Files
ragflow/internal/handler/oauth_login.go
Zhichang Yu 195bfffb5e fix(security): address 93 CodeQL code-scanning alerts across 61 files (#16407)
## Summary

Resolves all 93 open alerts at
https://github.com/infiniflow/ragflow/security/code-scanning by rule:

| Rule | Count | Treatment |
|------|-------|-----------|
| py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data | 23 | Real fix — log scrubbing |
| go/path-injection | 15 | Real fix where possible, suppression with
rationale |
| go/request-forgery | 8 | Suppression with rationale
(operator-controlled URLs) |
| go/clear-text-logging | 10 | Real fix — log scrubbing |
| go/unsafe-quoting | 5 | Real fix — escape or refactor |
| go/sql-injection | 3 | Real fix — orderby whitelist + CodeQL comment |
| go/uncontrolled-allocation-size | 2 | Real fix — cap to 1024 |
| go/incorrect-integer-conversion | 3 | Real fix — ParseInt + range
check |
| go/insecure-hostkeycallback | 1 | Real fix — known_hosts file |
| go/disabled-certificate-check | 2 | Suppression with rationale |
| go/command-injection | 1 | Suppression (sanitized via shq()) |
| go/email-injection | 1 | Suppression with rationale |
| go/cookie-httponly-not-set | 1 | Suppression (SPA bootstrap) |
| js/stack-trace-exposure | 1 | Real fix — generic client message |
| js/prototype-pollution-utility | 1 | Real fix — reject
__proto__/constructor/prototype |
| py/weak-sensitive-data-hashing | 1 | Real fix — MD5 → SHA-256 |
| py/incomplete-url-substring-sanitization | 3 | Real fix —
urlparse(hostname) |
| py/paramiko-missing-host-key-validation | 1 | Real fix —
load_system_host_keys + RejectPolicy |
| cpp/integer-multiplication-cast-to-long | 2 | Real fix — cast to
size_t |

## Real fixes (with measurable security improvement)

**SSH host key verification (Go + Python)**  
Replace `InsecureIgnoreHostKey()` / `paramiko.AutoAddPolicy()` with
proper host key verification against a known_hosts file (configurable
via `SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS` env / `known_hosts` config field; fail-closed when
unset). Loads `~/.ssh/known_hosts` first via `load_system_host_keys()`
so existing setups keep working.

**SQL injection in `user_canvas`**  
Add `userCanvasOrderableColumns` whitelist + `userCanvasOrderClause`
helper. Both `GetList()` and `ListByTenantIDs()` now route the
user-supplied `orderby` query param through the helper, defaulting to
`create_time` on miss.

**SQL injection in `pipeline_operation_log`**  
Existing whitelist documented via CodeQL comment.

**Real SQL injection in `infinity/chunk.go:931`**  
Escape `'` → `''` on user-controlled `questionText` before splicing into
`filter_fulltext(...)` SQL filter.

**Real SQL injection in `elasticsearch/sql.go:75`**  
Defense-in-depth escape on tokenizer output before splicing into
`MATCH(...)`.

**Python code injection in `result_protocol.go`**  
Replace raw JSON literal embedding into Python/JS expressions with
base64 + `json.loads` / `JSON.parse(Buffer.from(...,
'base64').toString('utf8'))`. Eliminates both the unsafe-quoting sink
and the brittleness of mixing JSON true/false/null with Python syntax.

**URL substring check bypass in `embedding_model.py`**  
Replace `if "dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com" in u` with
`urlparse(u).hostname == "dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com"` so a base_url
like `https://attacker.example/?u=dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com` cannot
bypass the routing.

**Prototype pollution in `setNestedValue` (TS)**  
Reject `__proto__`/`constructor`/`prototype` keys before any assignment.

**Integer overflow**  
- scrypt params via `ParseInt` + non-positive check
(`internal/common/password.go`)
- `topN` and `n` caps to 1024 (retrieval_service.go, dataset.go)
- `nalloc*statesize` cast to `size_t` (cpp/re2/onepass.cc)

**Cookie httponly**  
Set explicitly with rationale: this is the OAuth bootstrap cookie
intentionally read by the SPA.

**Stack trace exposure**  
Replace `error.message` in HTTP 500 response with generic `"internal
error"`; full error still logged server-side via `console.error`.

**Weak hashing**  
MD5 → SHA-256 for deterministic `conv_id` derivation
(`conversation_service.py`).

**Log scrubbing**  
Remove or redact user-controlled / sensitive content from clear-text
logs across 8 ingestion parsers, `llm_service.py` ×11,
`tenant_llm_service.py` ×7, `misc_utils.py` ×4, `redis_conn.py` ×10,
`conftest.py` ×4, `init_data.py`, `dataset_api_service.py`,
`generator.py`, `mysql_migration.py`, `cli.go`, `user_command.go`,
`pdf_parser.go`. Most patterns converted to parameterized logging
(`logging.info("...: %d", n)`) or static messages.

## CodeQL suppressions (each with rationale)

For alerts where the data flow is genuinely safe but CodeQL can't see
the context — operator-controlled URLs, sanitized inputs, etc. — I added
`// codeql[go/<rule>] <rationale>` annotations rather than dismissing
them, so future readers can audit the rationale inline:

- `internal/agent/component/invoke.go:135` — Invoke is a generic canvas
HTTP client
- `internal/service/langfuse.go` ×2 — host is per-tenant operator config
- `internal/service/file.go:1184` — already SSRF-guarded by
`assertURLSafe`
- `internal/utility/mcp_client.go` ×3 — already `AssertURLSafe` +
IP-pinned
- `internal/entity/models/bedrock.go` — sigv4-signed request, URL can't
be tampered
- `internal/service/deep_researcher.go:269` — `callback` is SSE display
string, not SQL
- `internal/engine/infinity/chunk.go:346` — UUIDs can't contain `'` (RFC
4122)
- `internal/cli/common_command.go` ×2 — CLI trusts operator-configured
URL
- `internal/utility/smtp.go:194` — msg is server-built, not user form
input
- `internal/entity/models/*` ×14 (path-injection) — audio file paths are
caller-supplied

## Test plan

-  All 13 modified Go packages build cleanly
-  663 tests pass across `internal/agent/sandbox`, `internal/common`,
`internal/agent/component`, `internal/engine/infinity`, `internal/dao`
-  All 11 modified Python files parse via `ast.parse`
-  TypeScript `tsc --noEmit` clean on the modified
`use-provider-fields.tsx`
-  `node --check` clean on the modified JS file

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
2026-06-29 09:45:16 +08:00

229 lines
7.9 KiB
Go

//
// Copyright 2026 The InfiniFlow Authors. All Rights Reserved.
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
//
package handler
import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"ragflow/internal/engine/redis"
"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
"ragflow/internal/common"
"ragflow/internal/server"
"ragflow/internal/service"
"ragflow/internal/utility"
)
// oauthStateCookie is the HttpOnly cookie name that ties the in-flight
// state token to the browser that initiated the flow. The handler reads
// it back from the callback request to defend against CSRF in addition to
// the Redis-side verification.
const oauthStateCookie = "ragflow_oauth_state"
// oauthAuthCookie is the cookie the callback writes on success, so the SPA
// can pick up the signed access token after the redirect. The frontend
// reads it and either re-issues the value as an Authorization header on
// subsequent API calls or hands it off to its own token store. Not
// HttpOnly so the SPA's JS can read it.
const oauthAuthCookie = "ragflow_auth"
// OAuthLogin starts an OAuth/OIDC login flow for the configured channel.
// It generates a random state token, persists it briefly in Redis, sets a
// state cookie on the response, and redirects the browser to the channel's
// authorization URL. Mirrors Python's GET /auth/login/<channel>.
//
// @Summary Start OAuth Login
// @Tags users
// @Param channel path string true "channel name"
// @Router /api/v1/auth/login/{channel} [get]
func (h *UserHandler) OAuthLogin(c *gin.Context) {
channel := c.Param("channel")
if channel == "" {
c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{
"code": common.CodeBadRequest,
"message": "channel is required",
})
return
}
init, code, err := h.userService.OAuthLoginInitiate(channel, redis.Get())
if err != nil {
// Mirror Python's oauth_login: the raised ValueError propagates to
// server_error_response, which replies HTTP 200 with code 100 and
// the exception's repr() as the message (no short error code).
if errors.Is(err, service.ErrOAuthInvalidChannel) {
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{
"code": common.CodeExceptionError,
"data": nil,
"message": fmt.Sprintf("ValueError('Invalid channel name: %s')", channel),
})
return
}
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{
"code": code,
"message": err.Error(),
})
return
}
setOAuthStateCookie(c, init.State, int(init.CookieMaxAge.Seconds()))
c.Redirect(http.StatusFound, init.AuthURL)
}
// OAuthCallback handles the OAuth/OIDC callback for the configured channel.
// Mirrors Python's GET /auth/oauth/<channel>/callback: it verifies the
// state, exchanges the code for an access token, fetches user info, and
// then either logs in an existing user or registers a new one. On every
// outcome it redirects the browser back to the frontend root with either
// `?auth=<user_id>` or `?error=<code>` so the SPA can show the right page.
//
// @Summary OAuth Login Callback
// @Tags users
// @Param channel path string true "channel name"
// @Param code query string true "authorization code"
// @Param state query string true "state token"
// @Router /api/v1/auth/oauth/{channel}/callback [get]
func (h *UserHandler) OAuthCallback(c *gin.Context) {
channel := c.Param("channel")
// An empty channel segment (/auth/oauth//callback) is a malformed path,
// not a real channel. Python's router never matches it and returns 404;
// match that here instead of flowing into the callback and emitting a
// bogus "Invalid channel name:" redirect.
if channel == "" {
HandleNoRoute(c)
return
}
queryCode := c.Query("code")
queryState := c.Query("state")
cookieState := readOAuthStateCookie(c)
clearOAuthStateCookie(c)
frontendBase := frontendRedirectBase()
result, _, err := h.userService.OAuthCallback(c.Request.Context(), channel, queryCode, queryState, cookieState, redis.Get())
if err != nil {
c.Redirect(http.StatusFound, frontendBase+"?error="+callbackError(channel, err))
return
}
secretKey, kerr := server.GetSecretKey(redis.Get())
if kerr != nil {
c.Redirect(http.StatusFound, frontendBase+"?error=server_error")
return
}
authToken, terr := utility.DumpAccessToken(*result.User.AccessToken, secretKey)
if terr != nil {
c.Redirect(http.StatusFound, frontendBase+"?error=server_error")
return
}
setOAuthAuthCookie(c, authToken)
c.Header("Authorization", authToken)
c.Header("Access-Control-Expose-Headers", "Authorization")
c.Redirect(http.StatusFound, frontendBase+"?auth="+result.User.ID)
}
// callbackError maps the OAuth callback errors to the `?error=` strings
// Python's oauth_callback emits. Python redirects with `?error={str(e)}`,
// so an invalid channel surfaces the full "Invalid channel name: <channel>"
// message (str of the ValueError), while the other failures use the short
// tokens Python hard-codes. The value is intentionally not URL-encoded to
// match Python's raw f-string redirect.
func callbackError(channel string, err error) string {
switch {
case errors.Is(err, service.ErrOAuthInvalidChannel):
return "Invalid channel name: " + channel
case errors.Is(err, service.ErrOAuthInvalidState):
return "invalid_state"
case errors.Is(err, service.ErrOAuthMissingCode):
return "missing_code"
case errors.Is(err, service.ErrOAuthTokenFailed):
return "token_failed"
case errors.Is(err, service.ErrOAuthEmailMissing):
return "email_missing"
case errors.Is(err, service.ErrOAuthUserInactive):
return "user_inactive"
default:
return "server_error"
}
}
// setOAuthStateCookie writes the state token as an HttpOnly cookie scoped
// to the API host. SameSite=Lax keeps the cookie attached on the top-level
// navigation that brings the user back to the callback.
func setOAuthStateCookie(c *gin.Context, state string, maxAgeSec int) {
http.SetCookie(c.Writer, &http.Cookie{
Name: oauthStateCookie,
Value: state,
Path: "/",
MaxAge: maxAgeSec,
HttpOnly: true,
SameSite: http.SameSiteLaxMode,
Secure: c.Request.TLS != nil,
})
}
func readOAuthStateCookie(c *gin.Context) string {
if cookie, err := c.Request.Cookie(oauthStateCookie); err == nil {
return cookie.Value
}
return ""
}
func clearOAuthStateCookie(c *gin.Context) {
http.SetCookie(c.Writer, &http.Cookie{
Name: oauthStateCookie,
Value: "",
Path: "/",
MaxAge: -1,
HttpOnly: true,
SameSite: http.SameSiteLaxMode,
Secure: c.Request.TLS != nil,
})
}
// setOAuthAuthCookie writes the signed access token so the SPA can pick it
// up after the redirect. Not HttpOnly so the SPA can copy it into its
// Authorization header on subsequent fetches. Lifetime mirrors the
// access-token TTL used by the rest of the app.
func setOAuthAuthCookie(c *gin.Context, token string) {
// codeql[go/cookie-httponly-not-set] Intentional: this cookie is
// the SPA's bootstrap credential after the OAuth redirect. The
// SPA reads it via document.cookie and copies it into the
// Authorization header. Setting HttpOnly would break the login
// flow. The token is short-lived (7 days) and signed with itsdangerous.
http.SetCookie(c.Writer, &http.Cookie{
Name: oauthAuthCookie,
Value: token,
Path: "/",
MaxAge: 60 * 60 * 24 * 7,
HttpOnly: false,
SameSite: http.SameSiteLaxMode,
Secure: c.Request.TLS != nil,
})
}
// frontendRedirectBase returns the URL prefix the OAuth callback should
// redirect back to. Mirrors Python's oauth_callback, which always issues
// relative "/?auth=..." / "/?error=..." redirects so the browser stays on
// the same origin that served the SPA.
func frontendRedirectBase() string {
return "/"
}