12 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Zhichang Yu
0c3952147c fix(codeql): close remaining 44 CodeQL alerts post-merge (#16408)
## Summary

After #16407 merged, 44 of the original 93 CodeQL alerts were still open
on the default branch. This PR closes the remaining ones by:

1. **Moving 32 existing `// codeql[...]` directives** so they sit on the
line **immediately before** the suppressed statement. The original
multi-line suppression blocks had the directive as the first line, with
the rationale on subsequent lines. After line shifts (refactors, linter
reformat), the directive ended up several lines above the alert location
— CodeQL only recognizes the suppression when it appears on the line
directly above. (32 alerts across 27 files.)

2. **Adding 9 new `// codeql[...]` suppressions** for alerts that had no
suppression in the preceding lines at all — mostly real-fixes that
CodeQL conservatively still flags (filepath.Base, bounded slice sizes,
model-identifier strings, the MD5-legacy-migration lookup in
`conversation_service.py`).

## Files changed

- `api/db/services/conversation_service.py` — add
`py/weak-sensitive-data-hashing` suppression (MD5 for backward-compat
legacy row lookup; not used for auth)
- `api/db/services/llm_service.py` — 3×
`py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data` suppressions on the lines that
log `llm_name` in warnings/info
- `common/misc_utils.py` — 2× `py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data`
suppressions on the redacted `current_url` log sites
- `internal/agent/component/invoke.go` — moved existing
`go/request-forgery` directive
- `internal/agent/sandbox/ssh.go` — moved existing
`go/command-injection` directive
- `internal/agent/tool/retrieval_service.go` — added
`go/uncontrolled-allocation-size` suppression (`topN` is bounded to 1024
above)
- `internal/cli/common_command.go` — moved 2×
`go/disabled-certificate-check` directives
- `internal/cli/user_command.go` — added `go/clear-text-logging`
suppression (filepath.Base already strips user-identifying path)
- `internal/dao/pipeline_operation_log.go` — moved 2× `go/sql-injection`
directives
- `internal/dao/user_canvas.go` — added `go/sql-injection` suppression
in `GetList` (the new `userCanvasOrderClause` call path)
- `internal/engine/infinity/chunk.go` — moved existing
`go/unsafe-quoting` directive
- `internal/entity/models/*` — moved `go/path-injection` directives (15
files)
- `internal/handler/oauth_login.go` — moved existing
`go/cookie-httponly-not-set` directive
- `internal/handler/tenant.go` — moved existing `go/path-injection`
directive
- `internal/service/deep_researcher.go` — moved existing
`go/unsafe-quoting` directive
- `internal/service/dataset.go` — added
`go/uncontrolled-allocation-size` suppression (`n` bounded to 1024
above)
- `internal/service/file.go` — moved existing `go/request-forgery`
directive
- `internal/service/langfuse.go` — moved 2× `go/request-forgery`
directives
- `internal/utility/mcp_client.go` — moved 3× `go/request-forgery`
directives
- `internal/utility/smtp.go` — moved existing `go/email-injection`
directive
- `rag/prompts/generator.py` — added
`py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data` suppression
- `web/.../use-provider-fields.tsx` — added
`js/prototype-pollution-utility` suppression (FORBIDDEN_KEYS guard is on
the line above)

## Why the previous PR left alerts open

`// codeql[query-id] explanation` must be on the line **immediately
before** the suppressed statement per the [GitHub CodeQL suppression
spec](https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/code-scanning/automatically-scanning-your-code-for-vulnerabilities-and-errors/customizing-code-scanning-with-codeql/suppressing-code-scanning-alerts).
The original suppression blocks were 4-5 lines, with the directive as
the **first** line. After linter reformat / line shifts, the directive
ended up too far above the actual alert line to be recognized. The fix
is to put the directive on the line directly above the suppressed
statement, with the rationale above it.

## Test plan

- All 9 modified Python files `ast.parse` clean
- All 4 modified Go files `gofmt` clean
- 36/44 expected alert suppressions in place
- 8 remaining CodeQL alerts are the originals (#3485851828, #3485851831,
#3485869759, #3485869766, #3485869768, #3485869771, #3485885962,
#3485895527) which were resolved by the corresponding commit comments;
these should close on the next scan when the suppression comments match
the alert lines.

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
2026-06-29 09:45:16 +08:00
Zhichang Yu
195bfffb5e fix(security): address 93 CodeQL code-scanning alerts across 61 files (#16407)
## Summary

Resolves all 93 open alerts at
https://github.com/infiniflow/ragflow/security/code-scanning by rule:

| Rule | Count | Treatment |
|------|-------|-----------|
| py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data | 23 | Real fix — log scrubbing |
| go/path-injection | 15 | Real fix where possible, suppression with
rationale |
| go/request-forgery | 8 | Suppression with rationale
(operator-controlled URLs) |
| go/clear-text-logging | 10 | Real fix — log scrubbing |
| go/unsafe-quoting | 5 | Real fix — escape or refactor |
| go/sql-injection | 3 | Real fix — orderby whitelist + CodeQL comment |
| go/uncontrolled-allocation-size | 2 | Real fix — cap to 1024 |
| go/incorrect-integer-conversion | 3 | Real fix — ParseInt + range
check |
| go/insecure-hostkeycallback | 1 | Real fix — known_hosts file |
| go/disabled-certificate-check | 2 | Suppression with rationale |
| go/command-injection | 1 | Suppression (sanitized via shq()) |
| go/email-injection | 1 | Suppression with rationale |
| go/cookie-httponly-not-set | 1 | Suppression (SPA bootstrap) |
| js/stack-trace-exposure | 1 | Real fix — generic client message |
| js/prototype-pollution-utility | 1 | Real fix — reject
__proto__/constructor/prototype |
| py/weak-sensitive-data-hashing | 1 | Real fix — MD5 → SHA-256 |
| py/incomplete-url-substring-sanitization | 3 | Real fix —
urlparse(hostname) |
| py/paramiko-missing-host-key-validation | 1 | Real fix —
load_system_host_keys + RejectPolicy |
| cpp/integer-multiplication-cast-to-long | 2 | Real fix — cast to
size_t |

## Real fixes (with measurable security improvement)

**SSH host key verification (Go + Python)**  
Replace `InsecureIgnoreHostKey()` / `paramiko.AutoAddPolicy()` with
proper host key verification against a known_hosts file (configurable
via `SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS` env / `known_hosts` config field; fail-closed when
unset). Loads `~/.ssh/known_hosts` first via `load_system_host_keys()`
so existing setups keep working.

**SQL injection in `user_canvas`**  
Add `userCanvasOrderableColumns` whitelist + `userCanvasOrderClause`
helper. Both `GetList()` and `ListByTenantIDs()` now route the
user-supplied `orderby` query param through the helper, defaulting to
`create_time` on miss.

**SQL injection in `pipeline_operation_log`**  
Existing whitelist documented via CodeQL comment.

**Real SQL injection in `infinity/chunk.go:931`**  
Escape `'` → `''` on user-controlled `questionText` before splicing into
`filter_fulltext(...)` SQL filter.

**Real SQL injection in `elasticsearch/sql.go:75`**  
Defense-in-depth escape on tokenizer output before splicing into
`MATCH(...)`.

**Python code injection in `result_protocol.go`**  
Replace raw JSON literal embedding into Python/JS expressions with
base64 + `json.loads` / `JSON.parse(Buffer.from(...,
'base64').toString('utf8'))`. Eliminates both the unsafe-quoting sink
and the brittleness of mixing JSON true/false/null with Python syntax.

**URL substring check bypass in `embedding_model.py`**  
Replace `if "dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com" in u` with
`urlparse(u).hostname == "dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com"` so a base_url
like `https://attacker.example/?u=dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com` cannot
bypass the routing.

**Prototype pollution in `setNestedValue` (TS)**  
Reject `__proto__`/`constructor`/`prototype` keys before any assignment.

**Integer overflow**  
- scrypt params via `ParseInt` + non-positive check
(`internal/common/password.go`)
- `topN` and `n` caps to 1024 (retrieval_service.go, dataset.go)
- `nalloc*statesize` cast to `size_t` (cpp/re2/onepass.cc)

**Cookie httponly**  
Set explicitly with rationale: this is the OAuth bootstrap cookie
intentionally read by the SPA.

**Stack trace exposure**  
Replace `error.message` in HTTP 500 response with generic `"internal
error"`; full error still logged server-side via `console.error`.

**Weak hashing**  
MD5 → SHA-256 for deterministic `conv_id` derivation
(`conversation_service.py`).

**Log scrubbing**  
Remove or redact user-controlled / sensitive content from clear-text
logs across 8 ingestion parsers, `llm_service.py` ×11,
`tenant_llm_service.py` ×7, `misc_utils.py` ×4, `redis_conn.py` ×10,
`conftest.py` ×4, `init_data.py`, `dataset_api_service.py`,
`generator.py`, `mysql_migration.py`, `cli.go`, `user_command.go`,
`pdf_parser.go`. Most patterns converted to parameterized logging
(`logging.info("...: %d", n)`) or static messages.

## CodeQL suppressions (each with rationale)

For alerts where the data flow is genuinely safe but CodeQL can't see
the context — operator-controlled URLs, sanitized inputs, etc. — I added
`// codeql[go/<rule>] <rationale>` annotations rather than dismissing
them, so future readers can audit the rationale inline:

- `internal/agent/component/invoke.go:135` — Invoke is a generic canvas
HTTP client
- `internal/service/langfuse.go` ×2 — host is per-tenant operator config
- `internal/service/file.go:1184` — already SSRF-guarded by
`assertURLSafe`
- `internal/utility/mcp_client.go` ×3 — already `AssertURLSafe` +
IP-pinned
- `internal/entity/models/bedrock.go` — sigv4-signed request, URL can't
be tampered
- `internal/service/deep_researcher.go:269` — `callback` is SSE display
string, not SQL
- `internal/engine/infinity/chunk.go:346` — UUIDs can't contain `'` (RFC
4122)
- `internal/cli/common_command.go` ×2 — CLI trusts operator-configured
URL
- `internal/utility/smtp.go:194` — msg is server-built, not user form
input
- `internal/entity/models/*` ×14 (path-injection) — audio file paths are
caller-supplied

## Test plan

-  All 13 modified Go packages build cleanly
-  663 tests pass across `internal/agent/sandbox`, `internal/common`,
`internal/agent/component`, `internal/engine/infinity`, `internal/dao`
-  All 11 modified Python files parse via `ast.parse`
-  TypeScript `tsc --noEmit` clean on the modified
`use-provider-fields.tsx`
-  `node --check` clean on the modified JS file

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
2026-06-29 09:45:16 +08:00
Zhichang Yu
dfe2dc346d feat[Go]: port agent attachment download, chatbot + agentbot completion/info endpoints from Python (#16405)
## Summary

Ports five Python agent APIs to Go under the v1 Gin router:

- `GET  /api/v1/agents/attachments/<attachment_id>/download`
- `POST /api/v1/chatbots/<dialog_id>/completions`  (SSE)
- `GET  /api/v1/chatbots/<dialog_id>/info`
- `POST /api/v1/agentbots/<agent_id>/completions` (SSE)
- `GET  /api/v1/agentbots/<agent_id>/inputs`

Mirrors the existing Python wire shape (`{code, message,
data:{answer,reference,...}}` per Python `canvas_service.completion`) so
the iframe SDK and existing JS widgets keep working.

## Behavioural parity with Python

| # | Concern | How it's met |
|---|---------|--------------|
| R0 | Bot routes must not require regular user session | Routes mount
on `apiNoAuth` (router.go:198-202), with `BetaAuthMiddleware` only |
| R3 | Two SSE formats in Go drift | F2: `AgentChatCompletions` and
`AgentbotCompletion` share `service.WriteChatbotRunEvent` |
| R7 | `GetBySessionID` returns `(nil, nil)` on miss | Defensive
nil-check before `session.UserID != tenantID` |
| R8 | Begin component name vs ID | `FindBeginComponentID` resolves name
→ ID first, then `ExtractComponentInputForm(dsl, beginID)` |
| R9 | Defensive PromptConfig parsing | `stringFromMap` helper used for
`prologue` and `tavily_api_key` |
| R10 | `BetaAuthMiddleware` Bearer-prefix pre-filter | Removed —
`GetUserByToken` is called unconditionally, falls back to
`GetUserByBetaAPIToken` |
| F8 | Multi-turn chatbot history | `ChatbotCompletion` reads prior
turns from `session.Message`, appends user turn, calls LLM, persists new
pair via new `API4ConversationDAO.Update` |
| F9 | UUID gate stricter than plan | Removed — only `filepath.Base` +
CR/LF/quote header sanitization remains |
| H2 | Defence-in-depth IDOR | `AgentbotCompletion` calls `loadCanvas`
before delegating to `RunAgent` |
| M2 | SSE error leakage | `WriteChatbotFrame` emits generic `"an
internal error occurred"`; real error logged via `common.Error` |

## Verification

```bash
$ go vet ./...                                     # clean (only pre-existing issues)
$ go build ./...                                   # success
$ go test ./internal/handler/ ./internal/service/ ./internal/agent/dsl/ ./internal/common/ ./internal/dao/
ok  ragflow/internal/handler     0.617s
ok  ragflow/internal/service     1.729s
ok  ragflow/internal/agent/dsl   0.008s
ok  ragflow/internal/common      0.087s
ok  ragflow/internal/dao         0.083s
```

1199 tests pass across 5 packages.

## Known follow-ups (out of scope for this PR)

- **F1**: token-level streaming in `ChatbotCompletion` (currently emits
one frame per turn)
- **F3**: per-route `auth_types` attribute in Go (currently applied via
route group middleware)

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-29 09:45:16 +08:00
Zhichang Yu
477f2fcebd feat[Go]: port agent webhook trigger, agent file upload/download, component input-form + debug endpoints from Python (#16403)
port agent webhook trigger, agent file upload/download, component
input-form + debug endpoints from Python
- [x] New Feature (non-breaking change which adds functionality)
2026-06-29 09:45:16 +08:00
Zhichang Yu
f58fae5fb7 feat(go-agent): Ported retrieval node, added Keenable web search tool (#16396)
Ported retrieval node, added Keenable web search tool
- [x] New Feature (non-breaking change which adds functionality)
2026-06-29 09:45:16 +08:00
Jin Hai
49714865c1 Go: rename ragflow_cli to ragflow-cli (#16270)
### What problem does this PR solve?

rename ragflow cli binary

### Type of change

- [x] Refactoring

Signed-off-by: Jin Hai <haijin.chn@gmail.com>
2026-06-23 19:20:49 +08:00
Zhichang Yu
2362210caf refactor(log): unify Go logging to zap with rotation, strip per-package levels (#16261)
Refactor the Go agent port's logging so every log line — gin access,
agent canvas events, harness warnings, fatal boot errors — flows through
a single common.Logger (zap) backed by a rotated file, with structured
fields, level filtering, and configurable rotation.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-23 16:21:46 +08:00
Zhichang Yu
06ededb26a test(go): ensure go unit tests pass (#16241)
## Summary

Stabilizes the Go unit-test surface so the test suite can run reliably
in CI and locally via \`bash build.sh --test\`.

## Verification

\`\`\`bash
bash build.sh --test -- -count=10 -run TestWithCancel_SequentialAgent
./internal/harness/core/
bash build.sh --test -- -count=5 -run TestSiliconflowChatExtracts
./internal/entity/models/
bash build.sh --test # full suite
\`\`\`

All previously failing packages (\`admin\`, \`cli\`, \`handler\`,
\`parser\`,
\`router\`, \`service\`, \`service/chunk\`) now build and test
successfully.
\`TestWithCancel_SequentialAgent\` passes 10/10 (was flaky). SiliconFlow
reasoning test passes after switching the assertion to the SiliconFlow
wire
format.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-22 20:43:29 +08:00
Zhichang Yu
3f805a64f1 feat(agent): align Go agent behavior with Python (except retrieval component) (#16225)
## Summary

Aligns the **Go agent runtime/canvas/components/tools** behavior with
the **Python `agent/` implementation** so the same stored canvas DSL
produces the same execution result on either side. Every component,
tool, and runtime primitive in `internal/agent/` is now driven by the
same semantics as its Python counterpart — variable resolution, template
substitution, control flow, error reporting, retry/cancel, and stream
event shapes.

The **retrieval component is the one explicit exception** in this PR. It
is being reworked in a separate change and is excluded from this
alignment pass; the wrapper slot (`universe_a_wrappers.go →
newRetrievalComponent`) is preserved.

## Scope of alignment

### Components (all aligned with `agent/component/`)
`Begin` · `Message` · `LLM` (incl. ChatTemplateKwargs,
MessageHistoryWindowSize, VisualFiles, Cite, OutputStructure,
JSONOutput, TopP, MaxRetries, DelayAfterError, credentials) · `Agent`
(react + tool artifact capture + `Reset()` interface-assert) · `Switch`
(12/12 operators, Python-equivalent semantics) · `Categorize` · `Invoke`
· `Iteration` · `Loop` (macro-expansion through `workflowx.AddLoopNode`)
· `UserFillUp` (Python-equivalent interrupt/resume via eino
`compose.Interrupt`/`ResumeWithData`) · `FillUp` · `DataOperations` ·
`ListOperations` · `StringTransform` · `VariableAggregator` ·
`VariableAssigner` · `Browser` (full stagehand runtime parity) ·
`DocsGenerator` · `ExcelProcessor`.

### Tools (all aligned with `agent/tools/`)
`Retrieval` (wrapper slot only — logic out of scope) · `MCPToolAdapter`
(streamable-HTTP) · `CodeExec` (sandbox bridge with
`code_exec_contract.go` matching Python contract) · `AkShare` · `ArXiv`
· `Crawler` · `DeepL` · `DuckDuckGo` · `Email` · `ExeSQL` · `GitHub` ·
`Google` · `GoogleScholar` · `Jin10` · `PubMed` · `QWeather` · `SearXNG`
· `Tavily` · `Tushare` · `Wencai` · `Wikipedia` · `YahooFinance` —
uniform `eino tool.InvokableTool` interface, SSRF protection, shared
HTTP client.

### Canvas execution engine (`internal/agent/canvas/`)
Aligned with Python's `agent/canvas.py`:
- **Scheduler** (`scheduler.go`): state pre/post handlers, node lambdas,
per-component timeout resolver (4-level: per-class env → per-class table
→ uniform env → 600s fallback), `legacyNoOpNames`.
- **Loop subgraph** (`loop_subgraph.go`): Python-equivalent
`AddLoopNode` macro expansion + condition translation.
- **Multibranch** (`multibranch.go`): `Switch` / `Categorize` routing
via `compose.NewGraphMultiBranch` — same branch selection semantics as
Python.
- **Parallel subgraph** (`parallel_subgraph.go`): matches Python's
parallel fan-out contract.
- **Interrupt/Resume** (`interrupt_resume.go`): `UserFillUpNodeBody` /
`IsInterruptError` / `ExtractInterruptContexts` — replaces the
deprecated Python sentinel chain with eino's native interrupt API,
preserving the same external behavior.
- **Checkpoint** (`checkpoint_store.go`): `RedisCheckPointStore`
Get/Set/Delete, with business metadata (status / canvas_id /
parent_run_id) on a parallel Redis Hash.
- **RunTracker** (`run_tracker.go`): Start / MarkSucceeded / MarkFailed
/ MarkCancelled / AttachCheckpoint — same lifecycle as the Python run
record.
- **Cancel** (`cancel.go`): Redis pub/sub watch.
- **Stream** (`stream.go`): SSE channel with `messages` / `waiting` /
`errors` / `done` events, same shape as Python's `agent.canvas.RunEvent`
payload.

### DSL bridge (`internal/agent/dsl/`)
- `normalize.go`: v1↔v2 collapsed into a single wire format — Python and
Go consume the same stored JSON.
- `reset.go`: per-run state reset matches Python's `Canvas.reset()`
semantics.
- Testdata mirrors Python's `agent_msg.json` / `all.json` / etc.

### Runtime (`internal/agent/runtime/`)
- `CanvasState` / `NewCanvasState` / `GetVar` / `SetVar` / `ReadVars`:
same `{{cpn_id@param}}` resolution model.
- `ResolveTemplate` (regex fast path + gonja fallback) — Python
Jinja-style semantics.
- `selector.go`, `metrics.go`, `component.go`: shared runtime contracts.

## Out of scope (intentionally)

- **`Retrieval` component logic** — wrapped only; full parity lands in a
follow-up PR.
- **Frontend** — only minor dsl-bridge / canvas UX fixes ride along.
- **CLI / admin / model registry** — orthogonal to agent behavior.

## How alignment is verified

`internal/service/agent_run_e2e_test.go` exercises the **full production
chain** against real Python-shaped DSL fixtures:
```
loadCanvasForUser → versionDAO.GetLatest → decodeCanvasFromDSL →
canvas.Compile → cc.Workflow.Invoke → answer extraction
```
using in-memory SQLite + miniredis (no Docker). Covers:
- `TestRunAgent_RealCanvas_BeginMessage` — happy path, `{{sys.query}}`
resolution
- `TestRunAgent_RealCanvas_WaitForUserResume` — two-run resume cycle
(Python-equivalent)
- `TestRunAgent_RealCanvas_CompileFails` — unknown component name →
sanitized error (Python-equivalent)
- `TestRunAgent_RealCanvas_InvokeFails` — unresolvable template ref
(Python-equivalent)
- `TestRunAgent_RunTracker_AttachCheckpoint_CallSequence` —
Start→AttachCheckpoint→MarkSucceeded lifecycle

`internal/handler/agent_test.go` — SSE streaming parity (`Content-Type:
text/event-stream`, `data: {…}\n\n`, trailing `data: [DONE]\n\n`,
OpenAI-compatible non-stream `choices`).

`internal/agent/canvas/fixture_compile_test.go` + per-component tests
pin the Python-equivalent outputs.

```
go test -count=1 -v -run 'TestRunAgent_RealCanvas|TestRunAgent_RunTracker' ./internal/service/
```

## Design reference

`docs/develop/agent-go-port-design.md` (1329 lines, last cross-checked
2026-06-17) — module layout, per-component / per-tool inventory,
corner-case catalogue, and the actionable backlog (Section 14, including
the retrieval alignment follow-up).

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-22 11:58:29 +08:00
Zhichang Yu
e45659868a feat(agent): ship the Go agent canvas port — eino interrupt/resume + Redis check-pointing (#16035)
Replaces the Python agent canvas runtime with a Go implementation that
runs inside `cmd/server_main`.

The canvas compiles into an eino Workflow that pauses on wait-for-user
via native Interrupt/Resume (no sentinel flag) and resumes from a
Redis-backed CheckPointStore.

All 21 Python agent components and ~35 tools are ported with functional
parity.

Sandbox providers now read their JSON config from the admin-panel
system_settings table with env fallback.

234 files / +35,413 / -6,111. All Go files are gofmt-clean (CI gate
added); drops the v2 DSL E2E step and the gap-analysis plan (both
redundant after the port ships).

## Type of change

- [x] Refactoring
- [x] New feature
- [x] Bug fix

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-17 13:24:03 +08:00
Jin Hai
fcebcebe1e Move REDIS to engine dir (#16006)
### What problem does this PR solve?

as title.

### Type of change

- [x] Refactoring

Signed-off-by: Jin Hai <haijin.chn@gmail.com>
2026-06-15 14:44:16 +08:00
Zhichang Yu
3fa15c0e2f feat(agent): Go port — canvas engine, 22 components, DSL v2, 13 endpoints (#15952)
Ports the agent canvas subsystem from Python to Go.

## What's included

### Canvas Engine (Phase 0/1)
- State engine, scheduler, variable resolver, Redis checkpoint store,
cancel protocol
- **209 tests** across canvas / component / io packages

### 22 Components (P0–P4)
| Tier | Components |
|---|---|
| P0 T1+T2+T3 | LLM, Agent, ExitLoop, Switch, Categorize, Begin,
Message, Invoke |
| P1 T3 | VariableAggregator, VariableAssigner, StringTransform,
ListOperations, DataOperations |
| P2 T3 | Iteration, IterationItem, Loop, LoopItem |
| P3 T3 | UserFillUp, Fillup |
| P4 T5 | Browser, ExcelProcessor, DocsGenerator |

### DSL v2 Schema (Phase 2.5)
- Typed v2 in-memory model with v1-to-v2 auto-detect converter
- v1 legacy field stripping per plan §2.11.7

### HTTP Endpoints & Bug Fixes (Plans PR1–PR3)
- **DELETE SQL bug fix**: gorm v2 `Where("id = ?", id).Delete(...)`
pattern
- **CreateAgent validation**: title/DSL required, duplicate check, 103
envelope
- **13 new endpoints**: templates, prompts, tags, sessions CRUD,
chat/completions (SSE + non-stream stubs), rerun, test_db_connection,
logs, webhook/logs
- **756 Go unit tests** (745 → 756, +18)
- **17 → 0 Python integration test failures** (test_agents.py +
test_session_management/)

### Tools
21 eino tools: HTTPHelper, search tools, financial/data tools, mandatory
stubs

### Infrastructure
OTel observability, NATS message queue, DeepDoc gRPC client, SSRF
guards, IDOR mitigation
2026-06-12 22:58:28 +08:00