### What problem does this PR solve?
Closes#15180.
`OIDCClient.parse_id_token` in `api/apps/auth/oidc.py` read the JWT
signing
algorithm from the **unverified** JWT header and passed it through to
`jwt.decode(..., algorithms=[alg], ...)` as the trust anchor. This is
the
textbook JWT algorithm-confusion vulnerability (CWE-345 / CWE-347). Any
unauthenticated client capable of reaching the OIDC callback could take
over
an arbitrary account on any RAGFlow deployment with OIDC login enabled:
1. **`alg: "none"`** — present a JWT with `{"alg": "none"}` and no
signature segment → `jwt.decode(..., algorithms=["none"])` → PyJWT's
`NoneAlgorithm` accepts the token without verification → login as any
user.
2. **RSA / HMAC confusion** — fetch the public RSA key from the
provider's
JWKS (it's public), forge a JWT with `{"alg": "HS256"}` HMAC-signed
using the public-key bytes as the secret → `jwt.decode(...,
algorithms=["HS256"], key=public_key)` → verifier accepts → login as
any user. (Modern PyJWT independently refuses to use a PEM-formatted
key as an HMAC secret, which mitigates this leg for PEM key formats;
the fix here is the only mitigation for raw / DER / JWK octet keys and
for older PyJWT versions.)
### What changed
**`api/apps/auth/oidc.py`:**
- New module constants `_ALLOWED_OIDC_SIGNING_ALGS` (asymmetric-only:
`RS*`, `ES*`, `PS*`, `EdDSA` — explicitly excludes `none` and `HS*`)
and `_DEFAULT_OIDC_SIGNING_ALGS = ("RS256",)` (the OIDC Core 1.0 §2
spec default).
- New helper `_resolve_id_token_signing_algs(metadata)` — intersects the
provider's advertised `id_token_signing_alg_values_supported` from
`/.well-known/openid-configuration` with the safe allowlist; falls back
to RS256 when the field is missing or contains only unsafe values.
- `OIDCClient.__init__` now stores the resolved allowlist on
`self.id_token_signing_algs` — pinned once, from a trusted source, at
construction time.
- `parse_id_token` no longer calls `jwt.get_unverified_header` and no
longer reads `alg` from the JWT header. It passes
`self.id_token_signing_algs` to `jwt.decode(..., algorithms=...)`.
`PyJWKClient.get_signing_key_from_jwt` still reads the `kid` from the
header internally for JWKS lookup — that's fine, `kid` is not a
security decision; the signature still proves which key was actually
used.
**`test/testcases/test_web_api/test_auth_app/test_oidc_client_unit.py`:**
- Existing `test_parse_id_token_success_and_error` drops its
`jwt.get_unverified_header` mock (no longer called by `parse_id_token`).
- `_metadata` and `_make_client` helpers grew an optional `signing_algs`
parameter so tests can configure what the discovery document advertises.
- New `TestSSRFValidation` / algorithm-confusion regression block (7
tests):
- `test_id_token_signing_algs_default_to_rs256_when_metadata_missing`
- `test_id_token_signing_algs_intersect_metadata_with_safe_allowlist`
- `test_id_token_signing_algs_fall_back_when_only_unsafe_advertised`
- `test_id_token_signing_algs_ignores_non_string_entries`
- `test_id_token_signing_algs_handles_non_list_metadata_field`
- `test_parse_id_token_passes_pinned_algorithms_to_jwt_decode` —
sabotages `jwt.get_unverified_header` to raise on call, proving the
verification path never consults the unverified header.
- `test_parse_id_token_rejects_alg_none` — uses real PyJWT to encode an
`alg: "none"` token; `parse_id_token` raises `ValueError("Error
parsing ID Token: …")` instead of accepting it.
- `test_parse_id_token_rejects_hs256_when_allowlist_is_asymmetric` —
uses real PyJWT to forge an `alg: "HS256"` token with a non-PEM
shared secret (so PyJWT's incidental PEM-as-HMAC refusal isn't what
blocks it); `parse_id_token` raises because `HS256` is not in the
pinned allowlist.
Sanity-checked end-to-end with real PyJWT outside the project test
runner:
- `alg=none` forged token + `algorithms=["RS256"]` →
`InvalidAlgorithmError` ✓
- `alg=HS256` forged token + `algorithms=["RS256"]` →
`InvalidAlgorithmError` ✓
- Same `alg=HS256` token + `algorithms=["HS256"]` → **accepted**
({'sub': 'admin'})
— confirming the attack path was real before the fix.
### Type of change
- [x] Bug Fix (non-breaking change which fixes an issue)
Co-authored-by: galuis116 <contact@duerrimports.com>
### What problem does this PR solve?
Try to make this more asynchronous. Verified in chat and agent
scenarios, reducing blocking behavior. #11551, #11579.
However, the impact of these changes still requires further
investigation to ensure everything works as expected.
### Type of change
- [x] Refactoring
### What problem does this PR solve?
```
admin> show version;
show_version
+-----------------------+
| version |
+-----------------------+
| v0.21.0-241-gc6cf58d5 |
+-----------------------+
admin> \q
Goodbye!
```
### Type of change
- [x] New Feature (non-breaking change which adds functionality)
---------
Signed-off-by: Jin Hai <haijin.chn@gmail.com>
### What problem does this PR solve?
Issue: #8051
The current implementation assumes JWKS endpoints follow the standard
`/.well-known/jwks.json` convention. This breaks authentication for OIDC
providers that use non-standard JWKS paths, resulting in 404 errors
during token validation.
Root Cause Analysis
- The OpenID Connect specification doesn't mandate a fixed path for JWKS
endpoints
- Some identity providers (like certain Keycloak configurations) use
custom endpoints
- Our previous approach constructed JWKS URLs by convention rather than
discovery
### Solution Approach
Instead of constructing JWKS URLs by appending to the issuer URI, we
now:
1. Properly leverage the `jwks_uri` from the OIDC discovery metadata
2. Honor the identity provider's actual configured endpoint
```python
# Before (fragile approach)
jwks_url = f"{self.issuer}/.well-known/jwks.json"
# After (standards-compliant)
jwks_cli = jwt.PyJWKClient(self.jwks_uri) # Use discovered endpoint
```
### Type of change
- [x] Bug Fix (non-breaking change which fixes an issue)
### What problem does this PR solve?
Add `/login/channels` route and improve auth logic to support frontend
integration with third-party login providers:
- Add `/login/channels` route to provide authentication channel list
with `display_name` and `icon`
- Optimize user info parsing logic by prioritizing `avatar_url` and
falling back to `picture`
- Simplify OIDC token validation by removing unnecessary `kid` checks
- Ensure `client_id` is safely cast to string during `audience`
validation
- Fix typo
---
- Related pull request: #7379
### Type of change
- [x] New Feature (non-breaking change which adds functionality)
- [x] Documentation Update
### What problem does this PR solve?
Add support for OAuth2 and OpenID Connect (OIDC) authentication,
allowing OAuth/OIDC authentication using the specified routes:
- `/login/<channel>`: Initiates the OAuth flow for the specified channel
- `/oauth/callback/<channel>`: Handles the OAuth callback after
successful authentication
The callback URL should be configured in your OAuth provider as:
```
https://your-app.com/oauth/callback/<channel>
```
For detailed instructions on configuring **service_conf.yaml.template**,
see: `./api/apps/auth/README.md#usage`.
- Related issues
#3495
### Type of change
- [x] New Feature (non-breaking change which adds functionality)
- [x] Documentation Update
