Files
ragflow/internal/utility/smtp.go
Rene Arredondo bf59eb77cc feat(go-api): port forgot-password flow to Go (#15282) (#15290)
## Summary

Implements **chunk 1** of #15282 — the four `/api/v1/auth/password/...`
endpoints from the login-page Go port. **Chunk 2 (OAuth/OIDC) is
deferred** to its own subtask, matching the issue author's own
confidence-low recommendation ("multi-provider, stateful redirect flow
with external dependencies; recommend its own subtask").

New endpoints, all registered under `apiNoAuth` (forgot-password users
are unauthenticated by definition):

| Method | Path | Status |
|--------|------|--------|
| `POST` | `/api/v1/auth/password/forgot/captcha` | new |
| `POST` | `/api/v1/auth/password/forgot/otp` | new |
| `POST` | `/api/v1/auth/password/forgot/otp/verify` | new |
| `POST` | `/api/v1/auth/password/reset` | new |

## Wire compatibility with the Python backend

The two backends share state through Redis, so the Go port had to use
identical keys, encodings, and constants. Either backend can now
validate a code the other minted.

- **Redis keys**: `captcha:<email>`, `otp:<email>`,
`otp_attempts:<email>`, `otp_last_sent:<email>`, `otp_lock:<email>`,
`otp:verified:<email>` — same as `api/utils/web_utils.py`.
- **Stored OTP value**: `"<hex_hash>:<hex_salt>"` — same as Python.
- **Hash**: HMAC-SHA256 with a `crypto/rand` 16-byte salt — same as
`hash_code()`.
- **Constants**: `OTP_LENGTH=4`, `OTP_TTL=5min`, `ATTEMPT_LIMIT=5`,
`ATTEMPT_LOCK_SECONDS=30min`, `RESEND_COOLDOWN_SECONDS=60s` — all match
`api/utils/web_utils.py`.
- **Email body**: matches `RESET_CODE_EMAIL_TMPL` byte-for-byte.

## Files

### New

| File | Purpose |
|---|---|
| `internal/utility/otp.go` | OTP/captcha constants, Redis key builders
(`CaptchaRedisKey`, `OTPRedisKeys`, `OTPVerifiedRedisKey`),
`HashOTPCode`, `GenerateOTPCode` / `GenerateCaptchaCode` /
`GenerateOTPSalt` via `crypto/rand`, and `EncodeOTPStorageValue` /
`DecodeOTPStorageValue` matching Python's storage shape. |
| `internal/utility/smtp.go` | Minimal stdlib `net/smtp` sender.
`SendResetCodeEmail(to, otp, ttlMin)` builds an RFC 5322 plain-text
message and dispatches via implicit TLS / STARTTLS / plain — same
selectors as Python `aiosmtplib`. Returns `SMTPNotConfiguredError` if
the config block is empty. |

### Modified

| File | Change |
|---|---|
| `internal/server/config.go` | New `SMTPConfig` struct + `Config.SMTP`
field. Field names mirror the `smtp:` keys in `common/settings.py`
(`mail_server`, `mail_port`, `mail_use_ssl`, `mail_use_tls`,
`mail_username`, `mail_password`, `mail_from_name`, `mail_from_address`,
`mail_frontend_url`) so a single `conf/service_conf.yaml` powers both
backends. |
| `internal/service/user.go` | Four methods — `ForgotIssueCaptcha`,
`ForgotSendOTP`, `ForgotVerifyOTP`, `ForgotResetPassword`. Reuses the
existing `decryptPassword`, `HashPassword`, `userDAO.Update`, and
`utility.GenerateToken` so the reset+auto-login path is identical to
`LoginByEmail`. |
| `internal/handler/user.go` | Four handlers in the same `c.JSON` shape
as `LoginByEmail`. The reset handler rotates the access token and emits
an `Authorization` header for auto-login (matches Python
`construct_response(auth=user.get_id())`). |
| `internal/router/router.go` | Routes registered under `apiNoAuth`,
with an explanatory comment on why they sit outside the auth middleware.
|

## Known divergence — captcha rendering

The Python endpoint returns a rendered `image/JPEG` from the
`python-captcha` library. The Go side has **no image-captcha dependency
vendored** in `go.mod`, and hand-rolling a raster generator was out of
scope for this PR.

This commit returns JSON `{captcha: "<text>"}` instead. Implications:

- **Backend gate is identical** — the OTP step still verifies the
user-submitted captcha string against the Redis value, so the security
model is unchanged.
- **Frontend impact**: the password-reset page rendering needs a small
tweak (text display instead of `<img>`) until a Go captcha library is
wired in.
- The handler comments call this out explicitly so the next PR knows
what to swap.

Possible follow-ups (any one closes the gap):
1. Add `github.com/mojocn/base64Captcha` or `github.com/dchest/captcha`
to `go.mod` and replace the JSON response with an `image/JPEG`.
2. Hand-roll a 5x7 bitmap font + `image/png` writer using only the
stdlib.
3. Render a server-side SVG (cheap, but trivially OCR-able — only useful
as a UI shim).

## Test plan

- [ ] **Captcha**: `POST
/api/v1/auth/password/forgot/captcha?email=<existing>` returns `{code:
0, data: {captcha: "ABCD"}}`. Redis shows `captcha:<email>` with that
value and ~60s TTL. Unknown email returns `code: CodeDataError`.
- [ ] **OTP send**: `POST /api/v1/auth/password/forgot/otp` with the
right captcha mints an OTP, stores `<hash>:<salt>` under `otp:<email>`
for 5 min, sends an email, returns success. With a wrong captcha returns
`CodeAuthenticationError`. Hitting it again within 60s returns "you
still have to wait …" with `CodeNotEffective`.
- [ ] **OTP verify**: correct OTP → `code: 0`, OTP keys cleared,
`otp:verified:<email>` = `"1"`. Wrong OTP → `code:
CodeAuthenticationError`, attempt counter bumped; after 5 wrong tries
`otp_lock:<email>` is set and further attempts hit `CodeNotEffective`.
- [ ] **Reset**: with the verified flag set, supply a new password
(RSA-encrypted+base64, same as `LoginByEmail`). Returns `code: 0`,
`Authorization` header set, verified flag deleted. Without the verified
flag returns `CodeAuthenticationError`.
- [ ] **Wire-compat smoke**: mint an OTP from the Python backend, verify
it via the Go endpoint, and vice versa. Should both succeed.
- [ ] **SMTP misconfigured**: drop `smtp.mail_server` from
`conf/service_conf.yaml`. The OTP-send endpoint should now return
"failed to send email" without panicking; check the log for the
`SMTPNotConfiguredError` warning.
- [ ] **End-to-end FE**: hit the password-reset flow from
`web/src/pages/login-next/`. Confirm the text-captcha shim works after
the FE tweak.
- [ ] `go build ./...` and `go vet ./...` — I could not run these in the
sandbox; please confirm a clean build before merging.
- [ ] `uv run pytest` to confirm no Python regressions (shared Redis
schema).

### Type of change

- [x] New Feature (non-breaking change which adds functionality)
2026-06-10 21:27:56 +08:00

203 lines
6.1 KiB
Go

//
// Copyright 2026 The InfiniFlow Authors. All Rights Reserved.
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
//
// Minimal SMTP sender for transactional email (forgot-password OTP, etc).
// Mirrors api/utils/web_utils.py:send_email_html on the Python side and
// uses the same conf/service_conf.yaml `smtp` block so a single config
// powers both backends.
//
// The config is passed in as a parameter rather than read via
// server.GetConfig() — internal/server already imports internal/utility
// (via variable.go), so importing server from here would close an
// import cycle. The SMTPConfig type lives in internal/common for the
// same reason.
package utility
import (
"crypto/tls"
"fmt"
"net"
"net/smtp"
"strings"
"ragflow/internal/common"
"go.uber.org/zap"
)
// SMTPNotConfiguredError is returned when an SMTP send is attempted but the
// active config has no mail server. Lets the caller distinguish a config
// problem from a transient delivery failure.
type SMTPNotConfiguredError struct{}
func (SMTPNotConfiguredError) Error() string {
return "smtp is not configured"
}
// SMTPInsecureAuthError is returned when authentication is requested over
// an unencrypted SMTP connection (neither MailUseSSL nor MailUseTLS set).
// Sending credentials in the clear is refused on principle.
type SMTPInsecureAuthError struct{}
func (SMTPInsecureAuthError) Error() string {
return "smtp authentication refused over plaintext connection (set mail_use_ssl or mail_use_tls)"
}
// SendResetCodeEmail delivers the password-reset OTP email. It is the Go
// analogue of:
//
// await send_email_html(
// subject="Your Password Reset Code",
// to_email=email,
// template_key="reset_code",
// code=otp,
// ttl_min=ttl_min,
// )
//
// — same subject, same plaintext body shape (see RESET_CODE_EMAIL_TMPL in
// api/utils/email_templates.py).
func SendResetCodeEmail(cfg common.SMTPConfig, toEmail, otp string, ttlMinutes int) error {
if cfg.MailServer == "" || cfg.MailPort == 0 {
return SMTPNotConfiguredError{}
}
subject := "Your Password Reset Code"
body := fmt.Sprintf(
"Hello,\nYour password reset code is: %s\nThis code will expire in %d minutes.\n",
otp, ttlMinutes,
)
fromAddr := cfg.MailFromAddress
if fromAddr == "" {
fromAddr = cfg.MailUsername
}
fromName := cfg.MailFromName
if fromName == "" {
fromName = "RAGFlow"
}
fromHeader := fmt.Sprintf("%s <%s>", fromName, fromAddr)
msg := buildPlainEmail(fromHeader, toEmail, subject, body)
if err := sendMail(cfg, fromAddr, toEmail, msg); err != nil {
common.Warn("smtp send failed",
zap.String("to", toEmail),
zap.String("server", cfg.MailServer),
zap.Int("port", cfg.MailPort),
zap.Error(err),
)
return err
}
return nil
}
// buildPlainEmail composes an RFC 5322 plain-text message. CRLF line
// endings are required by the SMTP DATA spec.
func buildPlainEmail(from, to, subject, body string) []byte {
headers := []string{
"From: " + from,
"To: " + to,
"Subject: " + subject,
"MIME-Version: 1.0",
"Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8",
"Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit",
}
return []byte(strings.Join(headers, "\r\n") + "\r\n\r\n" + body)
}
// sendMail dispatches the message over implicit TLS, STARTTLS, or plain
// — matching how the Python aiosmtplib client is configured by the
// `mail_use_ssl` / `mail_use_tls` flags.
//
// Authentication is only attempted over an encrypted session. If the
// caller asks for auth (MailUsername set) on a plaintext connection,
// SMTPInsecureAuthError is returned before any credential is written.
func sendMail(cfg common.SMTPConfig, from, to string, msg []byte) error {
if cfg.MailUsername != "" && !cfg.MailUseSSL && !cfg.MailUseTLS {
return SMTPInsecureAuthError{}
}
addr := net.JoinHostPort(cfg.MailServer, fmt.Sprintf("%d", cfg.MailPort))
auth := smtp.PlainAuth("", cfg.MailUsername, cfg.MailPassword, cfg.MailServer)
if cfg.MailUseSSL {
// Implicit TLS (typical port 465). Dial TLS first, then SMTP.
tlsCfg := &tls.Config{
ServerName: cfg.MailServer,
MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS12,
}
conn, err := tls.Dial("tcp", addr, tlsCfg)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("smtp tls dial: %w", err)
}
client, err := smtp.NewClient(conn, cfg.MailServer)
if err != nil {
conn.Close()
return fmt.Errorf("smtp client init: %w", err)
}
defer client.Quit()
if cfg.MailUsername != "" {
if err := client.Auth(auth); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("smtp auth: %w", err)
}
}
return deliverMail(client, from, to, msg)
}
// STARTTLS (typical port 587) or plain (auth refused above).
client, err := smtp.Dial(addr)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("smtp dial: %w", err)
}
defer client.Quit()
if cfg.MailUseTLS {
tlsCfg := &tls.Config{
ServerName: cfg.MailServer,
MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS12,
}
if err := client.StartTLS(tlsCfg); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("smtp starttls: %w", err)
}
if cfg.MailUsername != "" {
if err := client.Auth(auth); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("smtp auth: %w", err)
}
}
}
// Plaintext: no auth performed (refused at the top of the function).
return deliverMail(client, from, to, msg)
}
func deliverMail(client *smtp.Client, from, to string, msg []byte) error {
if err := client.Mail(from); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("smtp mail-from: %w", err)
}
if err := client.Rcpt(to); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("smtp rcpt-to: %w", err)
}
w, err := client.Data()
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("smtp data: %w", err)
}
if _, err := w.Write(msg); err != nil {
w.Close()
return fmt.Errorf("smtp write: %w", err)
}
if err := w.Close(); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("smtp close: %w", err)
}
return nil
}