## Related issues
Closes#15144
### What problem does this PR solve?
`POST /api/v1/agents/rerun` loaded a pipeline operation log by UUID via
`PipelineOperationLogService.get_documents_info` with no authorization,
then wiped chunks, reset document counters, deleted tasks, and re-queued
dataflow for the victim document.
Any authenticated user who knew a victim's pipeline log id could disrupt
parsing on documents they did not own.
### Type of change
- [x] Bug Fix (non-breaking change which fixes an issue)
- [ ] New Feature (non-breaking change which adds functionality)
- [ ] Documentation Update
- [ ] Refactoring
- [ ] Performance Improvement
- [ ] Other (please describe):
### Changes
| File | Change |
|------|--------|
| `api/apps/restful_apis/agent_api.py` | Call
`DocumentService.accessible(doc["id"], tenant_id)` before destructive
rerun operations; deny with generic `"Document not found."` |
|
`test/unit_test/api/apps/restful_apis/test_rerun_agent_authorization.py`
| Unit tests: cross-tenant log rejected, missing/unauthorized same
message, authorized rerun proceeds |
### Security notes
- **CWE-639:** Closes cross-tenant pipeline rerun / chunk wipe via
leaked log UUID.
- `tenant_id` from `@add_tenant_id_to_kwargs` is `current_user.id`;
`DocumentService.accessible` covers team-shared KBs.
### Test plan
- [ ] `pytest
test/unit_test/api/apps/restful_apis/test_rerun_agent_authorization.py`
- [ ] Manual: attacker cannot rerun victim pipeline log id
```bash
cd ragflow
uv run pytest test/unit_test/api/apps/restful_apis/test_rerun_agent_authorization.py -q
```
---------
Co-authored-by: Zhichang Yu <yuzhichang@gmail.com>
## Summary
- **Backend**: `_iter_session_completion_events` in `agent_api.py` was
filtering out `user_inputs` and `workflow_finished` SSE events, causing
agents with UserFillUp components to silently fail in explore mode — the
interactive form never appeared, while the same agent worked correctly
in run (editor) mode.
- **Frontend**: `SessionChat` component in explore mode was missing
`DebugContent` children rendering inside `MessageItem`, so even if the
backend forwarded the events, the form UI would not render. Added
`DebugContent`, `MarkdownContent`, `useAwaitCompentData` hook, and
input-disabling logic to match the run mode's `chat/box.tsx` behavior.
## What was changed
### Backend (`api/apps/restful_apis/agent_api.py`)
- Line 266: Added `"user_inputs"` and `"workflow_finished"` to the
allowed event filter in `_iter_session_completion_events`
### Frontend (`web/src/pages/agent/explore/components/session-chat.tsx`)
- Added imports: `DebugContent`, `MarkdownContent`,
`useAwaitCompentData`, `useParams`
- Added `sendFormMessage` from `useSendSessionMessage()` hook
- Added `useAwaitCompentData` hook for form state management
- Added `DebugContent` as `MessageItem` children for the latest
assistant message (renders UserFillUp form)
- Added `MarkdownContent` + submitted values display for previous
assistant messages
- Updated `NextMessageInput` disabled states to respect `isWaitting`
(form submission in progress)
## Test plan
- [x] Agent with UserFillUp component (e.g., email draft with
send/edit/cancel options) shows interactive form in **explore mode**
- [x] Same agent continues to work correctly in **run (editor) mode**
- [x] Form submission sends data back to the agent and workflow
continues
- [x] Input field is disabled while waiting for form submission
- [ ] Agents without UserFillUp components are unaffected in explore
mode
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Zhichang Yu <yuzhichang@gmail.com>
Fixes#16168
## Summary
- Add session-scoped authorization for `GET
/api/v1/documents/artifact/<filename>`
- Allow download only when the artifact filename appears in the caller's
`api_4_conversation` message and
`UserCanvasService.accessible(dialog_id, user_id)` passes
- Deny with generic `"Artifact not found."` before storage access (no
cross-user enumeration)
- Return 4xx when the blob is missing (existing behavior preserved)
## Approach
Sandbox artifacts are runtime CodeExec outputs, not KB documents — this
uses the same session gate pattern as `agent_chat_completion`, not
`DocumentService.accessible`.
## Test plan
- [x] Unit: denied when filename not referenced in user sessions
- [x] Unit: denied when agent canvas is not accessible
- [x] Unit: authorized user receives bytes; missing blob returns
`"Artifact not found."`
- [ ] `pytest
test/testcases/test_web_api/test_document_app/test_document_metadata.py
-k get_artifact`
---------
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Co-authored-by: Zhichang Yu <yuzhichang@gmail.com>
### What problem does this PR solve?
Fixes#14882
Agent webhook execution currently fails open when the saved webhook
`security` block is missing/empty, or when `auth_type` is set to `none`.
This allows unauthenticated webhook invocation without an explicit
operator opt-in.
This PR makes anonymous webhook access explicit:
- Rejects missing or empty webhook security config.
- Requires `allow_anonymous: true` when `auth_type` is `none`.
- Preserves explicit anonymous webhooks by having the frontend serialize
`allow_anonymous: true` when the user selects `None` auth.
- Updates webhook unit tests to cover both denied implicit-anonymous
configs and allowed explicit-anonymous configs.
### Type of change
- [x] Bug Fix
- [x] Security hardening
- [x] Test
### Tests
- [x] `ZHIPU_AI_API_KEY=dummy uv run python -m pytest
--confcutdir=test/testcases/test_web_api/test_agent_app
test/testcases/test_web_api/test_agent_app/test_agents_webhook_unit.py`
- [x] `uv run ruff check api/apps/restful_apis/agent_api.py
test/testcases/test_web_api/test_agent_app/test_agents_webhook_unit.py`
- [x] `npm exec eslint src/pages/agent/utils.ts
src/pages/agent/form/begin-form/schema.ts`
---------
Co-authored-by: Zhichang Yu <yuzhichang@gmail.com>
### What problem does this PR solve?
Fixes#15456.
The SDK agent-bot routes `POST /api/v1/agentbots/<agent_id>/completions`
and `GET /api/v1/agentbots/<agent_id>/inputs`
(`api/apps/restful_apis/bot_api.py`) authenticate the caller with a beta
API token — which only yields the caller's `tenant_id` — but then load
and run the agent named in the URL **without verifying the agent belongs
to the caller's tenant**. `UserCanvasService.get_agent_dsl_with_release`
even accepts a `tenant_id` it never uses, and `begin_inputs` calls
`get_by_id` directly. Any holder of a single valid beta token could
therefore run another tenant's agent (leaking its DSL/prompts/tool
config) or read another tenant's agent metadata and begin input form,
just by substituting a victim `agent_id`.
This PR adds the project's existing ownership gate,
`UserCanvasService.accessible(agent_id, tenant_id)`, to both endpoints
right after token authentication — mirroring the checks already enforced
on the equivalent first-party routes in
`api/apps/restful_apis/agent_api.py` (lines 75/578/775) and on the
sibling `chatbot_completions` / `create_agent_session` /
`delete_agent_session` handlers in the same file. On failure it returns
the same `Can't find agent by ID: <id>` message already used by
`begin_inputs`, so it does not reveal whether an `agent_id` exists in
another tenant.
Added a regression test
(`test/unit_test/api/apps/restful_apis/test_agentbots_access_control.py`,
following the existing stubbed-loader pattern from
`test_get_agent_session.py`) asserting that an inaccessible `agent_id`
is rejected before the agent is loaded (`begin_inputs`) or executed
(`completions`), and that an accessible agent still proceeds.
### Type of change
- [x] Bug Fix (non-breaking change which fixes an issue)
- [ ] New Feature (non-breaking change which adds functionality)
- [ ] Documentation Update
- [ ] Refactoring
- [ ] Performance Improvement
- [ ] Other (please describe):
---------
Co-authored-by: Zhichang Yu <yuzhichang@gmail.com>
## Summary
Fixes#14985 — clicking the **Thinking** button in a shared/embedded
chat returns 401 and bounces the user to the login page, even though
the same share page can chat with the agent just fine.
## Root cause
In shared chat, `useGetSharedChatSearchParams` binds `conversationId`
to the URL's `shared_id` query param — which is the **beta APIToken**,
not the real agent id. That `conversationId` propagates through the
component tree:
```tsx
<WorkFlowTimeline canvasId={conversationId}>
→ useFetchMessageTrace(canvasId)
→ GET /api/v1/agents/<sharedId>/logs/<messageId>
```
But `/agents/<agent_id>/logs/<message_id>` is decorated with
`@login_required` (`api/apps/restful_apis/agent_api.py:842-846`).
The share page only holds the beta token — there is no session JWT
— so the request 401s and quart-auth redirects to the login page.
The reporter's server log matches exactly:
```
load_user from jwt got exception No b'.' found in value
load_user: No APIToken found for token=ULG10SWG3E...
Unauthorized request (quart_auth)
GET /api/v1/agents/394013f8d42211f0bad6123fa55e8ed9/logs/96fd72e2-... 1.1 401
```
The `394013f8...` segment in the URL is the `shared_id` (beta
token), not an actual agent id. `_load_user` already accepts the
regular `APIToken.token` field, but not `APIToken.beta`, by design
— beta is a much weaker share-link credential than a personal API
key.
The sibling endpoints `/agentbots/<id>/completions` and
`/agentbots/<id>/inputs` already use the right auth pattern for
this scope (beta-token via `_get_sdk_authorization_token` →
`APIToken.query(beta=token)`). Trace just didn't have a parallel.
## Fix
### Backend (`api/apps/restful_apis/bot_api.py`)
Added a beta-token sibling endpoint:
```
GET /api/v1/agentbots/<shared_id>/logs/<message_id>
```
- Same auth shape as the existing `agentbots` endpoints.
- The `<shared_id>` path segment is a client-supplied label only.
The real `agent_id` used to build the Redis key
(`<agent_id>-<message_id>-logs`) is taken from
`APIToken.dialog_id` on the looked-up token, so the endpoint
never trusts client-supplied identifiers for the data lookup.
- Returns the same `{data: ...}` shape as the existing
`/agents/<id>/logs/<message_id>` endpoint, so the frontend
doesn't need to reshape the response.
### Frontend
- `web/src/utils/api.ts`: added `sharedTrace(sharedId, messageId)`
URL builder.
- `web/src/services/agent-service.ts`: added
`fetchSharedTrace({ shared_id, message_id })`.
- `web/src/hooks/use-agent-request.ts`: `useFetchMessageTrace`
takes an optional `isShare` argument. When set, it calls
`fetchSharedTrace`; `isShare` is also folded into the
`queryKey` so the two modes never share cached results.
- `web/src/pages/agent/log-sheet/workflow-timeline.tsx`:
forwards the already-existing `isShare` prop into the hook.
All other existing call sites of `useFetchMessageTrace` (webhook
timeline, pipeline log, dataflow result) pass no `isShare`
argument → undefined → falsy → unchanged behavior.
## Test plan
- [ ] In the regular Agent UI (logged-in user): open the trace /
log sheet for any message and click into "Thinking" — the
timeline should still load via `/agents/<id>/logs/<msg>`,
same as before.
- [ ] From the Agent page, click **Chat in new tab** to open
`/chat/share?shared_id=<token>&from=agent`. Send a message,
wait for a response, then click **Thinking** on the
assistant turn. The trace panel should load instead of
redirecting to the login page.
- [ ] Same flow but with the agent embedded in an iframe ("Embed
into webpage") — confirm there is no login redirect.
- [ ] In DevTools → Network, confirm the share-chat trace request
goes to `/api/v1/agentbots/<sharedId>/logs/<msgId>` and
returns 200 with the same JSON shape as the logged-in path.
- [ ] Confirm the chat completions, inputs, and upload flows in
the share page still work — they were not touched.
- [ ] Send a bogus / expired beta token to the new endpoint and
confirm it returns the standard "Authentication error: API
key is invalid!" response (no traceback, no 500).
- [ ] Run `uv run pytest` to make sure no existing tests regress.
### Type of change
- [x] Bug Fix (non-breaking change which fixes an issue)
- [ ] New Feature (non-breaking change which adds functionality)
- [ ] Documentation Update
- [ ] Refactoring
- [ ] Performance Improvement
- [ ] Other (please describe):
---------
Co-authored-by: Zhichang Yu <yuzhichang@gmail.com>
## Related issues
Closes#15128
### What problem does this PR solve?
`GET` and `DELETE` `/api/v1/agents/<agent_id>/sessions/<session_id>`
verified canvas access for `agent_id` in the URL but loaded/deleted
sessions only by `session_id`, without checking `conv.dialog_id ==
agent_id`.
Any user with access to **any** agent could read or delete another
agent's `API4Conversation` session (messages, references, DSL, etc.)
when they knew the session UUID.
Agent completions in the same file already enforce this binding; chat
sessions do too — these two routes were inconsistent.
### Type of change
- [x] Bug Fix (non-breaking change which fixes an issue)
- [ ] New Feature (non-breaking change which adds functionality)
- [ ] Documentation Update
- [ ] Refactoring
- [ ] Performance Improvement
- [ ] Other (please describe):
### Changes
| File | Change |
|------|--------|
| `api/apps/restful_apis/agent_api.py` | Require `conv.dialog_id ==
agent_id` in `get_agent_session` and `delete_agent_session_item`; return
generic `"Session not found!"` on mismatch |
| `test/unit_test/api/apps/restful_apis/test_get_agent_session.py` | Add
IDOR regression tests for GET/DELETE; fix success fixture to include
`dialog_id`; track `delete_by_id` calls |
### Test plan
- [x] Unit tests added for GET/DELETE IDOR and success paths
- [ ] `pytest
test/unit_test/api/apps/restful_apis/test_get_agent_session.py`
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Co-authored-by: Zhichang Yu <yuzhichang@gmail.com>
## Summary
- harden reopened advisory fixes across REST connector, invoke, document
downloads, and markdown rendering
- add targeted regression coverage for redirect-safe SSRF handling,
invoke SSRF checks, document access control, and markdown sanitization
- verify each referenced GHSA against the original GitHub advisory text
and align the closed-advisory plan with the implemented remediation
## What changed
- add tenant access checks to document download endpoints to avoid
cross-tenant document disclosure
- add per-hop SSRF validation, DNS pinning, redirect handling, and
redirect limits to the REST API connector
- ensure invoke requests validate and pin the resolved host and never
follow redirects implicitly
- keep the generic rate-limited request path wrapped, not just GET and
POST helpers
- sanitize markdown HTML before rendering in the highlight markdown
component
## Validation
- `cd web && npm test -- --runInBand
src/components/highlight-markdown/__tests__/index.test.tsx`
- `.venv/bin/python -m pytest -q
test/unit_test/data_source/test_rest_api_connector.py`
- targeted `test/testcases/test_web_api/...` unit additions were
reviewed, but the suite cannot be executed end-to-end in this
environment because parent `test/testcases/conftest.py` requires a local
service on `127.0.0.1:9380`
## Notes
- all GHSA entries referenced by the plan were checked against the
original GitHub advisory text, not sampled
- the closed-advisory plan document was updated locally during review,
but is intentionally not included in this PR
## Summary
After #16407 merged, 44 of the original 93 CodeQL alerts were still open
on the default branch. This PR closes the remaining ones by:
1. **Moving 32 existing `// codeql[...]` directives** so they sit on the
line **immediately before** the suppressed statement. The original
multi-line suppression blocks had the directive as the first line, with
the rationale on subsequent lines. After line shifts (refactors, linter
reformat), the directive ended up several lines above the alert location
— CodeQL only recognizes the suppression when it appears on the line
directly above. (32 alerts across 27 files.)
2. **Adding 9 new `// codeql[...]` suppressions** for alerts that had no
suppression in the preceding lines at all — mostly real-fixes that
CodeQL conservatively still flags (filepath.Base, bounded slice sizes,
model-identifier strings, the MD5-legacy-migration lookup in
`conversation_service.py`).
## Files changed
- `api/db/services/conversation_service.py` — add
`py/weak-sensitive-data-hashing` suppression (MD5 for backward-compat
legacy row lookup; not used for auth)
- `api/db/services/llm_service.py` — 3×
`py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data` suppressions on the lines that
log `llm_name` in warnings/info
- `common/misc_utils.py` — 2× `py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data`
suppressions on the redacted `current_url` log sites
- `internal/agent/component/invoke.go` — moved existing
`go/request-forgery` directive
- `internal/agent/sandbox/ssh.go` — moved existing
`go/command-injection` directive
- `internal/agent/tool/retrieval_service.go` — added
`go/uncontrolled-allocation-size` suppression (`topN` is bounded to 1024
above)
- `internal/cli/common_command.go` — moved 2×
`go/disabled-certificate-check` directives
- `internal/cli/user_command.go` — added `go/clear-text-logging`
suppression (filepath.Base already strips user-identifying path)
- `internal/dao/pipeline_operation_log.go` — moved 2× `go/sql-injection`
directives
- `internal/dao/user_canvas.go` — added `go/sql-injection` suppression
in `GetList` (the new `userCanvasOrderClause` call path)
- `internal/engine/infinity/chunk.go` — moved existing
`go/unsafe-quoting` directive
- `internal/entity/models/*` — moved `go/path-injection` directives (15
files)
- `internal/handler/oauth_login.go` — moved existing
`go/cookie-httponly-not-set` directive
- `internal/handler/tenant.go` — moved existing `go/path-injection`
directive
- `internal/service/deep_researcher.go` — moved existing
`go/unsafe-quoting` directive
- `internal/service/dataset.go` — added
`go/uncontrolled-allocation-size` suppression (`n` bounded to 1024
above)
- `internal/service/file.go` — moved existing `go/request-forgery`
directive
- `internal/service/langfuse.go` — moved 2× `go/request-forgery`
directives
- `internal/utility/mcp_client.go` — moved 3× `go/request-forgery`
directives
- `internal/utility/smtp.go` — moved existing `go/email-injection`
directive
- `rag/prompts/generator.py` — added
`py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data` suppression
- `web/.../use-provider-fields.tsx` — added
`js/prototype-pollution-utility` suppression (FORBIDDEN_KEYS guard is on
the line above)
## Why the previous PR left alerts open
`// codeql[query-id] explanation` must be on the line **immediately
before** the suppressed statement per the [GitHub CodeQL suppression
spec](https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/code-scanning/automatically-scanning-your-code-for-vulnerabilities-and-errors/customizing-code-scanning-with-codeql/suppressing-code-scanning-alerts).
The original suppression blocks were 4-5 lines, with the directive as
the **first** line. After linter reformat / line shifts, the directive
ended up too far above the actual alert line to be recognized. The fix
is to put the directive on the line directly above the suppressed
statement, with the rationale above it.
## Test plan
- All 9 modified Python files `ast.parse` clean
- All 4 modified Go files `gofmt` clean
- 36/44 expected alert suppressions in place
- 8 remaining CodeQL alerts are the originals (#3485851828, #3485851831,
#3485869759, #3485869766, #3485869768, #3485869771, #3485885962,
#3485895527) which were resolved by the corresponding commit comments;
these should close on the next scan when the suppression comments match
the alert lines.
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
### What problem does this PR solve?
When I run RAGFlow_server.py:
```
2026-06-24 10:27:01,938 ERROR 3413485 fetch task exception
Traceback (most recent call last):
File "/home/infiniflow/Documents/development/ragflow/api/db/services/document_service.py", line 948, in _sync_progress
if t.progress_msg.strip():
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
AttributeError: 'NoneType' object has no attribute 'strip'
```
fixed:
```python
if t.progress_msg.strip():
# fix:
if (t.progress_msg or "").strip():
```
Fix crash in `_sync_progress` when `progress_msg` is `None`.
#### Root Cause
`progress_msg` from task records can be `None`, causing:
### Type of change
- [x] Bug Fix (non-breaking change which fixes an issue)
### What does this PR do?
This PR adds a new DingTalk chat channel integration and hardens the
inbound callback path.
### Summary
- Adds DingTalk as a selectable chat channel in the UI and backend
channel registry.
- Adds the DingTalk chat channel icon asset.
- Acknowledges DingTalk Stream callbacks and deduplicates repeated
inbound messages to avoid duplicate replies.
### What problem does this PR solve?
Implement OpenAI chat completions in GO
POST /api/v1/openai/<chat_id>/chat/completions
OpenAI chat cli: internal/development.md
### Type of change
- [x] Refactoring
### What problem does this PR solve?
Adds qqbot as a built-in chat channel so it can be discovered and
started by the channel bootstrapper and shown in the chat channel
settings UI.
### Type of change
- [x] New Feature (non-breaking change which adds functionality)
### What problem does this PR solve?
Fix chat channel message routing to use the connected `chat_id`, and
make the Feishu websocket client bind to the thread-local event loop.
### Type of change
- [x] Bug Fix (non-breaking change which fixes an issue)
### What problem does this PR solve?
Use a 95% max_length threshold before truncating embedding inputs, which
reduces the chance of provider-side invalid-parameter errors on
near-limit chunks.
### Type of change
- [x] Bug Fix (non-breaking change which fixes an issue)
### What problem does this PR solve?
The `get_ingestion_log` endpoint (both Python
`dataset_api_service.get_ingestion_log` and Go
`DatasetService.GetIngestionLog`) was returning only the
**dataset-level** field set, which omits critical fields such as `dsl`,
`document_id`, `parser_id`, `document_name`, `pipeline_id`, etc.
This caused the front-end **dataflow-result page** to be unable to
render the pipeline timeline and chunks when viewing a single ingestion
log, regardless of whether the log was a dataset-level operation
(graph/raptor/mindmap) or a per-file parse.
### Background
`PipelineOperationLogService` provides two field sets:
| Method | Fields |
|---|---|
| `get_dataset_logs_fields` | Minimal set (progress, status, timestamps,
etc.) |
| `get_file_logs_fields` | Superset — includes `document_id`, `dsl`,
`parser_id`, `document_name`, `pipeline_id`, … |
When listing logs, the API correctly distinguishes dataset-level vs
file-level logs and uses the appropriate converter. However, when
**fetching a single log by ID**, both the Python and Go implementations
were hardcoded to the dataset-level set, dropping the extra fields that
the front-end needs.
The parser pods suffer from OOM kills when processing large PDF
documents. The root cause is in api/db/services/task_service.py: when
layout_recognize is not DeepDOC (e.g. Plain Text), page_size was set to
MAXIMUM_TASK_PAGE_NUMBER (100 million), causing the entire PDF to be
processed as a single task with all pages loaded into memory
simultaneously.
This PR fixes the issue by paginating non-DeepDOC PDF parsing tasks the
same way DeepDOC already does.
### What problem does this PR solve?
The parser pods suffer from OOM kills when processing large PDF
documents. The root cause is in api/db/services/task_service.py: when
layout_recognize is not DeepDOC (e.g. Plain Text), page_size was set to
MAXIMUM_TASK_PAGE_NUMBER (100 million), causing the entire PDF to be
processed as a single task with all pages loaded into memory
simultaneously.
This PR fixes the issue by paginating non-DeepDOC PDF parsing tasks the
same way DeepDOC already does.
### Type of change
- [x] Bug Fix (non-breaking change which fixes an issue)
- [ ] New Feature (non-breaking change which adds functionality)
- [ ] Documentation Update
- [ ] Refactoring
- [x] Performance Improvement
- [ ] Other (please describe):
## Summary
- The `ChatChannel` DB column was renamed from `dialog_id` to `chat_id`
via a migration (added in a prior commit).
- Aligns the REST API layer (`chat_channel_api.py`,
`chat_channel_service.py`) to use `chat_id` consistently.
- Updates the frontend (`interface.ts`, `hooks.ts`,
`connect-dialog-modal.tsx`, `added-channel-card.tsx`) to read/write
`chat_id` instead of `dialog_id`.
- The joined `dialog_name` alias in the list query is unchanged (backend
still returns it under that name).
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
### What problem does this PR solve?
Fix:
- Pass session_id to langfuse.
- Get correct status for add model_type.
### Type of change
- [x] Bug Fix (non-breaking change which fixes an issue)
### What problem does this PR solve?
Adds a legacy mode for /chat/completions that restores v0.23.0-style
output by converting start_to_think/end_to_think back into raw
<think></think> markers and streaming cumulative answer text.
### Type of change
- [x] Bug Fix (non-breaking change which fixes an issue)
