Files
ragflow/internal/service/langfuse.go
Zhichang Yu 195bfffb5e fix(security): address 93 CodeQL code-scanning alerts across 61 files (#16407)
## Summary

Resolves all 93 open alerts at
https://github.com/infiniflow/ragflow/security/code-scanning by rule:

| Rule | Count | Treatment |
|------|-------|-----------|
| py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data | 23 | Real fix — log scrubbing |
| go/path-injection | 15 | Real fix where possible, suppression with
rationale |
| go/request-forgery | 8 | Suppression with rationale
(operator-controlled URLs) |
| go/clear-text-logging | 10 | Real fix — log scrubbing |
| go/unsafe-quoting | 5 | Real fix — escape or refactor |
| go/sql-injection | 3 | Real fix — orderby whitelist + CodeQL comment |
| go/uncontrolled-allocation-size | 2 | Real fix — cap to 1024 |
| go/incorrect-integer-conversion | 3 | Real fix — ParseInt + range
check |
| go/insecure-hostkeycallback | 1 | Real fix — known_hosts file |
| go/disabled-certificate-check | 2 | Suppression with rationale |
| go/command-injection | 1 | Suppression (sanitized via shq()) |
| go/email-injection | 1 | Suppression with rationale |
| go/cookie-httponly-not-set | 1 | Suppression (SPA bootstrap) |
| js/stack-trace-exposure | 1 | Real fix — generic client message |
| js/prototype-pollution-utility | 1 | Real fix — reject
__proto__/constructor/prototype |
| py/weak-sensitive-data-hashing | 1 | Real fix — MD5 → SHA-256 |
| py/incomplete-url-substring-sanitization | 3 | Real fix —
urlparse(hostname) |
| py/paramiko-missing-host-key-validation | 1 | Real fix —
load_system_host_keys + RejectPolicy |
| cpp/integer-multiplication-cast-to-long | 2 | Real fix — cast to
size_t |

## Real fixes (with measurable security improvement)

**SSH host key verification (Go + Python)**  
Replace `InsecureIgnoreHostKey()` / `paramiko.AutoAddPolicy()` with
proper host key verification against a known_hosts file (configurable
via `SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS` env / `known_hosts` config field; fail-closed when
unset). Loads `~/.ssh/known_hosts` first via `load_system_host_keys()`
so existing setups keep working.

**SQL injection in `user_canvas`**  
Add `userCanvasOrderableColumns` whitelist + `userCanvasOrderClause`
helper. Both `GetList()` and `ListByTenantIDs()` now route the
user-supplied `orderby` query param through the helper, defaulting to
`create_time` on miss.

**SQL injection in `pipeline_operation_log`**  
Existing whitelist documented via CodeQL comment.

**Real SQL injection in `infinity/chunk.go:931`**  
Escape `'` → `''` on user-controlled `questionText` before splicing into
`filter_fulltext(...)` SQL filter.

**Real SQL injection in `elasticsearch/sql.go:75`**  
Defense-in-depth escape on tokenizer output before splicing into
`MATCH(...)`.

**Python code injection in `result_protocol.go`**  
Replace raw JSON literal embedding into Python/JS expressions with
base64 + `json.loads` / `JSON.parse(Buffer.from(...,
'base64').toString('utf8'))`. Eliminates both the unsafe-quoting sink
and the brittleness of mixing JSON true/false/null with Python syntax.

**URL substring check bypass in `embedding_model.py`**  
Replace `if "dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com" in u` with
`urlparse(u).hostname == "dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com"` so a base_url
like `https://attacker.example/?u=dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com` cannot
bypass the routing.

**Prototype pollution in `setNestedValue` (TS)**  
Reject `__proto__`/`constructor`/`prototype` keys before any assignment.

**Integer overflow**  
- scrypt params via `ParseInt` + non-positive check
(`internal/common/password.go`)
- `topN` and `n` caps to 1024 (retrieval_service.go, dataset.go)
- `nalloc*statesize` cast to `size_t` (cpp/re2/onepass.cc)

**Cookie httponly**  
Set explicitly with rationale: this is the OAuth bootstrap cookie
intentionally read by the SPA.

**Stack trace exposure**  
Replace `error.message` in HTTP 500 response with generic `"internal
error"`; full error still logged server-side via `console.error`.

**Weak hashing**  
MD5 → SHA-256 for deterministic `conv_id` derivation
(`conversation_service.py`).

**Log scrubbing**  
Remove or redact user-controlled / sensitive content from clear-text
logs across 8 ingestion parsers, `llm_service.py` ×11,
`tenant_llm_service.py` ×7, `misc_utils.py` ×4, `redis_conn.py` ×10,
`conftest.py` ×4, `init_data.py`, `dataset_api_service.py`,
`generator.py`, `mysql_migration.py`, `cli.go`, `user_command.go`,
`pdf_parser.go`. Most patterns converted to parameterized logging
(`logging.info("...: %d", n)`) or static messages.

## CodeQL suppressions (each with rationale)

For alerts where the data flow is genuinely safe but CodeQL can't see
the context — operator-controlled URLs, sanitized inputs, etc. — I added
`// codeql[go/<rule>] <rationale>` annotations rather than dismissing
them, so future readers can audit the rationale inline:

- `internal/agent/component/invoke.go:135` — Invoke is a generic canvas
HTTP client
- `internal/service/langfuse.go` ×2 — host is per-tenant operator config
- `internal/service/file.go:1184` — already SSRF-guarded by
`assertURLSafe`
- `internal/utility/mcp_client.go` ×3 — already `AssertURLSafe` +
IP-pinned
- `internal/entity/models/bedrock.go` — sigv4-signed request, URL can't
be tampered
- `internal/service/deep_researcher.go:269` — `callback` is SSE display
string, not SQL
- `internal/engine/infinity/chunk.go:346` — UUIDs can't contain `'` (RFC
4122)
- `internal/cli/common_command.go` ×2 — CLI trusts operator-configured
URL
- `internal/utility/smtp.go:194` — msg is server-built, not user form
input
- `internal/entity/models/*` ×14 (path-injection) — audio file paths are
caller-supplied

## Test plan

-  All 13 modified Go packages build cleanly
-  663 tests pass across `internal/agent/sandbox`, `internal/common`,
`internal/agent/component`, `internal/engine/infinity`, `internal/dao`
-  All 11 modified Python files parse via `ast.parse`
-  TypeScript `tsc --noEmit` clean on the modified
`use-provider-fields.tsx`
-  `node --check` clean on the modified JS file

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
2026-06-29 09:45:16 +08:00

352 lines
10 KiB
Go

//
// Copyright 2026 The InfiniFlow Authors. All Rights Reserved.
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
//
package service
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
"ragflow/internal/dao"
"ragflow/internal/entity"
"gorm.io/gorm"
)
type langfuseCtxKeyType struct{}
var langfuseCtxKey = langfuseCtxKeyType{}
// LangfuseClientFromTenant returns a tracing client for the given tenant,
// or nil if Langfuse is not configured. Failures to look up credentials
// are non-fatal; Langfuse is observability, not a chat path requirement.
func LangfuseClientFromTenant(ctx context.Context, tenantID, userID, chatID, modelName string) *LangfuseClient {
if tenantID == "" {
return nil
}
creds, err := getTenantLangfuse(tenantID)
if err != nil || creds == nil {
return nil
}
if creds.Host == "" || creds.PublicKey == "" || creds.SecretKey == "" {
return nil
}
return NewLangfuseClient(creds.Host, creds.PublicKey, creds.SecretKey)
}
// getTenantLangfuse returns the Langfuse credentials for a tenant, or
// (nil, nil) when no row exists.
func getTenantLangfuse(tenantID string) (*entity.TenantLangfuse, error) {
if tenantID == "" {
return nil, gorm.ErrInvalidDB
}
var row entity.TenantLangfuse
err := dao.DB.Where("tenant_id = ?", tenantID).First(&row).Error
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, gorm.ErrRecordNotFound) {
return nil, nil
}
return nil, err
}
return &row, nil
}
// LangfuseClient posts trace and observation events to a Langfuse ingestion
// endpoint. All writes are async (background worker drains a buffered
// channel); reads (none in this minimal version) are direct.
type LangfuseClient struct {
Host string
PublicKey string
SecretKey string
HTTP *http.Client
events chan []byte
stop chan struct{}
stopped chan struct{}
once sync.Once
}
// NewLangfuseClient constructs a LangfuseClient with a 2-second HTTP timeout
// and starts a background worker. Call Shutdown to drain pending events.
func NewLangfuseClient(host, publicKey, secretKey string) *LangfuseClient {
c := &LangfuseClient{
Host: host,
PublicKey: publicKey,
SecretKey: secretKey,
HTTP: &http.Client{Timeout: 2 * time.Second},
events: make(chan []byte, 1024),
stop: make(chan struct{}),
stopped: make(chan struct{}),
}
go c.worker()
return c
}
// LangfuseTrace is a single Langfuse trace (one per request).
type LangfuseTrace struct {
ID string `json:"id"`
Name string `json:"name"`
UserID string `json:"userId,omitempty"`
SessionID string `json:"sessionId,omitempty"`
Metadata map[string]interface{} `json:"metadata,omitempty"`
Timestamp string `json:"timestamp"`
}
// LangfuseSpan is a unit of work within a trace (e.g. "Pre-retrieval processing").
type LangfuseSpan struct {
ID string `json:"id"`
TraceID string `json:"traceId"`
ParentObservationID string `json:"parentObservationId,omitempty"`
Name string `json:"name"`
StartTime string `json:"startTime"`
EndTime string `json:"endTime,omitempty"`
Metadata map[string]interface{} `json:"metadata,omitempty"`
Input interface{} `json:"input,omitempty"`
Output interface{} `json:"output,omitempty"`
}
// LangfuseGeneration is a span with model, usage, and LLM-specific fields.
type LangfuseGeneration struct {
ID string `json:"id"`
TraceID string `json:"traceId"`
ParentObservationID string `json:"parentObservationId,omitempty"`
Name string `json:"name"`
Model string `json:"model,omitempty"`
StartTime string `json:"startTime"`
EndTime string `json:"endTime,omitempty"`
Metadata map[string]interface{} `json:"metadata,omitempty"`
Input interface{} `json:"input,omitempty"`
Output interface{} `json:"output,omitempty"`
Usage *LangfuseUsage `json:"usage,omitempty"`
}
// LangfuseUsage records prompt/completion/total token counts.
type LangfuseUsage struct {
PromptTokens int `json:"promptTokens"`
CompletionTokens int `json:"completionTokens"`
TotalTokens int `json:"totalTokens"`
}
func (c *LangfuseClient) PostTrace(ctx context.Context, t LangfuseTrace) error {
body, err := json.Marshal(t)
if err != nil {
return err
}
return c.enqueue("traces", body)
}
func (c *LangfuseClient) PostSpan(ctx context.Context, s LangfuseSpan) error {
body, err := json.Marshal(s)
if err != nil {
return err
}
return c.enqueue("observations", body)
}
func (c *LangfuseClient) PostGeneration(ctx context.Context, g LangfuseGeneration) error {
body, err := json.Marshal(g)
if err != nil {
return err
}
return c.enqueue("observations", body)
}
func (c *LangfuseClient) enqueue(kind string, body []byte) error {
if c == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("nil langfuse client")
}
envelope := struct {
Kind string `json:"kind"`
Body []byte `json:"body"`
}{Kind: kind, Body: body}
env, err := json.Marshal(envelope)
if err != nil {
return err
}
select {
case c.events <- env:
return nil
default:
return nil
}
}
func (c *LangfuseClient) worker() {
defer close(c.stopped)
for {
select {
case <-c.stop:
drainCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 1*time.Second)
for {
select {
case ev := <-c.events:
c.post(drainCtx, ev)
case <-drainCtx.Done():
cancel()
return
default:
cancel()
return
}
}
case ev := <-c.events:
c.post(context.Background(), ev)
}
}
}
func (c *LangfuseClient) post(ctx context.Context, envelope []byte) {
var env struct {
Kind string `json:"kind"`
Body json.RawMessage `json:"body"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal(envelope, &env); err != nil {
return
}
url := c.Host + "/api/public/" + env.Kind
auth := basicAuth(c.PublicKey, c.SecretKey)
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodPost, url, bytes.NewReader(env.Body))
if err != nil {
return
}
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
req.Header.Set("Authorization", auth)
// codeql[go/request-forgery] False positive: c.Host is configured
// per tenant by an operator (see entity.TenantLangfuse), not by
// the requesting user. End users only supply trace payloads
// (Kind + Body), never the destination URL.
res, err := c.HTTP.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return
}
defer res.Body.Close()
io.Copy(io.Discard, res.Body)
}
func (c *LangfuseClient) Shutdown(ctx context.Context) error {
if c == nil {
return nil
}
c.once.Do(func() { close(c.stop) })
select {
case <-c.stopped:
return nil
case <-ctx.Done():
return ctx.Err()
}
}
func basicAuth(public, secret string) string {
return "Basic " + base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(public+":"+secret))
}
// ErrLangfuseUnauthorized indicates the Langfuse credentials were rejected
var ErrLangfuseUnauthorized = errors.New("langfuse: unauthorized")
type LangfuseAPIError struct {
StatusCode int
Body string
}
func (e *LangfuseAPIError) Error() string {
if e.Body == "" {
return fmt.Sprintf("langfuse: unexpected status %d", e.StatusCode)
}
return fmt.Sprintf("langfuse: unexpected status %d: %s", e.StatusCode, e.Body)
}
func IsLangfuseAPIError(err error) bool {
var apiErr *LangfuseAPIError
return errors.As(err, &apiErr)
}
// langfuseProjectsResponse mirrors the body of GET /api/public/projects.
type langfuseProjectsResponse struct {
Data []struct {
ID string `json:"id"`
Name string `json:"name"`
} `json:"data"`
}
// GetProject calls GET {host}/api/public/projects and returns the first
// project's id and name.
func (c *LangfuseClient) GetProject(ctx context.Context) (string, string, error) {
if c == nil {
return "", "", fmt.Errorf("nil langfuse client")
}
url := strings.TrimRight(c.Host, "/") + "/api/public/projects"
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, url, nil)
if err != nil {
return "", "", err
}
req.Header.Set("Authorization", basicAuth(c.PublicKey, c.SecretKey))
// codeql[go/request-forgery] False positive: c.Host is configured
// per tenant by an operator (see entity.TenantLangfuse), not by
// the requesting user.
res, err := c.HTTP.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return "", "", err
}
defer res.Body.Close()
if res.StatusCode == http.StatusUnauthorized || res.StatusCode == http.StatusForbidden {
return "", "", ErrLangfuseUnauthorized
}
if res.StatusCode < 200 || res.StatusCode >= 300 {
body, _ := io.ReadAll(res.Body)
return "", "", &LangfuseAPIError{StatusCode: res.StatusCode, Body: string(body)}
}
body, err := io.ReadAll(res.Body)
if err != nil {
return "", "", err
}
var parsed langfuseProjectsResponse
if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &parsed); err != nil {
return "", "", err
}
if len(parsed.Data) == 0 {
return "", "", fmt.Errorf("langfuse: no project found")
}
return parsed.Data[0].ID, parsed.Data[0].Name, nil
}
// AuthCheck verifies the credentials are valid, mirroring the Python langfuse
// SDK's auth_check(). It returns (false, nil) when the credentials are
// rejected, and (false, err) for transport/remote errors.
func (c *LangfuseClient) AuthCheck(ctx context.Context) (bool, error) {
_, _, err := c.GetProject(ctx)
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, ErrLangfuseUnauthorized) {
return false, nil
}
return false, err
}
return true, nil
}