## Related issues
Closes#15144
### What problem does this PR solve?
`POST /api/v1/agents/rerun` loaded a pipeline operation log by UUID via
`PipelineOperationLogService.get_documents_info` with no authorization,
then wiped chunks, reset document counters, deleted tasks, and re-queued
dataflow for the victim document.
Any authenticated user who knew a victim's pipeline log id could disrupt
parsing on documents they did not own.
### Type of change
- [x] Bug Fix (non-breaking change which fixes an issue)
- [ ] New Feature (non-breaking change which adds functionality)
- [ ] Documentation Update
- [ ] Refactoring
- [ ] Performance Improvement
- [ ] Other (please describe):
### Changes
| File | Change |
|------|--------|
| `api/apps/restful_apis/agent_api.py` | Call
`DocumentService.accessible(doc["id"], tenant_id)` before destructive
rerun operations; deny with generic `"Document not found."` |
|
`test/unit_test/api/apps/restful_apis/test_rerun_agent_authorization.py`
| Unit tests: cross-tenant log rejected, missing/unauthorized same
message, authorized rerun proceeds |
### Security notes
- **CWE-639:** Closes cross-tenant pipeline rerun / chunk wipe via
leaked log UUID.
- `tenant_id` from `@add_tenant_id_to_kwargs` is `current_user.id`;
`DocumentService.accessible` covers team-shared KBs.
### Test plan
- [ ] `pytest
test/unit_test/api/apps/restful_apis/test_rerun_agent_authorization.py`
- [ ] Manual: attacker cannot rerun victim pipeline log id
```bash
cd ragflow
uv run pytest test/unit_test/api/apps/restful_apis/test_rerun_agent_authorization.py -q
```
---------
Co-authored-by: Zhichang Yu <yuzhichang@gmail.com>
