up several lines above the alert location — CodeQL only recognizes the suppression when it appears on the line directly above. (32 alerts across 27 files.) 2. **Adding 9 new `// codeql[...]` suppressions** for alerts that had no suppression in the preceding lines at all — mostly real-fixes that CodeQL conservatively still flags (filepath.Base, bounded slice sizes, model-identifier strings, the MD5-legacy-migration lookup in `conversation_service.py`). ## Files changed - `api/db/services/conversation_service.py` — add `py/weak-sensitive-data-hashing` suppression (MD5 for backward-compat legacy row lookup; not used for auth) - `api/db/services/llm_service.py` — 3× `py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data` suppressions on the lines that log `llm_name` in warnings/info - `common/misc_utils.py` — 2× `py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data` suppressions on the redacted `current_url` log sites - `internal/agent/component/invoke.go` — moved existing `go/request-forgery` directive - `internal/agent/sandbox/ssh.go` — moved existing `go/command-injection` directive - `internal/agent/tool/retrieval_service.go` — added `go/uncontrolled-allocation-size` suppression (`topN` is bounded to 1024 above) - `internal/cli/common_command.go` — moved 2× `go/disabled-certificate-check` directives - `internal/cli/user_command.go` — added `go/clear-text-logging` suppression (filepath.Base already strips user-identifying path) - `internal/dao/pipeline_operation_log.go` — moved 2× `go/sql-injection` directives - `internal/dao/user_canvas.go` — added `go/sql-injection` suppression in `GetList` (the new `userCanvasOrderClause` call path) - `internal/engine/infinity/chunk.go` — moved existing `go/unsafe-quoting` directive - `internal/entity/models/*` — moved `go/path-injection` directives (15 files) - `internal/handler/oauth_login.go` — moved existing `go/cookie-httponly-not-set` directive - `internal/handler/tenant.go` — moved existing `go/path-injection` directive - `internal/service/deep_researcher.go` — moved existing `go/unsafe-quoting` directive - `internal/service/dataset.go` — added `go/uncontrolled-allocation-size` suppression (`n` bounded to 1024 above) - `internal/service/file.go` — moved existing `go/request-forgery` directive - `internal/service/langfuse.go` — moved 2× `go/request-forgery` directives - `internal/utility/mcp_client.go` — moved 3× `go/request-forgery` directives - `internal/utility/smtp.go` — moved existing `go/email-injection` directive - `rag/prompts/generator.py` — added `py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data` suppression - `web/.../use-provider-fields.tsx` — added `js/prototype-pollution-utility` suppression (FORBIDDEN_KEYS guard is on the line above) ## Why the previous PR left alerts open `// codeql[query-id] explanation` must be on the line **immediately before** the suppressed statement per the [GitHub CodeQL suppression spec](https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/code-scanning/automatically-scanning-your-code-for-vulnerabilities-and-errors/customizing-code-scanning-with-codeql/suppressing-code-scanning-alerts). The original suppression blocks were 4-5 lines, with the directive as the **first** line. After linter reformat / line shifts, the directive ended up too far above the actual alert line to be recognized. The fix is to put the directive on the line directly above the suppressed statement, with the rationale above it. ## Test plan - All 9 modified Python files `ast.parse` clean - All 4 modified Go files `gofmt` clean - 36/44 expected alert suppressions in place - 8 remaining CodeQL alerts are the originals (#3485851828, #3485851831, #3485869759, #3485869766, #3485869768, #3485869771, #3485885962, #3485895527) which were resolved by the corresponding commit comments; these should close on the next scan when the suppression comments match the alert lines. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
2026-06-27 20:49:06 +08:00
// against userCanvasOrderableColumns (a closed allowlist) and
// defaults to "create_time" on miss. The string spliced into
// Order() is always one of a fixed set of qualified column names.
query := base.Order(order)
if page > 0 && pageSize > 0 {
query = query.Offset((page - 1) * pageSize).Limit(pageSize)
}
var canvases []*UserCanvasListItem
if err := query.Scan(&canvases).Error; err != nil {
return nil, 0, err
}
return canvases, total, nil
}
// ListTags returns tag usage counts across canvases visible to userID.
func (dao *UserCanvasDAO) ListTags(ownerIDs []string, userID string, canvasCategory string) (map[string]int, error) {
if len(ownerIDs) == 0 {
return map[string]int{}, nil
}
query := DB.Model(&entity.UserCanvas{}).
Select("user_canvas.tags").
Where(
DB.Where("user_canvas.user_id IN ? AND user_canvas.permission = ?", ownerIDs, "team").
Or("user_canvas.user_id = ?", userID),
)
if canvasCategory != "" {
query = query.Where("user_canvas.canvas_category = ?", canvasCategory)
} else {
query = query.Where("user_canvas.canvas_category = ?", "agent_canvas")
}
var rows []struct {
Tags string `gorm:"column:tags"`
}
if err := query.Scan(&rows).Error; err != nil {
return nil, err
}
counts := make(map[string]int)
for _, row := range rows {
for _, tag := range splitUserCanvasTags(row.Tags) {
counts[tag]++
}
}
return counts, nil
}
// GetByCanvasID get user canvas by canvas ID (alias for GetByID)
func (dao *UserCanvasDAO) GetByCanvasID(canvasID string) (*entity.UserCanvas, error) {
return dao.GetByID(canvasID)
}
// CanvasBasicInfo basic canvas information for list responses
type CanvasBasicInfo struct {
ID string `gorm:"column:id" json:"id"`
Avatar *string `gorm:"column:avatar" json:"avatar,omitempty"`
Title *string `gorm:"column:title" json:"title,omitempty"`
Permission string `gorm:"column:permission" json:"permission"`
CanvasType *string `gorm:"column:canvas_type" json:"canvas_type,omitempty"`
CanvasCategory string `gorm:"column:canvas_category" json:"canvas_category"`
}
// DeleteByUserID deletes all canvases by user ID (hard delete)
func (dao *UserCanvasDAO) DeleteByUserID(userID string) (int64, error) {
result := DB.Unscoped().Where("user_id = ?", userID).Delete(&entity.UserCanvas{})
return result.RowsAffected, result.Error
}
// GetAllCanvasIDsByUserID gets all canvas IDs by user ID
func (dao *UserCanvasDAO) GetAllCanvasIDsByUserID(userID string) ([]string, error) {
var canvasIDs []string
err := DB.Model(&entity.UserCanvas{}).
Where("user_id = ?", userID).
Pluck("id", &canvasIDs).Error
return canvasIDs, err
}
// UpdateDSL updates a canvas DSL by canvas ID.
func (dao *UserCanvasDAO) UpdateDSL(canvasID string, dsl entity.JSONMap) (int64, error) {
result := DB.Model(&entity.UserCanvas{}).Where("id = ?", canvasID).Update("dsl", dsl)
return result.RowsAffected, result.Error
}
// UpdateFields updates only the supplied user_canvas columns.
func (dao *UserCanvasDAO) UpdateFields(canvasID string, fields map[string]interface{}) (int64, error) {
result := DB.Model(&entity.UserCanvas{}).Where("id = ?", canvasID).Updates(fields)
return result.RowsAffected, result.Error
}
// UpdateTags updates a canvas's comma-separated tags by canvas ID.
func (dao *UserCanvasDAO) UpdateTags(canvasID, tags string) (int64, error) {
result := DB.Model(&entity.UserCanvas{}).Where("id = ?", canvasID).Update("tags", tags)
return result.RowsAffected, result.Error
}