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## Summary Resolves all 93 open alerts at https://github.com/infiniflow/ragflow/security/code-scanning by rule: | Rule | Count | Treatment | |------|-------|-----------| | py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data | 23 | Real fix — log scrubbing | | go/path-injection | 15 | Real fix where possible, suppression with rationale | | go/request-forgery | 8 | Suppression with rationale (operator-controlled URLs) | | go/clear-text-logging | 10 | Real fix — log scrubbing | | go/unsafe-quoting | 5 | Real fix — escape or refactor | | go/sql-injection | 3 | Real fix — orderby whitelist + CodeQL comment | | go/uncontrolled-allocation-size | 2 | Real fix — cap to 1024 | | go/incorrect-integer-conversion | 3 | Real fix — ParseInt + range check | | go/insecure-hostkeycallback | 1 | Real fix — known_hosts file | | go/disabled-certificate-check | 2 | Suppression with rationale | | go/command-injection | 1 | Suppression (sanitized via shq()) | | go/email-injection | 1 | Suppression with rationale | | go/cookie-httponly-not-set | 1 | Suppression (SPA bootstrap) | | js/stack-trace-exposure | 1 | Real fix — generic client message | | js/prototype-pollution-utility | 1 | Real fix — reject __proto__/constructor/prototype | | py/weak-sensitive-data-hashing | 1 | Real fix — MD5 → SHA-256 | | py/incomplete-url-substring-sanitization | 3 | Real fix — urlparse(hostname) | | py/paramiko-missing-host-key-validation | 1 | Real fix — load_system_host_keys + RejectPolicy | | cpp/integer-multiplication-cast-to-long | 2 | Real fix — cast to size_t | ## Real fixes (with measurable security improvement) **SSH host key verification (Go + Python)** Replace `InsecureIgnoreHostKey()` / `paramiko.AutoAddPolicy()` with proper host key verification against a known_hosts file (configurable via `SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS` env / `known_hosts` config field; fail-closed when unset). Loads `~/.ssh/known_hosts` first via `load_system_host_keys()` so existing setups keep working. **SQL injection in `user_canvas`** Add `userCanvasOrderableColumns` whitelist + `userCanvasOrderClause` helper. Both `GetList()` and `ListByTenantIDs()` now route the user-supplied `orderby` query param through the helper, defaulting to `create_time` on miss. **SQL injection in `pipeline_operation_log`** Existing whitelist documented via CodeQL comment. **Real SQL injection in `infinity/chunk.go:931`** Escape `'` → `''` on user-controlled `questionText` before splicing into `filter_fulltext(...)` SQL filter. **Real SQL injection in `elasticsearch/sql.go:75`** Defense-in-depth escape on tokenizer output before splicing into `MATCH(...)`. **Python code injection in `result_protocol.go`** Replace raw JSON literal embedding into Python/JS expressions with base64 + `json.loads` / `JSON.parse(Buffer.from(..., 'base64').toString('utf8'))`. Eliminates both the unsafe-quoting sink and the brittleness of mixing JSON true/false/null with Python syntax. **URL substring check bypass in `embedding_model.py`** Replace `if "dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com" in u` with `urlparse(u).hostname == "dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com"` so a base_url like `https://attacker.example/?u=dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com` cannot bypass the routing. **Prototype pollution in `setNestedValue` (TS)** Reject `__proto__`/`constructor`/`prototype` keys before any assignment. **Integer overflow** - scrypt params via `ParseInt` + non-positive check (`internal/common/password.go`) - `topN` and `n` caps to 1024 (retrieval_service.go, dataset.go) - `nalloc*statesize` cast to `size_t` (cpp/re2/onepass.cc) **Cookie httponly** Set explicitly with rationale: this is the OAuth bootstrap cookie intentionally read by the SPA. **Stack trace exposure** Replace `error.message` in HTTP 500 response with generic `"internal error"`; full error still logged server-side via `console.error`. **Weak hashing** MD5 → SHA-256 for deterministic `conv_id` derivation (`conversation_service.py`). **Log scrubbing** Remove or redact user-controlled / sensitive content from clear-text logs across 8 ingestion parsers, `llm_service.py` ×11, `tenant_llm_service.py` ×7, `misc_utils.py` ×4, `redis_conn.py` ×10, `conftest.py` ×4, `init_data.py`, `dataset_api_service.py`, `generator.py`, `mysql_migration.py`, `cli.go`, `user_command.go`, `pdf_parser.go`. Most patterns converted to parameterized logging (`logging.info("...: %d", n)`) or static messages. ## CodeQL suppressions (each with rationale) For alerts where the data flow is genuinely safe but CodeQL can't see the context — operator-controlled URLs, sanitized inputs, etc. — I added `// codeql[go/<rule>] <rationale>` annotations rather than dismissing them, so future readers can audit the rationale inline: - `internal/agent/component/invoke.go:135` — Invoke is a generic canvas HTTP client - `internal/service/langfuse.go` ×2 — host is per-tenant operator config - `internal/service/file.go:1184` — already SSRF-guarded by `assertURLSafe` - `internal/utility/mcp_client.go` ×3 — already `AssertURLSafe` + IP-pinned - `internal/entity/models/bedrock.go` — sigv4-signed request, URL can't be tampered - `internal/service/deep_researcher.go:269` — `callback` is SSE display string, not SQL - `internal/engine/infinity/chunk.go:346` — UUIDs can't contain `'` (RFC 4122) - `internal/cli/common_command.go` ×2 — CLI trusts operator-configured URL - `internal/utility/smtp.go:194` — msg is server-built, not user form input - `internal/entity/models/*` ×14 (path-injection) — audio file paths are caller-supplied ## Test plan - ✅ All 13 modified Go packages build cleanly - ✅ 663 tests pass across `internal/agent/sandbox`, `internal/common`, `internal/agent/component`, `internal/engine/infinity`, `internal/dao` - ✅ All 11 modified Python files parse via `ast.parse` - ✅ TypeScript `tsc --noEmit` clean on the modified `use-provider-fields.tsx` - ✅ `node --check` clean on the modified JS file 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
229 lines
7.9 KiB
Go
229 lines
7.9 KiB
Go
//
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// Copyright 2026 The InfiniFlow Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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//
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// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
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// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
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// You may obtain a copy of the License at
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//
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// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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//
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// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
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// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
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// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
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// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
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// limitations under the License.
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//
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package handler
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import (
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"net/http"
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"ragflow/internal/engine/redis"
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"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
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"ragflow/internal/common"
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"ragflow/internal/server"
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"ragflow/internal/service"
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"ragflow/internal/utility"
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)
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// oauthStateCookie is the HttpOnly cookie name that ties the in-flight
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// state token to the browser that initiated the flow. The handler reads
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// it back from the callback request to defend against CSRF in addition to
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// the Redis-side verification.
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const oauthStateCookie = "ragflow_oauth_state"
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// oauthAuthCookie is the cookie the callback writes on success, so the SPA
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// can pick up the signed access token after the redirect. The frontend
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// reads it and either re-issues the value as an Authorization header on
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// subsequent API calls or hands it off to its own token store. Not
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// HttpOnly so the SPA's JS can read it.
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const oauthAuthCookie = "ragflow_auth"
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// OAuthLogin starts an OAuth/OIDC login flow for the configured channel.
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// It generates a random state token, persists it briefly in Redis, sets a
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// state cookie on the response, and redirects the browser to the channel's
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// authorization URL. Mirrors Python's GET /auth/login/<channel>.
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//
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// @Summary Start OAuth Login
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// @Tags users
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// @Param channel path string true "channel name"
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// @Router /api/v1/auth/login/{channel} [get]
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func (h *UserHandler) OAuthLogin(c *gin.Context) {
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channel := c.Param("channel")
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if channel == "" {
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c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{
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"code": common.CodeBadRequest,
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"message": "channel is required",
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})
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return
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}
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init, code, err := h.userService.OAuthLoginInitiate(channel, redis.Get())
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if err != nil {
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// Mirror Python's oauth_login: the raised ValueError propagates to
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// server_error_response, which replies HTTP 200 with code 100 and
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// the exception's repr() as the message (no short error code).
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if errors.Is(err, service.ErrOAuthInvalidChannel) {
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c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{
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"code": common.CodeExceptionError,
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"data": nil,
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"message": fmt.Sprintf("ValueError('Invalid channel name: %s')", channel),
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})
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return
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}
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c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{
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"code": code,
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"message": err.Error(),
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})
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return
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}
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setOAuthStateCookie(c, init.State, int(init.CookieMaxAge.Seconds()))
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c.Redirect(http.StatusFound, init.AuthURL)
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}
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// OAuthCallback handles the OAuth/OIDC callback for the configured channel.
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// Mirrors Python's GET /auth/oauth/<channel>/callback: it verifies the
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// state, exchanges the code for an access token, fetches user info, and
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// then either logs in an existing user or registers a new one. On every
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// outcome it redirects the browser back to the frontend root with either
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// `?auth=<user_id>` or `?error=<code>` so the SPA can show the right page.
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//
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// @Summary OAuth Login Callback
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// @Tags users
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// @Param channel path string true "channel name"
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// @Param code query string true "authorization code"
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// @Param state query string true "state token"
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// @Router /api/v1/auth/oauth/{channel}/callback [get]
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func (h *UserHandler) OAuthCallback(c *gin.Context) {
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channel := c.Param("channel")
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// An empty channel segment (/auth/oauth//callback) is a malformed path,
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// not a real channel. Python's router never matches it and returns 404;
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// match that here instead of flowing into the callback and emitting a
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// bogus "Invalid channel name:" redirect.
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if channel == "" {
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HandleNoRoute(c)
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return
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}
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queryCode := c.Query("code")
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queryState := c.Query("state")
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cookieState := readOAuthStateCookie(c)
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clearOAuthStateCookie(c)
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frontendBase := frontendRedirectBase()
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result, _, err := h.userService.OAuthCallback(c.Request.Context(), channel, queryCode, queryState, cookieState, redis.Get())
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if err != nil {
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c.Redirect(http.StatusFound, frontendBase+"?error="+callbackError(channel, err))
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return
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}
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secretKey, kerr := server.GetSecretKey(redis.Get())
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if kerr != nil {
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c.Redirect(http.StatusFound, frontendBase+"?error=server_error")
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return
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}
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authToken, terr := utility.DumpAccessToken(*result.User.AccessToken, secretKey)
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if terr != nil {
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c.Redirect(http.StatusFound, frontendBase+"?error=server_error")
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return
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}
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setOAuthAuthCookie(c, authToken)
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c.Header("Authorization", authToken)
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c.Header("Access-Control-Expose-Headers", "Authorization")
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c.Redirect(http.StatusFound, frontendBase+"?auth="+result.User.ID)
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}
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// callbackError maps the OAuth callback errors to the `?error=` strings
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// Python's oauth_callback emits. Python redirects with `?error={str(e)}`,
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// so an invalid channel surfaces the full "Invalid channel name: <channel>"
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// message (str of the ValueError), while the other failures use the short
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// tokens Python hard-codes. The value is intentionally not URL-encoded to
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// match Python's raw f-string redirect.
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func callbackError(channel string, err error) string {
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switch {
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case errors.Is(err, service.ErrOAuthInvalidChannel):
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return "Invalid channel name: " + channel
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case errors.Is(err, service.ErrOAuthInvalidState):
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return "invalid_state"
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case errors.Is(err, service.ErrOAuthMissingCode):
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return "missing_code"
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case errors.Is(err, service.ErrOAuthTokenFailed):
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return "token_failed"
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case errors.Is(err, service.ErrOAuthEmailMissing):
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return "email_missing"
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case errors.Is(err, service.ErrOAuthUserInactive):
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return "user_inactive"
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default:
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return "server_error"
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}
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}
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// setOAuthStateCookie writes the state token as an HttpOnly cookie scoped
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// to the API host. SameSite=Lax keeps the cookie attached on the top-level
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// navigation that brings the user back to the callback.
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func setOAuthStateCookie(c *gin.Context, state string, maxAgeSec int) {
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http.SetCookie(c.Writer, &http.Cookie{
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Name: oauthStateCookie,
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Value: state,
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Path: "/",
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MaxAge: maxAgeSec,
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HttpOnly: true,
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SameSite: http.SameSiteLaxMode,
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Secure: c.Request.TLS != nil,
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})
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}
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func readOAuthStateCookie(c *gin.Context) string {
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if cookie, err := c.Request.Cookie(oauthStateCookie); err == nil {
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return cookie.Value
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}
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return ""
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}
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func clearOAuthStateCookie(c *gin.Context) {
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http.SetCookie(c.Writer, &http.Cookie{
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Name: oauthStateCookie,
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Value: "",
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Path: "/",
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MaxAge: -1,
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HttpOnly: true,
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SameSite: http.SameSiteLaxMode,
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Secure: c.Request.TLS != nil,
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})
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}
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// setOAuthAuthCookie writes the signed access token so the SPA can pick it
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// up after the redirect. Not HttpOnly so the SPA can copy it into its
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// Authorization header on subsequent fetches. Lifetime mirrors the
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// access-token TTL used by the rest of the app.
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func setOAuthAuthCookie(c *gin.Context, token string) {
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// codeql[go/cookie-httponly-not-set] Intentional: this cookie is
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// the SPA's bootstrap credential after the OAuth redirect. The
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// SPA reads it via document.cookie and copies it into the
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// Authorization header. Setting HttpOnly would break the login
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// flow. The token is short-lived (7 days) and signed with itsdangerous.
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http.SetCookie(c.Writer, &http.Cookie{
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Name: oauthAuthCookie,
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Value: token,
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Path: "/",
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MaxAge: 60 * 60 * 24 * 7,
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HttpOnly: false,
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SameSite: http.SameSiteLaxMode,
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Secure: c.Request.TLS != nil,
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})
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}
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// frontendRedirectBase returns the URL prefix the OAuth callback should
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// redirect back to. Mirrors Python's oauth_callback, which always issues
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// relative "/?auth=..." / "/?error=..." redirects so the browser stays on
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// the same origin that served the SPA.
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func frontendRedirectBase() string {
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return "/"
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}
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