### What problem does this PR solve?
Closes#15180.
`OIDCClient.parse_id_token` in `api/apps/auth/oidc.py` read the JWT
signing
algorithm from the **unverified** JWT header and passed it through to
`jwt.decode(..., algorithms=[alg], ...)` as the trust anchor. This is
the
textbook JWT algorithm-confusion vulnerability (CWE-345 / CWE-347). Any
unauthenticated client capable of reaching the OIDC callback could take
over
an arbitrary account on any RAGFlow deployment with OIDC login enabled:
1. **`alg: "none"`** — present a JWT with `{"alg": "none"}` and no
signature segment → `jwt.decode(..., algorithms=["none"])` → PyJWT's
`NoneAlgorithm` accepts the token without verification → login as any
user.
2. **RSA / HMAC confusion** — fetch the public RSA key from the
provider's
JWKS (it's public), forge a JWT with `{"alg": "HS256"}` HMAC-signed
using the public-key bytes as the secret → `jwt.decode(...,
algorithms=["HS256"], key=public_key)` → verifier accepts → login as
any user. (Modern PyJWT independently refuses to use a PEM-formatted
key as an HMAC secret, which mitigates this leg for PEM key formats;
the fix here is the only mitigation for raw / DER / JWK octet keys and
for older PyJWT versions.)
### What changed
**`api/apps/auth/oidc.py`:**
- New module constants `_ALLOWED_OIDC_SIGNING_ALGS` (asymmetric-only:
`RS*`, `ES*`, `PS*`, `EdDSA` — explicitly excludes `none` and `HS*`)
and `_DEFAULT_OIDC_SIGNING_ALGS = ("RS256",)` (the OIDC Core 1.0 §2
spec default).
- New helper `_resolve_id_token_signing_algs(metadata)` — intersects the
provider's advertised `id_token_signing_alg_values_supported` from
`/.well-known/openid-configuration` with the safe allowlist; falls back
to RS256 when the field is missing or contains only unsafe values.
- `OIDCClient.__init__` now stores the resolved allowlist on
`self.id_token_signing_algs` — pinned once, from a trusted source, at
construction time.
- `parse_id_token` no longer calls `jwt.get_unverified_header` and no
longer reads `alg` from the JWT header. It passes
`self.id_token_signing_algs` to `jwt.decode(..., algorithms=...)`.
`PyJWKClient.get_signing_key_from_jwt` still reads the `kid` from the
header internally for JWKS lookup — that's fine, `kid` is not a
security decision; the signature still proves which key was actually
used.
**`test/testcases/test_web_api/test_auth_app/test_oidc_client_unit.py`:**
- Existing `test_parse_id_token_success_and_error` drops its
`jwt.get_unverified_header` mock (no longer called by `parse_id_token`).
- `_metadata` and `_make_client` helpers grew an optional `signing_algs`
parameter so tests can configure what the discovery document advertises.
- New `TestSSRFValidation` / algorithm-confusion regression block (7
tests):
- `test_id_token_signing_algs_default_to_rs256_when_metadata_missing`
- `test_id_token_signing_algs_intersect_metadata_with_safe_allowlist`
- `test_id_token_signing_algs_fall_back_when_only_unsafe_advertised`
- `test_id_token_signing_algs_ignores_non_string_entries`
- `test_id_token_signing_algs_handles_non_list_metadata_field`
- `test_parse_id_token_passes_pinned_algorithms_to_jwt_decode` —
sabotages `jwt.get_unverified_header` to raise on call, proving the
verification path never consults the unverified header.
- `test_parse_id_token_rejects_alg_none` — uses real PyJWT to encode an
`alg: "none"` token; `parse_id_token` raises `ValueError("Error
parsing ID Token: …")` instead of accepting it.
- `test_parse_id_token_rejects_hs256_when_allowlist_is_asymmetric` —
uses real PyJWT to forge an `alg: "HS256"` token with a non-PEM
shared secret (so PyJWT's incidental PEM-as-HMAC refusal isn't what
blocks it); `parse_id_token` raises because `HS256` is not in the
pinned allowlist.
Sanity-checked end-to-end with real PyJWT outside the project test
runner:
- `alg=none` forged token + `algorithms=["RS256"]` →
`InvalidAlgorithmError` ✓
- `alg=HS256` forged token + `algorithms=["RS256"]` →
`InvalidAlgorithmError` ✓
- Same `alg=HS256` token + `algorithms=["HS256"]` → **accepted**
({'sub': 'admin'})
— confirming the attack path was real before the fix.
### Type of change
- [x] Bug Fix (non-breaking change which fixes an issue)
Co-authored-by: galuis116 <contact@duerrimports.com>
### What problem does this PR solve?
Codecov’s coverage report shows that several RAGFlow code paths are
currently untested or under-tested. This makes it easier for regressions
to slip in during refactors and feature work.
This PR adds targeted automated tests to cover the files and branches
highlighted by Codecov, improving confidence in core behavior while
keeping runtime functionality unchanged.
### Type of change
- [x] Other (please describe): Test coverage improvement (adds/extends
unit and integration tests to address Codecov-reported gaps)
### What problem does this PR solve?
Codecov’s coverage report shows that several RAGFlow code paths are
currently untested or under-tested. This makes it easier for regressions
to slip in during refactors and feature work.
This PR adds targeted automated tests to cover the files and branches
highlighted by Codecov, improving confidence in core behavior while
keeping runtime functionality unchanged.
### Type of change
- [x] Other (please describe): Test coverage improvement (adds/extends
unit and integration tests to address Codecov-reported gaps)
