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https://github.com/infiniflow/ragflow.git
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## Summary Resolves all 93 open alerts at https://github.com/infiniflow/ragflow/security/code-scanning by rule: | Rule | Count | Treatment | |------|-------|-----------| | py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data | 23 | Real fix — log scrubbing | | go/path-injection | 15 | Real fix where possible, suppression with rationale | | go/request-forgery | 8 | Suppression with rationale (operator-controlled URLs) | | go/clear-text-logging | 10 | Real fix — log scrubbing | | go/unsafe-quoting | 5 | Real fix — escape or refactor | | go/sql-injection | 3 | Real fix — orderby whitelist + CodeQL comment | | go/uncontrolled-allocation-size | 2 | Real fix — cap to 1024 | | go/incorrect-integer-conversion | 3 | Real fix — ParseInt + range check | | go/insecure-hostkeycallback | 1 | Real fix — known_hosts file | | go/disabled-certificate-check | 2 | Suppression with rationale | | go/command-injection | 1 | Suppression (sanitized via shq()) | | go/email-injection | 1 | Suppression with rationale | | go/cookie-httponly-not-set | 1 | Suppression (SPA bootstrap) | | js/stack-trace-exposure | 1 | Real fix — generic client message | | js/prototype-pollution-utility | 1 | Real fix — reject __proto__/constructor/prototype | | py/weak-sensitive-data-hashing | 1 | Real fix — MD5 → SHA-256 | | py/incomplete-url-substring-sanitization | 3 | Real fix — urlparse(hostname) | | py/paramiko-missing-host-key-validation | 1 | Real fix — load_system_host_keys + RejectPolicy | | cpp/integer-multiplication-cast-to-long | 2 | Real fix — cast to size_t | ## Real fixes (with measurable security improvement) **SSH host key verification (Go + Python)** Replace `InsecureIgnoreHostKey()` / `paramiko.AutoAddPolicy()` with proper host key verification against a known_hosts file (configurable via `SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS` env / `known_hosts` config field; fail-closed when unset). Loads `~/.ssh/known_hosts` first via `load_system_host_keys()` so existing setups keep working. **SQL injection in `user_canvas`** Add `userCanvasOrderableColumns` whitelist + `userCanvasOrderClause` helper. Both `GetList()` and `ListByTenantIDs()` now route the user-supplied `orderby` query param through the helper, defaulting to `create_time` on miss. **SQL injection in `pipeline_operation_log`** Existing whitelist documented via CodeQL comment. **Real SQL injection in `infinity/chunk.go:931`** Escape `'` → `''` on user-controlled `questionText` before splicing into `filter_fulltext(...)` SQL filter. **Real SQL injection in `elasticsearch/sql.go:75`** Defense-in-depth escape on tokenizer output before splicing into `MATCH(...)`. **Python code injection in `result_protocol.go`** Replace raw JSON literal embedding into Python/JS expressions with base64 + `json.loads` / `JSON.parse(Buffer.from(..., 'base64').toString('utf8'))`. Eliminates both the unsafe-quoting sink and the brittleness of mixing JSON true/false/null with Python syntax. **URL substring check bypass in `embedding_model.py`** Replace `if "dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com" in u` with `urlparse(u).hostname == "dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com"` so a base_url like `https://attacker.example/?u=dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com` cannot bypass the routing. **Prototype pollution in `setNestedValue` (TS)** Reject `__proto__`/`constructor`/`prototype` keys before any assignment. **Integer overflow** - scrypt params via `ParseInt` + non-positive check (`internal/common/password.go`) - `topN` and `n` caps to 1024 (retrieval_service.go, dataset.go) - `nalloc*statesize` cast to `size_t` (cpp/re2/onepass.cc) **Cookie httponly** Set explicitly with rationale: this is the OAuth bootstrap cookie intentionally read by the SPA. **Stack trace exposure** Replace `error.message` in HTTP 500 response with generic `"internal error"`; full error still logged server-side via `console.error`. **Weak hashing** MD5 → SHA-256 for deterministic `conv_id` derivation (`conversation_service.py`). **Log scrubbing** Remove or redact user-controlled / sensitive content from clear-text logs across 8 ingestion parsers, `llm_service.py` ×11, `tenant_llm_service.py` ×7, `misc_utils.py` ×4, `redis_conn.py` ×10, `conftest.py` ×4, `init_data.py`, `dataset_api_service.py`, `generator.py`, `mysql_migration.py`, `cli.go`, `user_command.go`, `pdf_parser.go`. Most patterns converted to parameterized logging (`logging.info("...: %d", n)`) or static messages. ## CodeQL suppressions (each with rationale) For alerts where the data flow is genuinely safe but CodeQL can't see the context — operator-controlled URLs, sanitized inputs, etc. — I added `// codeql[go/<rule>] <rationale>` annotations rather than dismissing them, so future readers can audit the rationale inline: - `internal/agent/component/invoke.go:135` — Invoke is a generic canvas HTTP client - `internal/service/langfuse.go` ×2 — host is per-tenant operator config - `internal/service/file.go:1184` — already SSRF-guarded by `assertURLSafe` - `internal/utility/mcp_client.go` ×3 — already `AssertURLSafe` + IP-pinned - `internal/entity/models/bedrock.go` — sigv4-signed request, URL can't be tampered - `internal/service/deep_researcher.go:269` — `callback` is SSE display string, not SQL - `internal/engine/infinity/chunk.go:346` — UUIDs can't contain `'` (RFC 4122) - `internal/cli/common_command.go` ×2 — CLI trusts operator-configured URL - `internal/utility/smtp.go:194` — msg is server-built, not user form input - `internal/entity/models/*` ×14 (path-injection) — audio file paths are caller-supplied ## Test plan - ✅ All 13 modified Go packages build cleanly - ✅ 663 tests pass across `internal/agent/sandbox`, `internal/common`, `internal/agent/component`, `internal/engine/infinity`, `internal/dao` - ✅ All 11 modified Python files parse via `ast.parse` - ✅ TypeScript `tsc --noEmit` clean on the modified `use-provider-fields.tsx` - ✅ `node --check` clean on the modified JS file 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
208 lines
6.4 KiB
Go
208 lines
6.4 KiB
Go
//
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// Copyright 2026 The InfiniFlow Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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//
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// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
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// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
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// You may obtain a copy of the License at
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//
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// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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//
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// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
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// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
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// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
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// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
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// limitations under the License.
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//
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// Minimal SMTP sender for transactional email (forgot-password OTP, etc).
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// Mirrors api/utils/web_utils.py:send_email_html on the Python side and
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// uses the same conf/service_conf.yaml `smtp` block so a single config
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// powers both backends.
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//
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// The config is passed in as a parameter rather than read via
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// server.GetConfig() — internal/server already imports internal/utility
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// (via variable.go), so importing server from here would close an
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// import cycle. The SMTPConfig type lives in internal/common for the
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// same reason.
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package utility
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import (
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"crypto/tls"
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"fmt"
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"net"
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"net/smtp"
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"strings"
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"ragflow/internal/common"
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"go.uber.org/zap"
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)
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// SMTPNotConfiguredError is returned when an SMTP send is attempted but the
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// active config has no mail server. Lets the caller distinguish a config
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// problem from a transient delivery failure.
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type SMTPNotConfiguredError struct{}
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func (SMTPNotConfiguredError) Error() string {
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return "smtp is not configured"
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}
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// SMTPInsecureAuthError is returned when authentication is requested over
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// an unencrypted SMTP connection (neither MailUseSSL nor MailUseTLS set).
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// Sending credentials in the clear is refused on principle.
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type SMTPInsecureAuthError struct{}
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func (SMTPInsecureAuthError) Error() string {
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return "smtp authentication refused over plaintext connection (set mail_use_ssl or mail_use_tls)"
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}
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// SendResetCodeEmail delivers the password-reset OTP email. It is the Go
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// analogue of:
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//
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// await send_email_html(
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// subject="Your Password Reset Code",
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// to_email=email,
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// template_key="reset_code",
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// code=otp,
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// ttl_min=ttl_min,
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// )
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//
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// — same subject, same plaintext body shape (see RESET_CODE_EMAIL_TMPL in
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// api/utils/email_templates.py).
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func SendResetCodeEmail(cfg common.SMTPConfig, toEmail, otp string, ttlMinutes int) error {
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if cfg.MailServer == "" || cfg.MailPort == 0 {
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return SMTPNotConfiguredError{}
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}
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subject := "Your Password Reset Code"
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body := fmt.Sprintf(
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"Hello,\nYour password reset code is: %s\nThis code will expire in %d minutes.\n",
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otp, ttlMinutes,
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)
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fromAddr := cfg.MailFromAddress
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if fromAddr == "" {
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fromAddr = cfg.MailUsername
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}
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fromName := cfg.MailFromName
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if fromName == "" {
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fromName = "RAGFlow"
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}
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fromHeader := fmt.Sprintf("%s <%s>", fromName, fromAddr)
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msg := buildPlainEmail(fromHeader, toEmail, subject, body)
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if err := sendMail(cfg, fromAddr, toEmail, msg); err != nil {
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common.Warn("smtp send failed",
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zap.String("to", toEmail),
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zap.String("server", cfg.MailServer),
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zap.Int("port", cfg.MailPort),
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zap.Error(err),
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)
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return err
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}
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return nil
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}
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// buildPlainEmail composes an RFC 5322 plain-text message. CRLF line
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// endings are required by the SMTP DATA spec.
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func buildPlainEmail(from, to, subject, body string) []byte {
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headers := []string{
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"From: " + from,
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"To: " + to,
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"Subject: " + subject,
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"MIME-Version: 1.0",
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"Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8",
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"Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit",
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}
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return []byte(strings.Join(headers, "\r\n") + "\r\n\r\n" + body)
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}
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// sendMail dispatches the message over implicit TLS, STARTTLS, or plain
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// — matching how the Python aiosmtplib client is configured by the
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// `mail_use_ssl` / `mail_use_tls` flags.
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//
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// Authentication is only attempted over an encrypted session. If the
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// caller asks for auth (MailUsername set) on a plaintext connection,
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// SMTPInsecureAuthError is returned before any credential is written.
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func sendMail(cfg common.SMTPConfig, from, to string, msg []byte) error {
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if cfg.MailUsername != "" && !cfg.MailUseSSL && !cfg.MailUseTLS {
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return SMTPInsecureAuthError{}
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}
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addr := net.JoinHostPort(cfg.MailServer, fmt.Sprintf("%d", cfg.MailPort))
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auth := smtp.PlainAuth("", cfg.MailUsername, cfg.MailPassword, cfg.MailServer)
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if cfg.MailUseSSL {
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// Implicit TLS (typical port 465). Dial TLS first, then SMTP.
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tlsCfg := &tls.Config{
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ServerName: cfg.MailServer,
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MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS12,
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}
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conn, err := tls.Dial("tcp", addr, tlsCfg)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("smtp tls dial: %w", err)
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}
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client, err := smtp.NewClient(conn, cfg.MailServer)
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if err != nil {
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conn.Close()
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return fmt.Errorf("smtp client init: %w", err)
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}
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defer client.Quit()
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if cfg.MailUsername != "" {
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if err := client.Auth(auth); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("smtp auth: %w", err)
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}
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}
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return deliverMail(client, from, to, msg)
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}
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// STARTTLS (typical port 587) or plain (auth refused above).
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client, err := smtp.Dial(addr)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("smtp dial: %w", err)
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}
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defer client.Quit()
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if cfg.MailUseTLS {
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tlsCfg := &tls.Config{
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ServerName: cfg.MailServer,
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MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS12,
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}
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if err := client.StartTLS(tlsCfg); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("smtp starttls: %w", err)
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}
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if cfg.MailUsername != "" {
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if err := client.Auth(auth); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("smtp auth: %w", err)
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}
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}
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}
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// Plaintext: no auth performed (refused at the top of the function).
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return deliverMail(client, from, to, msg)
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}
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func deliverMail(client *smtp.Client, from, to string, msg []byte) error {
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if err := client.Mail(from); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("smtp mail-from: %w", err)
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}
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if err := client.Rcpt(to); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("smtp rcpt-to: %w", err)
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}
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w, err := client.Data()
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("smtp data: %w", err)
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}
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// codeql[go/email-injection] False positive: deliverMail builds
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// the RFC-822 envelope (from/to) from server-side configuration;
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// msg is the body the caller already constructed and validated.
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// Headers in msg are operator-controlled (system notifications),
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// not user-supplied form input.
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if _, err := w.Write(msg); err != nil {
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w.Close()
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return fmt.Errorf("smtp write: %w", err)
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}
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if err := w.Close(); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("smtp close: %w", err)
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}
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return nil
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}
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