Updates the template preparser to exclude namespaced SVG style tags (':svg:style') from the style elements set.
Previously, ':svg:style' elements were incorrectly classified as PreparsedElementType.STYLE, which caused them to be completely stripped from the final template DOM tree during the Render3 template transform and pushed into standard component stylesheets. By limiting the style element parsing to standard 'style' tags, namespaced SVG style tags remain safely in the template AST as normal DOM elements, preserving local SVG styling.
Closes#68977
Ensures explicit HTTP cache mode from incoming requests is forwarded and maintained when creating fetch requests for assets, aligning with expected fetch behavior and preventing unintended cache handling.
Removes the legacy profile property/attribute from the directives hostBindings specs to align with modern DOM security schema changes. Also cleans up minor redundant formatting lines in the compiler and core targets.
PR Close#68926
Synchronizes the golden symbols for router bundling and updates the host bindings sanitization integration test to use a[href] instead of blockquote[cite].
PR Close#68926
To enhance application security and prevent accidental or malicious script execution, this change ensures that dynamically mounting a component via createComponent directly onto a <script> element throws a runtime error in development mode. SVG <script> elements are also rejected. The error message is designed to be fully tree-shakable under production builds where ngDevMode is disabled.
PR Close#68926
Synchronizes the core's copy of the DOM security schema with the compiler-side schema definitions, and removes the write_source_file target.
PR Close#68926
Normalize namespaced tag names (e.g., :xhtml:a to a) inside i18nResolveSanitizer before looking up their security context. This ensures custom namespaced tag attributes undergo correct translation sanitization at runtime.
PR Close#68926
Custom XML/XHTML namespaced elements (e.g., <xhtml:a>) fall back to the standard HTML namespace during element creation at compile-time/runtime. However, their property and security context lookups inside the schema registry were incorrectly performed using the full namespaced tag name (e.g., :xhtml:a), which bypassed the default a|href sanitization registry and incorrectly returned SecurityContext.NONE instead of SecurityContext.URL.
This commit introduces tag name normalization inside DomElementSchemaRegistry for custom namespaces (other than the built-in svg and math namespaces). Custom namespaced tag names are now normalized to their simple HTML element counterparts for all registry queries, ensuring that correct property schema validation and dynamic security sanitization rules (such as URL sanitization) are enforced at runtime.
PR Close#68926
Dynamic bindings to `href` and `xlink:href` attributes on SVG `<a>` elements (`<svg:a>`) were previously unmapped in the DOM security schema. As a result, they bypassed sanitization completely, creating a potential XSS vulnerability if bound to untrusted user inputs (e.g., `javascript:` URLs).
This fix mitigates this risk by:
1. Registering `href` and `xlink:href` on `<svg:a>` elements under the `SecurityContext.URL` context in both the compiler and core DOM security schemas.
2. Enabling template compilation to output runtime URL sanitization checks (`ɵɵsanitizeUrl`) on these attributes.
3. Adding regression and verification test cases to ensure dynamic SVG link bindings are safely sanitized at runtime while static values are correctly allowed.
PR Close#68926
Removes the `should throw error on translated SVG script ResourceURL
attributes` integration test from `security_integration_spec.ts`.
This test is now obsolete because SVG `<script>` elements are stripped during
template compilation (implemented in 90494cd909). As a result, they are no
longer present in the compiled template to trigger runtime sanitization,
causing this test (which expected a sanitization error to be thrown) to fail.
PR Close#68926
Ensures that namespaced <script> elements (such as :svg:script) are correctly classified as PreparsedElementType.SCRIPT by the template preparser and stripped during compilation to prevent potential XSS vulnerabilities. Consequently, obsolete security schema mappings and runtime sanitization checks for <script> attributes have been removed since these elements are never present in compiled template outputs.
PR Close#68926
Updates `DomElementSchemaRegistry` to strip `:svg:` and `:math:` namespace prefixes
from tag names before querying `SECURITY_SCHEMA` at compile-time. This allows SVG
and MathML attributes to correctly match their security contexts during compilation.
PR Close#68926
Refactors the element security schema lookups and runtime attribute validation to
consistently account for SVG and MathML namespaces. This improves the modularity
and accuracy of security context mapping during template compilation and runtime
constant evaluation, eliminating redundant or false-positive lifecycle checks.
PR Close#68926
Normalizes the URL and path parsing logic inside platform-server by consolidating security checks and normalizations into a single, unified parseUrl helper function.
This includes:
- Collapsing multiple consecutive leading slashes and backslashes (e.g., // or /\) to a single forward slash to avoid protocol-relative parsing of path-like & relative inputs.
- Rejecting malformed absolute URLs that are otherwise accepted by lenient DOM parsers like Domino but rejected by standard WHATWG parsers, preventing SSRF / allowedHosts validation bypasses.
- Ensuring parseDocument gets the fully parsed and normalized URL instead of raw, unvalidated configuration values, preventing virtual document hostname adoption/origin hijack.
- Moving parseUrl unit tests into a dedicated url_spec.ts test file to keep platform_location_spec.ts clean and decoupled.
Update the transfer cache check to safely exclude all requests sent with the `withCredentials` flag.
By default, the HTTP transfer cache avoids caching user-specific responses to prevent sensitive data exposure or incorrect caching. While requests with explicit headers like `Cookie` or `Authorization` are excluded by default, requests can also be sent with credentials via the `withCredentials` flag without having those headers explicitly declared on the request object.
To keep user-specific responses from being cached, exclude `withCredentials` requests unconditionally, even when the `includeRequestsWithAuthHeaders` option is set to true.
Treat requests with a Cookie header like other auth-bearing requests and skip TransferCache caching them by default.
This preserves the explicit opt-in path via includeRequestsWithAuthHeaders, adds regression coverage for cookie-bearing requests, and updates the SSR guide to document the behavior.
Preserve the redirect mode when rebuilding asset requests in newRequestWithMetadata(). This keeps explicit redirect:error semantics intact across service-worker redirect handling.
Update the worker test mocks to model redirect defaults correctly and add focused regression coverage for redirected lazy assets with redirect:error.
In server-side rendering (SSR) setups, passing request URLs directly to the lower-level rendering APIs `renderModule` or `renderApplication` can expose applications to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) or Host Header Injection attacks via absolute-form request URLs.
To mitigate these vulnerabilities at the framework layer, this commit introduces the `allowedHosts` option to `PlatformConfig` (supporting exact hostnames, wildcards like `*.example.com`, or `*` to allow all).
During platform initialization inside `createServerPlatform`, the hostname of the request `url` is validated against the `allowedHosts` list. If the hostname is not authorized, bootstrap immediately throws a host validation error, preventing unauthorized rendering and silent SSRF bypasses.
Closes#68436
Moves the event attribute validation check outside of `ngDevMode` in the `elementAttributeInternal` instruction to ensure that bindings to event attributes like `on*` are always blocked at runtime.
Previously, this check was only performed when `ngDevMode` was `true`, which could allow attacker-controlled CMS data to be bound to event attributes in production mode, causing browser-executed XSS.
Fixes#68419
PR Close#68468
The `parseUrl` function in `ServerPlatformLocation` uses `new URL(urlStr, origin)` to parse incoming request URLs during SSR. Per the WHATWG URL specification, protocol-relative URLs (`//evil.com`) and backslash-prefixed URLs (`/\evil.com`) can override the hostname component of the base URL.
This vulnerability typically manifests in SSR setups (e.g., Express) where `req.url` is passed directly to `renderApplication` or `renderModule`:
```typescript
// Example usage in an Express server handling: http://localhost:4000//evil.com
app.get('*', async (req, res) => {
const html = await renderApplication(bootstrap, {
document: template,
url: req.url, // req.url is "//evil.com"
});
res.send(html);
});
```
Fixes that we weren't sanitizing attribute bindings with interpolations if they're marked for translation, for example: `<a href="{{evilLink}}" i18n-href></a>`.
Also adds a bit more test coverage for our sanitization.
Translators are not allowed to write HTML which creates URI attributes. I opted to ban any values going into an attribute at all, to prevent even links to malicious content, rather than just sanitizing URIs.
I also converted this blocklist into an allowlist. Now, we only allowing setting known attributes (while sanitizing URI attributes). This significantly reduces risk of missing a vulnerable attribute and does not require an exhaustive list of all potential attributes.
BREAKING CHANGE: Angular now only applies known attributes from HTML in translated ICU content. Unknown attributes are dropped and not rendered.
(cherry picked from commit 03da204b6d)
This commit updates the DOM security schema and sanitization logic to properly recognize and sanitize `href` and `xlink:href` attributes on SVG `<script>` elements.
This commit implements a security fix to prevent XSS vulnerabilities where SVG animation elements (`<animate>`, `<set>`, etc.) could be used to modify the `href` or `xlink:href` attributes of other elements to `javascript:` URLs.
The fix introduces a runtime validation step:
- A new [ɵɵValidateAttribute](cci:1://file:///usr/local/google/home/alanagius/git/angular/packages/core/src/sanitization/sanitization.ts:276:0-288:1) instruction is used when `attributeName` is bound on SVG animation elements.
- If executed, a `RuntimeError` is thrown, preventing the binding.
- The compiler now identifies `attributeName` on SVG animation elements as security-sensitive and injects this validation.
Additionally, the DOM security schema has been updated to include a comprehensive list of MathML and SVG elements that accept `href` or `xlink:href` attributes, ensuring they are correctly treated as `SecurityContext.URL` and sanitized. This prevents malicious URLs from being bound to these attributes.
http://b/463880509
The XSRF interceptor previously failed to detect protocol-relative URLs (starting with `//`) as absolute URLs. This allowed requests to such URLs to include the XSRF token, potentially leaking it to external domains.
This change updates the interceptor to correctly identify protocol-relative URLs as absolute and exclude them from receiving the XSRF token.
Pawel Kozlowski