Files
ragflow/internal/agent/sandbox/result_protocol.go
Zhichang Yu 195bfffb5e fix(security): address 93 CodeQL code-scanning alerts across 61 files (#16407)
## Summary

Resolves all 93 open alerts at
https://github.com/infiniflow/ragflow/security/code-scanning by rule:

| Rule | Count | Treatment |
|------|-------|-----------|
| py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data | 23 | Real fix — log scrubbing |
| go/path-injection | 15 | Real fix where possible, suppression with
rationale |
| go/request-forgery | 8 | Suppression with rationale
(operator-controlled URLs) |
| go/clear-text-logging | 10 | Real fix — log scrubbing |
| go/unsafe-quoting | 5 | Real fix — escape or refactor |
| go/sql-injection | 3 | Real fix — orderby whitelist + CodeQL comment |
| go/uncontrolled-allocation-size | 2 | Real fix — cap to 1024 |
| go/incorrect-integer-conversion | 3 | Real fix — ParseInt + range
check |
| go/insecure-hostkeycallback | 1 | Real fix — known_hosts file |
| go/disabled-certificate-check | 2 | Suppression with rationale |
| go/command-injection | 1 | Suppression (sanitized via shq()) |
| go/email-injection | 1 | Suppression with rationale |
| go/cookie-httponly-not-set | 1 | Suppression (SPA bootstrap) |
| js/stack-trace-exposure | 1 | Real fix — generic client message |
| js/prototype-pollution-utility | 1 | Real fix — reject
__proto__/constructor/prototype |
| py/weak-sensitive-data-hashing | 1 | Real fix — MD5 → SHA-256 |
| py/incomplete-url-substring-sanitization | 3 | Real fix —
urlparse(hostname) |
| py/paramiko-missing-host-key-validation | 1 | Real fix —
load_system_host_keys + RejectPolicy |
| cpp/integer-multiplication-cast-to-long | 2 | Real fix — cast to
size_t |

## Real fixes (with measurable security improvement)

**SSH host key verification (Go + Python)**  
Replace `InsecureIgnoreHostKey()` / `paramiko.AutoAddPolicy()` with
proper host key verification against a known_hosts file (configurable
via `SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS` env / `known_hosts` config field; fail-closed when
unset). Loads `~/.ssh/known_hosts` first via `load_system_host_keys()`
so existing setups keep working.

**SQL injection in `user_canvas`**  
Add `userCanvasOrderableColumns` whitelist + `userCanvasOrderClause`
helper. Both `GetList()` and `ListByTenantIDs()` now route the
user-supplied `orderby` query param through the helper, defaulting to
`create_time` on miss.

**SQL injection in `pipeline_operation_log`**  
Existing whitelist documented via CodeQL comment.

**Real SQL injection in `infinity/chunk.go:931`**  
Escape `'` → `''` on user-controlled `questionText` before splicing into
`filter_fulltext(...)` SQL filter.

**Real SQL injection in `elasticsearch/sql.go:75`**  
Defense-in-depth escape on tokenizer output before splicing into
`MATCH(...)`.

**Python code injection in `result_protocol.go`**  
Replace raw JSON literal embedding into Python/JS expressions with
base64 + `json.loads` / `JSON.parse(Buffer.from(...,
'base64').toString('utf8'))`. Eliminates both the unsafe-quoting sink
and the brittleness of mixing JSON true/false/null with Python syntax.

**URL substring check bypass in `embedding_model.py`**  
Replace `if "dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com" in u` with
`urlparse(u).hostname == "dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com"` so a base_url
like `https://attacker.example/?u=dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com` cannot
bypass the routing.

**Prototype pollution in `setNestedValue` (TS)**  
Reject `__proto__`/`constructor`/`prototype` keys before any assignment.

**Integer overflow**  
- scrypt params via `ParseInt` + non-positive check
(`internal/common/password.go`)
- `topN` and `n` caps to 1024 (retrieval_service.go, dataset.go)
- `nalloc*statesize` cast to `size_t` (cpp/re2/onepass.cc)

**Cookie httponly**  
Set explicitly with rationale: this is the OAuth bootstrap cookie
intentionally read by the SPA.

**Stack trace exposure**  
Replace `error.message` in HTTP 500 response with generic `"internal
error"`; full error still logged server-side via `console.error`.

**Weak hashing**  
MD5 → SHA-256 for deterministic `conv_id` derivation
(`conversation_service.py`).

**Log scrubbing**  
Remove or redact user-controlled / sensitive content from clear-text
logs across 8 ingestion parsers, `llm_service.py` ×11,
`tenant_llm_service.py` ×7, `misc_utils.py` ×4, `redis_conn.py` ×10,
`conftest.py` ×4, `init_data.py`, `dataset_api_service.py`,
`generator.py`, `mysql_migration.py`, `cli.go`, `user_command.go`,
`pdf_parser.go`. Most patterns converted to parameterized logging
(`logging.info("...: %d", n)`) or static messages.

## CodeQL suppressions (each with rationale)

For alerts where the data flow is genuinely safe but CodeQL can't see
the context — operator-controlled URLs, sanitized inputs, etc. — I added
`// codeql[go/<rule>] <rationale>` annotations rather than dismissing
them, so future readers can audit the rationale inline:

- `internal/agent/component/invoke.go:135` — Invoke is a generic canvas
HTTP client
- `internal/service/langfuse.go` ×2 — host is per-tenant operator config
- `internal/service/file.go:1184` — already SSRF-guarded by
`assertURLSafe`
- `internal/utility/mcp_client.go` ×3 — already `AssertURLSafe` +
IP-pinned
- `internal/entity/models/bedrock.go` — sigv4-signed request, URL can't
be tampered
- `internal/service/deep_researcher.go:269` — `callback` is SSE display
string, not SQL
- `internal/engine/infinity/chunk.go:346` — UUIDs can't contain `'` (RFC
4122)
- `internal/cli/common_command.go` ×2 — CLI trusts operator-configured
URL
- `internal/utility/smtp.go:194` — msg is server-built, not user form
input
- `internal/entity/models/*` ×14 (path-injection) — audio file paths are
caller-supplied

## Test plan

-  All 13 modified Go packages build cleanly
-  663 tests pass across `internal/agent/sandbox`, `internal/common`,
`internal/agent/component`, `internal/engine/infinity`, `internal/dao`
-  All 11 modified Python files parse via `ast.parse`
-  TypeScript `tsc --noEmit` clean on the modified
`use-provider-fields.tsx`
-  `node --check` clean on the modified JS file

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
2026-06-29 09:45:16 +08:00

197 lines
7.5 KiB
Go

//
// Copyright 2026 The InfiniFlow Authors. All Rights Reserved.
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
//
// result_protocol.go is the Go port of `agent/sandbox/result_protocol.py`.
//
// The contract:
//
// 1. The user's code is expected to define a `main(**args)` function
// (Python) or export a `main(args)` function (JavaScript).
// 2. The provider wraps the code in a small driver that calls main
// with the agent-supplied arguments and emits a marker line
// carrying main's return value as base64-JSON. The marker prefix
// is `__RAGFLOW_RESULT__:`. This is the ONLY line the agent code
// parser keeps from the synthesized output — the rest is the
// user's stdout, surfaced verbatim.
//
// The marker protocol is a contract with `executor_manager`
// (Python FastAPI service that runs the actual code). Renaming the
// marker is a wire-format break — `executor_manager` parses for this
// exact prefix. See `agent/sandbox/executor_manager/services/execution.py`
// for the Python side that depends on it.
package sandbox
import (
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"strings"
)
// resultMarkerPrefix is the wire-level marker the executor_manager
// Python service scans stdout for. Keep in sync with Python
// `agent/sandbox/result_protocol.py::RESULT_MARKER_PREFIX`.
const resultMarkerPrefix = "__RAGFLOW_RESULT__:"
// BuildPythonWrapper wraps a Python source so that:
//
// - When executed as `python -c <wrapped>`, the user-defined
// `main(**args)` is invoked with the JSON-decoded args.
// - main's return value is JSON-encoded, prefixed with the
// marker, and printed to stdout.
//
// argsJSON is base64-encoded and decoded inside Python via
// json.loads(base64.b64decode(...)). The base64 alphabet has no
// characters that conflict with Python syntax, so splicing the
// encoded string into a Python literal is safe. This avoids the
// fragility of embedding raw JSON directly (true/false/null vs
// Python's True/False/None) and removes the unsafe-quoting sink
// from CodeQL's view.
func BuildPythonWrapper(code, argsJSON string) string {
argsB64 := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(argsJSON))
return code + `
if __name__ == "__main__":
import base64
import json
result = main(**json.loads(base64.b64decode("` + argsB64 + `").decode("utf-8")))
payload = json.dumps({"present": True, "value": result, "type": "json"}, ensure_ascii=False, separators=(",", ":"))
print("` + resultMarkerPrefix + `" + base64.b64encode(payload.encode("utf-8")).decode("ascii"))
`
}
// BuildJavaScriptWrapper wraps a JavaScript source so that:
//
// - When executed as `node -e <wrapped>`, the user-defined
// `main(args)` (or `module.exports.main`) is awaited with the
// JSON-decoded args object.
// - main's return value is JSON-encoded, prefixed with the
// marker, and printed to stdout.
//
// JavaScript lacks a "module" boundary in `node -e`, so we look for
// `main` in (a) the global scope and (b) `module.exports.main`,
// matching the Python wrapper.
//
// argsJSON is embedded as a base64 literal (alphabet contains no JS
// syntax-significant characters) and decoded at runtime via
// JSON.parse(Buffer.from(..., 'base64').toString('utf8')), so the
// only Go-side dataflow into the JS source is the base64 string.
func BuildJavaScriptWrapper(code, argsJSON string) string {
argsB64 := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(argsJSON))
// Note: this string is *embedded inside* a Go raw string, but the
// Go raw string and the JS source are independent languages. We
// need the final JS to be valid; the doubled braces {{ }} are JS
// template-literal escapes only on the JS side. We pass them
// through as-is.
return code + `
const __ragflowArgsB64 = "` + argsB64 + `";
const __ragflowArgs = JSON.parse(Buffer.from(__ragflowArgsB64, 'base64').toString('utf8'));
(async () => {
const __ragflowMain = typeof main !== 'undefined' ? main : module.exports && module.exports.main;
if (typeof __ragflowMain !== 'function') {
throw new Error('main() must be defined or exported.');
}
const output = await Promise.resolve(__ragflowMain(__ragflowArgs));
if (typeof output === 'undefined') {
throw new Error('main() must return a value. Use null for an empty result.');
}
const payload = JSON.stringify({ present: true, value: output, type: 'json' });
if (typeof payload === 'undefined') {
throw new Error('main() returned a non-JSON-serializable value.');
}
console.log('` + resultMarkerPrefix + `' + Buffer.from(payload, 'utf8').toString('base64'));
})();
`
}
// ExtractStructuredResult scans stdout for the marker line, decodes
// the JSON payload after it, and returns the user-visible stdout
// (with the marker line removed) plus the parsed structured result.
//
// The Python side returns `(cleaned_stdout, structured_result_dict)`.
// On Go the dict is `map[string]any`.
//
// Edge cases (matching the Python implementation):
// - empty stdout → ("", empty map).
// - multiple marker lines → only the LAST one wins (later result
// overrides earlier). The Python implementation does the same
// because the loop overwrites `structured_result`.
// - undecodable payload → the marker line is kept in the cleaned
// stdout (the user gets to see the raw base64) and the map stays
// empty. Python's `except Exception: cleaned_lines.append(line)`
// does the same.
// - the trailing newline is preserved if the input had one.
func ExtractStructuredResult(stdout string) (string, map[string]any) {
if stdout == "" {
return "", map[string]any{}
}
cleanedLines := []string{}
structured := map[string]any{}
for _, line := range strings.Split(stdout, "\n") {
if strings.HasPrefix(line, resultMarkerPrefix) {
payloadB64 := strings.TrimSpace(line[len(resultMarkerPrefix):])
if payloadB64 == "" {
cleanedLines = append(cleanedLines, line)
continue
}
raw, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(payloadB64)
if err != nil {
cleanedLines = append(cleanedLines, line)
continue
}
var decoded map[string]any
if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &decoded); err != nil {
cleanedLines = append(cleanedLines, line)
continue
}
structured = decoded
continue
}
cleanedLines = append(cleanedLines, line)
}
cleaned := strings.Join(cleanedLines, "\n")
if strings.HasSuffix(stdout, "\n") && cleaned != "" && !strings.HasSuffix(cleaned, "\n") {
cleaned += "\n"
}
return cleaned, structured
}
// argsToJSON is a small helper used by the providers to build the
// args string the wrapper expects. Empty/nil maps serialize to "{}"
// so the wrapper can always json.loads safely.
func argsToJSON(args map[string]any) (string, error) {
if args == nil {
return "{}", nil
}
// json.Marshal of a nil map produces "null" — replace with "{}"
// so the wrappers see an object literal in both languages.
b, err := json.Marshal(args)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("sandbox: marshal args: %w", err)
}
if string(b) == "null" {
return "{}", nil
}
return string(b), nil
}