Commit Graph

14 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Hz_
ac5860c3e2 fix(go-pipline): list agents incorrectly filtering out ingestion pipelines (#16698) 2026-07-07 16:32:40 +08:00
Hz_
d0d0339428 fix(go): agent settings update clearing DSL (#16495)
### Summary

This PR fixes a Go backend bug where updating agent settings, such as
description, could clear the agent DSL.

Root cause:
PUT /api/v1/agents/:canvas_id only bound the dsl field in Go. When the
frontend submitted settings without dsl, the service still updated the
canvas with an empty DSL value.

Changes:

- Treat agent updates as partial patches.
- Preserve existing DSL when dsl is not present in the request.
- Update only specified user_canvas fields instead of saving the full
row.
- Add a regression test for settings updates preserving DSL.

Test:

`go test ./internal/service ./internal/handler`

Co-authored-by: Zhichang Yu <yuzhichang@gmail.com>
2026-07-02 13:41:24 +08:00
qinling0210
133b1e15fd Port agent PRs to GO (#16529)
### Summary

Port the following PRs to GO in this PR

https://github.com/infiniflow/ragflow/pull/14210
https://github.com/infiniflow/ragflow/pull/14641
https://github.com/infiniflow/ragflow/pull/15220
https://github.com/infiniflow/ragflow/pull/15228
https://github.com/infiniflow/ragflow/pull/15384
https://github.com/infiniflow/ragflow/pull/15754
https://github.com/infiniflow/ragflow/pull/16413
https://github.com/infiniflow/ragflow/pull/16483
https://github.com/infiniflow/ragflow/pull/16419
https://github.com/infiniflow/ragflow/pull/16361   
https://github.com/infiniflow/ragflow/pull/16050
2026-07-02 09:45:01 +08:00
Haruko386
9eacbb418f fix: unable to open filter in agent page(no agent tags...) (#16531)
### Summary

As title
2026-07-01 19:07:15 +08:00
Zhichang Yu
4c54cefd29 Port 14 upstream agent security / correctness fixes to Go canvas (#16455)
Mirrors 14 merged upstream PRs into the Go agent port.

PRs ported:
  - #15609 ExeSQL SSRF guard + DNS pin
  - #15436 HTTP timeout on external API tools
  - #16363 be_output restore + DeepL error path
  - #15644 switch no longer matches empty condition
  - #15374 session_id bind to path agent_id (DAO idor guard)
  - #16169 sandbox artifact ownership gate
  - #15457 tenant ownership on agentbots
  - #15145 rerun agent document access check
- #15446 thinking switch (component portion; provider policy lives in
internal/llm)
  - #15426 Invoke URL/proxy SSRF + DNS pin + no-redirects
  - #15238 agentbot thinking-logs beta endpoint
  - #14589 UserFillUp SSE event propagation
  - #14890 anonymous webhook opt-in
- #15068 PipelineChunker new component (text/file_ref/parser_id
dispatch; file-format extraction is a follow-up)

40 files, +2355 / -58 lines. 33 new tests, all targeted package suites
pass (1721 + 4 skipped); 1 pre-existing flaky test unrelated.
2026-06-30 16:28:48 +08:00
Zhichang Yu
0c3952147c fix(codeql): close remaining 44 CodeQL alerts post-merge (#16408)
## Summary

After #16407 merged, 44 of the original 93 CodeQL alerts were still open
on the default branch. This PR closes the remaining ones by:

1. **Moving 32 existing `// codeql[...]` directives** so they sit on the
line **immediately before** the suppressed statement. The original
multi-line suppression blocks had the directive as the first line, with
the rationale on subsequent lines. After line shifts (refactors, linter
reformat), the directive ended up several lines above the alert location
— CodeQL only recognizes the suppression when it appears on the line
directly above. (32 alerts across 27 files.)

2. **Adding 9 new `// codeql[...]` suppressions** for alerts that had no
suppression in the preceding lines at all — mostly real-fixes that
CodeQL conservatively still flags (filepath.Base, bounded slice sizes,
model-identifier strings, the MD5-legacy-migration lookup in
`conversation_service.py`).

## Files changed

- `api/db/services/conversation_service.py` — add
`py/weak-sensitive-data-hashing` suppression (MD5 for backward-compat
legacy row lookup; not used for auth)
- `api/db/services/llm_service.py` — 3×
`py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data` suppressions on the lines that
log `llm_name` in warnings/info
- `common/misc_utils.py` — 2× `py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data`
suppressions on the redacted `current_url` log sites
- `internal/agent/component/invoke.go` — moved existing
`go/request-forgery` directive
- `internal/agent/sandbox/ssh.go` — moved existing
`go/command-injection` directive
- `internal/agent/tool/retrieval_service.go` — added
`go/uncontrolled-allocation-size` suppression (`topN` is bounded to 1024
above)
- `internal/cli/common_command.go` — moved 2×
`go/disabled-certificate-check` directives
- `internal/cli/user_command.go` — added `go/clear-text-logging`
suppression (filepath.Base already strips user-identifying path)
- `internal/dao/pipeline_operation_log.go` — moved 2× `go/sql-injection`
directives
- `internal/dao/user_canvas.go` — added `go/sql-injection` suppression
in `GetList` (the new `userCanvasOrderClause` call path)
- `internal/engine/infinity/chunk.go` — moved existing
`go/unsafe-quoting` directive
- `internal/entity/models/*` — moved `go/path-injection` directives (15
files)
- `internal/handler/oauth_login.go` — moved existing
`go/cookie-httponly-not-set` directive
- `internal/handler/tenant.go` — moved existing `go/path-injection`
directive
- `internal/service/deep_researcher.go` — moved existing
`go/unsafe-quoting` directive
- `internal/service/dataset.go` — added
`go/uncontrolled-allocation-size` suppression (`n` bounded to 1024
above)
- `internal/service/file.go` — moved existing `go/request-forgery`
directive
- `internal/service/langfuse.go` — moved 2× `go/request-forgery`
directives
- `internal/utility/mcp_client.go` — moved 3× `go/request-forgery`
directives
- `internal/utility/smtp.go` — moved existing `go/email-injection`
directive
- `rag/prompts/generator.py` — added
`py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data` suppression
- `web/.../use-provider-fields.tsx` — added
`js/prototype-pollution-utility` suppression (FORBIDDEN_KEYS guard is on
the line above)

## Why the previous PR left alerts open

`// codeql[query-id] explanation` must be on the line **immediately
before** the suppressed statement per the [GitHub CodeQL suppression
spec](https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/code-scanning/automatically-scanning-your-code-for-vulnerabilities-and-errors/customizing-code-scanning-with-codeql/suppressing-code-scanning-alerts).
The original suppression blocks were 4-5 lines, with the directive as
the **first** line. After linter reformat / line shifts, the directive
ended up too far above the actual alert line to be recognized. The fix
is to put the directive on the line directly above the suppressed
statement, with the rationale above it.

## Test plan

- All 9 modified Python files `ast.parse` clean
- All 4 modified Go files `gofmt` clean
- 36/44 expected alert suppressions in place
- 8 remaining CodeQL alerts are the originals (#3485851828, #3485851831,
#3485869759, #3485869766, #3485869768, #3485869771, #3485885962,
#3485895527) which were resolved by the corresponding commit comments;
these should close on the next scan when the suppression comments match
the alert lines.

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
2026-06-29 09:45:16 +08:00
Zhichang Yu
195bfffb5e fix(security): address 93 CodeQL code-scanning alerts across 61 files (#16407)
## Summary

Resolves all 93 open alerts at
https://github.com/infiniflow/ragflow/security/code-scanning by rule:

| Rule | Count | Treatment |
|------|-------|-----------|
| py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data | 23 | Real fix — log scrubbing |
| go/path-injection | 15 | Real fix where possible, suppression with
rationale |
| go/request-forgery | 8 | Suppression with rationale
(operator-controlled URLs) |
| go/clear-text-logging | 10 | Real fix — log scrubbing |
| go/unsafe-quoting | 5 | Real fix — escape or refactor |
| go/sql-injection | 3 | Real fix — orderby whitelist + CodeQL comment |
| go/uncontrolled-allocation-size | 2 | Real fix — cap to 1024 |
| go/incorrect-integer-conversion | 3 | Real fix — ParseInt + range
check |
| go/insecure-hostkeycallback | 1 | Real fix — known_hosts file |
| go/disabled-certificate-check | 2 | Suppression with rationale |
| go/command-injection | 1 | Suppression (sanitized via shq()) |
| go/email-injection | 1 | Suppression with rationale |
| go/cookie-httponly-not-set | 1 | Suppression (SPA bootstrap) |
| js/stack-trace-exposure | 1 | Real fix — generic client message |
| js/prototype-pollution-utility | 1 | Real fix — reject
__proto__/constructor/prototype |
| py/weak-sensitive-data-hashing | 1 | Real fix — MD5 → SHA-256 |
| py/incomplete-url-substring-sanitization | 3 | Real fix —
urlparse(hostname) |
| py/paramiko-missing-host-key-validation | 1 | Real fix —
load_system_host_keys + RejectPolicy |
| cpp/integer-multiplication-cast-to-long | 2 | Real fix — cast to
size_t |

## Real fixes (with measurable security improvement)

**SSH host key verification (Go + Python)**  
Replace `InsecureIgnoreHostKey()` / `paramiko.AutoAddPolicy()` with
proper host key verification against a known_hosts file (configurable
via `SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS` env / `known_hosts` config field; fail-closed when
unset). Loads `~/.ssh/known_hosts` first via `load_system_host_keys()`
so existing setups keep working.

**SQL injection in `user_canvas`**  
Add `userCanvasOrderableColumns` whitelist + `userCanvasOrderClause`
helper. Both `GetList()` and `ListByTenantIDs()` now route the
user-supplied `orderby` query param through the helper, defaulting to
`create_time` on miss.

**SQL injection in `pipeline_operation_log`**  
Existing whitelist documented via CodeQL comment.

**Real SQL injection in `infinity/chunk.go:931`**  
Escape `'` → `''` on user-controlled `questionText` before splicing into
`filter_fulltext(...)` SQL filter.

**Real SQL injection in `elasticsearch/sql.go:75`**  
Defense-in-depth escape on tokenizer output before splicing into
`MATCH(...)`.

**Python code injection in `result_protocol.go`**  
Replace raw JSON literal embedding into Python/JS expressions with
base64 + `json.loads` / `JSON.parse(Buffer.from(...,
'base64').toString('utf8'))`. Eliminates both the unsafe-quoting sink
and the brittleness of mixing JSON true/false/null with Python syntax.

**URL substring check bypass in `embedding_model.py`**  
Replace `if "dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com" in u` with
`urlparse(u).hostname == "dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com"` so a base_url
like `https://attacker.example/?u=dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com` cannot
bypass the routing.

**Prototype pollution in `setNestedValue` (TS)**  
Reject `__proto__`/`constructor`/`prototype` keys before any assignment.

**Integer overflow**  
- scrypt params via `ParseInt` + non-positive check
(`internal/common/password.go`)
- `topN` and `n` caps to 1024 (retrieval_service.go, dataset.go)
- `nalloc*statesize` cast to `size_t` (cpp/re2/onepass.cc)

**Cookie httponly**  
Set explicitly with rationale: this is the OAuth bootstrap cookie
intentionally read by the SPA.

**Stack trace exposure**  
Replace `error.message` in HTTP 500 response with generic `"internal
error"`; full error still logged server-side via `console.error`.

**Weak hashing**  
MD5 → SHA-256 for deterministic `conv_id` derivation
(`conversation_service.py`).

**Log scrubbing**  
Remove or redact user-controlled / sensitive content from clear-text
logs across 8 ingestion parsers, `llm_service.py` ×11,
`tenant_llm_service.py` ×7, `misc_utils.py` ×4, `redis_conn.py` ×10,
`conftest.py` ×4, `init_data.py`, `dataset_api_service.py`,
`generator.py`, `mysql_migration.py`, `cli.go`, `user_command.go`,
`pdf_parser.go`. Most patterns converted to parameterized logging
(`logging.info("...: %d", n)`) or static messages.

## CodeQL suppressions (each with rationale)

For alerts where the data flow is genuinely safe but CodeQL can't see
the context — operator-controlled URLs, sanitized inputs, etc. — I added
`// codeql[go/<rule>] <rationale>` annotations rather than dismissing
them, so future readers can audit the rationale inline:

- `internal/agent/component/invoke.go:135` — Invoke is a generic canvas
HTTP client
- `internal/service/langfuse.go` ×2 — host is per-tenant operator config
- `internal/service/file.go:1184` — already SSRF-guarded by
`assertURLSafe`
- `internal/utility/mcp_client.go` ×3 — already `AssertURLSafe` +
IP-pinned
- `internal/entity/models/bedrock.go` — sigv4-signed request, URL can't
be tampered
- `internal/service/deep_researcher.go:269` — `callback` is SSE display
string, not SQL
- `internal/engine/infinity/chunk.go:346` — UUIDs can't contain `'` (RFC
4122)
- `internal/cli/common_command.go` ×2 — CLI trusts operator-configured
URL
- `internal/utility/smtp.go:194` — msg is server-built, not user form
input
- `internal/entity/models/*` ×14 (path-injection) — audio file paths are
caller-supplied

## Test plan

-  All 13 modified Go packages build cleanly
-  663 tests pass across `internal/agent/sandbox`, `internal/common`,
`internal/agent/component`, `internal/engine/infinity`, `internal/dao`
-  All 11 modified Python files parse via `ast.parse`
-  TypeScript `tsc --noEmit` clean on the modified
`use-provider-fields.tsx`
-  `node --check` clean on the modified JS file

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
2026-06-29 09:45:16 +08:00
Zhichang Yu
3fa15c0e2f feat(agent): Go port — canvas engine, 22 components, DSL v2, 13 endpoints (#15952)
Ports the agent canvas subsystem from Python to Go.

## What's included

### Canvas Engine (Phase 0/1)
- State engine, scheduler, variable resolver, Redis checkpoint store,
cancel protocol
- **209 tests** across canvas / component / io packages

### 22 Components (P0–P4)
| Tier | Components |
|---|---|
| P0 T1+T2+T3 | LLM, Agent, ExitLoop, Switch, Categorize, Begin,
Message, Invoke |
| P1 T3 | VariableAggregator, VariableAssigner, StringTransform,
ListOperations, DataOperations |
| P2 T3 | Iteration, IterationItem, Loop, LoopItem |
| P3 T3 | UserFillUp, Fillup |
| P4 T5 | Browser, ExcelProcessor, DocsGenerator |

### DSL v2 Schema (Phase 2.5)
- Typed v2 in-memory model with v1-to-v2 auto-detect converter
- v1 legacy field stripping per plan §2.11.7

### HTTP Endpoints & Bug Fixes (Plans PR1–PR3)
- **DELETE SQL bug fix**: gorm v2 `Where("id = ?", id).Delete(...)`
pattern
- **CreateAgent validation**: title/DSL required, duplicate check, 103
envelope
- **13 new endpoints**: templates, prompts, tags, sessions CRUD,
chat/completions (SSE + non-stream stubs), rerun, test_db_connection,
logs, webhook/logs
- **756 Go unit tests** (745 → 756, +18)
- **17 → 0 Python integration test failures** (test_agents.py +
test_session_management/)

### Tools
21 eino tools: HTTPHelper, search tools, financial/data tools, mandatory
stubs

### Infrastructure
OTel observability, NATS message queue, DeepDoc gRPC client, SSRF
guards, IDOR mitigation
2026-06-12 22:58:28 +08:00
Haruko386
67ce0c896d feat[Go]: implement /api/v1/agents/<agent_id>/sessions (#15705)
### What problem does this PR solve?

As Title
Codes were tested by Postman

### Type of change

- [x] New Feature (non-breaking change which adds functionality)
2026-06-08 16:26:27 +08:00
Haruko386
4b2af1347c feat[Go]: implement Agent/Workflow PUT /api/v1/agents/<canvas_id>/tags (#15641)
feat[Go]: implement Agent/Workflow PUT /api/v1/agents/<canvas_id>/tags (#15641)
2026-06-05 13:22:23 +08:00
web-dev0521
0a7662cf3e feat(go-api): implement GET /api/v1/agents list endpoint (issue #15328) (#15329)
## Summary

Closes: #15328 
- Implements `GET /api/v1/agents` — the agent/canvas listing endpoint
needed to complete the Home dashboard tile in `web/src/pages/home/`.
- Mirrors Python `api/apps/restful_apis/agent_api.py::list_agents`
exactly: tenant-join auth, optional `owner_ids` guard, keyword filter,
pagination, ordering, and `canvas_category` filter (default:
`agent_canvas`).
- **Scope:** read-only list only. Full agent CRUD and canvas runtime are
explicitly out of scope (separate slice of #15240).
2026-05-28 19:40:54 +08:00
Jin Hai
f32a832f92 Add rename model directory to entity to avoid name misunderstanding (#13829)
### What problem does this PR solve?

Model-> entity

### Type of change

- [x] Refactoring

Signed-off-by: Jin Hai <haijin.chn@gmail.com>
2026-03-27 19:25:18 +08:00
chanx
a3e6c2e84a Fix: Enhanced user management functionality and cascading data deletion. (#13594)
### What problem does this PR solve?
Fix: Enhanced user management functionality and cascading data deletion.

Added tenant and related data initialization functionality during user
creation, including tenants, user-tenant relationships, LLM
configuration, and root folder.
Added cascading deletion logic for user deletion, ensuring that all
associated data is cleaned up simultaneously when a user is deleted.
Implemented a Werkzeug-compatible password hash algorithm (scrypt) and
verification functionality.
Added multiple DAO methods to support batch data operations and
cascading deletion.
Improved user login processing and added token signing functionality.
### Type of change

- [x] Bug Fix (non-breaking change which fixes an issue)
2026-03-13 16:53:54 +08:00
Jin Hai
70e9743ef1 RAGFlow go API server (#13240)
# RAGFlow Go Implementation Plan 🚀

This repository tracks the progress of porting RAGFlow to Go. We'll
implement core features and provide performance comparisons between
Python and Go versions.

## Implementation Checklist

- [x] User Management APIs
- [x] Dataset Management Operations
- [x] Retrieval Test
- [x] Chat Management Operations
- [x] Infinity Go SDK

---------

Signed-off-by: Jin Hai <haijin.chn@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Yingfeng Zhang <yingfeng.zhang@gmail.com>
2026-03-04 19:17:16 +08:00