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## Related issues Closes #15144 ### What problem does this PR solve? `POST /api/v1/agents/rerun` loaded a pipeline operation log by UUID via `PipelineOperationLogService.get_documents_info` with no authorization, then wiped chunks, reset document counters, deleted tasks, and re-queued dataflow for the victim document. Any authenticated user who knew a victim's pipeline log id could disrupt parsing on documents they did not own. ### Type of change - [x] Bug Fix (non-breaking change which fixes an issue) - [ ] New Feature (non-breaking change which adds functionality) - [ ] Documentation Update - [ ] Refactoring - [ ] Performance Improvement - [ ] Other (please describe): ### Changes | File | Change | |------|--------| | `api/apps/restful_apis/agent_api.py` | Call `DocumentService.accessible(doc["id"], tenant_id)` before destructive rerun operations; deny with generic `"Document not found."` | | `test/unit_test/api/apps/restful_apis/test_rerun_agent_authorization.py` | Unit tests: cross-tenant log rejected, missing/unauthorized same message, authorized rerun proceeds | ### Security notes - **CWE-639:** Closes cross-tenant pipeline rerun / chunk wipe via leaked log UUID. - `tenant_id` from `@add_tenant_id_to_kwargs` is `current_user.id`; `DocumentService.accessible` covers team-shared KBs. ### Test plan - [ ] `pytest test/unit_test/api/apps/restful_apis/test_rerun_agent_authorization.py` - [ ] Manual: attacker cannot rerun victim pipeline log id ```bash cd ragflow uv run pytest test/unit_test/api/apps/restful_apis/test_rerun_agent_authorization.py -q ``` --------- Co-authored-by: Zhichang Yu <yuzhichang@gmail.com>