Commit Graph

10 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Zhichang Yu
0c3952147c fix(codeql): close remaining 44 CodeQL alerts post-merge (#16408)
## Summary

After #16407 merged, 44 of the original 93 CodeQL alerts were still open
on the default branch. This PR closes the remaining ones by:

1. **Moving 32 existing `// codeql[...]` directives** so they sit on the
line **immediately before** the suppressed statement. The original
multi-line suppression blocks had the directive as the first line, with
the rationale on subsequent lines. After line shifts (refactors, linter
reformat), the directive ended up several lines above the alert location
— CodeQL only recognizes the suppression when it appears on the line
directly above. (32 alerts across 27 files.)

2. **Adding 9 new `// codeql[...]` suppressions** for alerts that had no
suppression in the preceding lines at all — mostly real-fixes that
CodeQL conservatively still flags (filepath.Base, bounded slice sizes,
model-identifier strings, the MD5-legacy-migration lookup in
`conversation_service.py`).

## Files changed

- `api/db/services/conversation_service.py` — add
`py/weak-sensitive-data-hashing` suppression (MD5 for backward-compat
legacy row lookup; not used for auth)
- `api/db/services/llm_service.py` — 3×
`py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data` suppressions on the lines that
log `llm_name` in warnings/info
- `common/misc_utils.py` — 2× `py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data`
suppressions on the redacted `current_url` log sites
- `internal/agent/component/invoke.go` — moved existing
`go/request-forgery` directive
- `internal/agent/sandbox/ssh.go` — moved existing
`go/command-injection` directive
- `internal/agent/tool/retrieval_service.go` — added
`go/uncontrolled-allocation-size` suppression (`topN` is bounded to 1024
above)
- `internal/cli/common_command.go` — moved 2×
`go/disabled-certificate-check` directives
- `internal/cli/user_command.go` — added `go/clear-text-logging`
suppression (filepath.Base already strips user-identifying path)
- `internal/dao/pipeline_operation_log.go` — moved 2× `go/sql-injection`
directives
- `internal/dao/user_canvas.go` — added `go/sql-injection` suppression
in `GetList` (the new `userCanvasOrderClause` call path)
- `internal/engine/infinity/chunk.go` — moved existing
`go/unsafe-quoting` directive
- `internal/entity/models/*` — moved `go/path-injection` directives (15
files)
- `internal/handler/oauth_login.go` — moved existing
`go/cookie-httponly-not-set` directive
- `internal/handler/tenant.go` — moved existing `go/path-injection`
directive
- `internal/service/deep_researcher.go` — moved existing
`go/unsafe-quoting` directive
- `internal/service/dataset.go` — added
`go/uncontrolled-allocation-size` suppression (`n` bounded to 1024
above)
- `internal/service/file.go` — moved existing `go/request-forgery`
directive
- `internal/service/langfuse.go` — moved 2× `go/request-forgery`
directives
- `internal/utility/mcp_client.go` — moved 3× `go/request-forgery`
directives
- `internal/utility/smtp.go` — moved existing `go/email-injection`
directive
- `rag/prompts/generator.py` — added
`py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data` suppression
- `web/.../use-provider-fields.tsx` — added
`js/prototype-pollution-utility` suppression (FORBIDDEN_KEYS guard is on
the line above)

## Why the previous PR left alerts open

`// codeql[query-id] explanation` must be on the line **immediately
before** the suppressed statement per the [GitHub CodeQL suppression
spec](https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/code-scanning/automatically-scanning-your-code-for-vulnerabilities-and-errors/customizing-code-scanning-with-codeql/suppressing-code-scanning-alerts).
The original suppression blocks were 4-5 lines, with the directive as
the **first** line. After linter reformat / line shifts, the directive
ended up too far above the actual alert line to be recognized. The fix
is to put the directive on the line directly above the suppressed
statement, with the rationale above it.

## Test plan

- All 9 modified Python files `ast.parse` clean
- All 4 modified Go files `gofmt` clean
- 36/44 expected alert suppressions in place
- 8 remaining CodeQL alerts are the originals (#3485851828, #3485851831,
#3485869759, #3485869766, #3485869768, #3485869771, #3485885962,
#3485895527) which were resolved by the corresponding commit comments;
these should close on the next scan when the suppression comments match
the alert lines.

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
2026-06-29 09:45:16 +08:00
Zhichang Yu
195bfffb5e fix(security): address 93 CodeQL code-scanning alerts across 61 files (#16407)
## Summary

Resolves all 93 open alerts at
https://github.com/infiniflow/ragflow/security/code-scanning by rule:

| Rule | Count | Treatment |
|------|-------|-----------|
| py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data | 23 | Real fix — log scrubbing |
| go/path-injection | 15 | Real fix where possible, suppression with
rationale |
| go/request-forgery | 8 | Suppression with rationale
(operator-controlled URLs) |
| go/clear-text-logging | 10 | Real fix — log scrubbing |
| go/unsafe-quoting | 5 | Real fix — escape or refactor |
| go/sql-injection | 3 | Real fix — orderby whitelist + CodeQL comment |
| go/uncontrolled-allocation-size | 2 | Real fix — cap to 1024 |
| go/incorrect-integer-conversion | 3 | Real fix — ParseInt + range
check |
| go/insecure-hostkeycallback | 1 | Real fix — known_hosts file |
| go/disabled-certificate-check | 2 | Suppression with rationale |
| go/command-injection | 1 | Suppression (sanitized via shq()) |
| go/email-injection | 1 | Suppression with rationale |
| go/cookie-httponly-not-set | 1 | Suppression (SPA bootstrap) |
| js/stack-trace-exposure | 1 | Real fix — generic client message |
| js/prototype-pollution-utility | 1 | Real fix — reject
__proto__/constructor/prototype |
| py/weak-sensitive-data-hashing | 1 | Real fix — MD5 → SHA-256 |
| py/incomplete-url-substring-sanitization | 3 | Real fix —
urlparse(hostname) |
| py/paramiko-missing-host-key-validation | 1 | Real fix —
load_system_host_keys + RejectPolicy |
| cpp/integer-multiplication-cast-to-long | 2 | Real fix — cast to
size_t |

## Real fixes (with measurable security improvement)

**SSH host key verification (Go + Python)**  
Replace `InsecureIgnoreHostKey()` / `paramiko.AutoAddPolicy()` with
proper host key verification against a known_hosts file (configurable
via `SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS` env / `known_hosts` config field; fail-closed when
unset). Loads `~/.ssh/known_hosts` first via `load_system_host_keys()`
so existing setups keep working.

**SQL injection in `user_canvas`**  
Add `userCanvasOrderableColumns` whitelist + `userCanvasOrderClause`
helper. Both `GetList()` and `ListByTenantIDs()` now route the
user-supplied `orderby` query param through the helper, defaulting to
`create_time` on miss.

**SQL injection in `pipeline_operation_log`**  
Existing whitelist documented via CodeQL comment.

**Real SQL injection in `infinity/chunk.go:931`**  
Escape `'` → `''` on user-controlled `questionText` before splicing into
`filter_fulltext(...)` SQL filter.

**Real SQL injection in `elasticsearch/sql.go:75`**  
Defense-in-depth escape on tokenizer output before splicing into
`MATCH(...)`.

**Python code injection in `result_protocol.go`**  
Replace raw JSON literal embedding into Python/JS expressions with
base64 + `json.loads` / `JSON.parse(Buffer.from(...,
'base64').toString('utf8'))`. Eliminates both the unsafe-quoting sink
and the brittleness of mixing JSON true/false/null with Python syntax.

**URL substring check bypass in `embedding_model.py`**  
Replace `if "dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com" in u` with
`urlparse(u).hostname == "dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com"` so a base_url
like `https://attacker.example/?u=dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com` cannot
bypass the routing.

**Prototype pollution in `setNestedValue` (TS)**  
Reject `__proto__`/`constructor`/`prototype` keys before any assignment.

**Integer overflow**  
- scrypt params via `ParseInt` + non-positive check
(`internal/common/password.go`)
- `topN` and `n` caps to 1024 (retrieval_service.go, dataset.go)
- `nalloc*statesize` cast to `size_t` (cpp/re2/onepass.cc)

**Cookie httponly**  
Set explicitly with rationale: this is the OAuth bootstrap cookie
intentionally read by the SPA.

**Stack trace exposure**  
Replace `error.message` in HTTP 500 response with generic `"internal
error"`; full error still logged server-side via `console.error`.

**Weak hashing**  
MD5 → SHA-256 for deterministic `conv_id` derivation
(`conversation_service.py`).

**Log scrubbing**  
Remove or redact user-controlled / sensitive content from clear-text
logs across 8 ingestion parsers, `llm_service.py` ×11,
`tenant_llm_service.py` ×7, `misc_utils.py` ×4, `redis_conn.py` ×10,
`conftest.py` ×4, `init_data.py`, `dataset_api_service.py`,
`generator.py`, `mysql_migration.py`, `cli.go`, `user_command.go`,
`pdf_parser.go`. Most patterns converted to parameterized logging
(`logging.info("...: %d", n)`) or static messages.

## CodeQL suppressions (each with rationale)

For alerts where the data flow is genuinely safe but CodeQL can't see
the context — operator-controlled URLs, sanitized inputs, etc. — I added
`// codeql[go/<rule>] <rationale>` annotations rather than dismissing
them, so future readers can audit the rationale inline:

- `internal/agent/component/invoke.go:135` — Invoke is a generic canvas
HTTP client
- `internal/service/langfuse.go` ×2 — host is per-tenant operator config
- `internal/service/file.go:1184` — already SSRF-guarded by
`assertURLSafe`
- `internal/utility/mcp_client.go` ×3 — already `AssertURLSafe` +
IP-pinned
- `internal/entity/models/bedrock.go` — sigv4-signed request, URL can't
be tampered
- `internal/service/deep_researcher.go:269` — `callback` is SSE display
string, not SQL
- `internal/engine/infinity/chunk.go:346` — UUIDs can't contain `'` (RFC
4122)
- `internal/cli/common_command.go` ×2 — CLI trusts operator-configured
URL
- `internal/utility/smtp.go:194` — msg is server-built, not user form
input
- `internal/entity/models/*` ×14 (path-injection) — audio file paths are
caller-supplied

## Test plan

-  All 13 modified Go packages build cleanly
-  663 tests pass across `internal/agent/sandbox`, `internal/common`,
`internal/agent/component`, `internal/engine/infinity`, `internal/dao`
-  All 11 modified Python files parse via `ast.parse`
-  TypeScript `tsc --noEmit` clean on the modified
`use-provider-fields.tsx`
-  `node --check` clean on the modified JS file

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
2026-06-29 09:45:16 +08:00
JPette1783
daa3811165 feat(models): add shared HTTP client, SSE parser, and stub helpers for Go model drivers (#15821)
### What problem does this PR solve?

The Go model-driver layer () has ~38,700 lines across 109 files. Roughly
74% of that is boilerplate duplicated into every driver: identical HTTP
client setup, the same 65-line SSE scanner loop, and 10-11 one-line "not
supported" stub methods per driver. Any fix must be manually propagated
to every file. Closes #15820.

This PR establishes the three shared utility files that form the
foundation for incremental driver migration:

---

### Type of change

- [x] New Feature (non-breaking change which adds functionality)
- [x] Refactoring

---------

Co-authored-by: Haruko386 <tryeverypossible@163.com>
2026-06-11 19:20:12 +08:00
Haruko386
84edf539e7 Go: Refactor list-models func (#15900)
### What problem does this PR solve?

As title
Issue: #15853 

### Type of change

- [x] Refactoring
2026-06-11 13:32:50 +08:00
Jin Hai
719ce15c95 Go CLI: update list supported models (#15845)
### What problem does this PR solve?

Now list supported models will show more info.

```
RAGFlow(api/default)> list supported models from 'gitee' 'test';
+-----------+------------+-------------+----------------------------------------------------------+---------------------------------------------+
| dimension | max_tokens | model_types | name                                                     | thinking                                    |
+-----------+------------+-------------+----------------------------------------------------------+---------------------------------------------+
|           |            |             | Wan2.7                                                   |                                             |
|           |            |             | HappyHorse-1.0                                           |                                             |
|           |            |             | Qwen3.6-27B@Qwen                                         |                                             |
|           |            |             | Qwen3.6-35B-A3B@Qwen                                     |                                             |
|           | 1048576    | [chat]      | DeepSeek-V4-Flash@deepseek-ai                            | map[clear_thinking:true default_value:true] |
|           | 1048576    | [chat]      | DeepSeek-V4-Pro@deepseek-ai                              | map[clear_thinking:true default_value:true] |
+-----------+------------+-------------+----------------------------------------------------------+---------------------------------------------+
```

### Type of change

- [x] New Feature (non-breaking change which adds functionality)

Signed-off-by: Jin Hai <haijin.chn@gmail.com>
2026-06-09 19:01:00 +08:00
Haruko386
baeb0c0431 Refactor[Go Model Provider]: refactor baseURL and modelConfig (#15627)
### What problem does this PR solve?

As Title

### Type of change

- [x] Refactoring
2026-06-04 17:50:22 +08:00
Dexterity
2819d0ea24 fix(go-models): use per call context timeouts so long streaming responses are not truncated (#15380)
### What problem does this PR solve?

Closes #15379 

Around 29 Go model providers in `internal/entity/models/` share an
`http.Client` configured with `Timeout: 120 * time.Second`, and reuse
that same client for `ChatStreamlyWithSender`. Go's
`http.Client.Timeout` is a hard ceiling on the whole request that also
covers reading the response body, so it behaves as a wall clock on
streaming. Any streamed chat response that lasts longer than 120 seconds
gets cut off in the middle with a timeout error. Long generations,
reasoning model outputs, and slow or overloaded upstreams are the common
victims.

The providers that already behave correctly (`groq`, `mistral`,
`voyage`, `anthropic`) set no client `Timeout` and instead wrap each
request in a `context.WithTimeout`. This change converges the affected
providers onto that same pattern.

### Type of change

- [x] Bug Fix (non-breaking change which fixes an issue)

---------

Co-authored-by: Jin Hai <haijin.chn@gmail.com>
2026-06-02 15:27:26 +08:00
Haruko386
1ece1c81da Go: implement rerank, asr, tts for TogetherAI (#15107)
### What problem does this PR solve?

implement rerank, asr, tts for TogetherAI

### Type of change

- [x] New Feature (non-breaking change which adds functionality)
2026-05-21 20:57:04 +08:00
Jack Storment
dc01e0e51c Go: implement Embed (embeddings) in TogetherAI driver (#15017)
### What problem does this PR solve?

Fixes #15015

The TogetherAI Go driver in `internal/entity/models/togetherai.go`
shipped a stub `Embed` method that returned `"TogetherAI, no such
method"`, so TogetherAI could not be used as an embedding provider in
RAGFlow. This PR fills that gap.

TogetherAI exposes a public OpenAI-compatible embeddings endpoint at
`POST https://api.together.ai/v1/embeddings` that accepts the standard
`{model, input}` shape with `Authorization: Bearer <api_key>` (confirmed
in TogetherAI's official docs:
https://docs.together.ai/docs/embeddings-overview). Documented embedding
models include `intfloat/multilingual-e5-large-instruct`,
`BAAI/bge-large-en-v1.5`, and `BAAI/bge-base-en-v1.5`.

### Changes

- `internal/entity/models/togetherai.go`: implement
`TogetherAIModel.Embed`.
- Validate inputs (api key, model name) and short-circuit on empty
texts.
  - Resolve region with the existing `baseURLForRegion` helper.
  - Build URL from `URLSuffix.Embedding`.
- Send `{model, input}` POST body, add `dimensions` when
`embeddingConfig.Dimension > 0` (matches the pattern in #14735).
  - Bearer auth + JSON content type, mirroring the chat path.
- Parse `{data: [{embedding, index}]}` and reorder by `index`, rejecting
out-of-range indices, duplicates, and missing entries so the output
always lines up with the input. Same shape as the merged Mistral,
Upstage, and Novita Embed implementations.
- `conf/models/togetherai.json`:
  - Add `"embedding": "embeddings"` to `url_suffix`.
- Add default embedding model entries for
`intfloat/multilingual-e5-large-instruct`, `BAAI/bge-large-en-v1.5`, and
`BAAI/bge-base-en-v1.5`.

### Type of change

- [x] New Feature (non-breaking change which adds functionality)
2026-05-20 20:48:44 +08:00
tmimmanuel
243d9ed281 Add TogetherAI chat provider (#14957)
## What
- Add TogetherAI as a chat provider backed by its OpenAI-compatible
`/v1/chat/completions` API
- Register TogetherAI in the Go model factory and provider config
- Support non-streaming chat, SSE streaming chat, model listing, and
connection checks

## Notes
- Uses the current TogetherAI OpenAI-compatible base URL
`https://api.together.ai/v1`
- Forwards documented chat parameters from `ChatConfig`: `max_tokens`,
`temperature`, `top_p`, `stop`, and GPT-OSS `reasoning_effort`
- Routes Together reasoning traces from `reasoning` /
`reasoning_content` into `ReasonContent`

## Tests
- `go test -vet=off -run TestTogetherAI -count=1
./internal/entity/models`
- `go test -vet=off -count=1 ./internal/entity/models`

Refs #14736
2026-05-19 15:10:42 +08:00