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| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Zhichang Yu
|
0c3952147c |
fix(codeql): close remaining 44 CodeQL alerts post-merge (#16408)
## Summary After #16407 merged, 44 of the original 93 CodeQL alerts were still open on the default branch. This PR closes the remaining ones by: 1. **Moving 32 existing `// codeql[...]` directives** so they sit on the line **immediately before** the suppressed statement. The original multi-line suppression blocks had the directive as the first line, with the rationale on subsequent lines. After line shifts (refactors, linter reformat), the directive ended up several lines above the alert location — CodeQL only recognizes the suppression when it appears on the line directly above. (32 alerts across 27 files.) 2. **Adding 9 new `// codeql[...]` suppressions** for alerts that had no suppression in the preceding lines at all — mostly real-fixes that CodeQL conservatively still flags (filepath.Base, bounded slice sizes, model-identifier strings, the MD5-legacy-migration lookup in `conversation_service.py`). ## Files changed - `api/db/services/conversation_service.py` — add `py/weak-sensitive-data-hashing` suppression (MD5 for backward-compat legacy row lookup; not used for auth) - `api/db/services/llm_service.py` — 3× `py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data` suppressions on the lines that log `llm_name` in warnings/info - `common/misc_utils.py` — 2× `py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data` suppressions on the redacted `current_url` log sites - `internal/agent/component/invoke.go` — moved existing `go/request-forgery` directive - `internal/agent/sandbox/ssh.go` — moved existing `go/command-injection` directive - `internal/agent/tool/retrieval_service.go` — added `go/uncontrolled-allocation-size` suppression (`topN` is bounded to 1024 above) - `internal/cli/common_command.go` — moved 2× `go/disabled-certificate-check` directives - `internal/cli/user_command.go` — added `go/clear-text-logging` suppression (filepath.Base already strips user-identifying path) - `internal/dao/pipeline_operation_log.go` — moved 2× `go/sql-injection` directives - `internal/dao/user_canvas.go` — added `go/sql-injection` suppression in `GetList` (the new `userCanvasOrderClause` call path) - `internal/engine/infinity/chunk.go` — moved existing `go/unsafe-quoting` directive - `internal/entity/models/*` — moved `go/path-injection` directives (15 files) - `internal/handler/oauth_login.go` — moved existing `go/cookie-httponly-not-set` directive - `internal/handler/tenant.go` — moved existing `go/path-injection` directive - `internal/service/deep_researcher.go` — moved existing `go/unsafe-quoting` directive - `internal/service/dataset.go` — added `go/uncontrolled-allocation-size` suppression (`n` bounded to 1024 above) - `internal/service/file.go` — moved existing `go/request-forgery` directive - `internal/service/langfuse.go` — moved 2× `go/request-forgery` directives - `internal/utility/mcp_client.go` — moved 3× `go/request-forgery` directives - `internal/utility/smtp.go` — moved existing `go/email-injection` directive - `rag/prompts/generator.py` — added `py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data` suppression - `web/.../use-provider-fields.tsx` — added `js/prototype-pollution-utility` suppression (FORBIDDEN_KEYS guard is on the line above) ## Why the previous PR left alerts open `// codeql[query-id] explanation` must be on the line **immediately before** the suppressed statement per the [GitHub CodeQL suppression spec](https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/code-scanning/automatically-scanning-your-code-for-vulnerabilities-and-errors/customizing-code-scanning-with-codeql/suppressing-code-scanning-alerts). The original suppression blocks were 4-5 lines, with the directive as the **first** line. After linter reformat / line shifts, the directive ended up too far above the actual alert line to be recognized. The fix is to put the directive on the line directly above the suppressed statement, with the rationale above it. ## Test plan - All 9 modified Python files `ast.parse` clean - All 4 modified Go files `gofmt` clean - 36/44 expected alert suppressions in place - 8 remaining CodeQL alerts are the originals (#3485851828, #3485851831, #3485869759, #3485869766, #3485869768, #3485869771, #3485885962, #3485895527) which were resolved by the corresponding commit comments; these should close on the next scan when the suppression comments match the alert lines. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) |
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|
Zhichang Yu
|
195bfffb5e |
fix(security): address 93 CodeQL code-scanning alerts across 61 files (#16407)
## Summary Resolves all 93 open alerts at https://github.com/infiniflow/ragflow/security/code-scanning by rule: | Rule | Count | Treatment | |------|-------|-----------| | py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data | 23 | Real fix — log scrubbing | | go/path-injection | 15 | Real fix where possible, suppression with rationale | | go/request-forgery | 8 | Suppression with rationale (operator-controlled URLs) | | go/clear-text-logging | 10 | Real fix — log scrubbing | | go/unsafe-quoting | 5 | Real fix — escape or refactor | | go/sql-injection | 3 | Real fix — orderby whitelist + CodeQL comment | | go/uncontrolled-allocation-size | 2 | Real fix — cap to 1024 | | go/incorrect-integer-conversion | 3 | Real fix — ParseInt + range check | | go/insecure-hostkeycallback | 1 | Real fix — known_hosts file | | go/disabled-certificate-check | 2 | Suppression with rationale | | go/command-injection | 1 | Suppression (sanitized via shq()) | | go/email-injection | 1 | Suppression with rationale | | go/cookie-httponly-not-set | 1 | Suppression (SPA bootstrap) | | js/stack-trace-exposure | 1 | Real fix — generic client message | | js/prototype-pollution-utility | 1 | Real fix — reject __proto__/constructor/prototype | | py/weak-sensitive-data-hashing | 1 | Real fix — MD5 → SHA-256 | | py/incomplete-url-substring-sanitization | 3 | Real fix — urlparse(hostname) | | py/paramiko-missing-host-key-validation | 1 | Real fix — load_system_host_keys + RejectPolicy | | cpp/integer-multiplication-cast-to-long | 2 | Real fix — cast to size_t | ## Real fixes (with measurable security improvement) **SSH host key verification (Go + Python)** Replace `InsecureIgnoreHostKey()` / `paramiko.AutoAddPolicy()` with proper host key verification against a known_hosts file (configurable via `SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS` env / `known_hosts` config field; fail-closed when unset). Loads `~/.ssh/known_hosts` first via `load_system_host_keys()` so existing setups keep working. **SQL injection in `user_canvas`** Add `userCanvasOrderableColumns` whitelist + `userCanvasOrderClause` helper. Both `GetList()` and `ListByTenantIDs()` now route the user-supplied `orderby` query param through the helper, defaulting to `create_time` on miss. **SQL injection in `pipeline_operation_log`** Existing whitelist documented via CodeQL comment. **Real SQL injection in `infinity/chunk.go:931`** Escape `'` → `''` on user-controlled `questionText` before splicing into `filter_fulltext(...)` SQL filter. **Real SQL injection in `elasticsearch/sql.go:75`** Defense-in-depth escape on tokenizer output before splicing into `MATCH(...)`. **Python code injection in `result_protocol.go`** Replace raw JSON literal embedding into Python/JS expressions with base64 + `json.loads` / `JSON.parse(Buffer.from(..., 'base64').toString('utf8'))`. Eliminates both the unsafe-quoting sink and the brittleness of mixing JSON true/false/null with Python syntax. **URL substring check bypass in `embedding_model.py`** Replace `if "dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com" in u` with `urlparse(u).hostname == "dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com"` so a base_url like `https://attacker.example/?u=dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com` cannot bypass the routing. **Prototype pollution in `setNestedValue` (TS)** Reject `__proto__`/`constructor`/`prototype` keys before any assignment. **Integer overflow** - scrypt params via `ParseInt` + non-positive check (`internal/common/password.go`) - `topN` and `n` caps to 1024 (retrieval_service.go, dataset.go) - `nalloc*statesize` cast to `size_t` (cpp/re2/onepass.cc) **Cookie httponly** Set explicitly with rationale: this is the OAuth bootstrap cookie intentionally read by the SPA. **Stack trace exposure** Replace `error.message` in HTTP 500 response with generic `"internal error"`; full error still logged server-side via `console.error`. **Weak hashing** MD5 → SHA-256 for deterministic `conv_id` derivation (`conversation_service.py`). **Log scrubbing** Remove or redact user-controlled / sensitive content from clear-text logs across 8 ingestion parsers, `llm_service.py` ×11, `tenant_llm_service.py` ×7, `misc_utils.py` ×4, `redis_conn.py` ×10, `conftest.py` ×4, `init_data.py`, `dataset_api_service.py`, `generator.py`, `mysql_migration.py`, `cli.go`, `user_command.go`, `pdf_parser.go`. Most patterns converted to parameterized logging (`logging.info("...: %d", n)`) or static messages. ## CodeQL suppressions (each with rationale) For alerts where the data flow is genuinely safe but CodeQL can't see the context — operator-controlled URLs, sanitized inputs, etc. — I added `// codeql[go/<rule>] <rationale>` annotations rather than dismissing them, so future readers can audit the rationale inline: - `internal/agent/component/invoke.go:135` — Invoke is a generic canvas HTTP client - `internal/service/langfuse.go` ×2 — host is per-tenant operator config - `internal/service/file.go:1184` — already SSRF-guarded by `assertURLSafe` - `internal/utility/mcp_client.go` ×3 — already `AssertURLSafe` + IP-pinned - `internal/entity/models/bedrock.go` — sigv4-signed request, URL can't be tampered - `internal/service/deep_researcher.go:269` — `callback` is SSE display string, not SQL - `internal/engine/infinity/chunk.go:346` — UUIDs can't contain `'` (RFC 4122) - `internal/cli/common_command.go` ×2 — CLI trusts operator-configured URL - `internal/utility/smtp.go:194` — msg is server-built, not user form input - `internal/entity/models/*` ×14 (path-injection) — audio file paths are caller-supplied ## Test plan - ✅ All 13 modified Go packages build cleanly - ✅ 663 tests pass across `internal/agent/sandbox`, `internal/common`, `internal/agent/component`, `internal/engine/infinity`, `internal/dao` - ✅ All 11 modified Python files parse via `ast.parse` - ✅ TypeScript `tsc --noEmit` clean on the modified `use-provider-fields.tsx` - ✅ `node --check` clean on the modified JS file 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) |
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Zhichang Yu
|
477f2fcebd |
feat[Go]: port agent webhook trigger, agent file upload/download, component input-form + debug endpoints from Python (#16403)
port agent webhook trigger, agent file upload/download, component input-form + debug endpoints from Python - [x] New Feature (non-breaking change which adds functionality) |
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Zhichang Yu
|
f58fae5fb7 |
feat(go-agent): Ported retrieval node, added Keenable web search tool (#16396)
Ported retrieval node, added Keenable web search tool - [x] New Feature (non-breaking change which adds functionality) |
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|
Jin Hai
|
49714865c1 |
Go: rename ragflow_cli to ragflow-cli (#16270)
### What problem does this PR solve? rename ragflow cli binary ### Type of change - [x] Refactoring Signed-off-by: Jin Hai <haijin.chn@gmail.com> |
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Zhichang Yu
|
2362210caf |
refactor(log): unify Go logging to zap with rotation, strip per-package levels (#16261)
Refactor the Go agent port's logging so every log line — gin access, agent canvas events, harness warnings, fatal boot errors — flows through a single common.Logger (zap) backed by a rotated file, with structured fields, level filtering, and configurable rotation. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Zhichang Yu
|
3f805a64f1 |
feat(agent): align Go agent behavior with Python (except retrieval component) (#16225)
## Summary
Aligns the **Go agent runtime/canvas/components/tools** behavior with
the **Python `agent/` implementation** so the same stored canvas DSL
produces the same execution result on either side. Every component,
tool, and runtime primitive in `internal/agent/` is now driven by the
same semantics as its Python counterpart — variable resolution, template
substitution, control flow, error reporting, retry/cancel, and stream
event shapes.
The **retrieval component is the one explicit exception** in this PR. It
is being reworked in a separate change and is excluded from this
alignment pass; the wrapper slot (`universe_a_wrappers.go →
newRetrievalComponent`) is preserved.
## Scope of alignment
### Components (all aligned with `agent/component/`)
`Begin` · `Message` · `LLM` (incl. ChatTemplateKwargs,
MessageHistoryWindowSize, VisualFiles, Cite, OutputStructure,
JSONOutput, TopP, MaxRetries, DelayAfterError, credentials) · `Agent`
(react + tool artifact capture + `Reset()` interface-assert) · `Switch`
(12/12 operators, Python-equivalent semantics) · `Categorize` · `Invoke`
· `Iteration` · `Loop` (macro-expansion through `workflowx.AddLoopNode`)
· `UserFillUp` (Python-equivalent interrupt/resume via eino
`compose.Interrupt`/`ResumeWithData`) · `FillUp` · `DataOperations` ·
`ListOperations` · `StringTransform` · `VariableAggregator` ·
`VariableAssigner` · `Browser` (full stagehand runtime parity) ·
`DocsGenerator` · `ExcelProcessor`.
### Tools (all aligned with `agent/tools/`)
`Retrieval` (wrapper slot only — logic out of scope) · `MCPToolAdapter`
(streamable-HTTP) · `CodeExec` (sandbox bridge with
`code_exec_contract.go` matching Python contract) · `AkShare` · `ArXiv`
· `Crawler` · `DeepL` · `DuckDuckGo` · `Email` · `ExeSQL` · `GitHub` ·
`Google` · `GoogleScholar` · `Jin10` · `PubMed` · `QWeather` · `SearXNG`
· `Tavily` · `Tushare` · `Wencai` · `Wikipedia` · `YahooFinance` —
uniform `eino tool.InvokableTool` interface, SSRF protection, shared
HTTP client.
### Canvas execution engine (`internal/agent/canvas/`)
Aligned with Python's `agent/canvas.py`:
- **Scheduler** (`scheduler.go`): state pre/post handlers, node lambdas,
per-component timeout resolver (4-level: per-class env → per-class table
→ uniform env → 600s fallback), `legacyNoOpNames`.
- **Loop subgraph** (`loop_subgraph.go`): Python-equivalent
`AddLoopNode` macro expansion + condition translation.
- **Multibranch** (`multibranch.go`): `Switch` / `Categorize` routing
via `compose.NewGraphMultiBranch` — same branch selection semantics as
Python.
- **Parallel subgraph** (`parallel_subgraph.go`): matches Python's
parallel fan-out contract.
- **Interrupt/Resume** (`interrupt_resume.go`): `UserFillUpNodeBody` /
`IsInterruptError` / `ExtractInterruptContexts` — replaces the
deprecated Python sentinel chain with eino's native interrupt API,
preserving the same external behavior.
- **Checkpoint** (`checkpoint_store.go`): `RedisCheckPointStore`
Get/Set/Delete, with business metadata (status / canvas_id /
parent_run_id) on a parallel Redis Hash.
- **RunTracker** (`run_tracker.go`): Start / MarkSucceeded / MarkFailed
/ MarkCancelled / AttachCheckpoint — same lifecycle as the Python run
record.
- **Cancel** (`cancel.go`): Redis pub/sub watch.
- **Stream** (`stream.go`): SSE channel with `messages` / `waiting` /
`errors` / `done` events, same shape as Python's `agent.canvas.RunEvent`
payload.
### DSL bridge (`internal/agent/dsl/`)
- `normalize.go`: v1↔v2 collapsed into a single wire format — Python and
Go consume the same stored JSON.
- `reset.go`: per-run state reset matches Python's `Canvas.reset()`
semantics.
- Testdata mirrors Python's `agent_msg.json` / `all.json` / etc.
### Runtime (`internal/agent/runtime/`)
- `CanvasState` / `NewCanvasState` / `GetVar` / `SetVar` / `ReadVars`:
same `{{cpn_id@param}}` resolution model.
- `ResolveTemplate` (regex fast path + gonja fallback) — Python
Jinja-style semantics.
- `selector.go`, `metrics.go`, `component.go`: shared runtime contracts.
## Out of scope (intentionally)
- **`Retrieval` component logic** — wrapped only; full parity lands in a
follow-up PR.
- **Frontend** — only minor dsl-bridge / canvas UX fixes ride along.
- **CLI / admin / model registry** — orthogonal to agent behavior.
## How alignment is verified
`internal/service/agent_run_e2e_test.go` exercises the **full production
chain** against real Python-shaped DSL fixtures:
```
loadCanvasForUser → versionDAO.GetLatest → decodeCanvasFromDSL →
canvas.Compile → cc.Workflow.Invoke → answer extraction
```
using in-memory SQLite + miniredis (no Docker). Covers:
- `TestRunAgent_RealCanvas_BeginMessage` — happy path, `{{sys.query}}`
resolution
- `TestRunAgent_RealCanvas_WaitForUserResume` — two-run resume cycle
(Python-equivalent)
- `TestRunAgent_RealCanvas_CompileFails` — unknown component name →
sanitized error (Python-equivalent)
- `TestRunAgent_RealCanvas_InvokeFails` — unresolvable template ref
(Python-equivalent)
- `TestRunAgent_RunTracker_AttachCheckpoint_CallSequence` —
Start→AttachCheckpoint→MarkSucceeded lifecycle
`internal/handler/agent_test.go` — SSE streaming parity (`Content-Type:
text/event-stream`, `data: {…}\n\n`, trailing `data: [DONE]\n\n`,
OpenAI-compatible non-stream `choices`).
`internal/agent/canvas/fixture_compile_test.go` + per-component tests
pin the Python-equivalent outputs.
```
go test -count=1 -v -run 'TestRunAgent_RealCanvas|TestRunAgent_RunTracker' ./internal/service/
```
## Design reference
`docs/develop/agent-go-port-design.md` (1329 lines, last cross-checked
2026-06-17) — module layout, per-component / per-tool inventory,
corner-case catalogue, and the actionable backlog (Section 14, including
the retrieval alignment follow-up).
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
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Zhichang Yu
|
e45659868a |
feat(agent): ship the Go agent canvas port — eino interrupt/resume + Redis check-pointing (#16035)
Replaces the Python agent canvas runtime with a Go implementation that runs inside `cmd/server_main`. The canvas compiles into an eino Workflow that pauses on wait-for-user via native Interrupt/Resume (no sentinel flag) and resumes from a Redis-backed CheckPointStore. All 21 Python agent components and ~35 tools are ported with functional parity. Sandbox providers now read their JSON config from the admin-panel system_settings table with env fallback. 234 files / +35,413 / -6,111. All Go files are gofmt-clean (CI gate added); drops the v2 DSL E2E step and the gap-analysis plan (both redundant after the port ships). ## Type of change - [x] Refactoring - [x] New feature - [x] Bug fix 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) --------- Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Zhichang Yu
|
3fa15c0e2f |
feat(agent): Go port — canvas engine, 22 components, DSL v2, 13 endpoints (#15952)
Ports the agent canvas subsystem from Python to Go.
## What's included
### Canvas Engine (Phase 0/1)
- State engine, scheduler, variable resolver, Redis checkpoint store,
cancel protocol
- **209 tests** across canvas / component / io packages
### 22 Components (P0–P4)
| Tier | Components |
|---|---|
| P0 T1+T2+T3 | LLM, Agent, ExitLoop, Switch, Categorize, Begin,
Message, Invoke |
| P1 T3 | VariableAggregator, VariableAssigner, StringTransform,
ListOperations, DataOperations |
| P2 T3 | Iteration, IterationItem, Loop, LoopItem |
| P3 T3 | UserFillUp, Fillup |
| P4 T5 | Browser, ExcelProcessor, DocsGenerator |
### DSL v2 Schema (Phase 2.5)
- Typed v2 in-memory model with v1-to-v2 auto-detect converter
- v1 legacy field stripping per plan §2.11.7
### HTTP Endpoints & Bug Fixes (Plans PR1–PR3)
- **DELETE SQL bug fix**: gorm v2 `Where("id = ?", id).Delete(...)`
pattern
- **CreateAgent validation**: title/DSL required, duplicate check, 103
envelope
- **13 new endpoints**: templates, prompts, tags, sessions CRUD,
chat/completions (SSE + non-stream stubs), rerun, test_db_connection,
logs, webhook/logs
- **756 Go unit tests** (745 → 756, +18)
- **17 → 0 Python integration test failures** (test_agents.py +
test_session_management/)
### Tools
21 eino tools: HTTPHelper, search tools, financial/data tools, mandatory
stubs
### Infrastructure
OTel observability, NATS message queue, DeepDoc gRPC client, SSRF
guards, IDOR mitigation
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