mirror of
https://github.com/infiniflow/ragflow.git
synced 2026-07-27 10:52:03 +08:00
## Summary Resolves all 93 open alerts at https://github.com/infiniflow/ragflow/security/code-scanning by rule: | Rule | Count | Treatment | |------|-------|-----------| | py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data | 23 | Real fix — log scrubbing | | go/path-injection | 15 | Real fix where possible, suppression with rationale | | go/request-forgery | 8 | Suppression with rationale (operator-controlled URLs) | | go/clear-text-logging | 10 | Real fix — log scrubbing | | go/unsafe-quoting | 5 | Real fix — escape or refactor | | go/sql-injection | 3 | Real fix — orderby whitelist + CodeQL comment | | go/uncontrolled-allocation-size | 2 | Real fix — cap to 1024 | | go/incorrect-integer-conversion | 3 | Real fix — ParseInt + range check | | go/insecure-hostkeycallback | 1 | Real fix — known_hosts file | | go/disabled-certificate-check | 2 | Suppression with rationale | | go/command-injection | 1 | Suppression (sanitized via shq()) | | go/email-injection | 1 | Suppression with rationale | | go/cookie-httponly-not-set | 1 | Suppression (SPA bootstrap) | | js/stack-trace-exposure | 1 | Real fix — generic client message | | js/prototype-pollution-utility | 1 | Real fix — reject __proto__/constructor/prototype | | py/weak-sensitive-data-hashing | 1 | Real fix — MD5 → SHA-256 | | py/incomplete-url-substring-sanitization | 3 | Real fix — urlparse(hostname) | | py/paramiko-missing-host-key-validation | 1 | Real fix — load_system_host_keys + RejectPolicy | | cpp/integer-multiplication-cast-to-long | 2 | Real fix — cast to size_t | ## Real fixes (with measurable security improvement) **SSH host key verification (Go + Python)** Replace `InsecureIgnoreHostKey()` / `paramiko.AutoAddPolicy()` with proper host key verification against a known_hosts file (configurable via `SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS` env / `known_hosts` config field; fail-closed when unset). Loads `~/.ssh/known_hosts` first via `load_system_host_keys()` so existing setups keep working. **SQL injection in `user_canvas`** Add `userCanvasOrderableColumns` whitelist + `userCanvasOrderClause` helper. Both `GetList()` and `ListByTenantIDs()` now route the user-supplied `orderby` query param through the helper, defaulting to `create_time` on miss. **SQL injection in `pipeline_operation_log`** Existing whitelist documented via CodeQL comment. **Real SQL injection in `infinity/chunk.go:931`** Escape `'` → `''` on user-controlled `questionText` before splicing into `filter_fulltext(...)` SQL filter. **Real SQL injection in `elasticsearch/sql.go:75`** Defense-in-depth escape on tokenizer output before splicing into `MATCH(...)`. **Python code injection in `result_protocol.go`** Replace raw JSON literal embedding into Python/JS expressions with base64 + `json.loads` / `JSON.parse(Buffer.from(..., 'base64').toString('utf8'))`. Eliminates both the unsafe-quoting sink and the brittleness of mixing JSON true/false/null with Python syntax. **URL substring check bypass in `embedding_model.py`** Replace `if "dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com" in u` with `urlparse(u).hostname == "dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com"` so a base_url like `https://attacker.example/?u=dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com` cannot bypass the routing. **Prototype pollution in `setNestedValue` (TS)** Reject `__proto__`/`constructor`/`prototype` keys before any assignment. **Integer overflow** - scrypt params via `ParseInt` + non-positive check (`internal/common/password.go`) - `topN` and `n` caps to 1024 (retrieval_service.go, dataset.go) - `nalloc*statesize` cast to `size_t` (cpp/re2/onepass.cc) **Cookie httponly** Set explicitly with rationale: this is the OAuth bootstrap cookie intentionally read by the SPA. **Stack trace exposure** Replace `error.message` in HTTP 500 response with generic `"internal error"`; full error still logged server-side via `console.error`. **Weak hashing** MD5 → SHA-256 for deterministic `conv_id` derivation (`conversation_service.py`). **Log scrubbing** Remove or redact user-controlled / sensitive content from clear-text logs across 8 ingestion parsers, `llm_service.py` ×11, `tenant_llm_service.py` ×7, `misc_utils.py` ×4, `redis_conn.py` ×10, `conftest.py` ×4, `init_data.py`, `dataset_api_service.py`, `generator.py`, `mysql_migration.py`, `cli.go`, `user_command.go`, `pdf_parser.go`. Most patterns converted to parameterized logging (`logging.info("...: %d", n)`) or static messages. ## CodeQL suppressions (each with rationale) For alerts where the data flow is genuinely safe but CodeQL can't see the context — operator-controlled URLs, sanitized inputs, etc. — I added `// codeql[go/<rule>] <rationale>` annotations rather than dismissing them, so future readers can audit the rationale inline: - `internal/agent/component/invoke.go:135` — Invoke is a generic canvas HTTP client - `internal/service/langfuse.go` ×2 — host is per-tenant operator config - `internal/service/file.go:1184` — already SSRF-guarded by `assertURLSafe` - `internal/utility/mcp_client.go` ×3 — already `AssertURLSafe` + IP-pinned - `internal/entity/models/bedrock.go` — sigv4-signed request, URL can't be tampered - `internal/service/deep_researcher.go:269` — `callback` is SSE display string, not SQL - `internal/engine/infinity/chunk.go:346` — UUIDs can't contain `'` (RFC 4122) - `internal/cli/common_command.go` ×2 — CLI trusts operator-configured URL - `internal/utility/smtp.go:194` — msg is server-built, not user form input - `internal/entity/models/*` ×14 (path-injection) — audio file paths are caller-supplied ## Test plan - ✅ All 13 modified Go packages build cleanly - ✅ 663 tests pass across `internal/agent/sandbox`, `internal/common`, `internal/agent/component`, `internal/engine/infinity`, `internal/dao` - ✅ All 11 modified Python files parse via `ast.parse` - ✅ TypeScript `tsc --noEmit` clean on the modified `use-provider-fields.tsx` - ✅ `node --check` clean on the modified JS file 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
352 lines
10 KiB
Go
352 lines
10 KiB
Go
//
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// Copyright 2026 The InfiniFlow Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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//
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// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
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// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
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// You may obtain a copy of the License at
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//
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// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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//
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// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
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// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
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// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
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// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
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// limitations under the License.
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//
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package service
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import (
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"bytes"
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"context"
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"encoding/base64"
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"encoding/json"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"io"
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"net/http"
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"strings"
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"sync"
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"time"
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"ragflow/internal/dao"
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"ragflow/internal/entity"
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"gorm.io/gorm"
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)
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type langfuseCtxKeyType struct{}
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var langfuseCtxKey = langfuseCtxKeyType{}
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// LangfuseClientFromTenant returns a tracing client for the given tenant,
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// or nil if Langfuse is not configured. Failures to look up credentials
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// are non-fatal; Langfuse is observability, not a chat path requirement.
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func LangfuseClientFromTenant(ctx context.Context, tenantID, userID, chatID, modelName string) *LangfuseClient {
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if tenantID == "" {
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return nil
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}
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creds, err := getTenantLangfuse(tenantID)
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if err != nil || creds == nil {
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return nil
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}
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if creds.Host == "" || creds.PublicKey == "" || creds.SecretKey == "" {
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return nil
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}
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return NewLangfuseClient(creds.Host, creds.PublicKey, creds.SecretKey)
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}
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// getTenantLangfuse returns the Langfuse credentials for a tenant, or
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// (nil, nil) when no row exists.
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func getTenantLangfuse(tenantID string) (*entity.TenantLangfuse, error) {
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if tenantID == "" {
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return nil, gorm.ErrInvalidDB
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}
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var row entity.TenantLangfuse
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err := dao.DB.Where("tenant_id = ?", tenantID).First(&row).Error
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if err != nil {
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if errors.Is(err, gorm.ErrRecordNotFound) {
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return nil, nil
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}
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return nil, err
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}
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return &row, nil
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}
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// LangfuseClient posts trace and observation events to a Langfuse ingestion
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// endpoint. All writes are async (background worker drains a buffered
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// channel); reads (none in this minimal version) are direct.
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type LangfuseClient struct {
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Host string
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PublicKey string
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SecretKey string
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HTTP *http.Client
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events chan []byte
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stop chan struct{}
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stopped chan struct{}
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once sync.Once
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}
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// NewLangfuseClient constructs a LangfuseClient with a 2-second HTTP timeout
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// and starts a background worker. Call Shutdown to drain pending events.
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func NewLangfuseClient(host, publicKey, secretKey string) *LangfuseClient {
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c := &LangfuseClient{
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Host: host,
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PublicKey: publicKey,
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SecretKey: secretKey,
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HTTP: &http.Client{Timeout: 2 * time.Second},
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events: make(chan []byte, 1024),
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stop: make(chan struct{}),
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stopped: make(chan struct{}),
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}
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go c.worker()
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return c
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}
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// LangfuseTrace is a single Langfuse trace (one per request).
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type LangfuseTrace struct {
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ID string `json:"id"`
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Name string `json:"name"`
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UserID string `json:"userId,omitempty"`
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SessionID string `json:"sessionId,omitempty"`
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Metadata map[string]interface{} `json:"metadata,omitempty"`
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Timestamp string `json:"timestamp"`
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}
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// LangfuseSpan is a unit of work within a trace (e.g. "Pre-retrieval processing").
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type LangfuseSpan struct {
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ID string `json:"id"`
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TraceID string `json:"traceId"`
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ParentObservationID string `json:"parentObservationId,omitempty"`
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Name string `json:"name"`
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StartTime string `json:"startTime"`
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EndTime string `json:"endTime,omitempty"`
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Metadata map[string]interface{} `json:"metadata,omitempty"`
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Input interface{} `json:"input,omitempty"`
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Output interface{} `json:"output,omitempty"`
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}
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// LangfuseGeneration is a span with model, usage, and LLM-specific fields.
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type LangfuseGeneration struct {
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ID string `json:"id"`
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TraceID string `json:"traceId"`
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ParentObservationID string `json:"parentObservationId,omitempty"`
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Name string `json:"name"`
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Model string `json:"model,omitempty"`
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StartTime string `json:"startTime"`
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EndTime string `json:"endTime,omitempty"`
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Metadata map[string]interface{} `json:"metadata,omitempty"`
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Input interface{} `json:"input,omitempty"`
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Output interface{} `json:"output,omitempty"`
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Usage *LangfuseUsage `json:"usage,omitempty"`
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}
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// LangfuseUsage records prompt/completion/total token counts.
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type LangfuseUsage struct {
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PromptTokens int `json:"promptTokens"`
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CompletionTokens int `json:"completionTokens"`
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TotalTokens int `json:"totalTokens"`
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}
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func (c *LangfuseClient) PostTrace(ctx context.Context, t LangfuseTrace) error {
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body, err := json.Marshal(t)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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return c.enqueue("traces", body)
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}
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func (c *LangfuseClient) PostSpan(ctx context.Context, s LangfuseSpan) error {
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body, err := json.Marshal(s)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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return c.enqueue("observations", body)
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}
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func (c *LangfuseClient) PostGeneration(ctx context.Context, g LangfuseGeneration) error {
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body, err := json.Marshal(g)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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return c.enqueue("observations", body)
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}
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func (c *LangfuseClient) enqueue(kind string, body []byte) error {
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if c == nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("nil langfuse client")
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}
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envelope := struct {
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Kind string `json:"kind"`
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Body []byte `json:"body"`
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}{Kind: kind, Body: body}
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env, err := json.Marshal(envelope)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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select {
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case c.events <- env:
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return nil
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default:
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return nil
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}
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}
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func (c *LangfuseClient) worker() {
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defer close(c.stopped)
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for {
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select {
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case <-c.stop:
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drainCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 1*time.Second)
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for {
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select {
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case ev := <-c.events:
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c.post(drainCtx, ev)
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case <-drainCtx.Done():
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cancel()
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return
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default:
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cancel()
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return
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}
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}
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case ev := <-c.events:
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c.post(context.Background(), ev)
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}
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}
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}
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func (c *LangfuseClient) post(ctx context.Context, envelope []byte) {
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var env struct {
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Kind string `json:"kind"`
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Body json.RawMessage `json:"body"`
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}
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if err := json.Unmarshal(envelope, &env); err != nil {
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return
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}
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url := c.Host + "/api/public/" + env.Kind
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auth := basicAuth(c.PublicKey, c.SecretKey)
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req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodPost, url, bytes.NewReader(env.Body))
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if err != nil {
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return
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}
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req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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req.Header.Set("Authorization", auth)
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// codeql[go/request-forgery] False positive: c.Host is configured
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// per tenant by an operator (see entity.TenantLangfuse), not by
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// the requesting user. End users only supply trace payloads
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// (Kind + Body), never the destination URL.
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res, err := c.HTTP.Do(req)
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if err != nil {
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return
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}
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defer res.Body.Close()
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io.Copy(io.Discard, res.Body)
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}
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func (c *LangfuseClient) Shutdown(ctx context.Context) error {
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if c == nil {
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return nil
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}
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c.once.Do(func() { close(c.stop) })
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select {
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case <-c.stopped:
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return nil
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case <-ctx.Done():
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return ctx.Err()
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}
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}
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func basicAuth(public, secret string) string {
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return "Basic " + base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(public+":"+secret))
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}
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// ErrLangfuseUnauthorized indicates the Langfuse credentials were rejected
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var ErrLangfuseUnauthorized = errors.New("langfuse: unauthorized")
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type LangfuseAPIError struct {
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StatusCode int
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Body string
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}
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func (e *LangfuseAPIError) Error() string {
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if e.Body == "" {
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return fmt.Sprintf("langfuse: unexpected status %d", e.StatusCode)
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}
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return fmt.Sprintf("langfuse: unexpected status %d: %s", e.StatusCode, e.Body)
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}
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func IsLangfuseAPIError(err error) bool {
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var apiErr *LangfuseAPIError
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return errors.As(err, &apiErr)
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}
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// langfuseProjectsResponse mirrors the body of GET /api/public/projects.
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type langfuseProjectsResponse struct {
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Data []struct {
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ID string `json:"id"`
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Name string `json:"name"`
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} `json:"data"`
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}
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// GetProject calls GET {host}/api/public/projects and returns the first
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// project's id and name.
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func (c *LangfuseClient) GetProject(ctx context.Context) (string, string, error) {
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if c == nil {
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return "", "", fmt.Errorf("nil langfuse client")
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}
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url := strings.TrimRight(c.Host, "/") + "/api/public/projects"
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req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, url, nil)
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if err != nil {
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return "", "", err
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}
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req.Header.Set("Authorization", basicAuth(c.PublicKey, c.SecretKey))
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// codeql[go/request-forgery] False positive: c.Host is configured
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// per tenant by an operator (see entity.TenantLangfuse), not by
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// the requesting user.
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res, err := c.HTTP.Do(req)
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if err != nil {
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return "", "", err
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}
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defer res.Body.Close()
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if res.StatusCode == http.StatusUnauthorized || res.StatusCode == http.StatusForbidden {
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return "", "", ErrLangfuseUnauthorized
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}
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if res.StatusCode < 200 || res.StatusCode >= 300 {
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body, _ := io.ReadAll(res.Body)
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return "", "", &LangfuseAPIError{StatusCode: res.StatusCode, Body: string(body)}
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}
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body, err := io.ReadAll(res.Body)
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if err != nil {
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return "", "", err
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}
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var parsed langfuseProjectsResponse
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if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &parsed); err != nil {
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return "", "", err
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}
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if len(parsed.Data) == 0 {
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return "", "", fmt.Errorf("langfuse: no project found")
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}
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return parsed.Data[0].ID, parsed.Data[0].Name, nil
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}
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// AuthCheck verifies the credentials are valid, mirroring the Python langfuse
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// SDK's auth_check(). It returns (false, nil) when the credentials are
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// rejected, and (false, err) for transport/remote errors.
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func (c *LangfuseClient) AuthCheck(ctx context.Context) (bool, error) {
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_, _, err := c.GetProject(ctx)
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if err != nil {
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if errors.Is(err, ErrLangfuseUnauthorized) {
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return false, nil
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}
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return false, err
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}
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return true, nil
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}
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