In server-side rendering (SSR) setups, passing request URLs directly to the lower-level rendering APIs `renderModule` or `renderApplication` can expose applications to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) or Host Header Injection attacks via absolute-form request URLs.
To mitigate these vulnerabilities at the framework layer, this commit introduces the `allowedHosts` option to `PlatformConfig` (supporting exact hostnames, wildcards like `*.example.com`, or `*` to allow all).
During platform initialization inside `createServerPlatform`, the hostname of the request `url` is validated against the `allowedHosts` list. If the hostname is not authorized, bootstrap immediately throws a host validation error, preventing unauthorized rendering and silent SSRF bypasses.
Closes#68436
Moves the event attribute validation check outside of `ngDevMode` in the `elementAttributeInternal` instruction to ensure that bindings to event attributes like `on*` are always blocked at runtime.
Previously, this check was only performed when `ngDevMode` was `true`, which could allow attacker-controlled CMS data to be bound to event attributes in production mode, causing browser-executed XSS.
Fixes#68419
PR Close#68468
The `parseUrl` function in `ServerPlatformLocation` uses `new URL(urlStr, origin)` to parse incoming request URLs during SSR. Per the WHATWG URL specification, protocol-relative URLs (`//evil.com`) and backslash-prefixed URLs (`/\evil.com`) can override the hostname component of the base URL.
This vulnerability typically manifests in SSR setups (e.g., Express) where `req.url` is passed directly to `renderApplication` or `renderModule`:
```typescript
// Example usage in an Express server handling: http://localhost:4000//evil.com
app.get('*', async (req, res) => {
const html = await renderApplication(bootstrap, {
document: template,
url: req.url, // req.url is "//evil.com"
});
res.send(html);
});
```
Fixes that we weren't sanitizing attribute bindings with interpolations if they're marked for translation, for example: `<a href="{{evilLink}}" i18n-href></a>`.
Also adds a bit more test coverage for our sanitization.
Translators are not allowed to write HTML which creates URI attributes. I opted to ban any values going into an attribute at all, to prevent even links to malicious content, rather than just sanitizing URIs.
I also converted this blocklist into an allowlist. Now, we only allowing setting known attributes (while sanitizing URI attributes). This significantly reduces risk of missing a vulnerable attribute and does not require an exhaustive list of all potential attributes.
BREAKING CHANGE: Angular now only applies known attributes from HTML in translated ICU content. Unknown attributes are dropped and not rendered.
(cherry picked from commit 03da204b6d)
This commit updates the DOM security schema and sanitization logic to properly recognize and sanitize `href` and `xlink:href` attributes on SVG `<script>` elements.
This commit implements a security fix to prevent XSS vulnerabilities where SVG animation elements (`<animate>`, `<set>`, etc.) could be used to modify the `href` or `xlink:href` attributes of other elements to `javascript:` URLs.
The fix introduces a runtime validation step:
- A new [ɵɵValidateAttribute](cci:1://file:///usr/local/google/home/alanagius/git/angular/packages/core/src/sanitization/sanitization.ts:276:0-288:1) instruction is used when `attributeName` is bound on SVG animation elements.
- If executed, a `RuntimeError` is thrown, preventing the binding.
- The compiler now identifies `attributeName` on SVG animation elements as security-sensitive and injects this validation.
Additionally, the DOM security schema has been updated to include a comprehensive list of MathML and SVG elements that accept `href` or `xlink:href` attributes, ensuring they are correctly treated as `SecurityContext.URL` and sanitized. This prevents malicious URLs from being bound to these attributes.
http://b/463880509
The XSRF interceptor previously failed to detect protocol-relative URLs (starting with `//`) as absolute URLs. This allowed requests to such URLs to include the XSRF token, potentially leaking it to external domains.
This change updates the interceptor to correctly identify protocol-relative URLs as absolute and exclude them from receiving the XSRF token.
Added recommendation in advanced section for redirectTo and canMatch will generate an error. These properties are incompatible together
fixes#65267
(cherry picked from commit c757fd6c29)
Although the prior commit has made more profiler events guaranteed symmetric
through the use of finally-blocks, there continue to be some situations
that could potentially result in asymmetric events, e.g. application
bootstrap doesn't guarantee symmetric events. This commit makes the profiler
lenient to these situations by unrolling the stack past the asymmetric event
data, eventually reaching the expected start event.
(cherry picked from commit da9911f2b4)
Profiler events are expected to be symmetric, yet in the case of errors this symmetry may break
if events aren't always kept in sync with their corresponding start event. This commit moves
various end events to be run from a finally-block, allowing them to notify the profiler even
when an error has occurred.
Fixes#62947
(cherry picked from commit af1ba52587)
Updated bash command examples to use fenced code blocks (```bash) instead of <docs-code> components, improving formatting consistency and aligning with current documentation standards.
(cherry picked from commit 7ea60052f0)
- Replaced <a><button></button></a> with a proper <a> containing text and
aria-label to ensure links have discernible text.
- Added main tag in home page to provide
a consistent main landmark, improving accessibility for screen readers
and satisfying WCAG and Lighthouse requirements.
Fixes#65181.
(cherry picked from commit ee5947db38)
Code blocks with `bash` language identifier were not rendering the `$`
prefix, while `shell` blocks did.
This ensures consistent command-line prompt rendering across both
`bash` and `shell` code blocks in the documentation.
(cherry picked from commit f462684211)
Matthew Beck