2024-12-09 12:38:04 +08:00
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# Copyright 2024 The InfiniFlow Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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#
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# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
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# you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
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# You may obtain a copy of the License at
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#
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# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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#
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# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
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# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
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# WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
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# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
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# limitations under the License.
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#
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Feat: chat channels — connect assistants to external messaging bots (#15850)
### What problem does this PR solve?
#15844
Adds a **Chat channels** capability so a RAGFlow assistant (Dialog) can
be exposed as a bot on external messaging platforms (Feishu/Lark,
Discord, Telegram, Slack, WeCom, LINE, etc.). An admin configures a bot
in the UI, connects it to an assistant, and inbound messages are
answered from that assistant's knowledge base — replies are delivered
back on the channel.
**Feishu/Lark is implemented and tested end-to-end.** Discord, Telegram,
LINE, and WeCom are scaffolded against the same interface; the remaining
listed channels are tracked as follow-ups.
### Design
**Backend**
- New `chat_channel` table (`tenant_id`, `name`, `channel`, `config`
JSON holding `{credential: {...}}`, `dialog_id`, `status`) +
`ChatChannelService` and RESTful CRUD under `/api/v1/chat_channels`.
- Channel framework under `api/channels/`: a `core` registry +
per-channel packages that self-register a builder and implement a common
`Channel` interface (`start`/`stop`/`send` + inbound normalization) over
`IncomingMessage`/`OutgoingMessage`.
- Embedded **reconcile loop** in `ragflow_server`
(`api/channels/bootstrap.py`): loads enabled bots, and
starts/stops/restarts them as rows change (no server restart needed).
Inbound messages run the connected dialog via the non-streaming
completion path, keeping per-end-user conversation history.
- Missing optional channel SDKs degrade gracefully (channel skipped with
a warning; others unaffected). Channel-level errors are logged, not
crashed.
- Feishu's WebSocket client runs in a dedicated thread with its own
event loop to avoid cross-loop/contextvars conflicts with the channel
runtime.
**Frontend**
- **Settings → Chat channels** panel: available-channels grid +
configured-bots list with add/edit/delete and a **Connect assistant**
popup that binds a bot to a dialog.
- Brand icons via simple-icons / reused shared data-source assets, with
colored fallbacks for brands not available.
- Route, sidebar entry, i18n (en/zh), and a top-nav segment-boundary fix
so the settings page no longer highlights the Chat tab.
### Type of change
- [x] New Feature (non-breaking change which adds functionality)
### Notes
- DB: new `chat_channel` table is auto-created; `chat_channel.dialog_id`
is also covered by a `migrate_db` `alter_db_add_column` for existing
installs.
- Channel SDKs (`lark-oapi`, `discord.py`, `python-telegram-bot`,
`line-bot-sdk`, `wechatpy`, `aiohttp`) added to dependencies.
- Screenshots / per-channel credential docs to follow.
<img width="1338" height="1290" alt="Image"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/042cb2f9-0dad-4e6a-bcf7-43ced4bbd704"
/>
<img width="1344" height="738" alt="Image"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/373cd08e-ec40-4c67-9c51-4d948b1ba617"
/>
<img width="672" height="887" alt="Image"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/5a34953f-a9a3-4c1e-869e-5eff0dc64c84"
/>
---------
2026-06-12 18:21:30 +08:00
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import hashlib
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2025-01-24 11:07:55 +08:00
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import time
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2026-05-08 03:00:18 -07:00
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import logging
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2024-12-09 12:38:04 +08:00
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from uuid import uuid4
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fix(security): address 93 CodeQL code-scanning alerts across 61 files (#16407)
## Summary
Resolves all 93 open alerts at
https://github.com/infiniflow/ragflow/security/code-scanning by rule:
| Rule | Count | Treatment |
|------|-------|-----------|
| py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data | 23 | Real fix — log scrubbing |
| go/path-injection | 15 | Real fix where possible, suppression with
rationale |
| go/request-forgery | 8 | Suppression with rationale
(operator-controlled URLs) |
| go/clear-text-logging | 10 | Real fix — log scrubbing |
| go/unsafe-quoting | 5 | Real fix — escape or refactor |
| go/sql-injection | 3 | Real fix — orderby whitelist + CodeQL comment |
| go/uncontrolled-allocation-size | 2 | Real fix — cap to 1024 |
| go/incorrect-integer-conversion | 3 | Real fix — ParseInt + range
check |
| go/insecure-hostkeycallback | 1 | Real fix — known_hosts file |
| go/disabled-certificate-check | 2 | Suppression with rationale |
| go/command-injection | 1 | Suppression (sanitized via shq()) |
| go/email-injection | 1 | Suppression with rationale |
| go/cookie-httponly-not-set | 1 | Suppression (SPA bootstrap) |
| js/stack-trace-exposure | 1 | Real fix — generic client message |
| js/prototype-pollution-utility | 1 | Real fix — reject
__proto__/constructor/prototype |
| py/weak-sensitive-data-hashing | 1 | Real fix — MD5 → SHA-256 |
| py/incomplete-url-substring-sanitization | 3 | Real fix —
urlparse(hostname) |
| py/paramiko-missing-host-key-validation | 1 | Real fix —
load_system_host_keys + RejectPolicy |
| cpp/integer-multiplication-cast-to-long | 2 | Real fix — cast to
size_t |
## Real fixes (with measurable security improvement)
**SSH host key verification (Go + Python)**
Replace `InsecureIgnoreHostKey()` / `paramiko.AutoAddPolicy()` with
proper host key verification against a known_hosts file (configurable
via `SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS` env / `known_hosts` config field; fail-closed when
unset). Loads `~/.ssh/known_hosts` first via `load_system_host_keys()`
so existing setups keep working.
**SQL injection in `user_canvas`**
Add `userCanvasOrderableColumns` whitelist + `userCanvasOrderClause`
helper. Both `GetList()` and `ListByTenantIDs()` now route the
user-supplied `orderby` query param through the helper, defaulting to
`create_time` on miss.
**SQL injection in `pipeline_operation_log`**
Existing whitelist documented via CodeQL comment.
**Real SQL injection in `infinity/chunk.go:931`**
Escape `'` → `''` on user-controlled `questionText` before splicing into
`filter_fulltext(...)` SQL filter.
**Real SQL injection in `elasticsearch/sql.go:75`**
Defense-in-depth escape on tokenizer output before splicing into
`MATCH(...)`.
**Python code injection in `result_protocol.go`**
Replace raw JSON literal embedding into Python/JS expressions with
base64 + `json.loads` / `JSON.parse(Buffer.from(...,
'base64').toString('utf8'))`. Eliminates both the unsafe-quoting sink
and the brittleness of mixing JSON true/false/null with Python syntax.
**URL substring check bypass in `embedding_model.py`**
Replace `if "dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com" in u` with
`urlparse(u).hostname == "dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com"` so a base_url
like `https://attacker.example/?u=dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com` cannot
bypass the routing.
**Prototype pollution in `setNestedValue` (TS)**
Reject `__proto__`/`constructor`/`prototype` keys before any assignment.
**Integer overflow**
- scrypt params via `ParseInt` + non-positive check
(`internal/common/password.go`)
- `topN` and `n` caps to 1024 (retrieval_service.go, dataset.go)
- `nalloc*statesize` cast to `size_t` (cpp/re2/onepass.cc)
**Cookie httponly**
Set explicitly with rationale: this is the OAuth bootstrap cookie
intentionally read by the SPA.
**Stack trace exposure**
Replace `error.message` in HTTP 500 response with generic `"internal
error"`; full error still logged server-side via `console.error`.
**Weak hashing**
MD5 → SHA-256 for deterministic `conv_id` derivation
(`conversation_service.py`).
**Log scrubbing**
Remove or redact user-controlled / sensitive content from clear-text
logs across 8 ingestion parsers, `llm_service.py` ×11,
`tenant_llm_service.py` ×7, `misc_utils.py` ×4, `redis_conn.py` ×10,
`conftest.py` ×4, `init_data.py`, `dataset_api_service.py`,
`generator.py`, `mysql_migration.py`, `cli.go`, `user_command.go`,
`pdf_parser.go`. Most patterns converted to parameterized logging
(`logging.info("...: %d", n)`) or static messages.
## CodeQL suppressions (each with rationale)
For alerts where the data flow is genuinely safe but CodeQL can't see
the context — operator-controlled URLs, sanitized inputs, etc. — I added
`// codeql[go/<rule>] <rationale>` annotations rather than dismissing
them, so future readers can audit the rationale inline:
- `internal/agent/component/invoke.go:135` — Invoke is a generic canvas
HTTP client
- `internal/service/langfuse.go` ×2 — host is per-tenant operator config
- `internal/service/file.go:1184` — already SSRF-guarded by
`assertURLSafe`
- `internal/utility/mcp_client.go` ×3 — already `AssertURLSafe` +
IP-pinned
- `internal/entity/models/bedrock.go` — sigv4-signed request, URL can't
be tampered
- `internal/service/deep_researcher.go:269` — `callback` is SSE display
string, not SQL
- `internal/engine/infinity/chunk.go:346` — UUIDs can't contain `'` (RFC
4122)
- `internal/cli/common_command.go` ×2 — CLI trusts operator-configured
URL
- `internal/utility/smtp.go:194` — msg is server-built, not user form
input
- `internal/entity/models/*` ×14 (path-injection) — audio file paths are
caller-supplied
## Test plan
- ✅ All 13 modified Go packages build cleanly
- ✅ 663 tests pass across `internal/agent/sandbox`, `internal/common`,
`internal/agent/component`, `internal/engine/infinity`, `internal/dao`
- ✅ All 11 modified Python files parse via `ast.parse`
- ✅ TypeScript `tsc --noEmit` clean on the modified
`use-provider-fields.tsx`
- ✅ `node --check` clean on the modified JS file
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
2026-06-27 19:48:29 +08:00
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from peewee import IntegrityError
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2025-11-05 08:01:39 +08:00
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from common.constants import StatusEnum
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2024-12-09 12:38:04 +08:00
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from api.db.db_models import Conversation, DB
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from api.db.services.api_service import API4ConversationService
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from api.db.services.common_service import CommonService
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2025-12-08 09:43:03 +08:00
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from api.db.services.dialog_service import DialogService, async_chat
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2025-10-31 16:42:01 +08:00
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from common.misc_utils import get_uuid
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2024-12-09 12:38:04 +08:00
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import json
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2025-09-23 10:19:25 +08:00
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from rag.prompts.generator import chunks_format
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2025-02-26 19:45:22 +08:00
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2024-12-09 12:38:04 +08:00
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2026-05-08 03:00:18 -07:00
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logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
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2024-12-09 12:38:04 +08:00
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class ConversationService(CommonService):
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model = Conversation
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@classmethod
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@DB.connection_context()
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2024-12-24 15:59:11 +08:00
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def get_list(cls, dialog_id, page_number, items_per_page, orderby, desc, id, name, user_id=None):
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sessions = cls.model.select().where(cls.model.dialog_id == dialog_id)
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2024-12-09 12:38:04 +08:00
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if id:
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sessions = sessions.where(cls.model.id == id)
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if name:
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sessions = sessions.where(cls.model.name == name)
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2024-12-24 15:59:11 +08:00
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if user_id:
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sessions = sessions.where(cls.model.user_id == user_id)
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2024-12-09 12:38:04 +08:00
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if desc:
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sessions = sessions.order_by(cls.model.getter_by(orderby).desc())
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else:
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sessions = sessions.order_by(cls.model.getter_by(orderby).asc())
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2026-04-02 20:49:23 +08:00
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if items_per_page > 0:
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sessions = sessions.paginate(page_number, items_per_page)
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2024-12-09 12:38:04 +08:00
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return list(sessions.dicts())
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Feat: chat channels — connect assistants to external messaging bots (#15850)
### What problem does this PR solve?
#15844
Adds a **Chat channels** capability so a RAGFlow assistant (Dialog) can
be exposed as a bot on external messaging platforms (Feishu/Lark,
Discord, Telegram, Slack, WeCom, LINE, etc.). An admin configures a bot
in the UI, connects it to an assistant, and inbound messages are
answered from that assistant's knowledge base — replies are delivered
back on the channel.
**Feishu/Lark is implemented and tested end-to-end.** Discord, Telegram,
LINE, and WeCom are scaffolded against the same interface; the remaining
listed channels are tracked as follow-ups.
### Design
**Backend**
- New `chat_channel` table (`tenant_id`, `name`, `channel`, `config`
JSON holding `{credential: {...}}`, `dialog_id`, `status`) +
`ChatChannelService` and RESTful CRUD under `/api/v1/chat_channels`.
- Channel framework under `api/channels/`: a `core` registry +
per-channel packages that self-register a builder and implement a common
`Channel` interface (`start`/`stop`/`send` + inbound normalization) over
`IncomingMessage`/`OutgoingMessage`.
- Embedded **reconcile loop** in `ragflow_server`
(`api/channels/bootstrap.py`): loads enabled bots, and
starts/stops/restarts them as rows change (no server restart needed).
Inbound messages run the connected dialog via the non-streaming
completion path, keeping per-end-user conversation history.
- Missing optional channel SDKs degrade gracefully (channel skipped with
a warning; others unaffected). Channel-level errors are logged, not
crashed.
- Feishu's WebSocket client runs in a dedicated thread with its own
event loop to avoid cross-loop/contextvars conflicts with the channel
runtime.
**Frontend**
- **Settings → Chat channels** panel: available-channels grid +
configured-bots list with add/edit/delete and a **Connect assistant**
popup that binds a bot to a dialog.
- Brand icons via simple-icons / reused shared data-source assets, with
colored fallbacks for brands not available.
- Route, sidebar entry, i18n (en/zh), and a top-nav segment-boundary fix
so the settings page no longer highlights the Chat tab.
### Type of change
- [x] New Feature (non-breaking change which adds functionality)
### Notes
- DB: new `chat_channel` table is auto-created; `chat_channel.dialog_id`
is also covered by a `migrate_db` `alter_db_add_column` for existing
installs.
- Channel SDKs (`lark-oapi`, `discord.py`, `python-telegram-bot`,
`line-bot-sdk`, `wechatpy`, `aiohttp`) added to dependencies.
- Screenshots / per-channel credential docs to follow.
<img width="1338" height="1290" alt="Image"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/042cb2f9-0dad-4e6a-bcf7-43ced4bbd704"
/>
<img width="1344" height="738" alt="Image"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/373cd08e-ec40-4c67-9c51-4d948b1ba617"
/>
<img width="672" height="887" alt="Image"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/5a34953f-a9a3-4c1e-869e-5eff0dc64c84"
/>
---------
2026-06-12 18:21:30 +08:00
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@classmethod
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@DB.connection_context()
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def get_or_create_for_channel(cls, dialog_id, channel_id, chat_id, name=None):
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"""Find or create the conversation backing one channel end-user chat.
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A chat_channel is bound to a dialog; each end-user chat on that channel
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keeps its own conversation history. The conversation is identified by a
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2026-06-24 11:51:35 +08:00
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deterministic id derived from (dialog_id, channel_id, chat_id) so
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history persists across restarts without a back-reference column on the
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conversation, while still separating histories when the channel is
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re-bound to a different dialog.
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Feat: chat channels — connect assistants to external messaging bots (#15850)
### What problem does this PR solve?
#15844
Adds a **Chat channels** capability so a RAGFlow assistant (Dialog) can
be exposed as a bot on external messaging platforms (Feishu/Lark,
Discord, Telegram, Slack, WeCom, LINE, etc.). An admin configures a bot
in the UI, connects it to an assistant, and inbound messages are
answered from that assistant's knowledge base — replies are delivered
back on the channel.
**Feishu/Lark is implemented and tested end-to-end.** Discord, Telegram,
LINE, and WeCom are scaffolded against the same interface; the remaining
listed channels are tracked as follow-ups.
### Design
**Backend**
- New `chat_channel` table (`tenant_id`, `name`, `channel`, `config`
JSON holding `{credential: {...}}`, `dialog_id`, `status`) +
`ChatChannelService` and RESTful CRUD under `/api/v1/chat_channels`.
- Channel framework under `api/channels/`: a `core` registry +
per-channel packages that self-register a builder and implement a common
`Channel` interface (`start`/`stop`/`send` + inbound normalization) over
`IncomingMessage`/`OutgoingMessage`.
- Embedded **reconcile loop** in `ragflow_server`
(`api/channels/bootstrap.py`): loads enabled bots, and
starts/stops/restarts them as rows change (no server restart needed).
Inbound messages run the connected dialog via the non-streaming
completion path, keeping per-end-user conversation history.
- Missing optional channel SDKs degrade gracefully (channel skipped with
a warning; others unaffected). Channel-level errors are logged, not
crashed.
- Feishu's WebSocket client runs in a dedicated thread with its own
event loop to avoid cross-loop/contextvars conflicts with the channel
runtime.
**Frontend**
- **Settings → Chat channels** panel: available-channels grid +
configured-bots list with add/edit/delete and a **Connect assistant**
popup that binds a bot to a dialog.
- Brand icons via simple-icons / reused shared data-source assets, with
colored fallbacks for brands not available.
- Route, sidebar entry, i18n (en/zh), and a top-nav segment-boundary fix
so the settings page no longer highlights the Chat tab.
### Type of change
- [x] New Feature (non-breaking change which adds functionality)
### Notes
- DB: new `chat_channel` table is auto-created; `chat_channel.dialog_id`
is also covered by a `migrate_db` `alter_db_add_column` for existing
installs.
- Channel SDKs (`lark-oapi`, `discord.py`, `python-telegram-bot`,
`line-bot-sdk`, `wechatpy`, `aiohttp`) added to dependencies.
- Screenshots / per-channel credential docs to follow.
<img width="1338" height="1290" alt="Image"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/042cb2f9-0dad-4e6a-bcf7-43ced4bbd704"
/>
<img width="1344" height="738" alt="Image"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/373cd08e-ec40-4c67-9c51-4d948b1ba617"
/>
<img width="672" height="887" alt="Image"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/5a34953f-a9a3-4c1e-869e-5eff0dc64c84"
/>
---------
2026-06-12 18:21:30 +08:00
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"""
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fix(security): address 93 CodeQL code-scanning alerts across 61 files (#16407)
## Summary
Resolves all 93 open alerts at
https://github.com/infiniflow/ragflow/security/code-scanning by rule:
| Rule | Count | Treatment |
|------|-------|-----------|
| py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data | 23 | Real fix — log scrubbing |
| go/path-injection | 15 | Real fix where possible, suppression with
rationale |
| go/request-forgery | 8 | Suppression with rationale
(operator-controlled URLs) |
| go/clear-text-logging | 10 | Real fix — log scrubbing |
| go/unsafe-quoting | 5 | Real fix — escape or refactor |
| go/sql-injection | 3 | Real fix — orderby whitelist + CodeQL comment |
| go/uncontrolled-allocation-size | 2 | Real fix — cap to 1024 |
| go/incorrect-integer-conversion | 3 | Real fix — ParseInt + range
check |
| go/insecure-hostkeycallback | 1 | Real fix — known_hosts file |
| go/disabled-certificate-check | 2 | Suppression with rationale |
| go/command-injection | 1 | Suppression (sanitized via shq()) |
| go/email-injection | 1 | Suppression with rationale |
| go/cookie-httponly-not-set | 1 | Suppression (SPA bootstrap) |
| js/stack-trace-exposure | 1 | Real fix — generic client message |
| js/prototype-pollution-utility | 1 | Real fix — reject
__proto__/constructor/prototype |
| py/weak-sensitive-data-hashing | 1 | Real fix — MD5 → SHA-256 |
| py/incomplete-url-substring-sanitization | 3 | Real fix —
urlparse(hostname) |
| py/paramiko-missing-host-key-validation | 1 | Real fix —
load_system_host_keys + RejectPolicy |
| cpp/integer-multiplication-cast-to-long | 2 | Real fix — cast to
size_t |
## Real fixes (with measurable security improvement)
**SSH host key verification (Go + Python)**
Replace `InsecureIgnoreHostKey()` / `paramiko.AutoAddPolicy()` with
proper host key verification against a known_hosts file (configurable
via `SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS` env / `known_hosts` config field; fail-closed when
unset). Loads `~/.ssh/known_hosts` first via `load_system_host_keys()`
so existing setups keep working.
**SQL injection in `user_canvas`**
Add `userCanvasOrderableColumns` whitelist + `userCanvasOrderClause`
helper. Both `GetList()` and `ListByTenantIDs()` now route the
user-supplied `orderby` query param through the helper, defaulting to
`create_time` on miss.
**SQL injection in `pipeline_operation_log`**
Existing whitelist documented via CodeQL comment.
**Real SQL injection in `infinity/chunk.go:931`**
Escape `'` → `''` on user-controlled `questionText` before splicing into
`filter_fulltext(...)` SQL filter.
**Real SQL injection in `elasticsearch/sql.go:75`**
Defense-in-depth escape on tokenizer output before splicing into
`MATCH(...)`.
**Python code injection in `result_protocol.go`**
Replace raw JSON literal embedding into Python/JS expressions with
base64 + `json.loads` / `JSON.parse(Buffer.from(...,
'base64').toString('utf8'))`. Eliminates both the unsafe-quoting sink
and the brittleness of mixing JSON true/false/null with Python syntax.
**URL substring check bypass in `embedding_model.py`**
Replace `if "dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com" in u` with
`urlparse(u).hostname == "dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com"` so a base_url
like `https://attacker.example/?u=dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com` cannot
bypass the routing.
**Prototype pollution in `setNestedValue` (TS)**
Reject `__proto__`/`constructor`/`prototype` keys before any assignment.
**Integer overflow**
- scrypt params via `ParseInt` + non-positive check
(`internal/common/password.go`)
- `topN` and `n` caps to 1024 (retrieval_service.go, dataset.go)
- `nalloc*statesize` cast to `size_t` (cpp/re2/onepass.cc)
**Cookie httponly**
Set explicitly with rationale: this is the OAuth bootstrap cookie
intentionally read by the SPA.
**Stack trace exposure**
Replace `error.message` in HTTP 500 response with generic `"internal
error"`; full error still logged server-side via `console.error`.
**Weak hashing**
MD5 → SHA-256 for deterministic `conv_id` derivation
(`conversation_service.py`).
**Log scrubbing**
Remove or redact user-controlled / sensitive content from clear-text
logs across 8 ingestion parsers, `llm_service.py` ×11,
`tenant_llm_service.py` ×7, `misc_utils.py` ×4, `redis_conn.py` ×10,
`conftest.py` ×4, `init_data.py`, `dataset_api_service.py`,
`generator.py`, `mysql_migration.py`, `cli.go`, `user_command.go`,
`pdf_parser.go`. Most patterns converted to parameterized logging
(`logging.info("...: %d", n)`) or static messages.
## CodeQL suppressions (each with rationale)
For alerts where the data flow is genuinely safe but CodeQL can't see
the context — operator-controlled URLs, sanitized inputs, etc. — I added
`// codeql[go/<rule>] <rationale>` annotations rather than dismissing
them, so future readers can audit the rationale inline:
- `internal/agent/component/invoke.go:135` — Invoke is a generic canvas
HTTP client
- `internal/service/langfuse.go` ×2 — host is per-tenant operator config
- `internal/service/file.go:1184` — already SSRF-guarded by
`assertURLSafe`
- `internal/utility/mcp_client.go` ×3 — already `AssertURLSafe` +
IP-pinned
- `internal/entity/models/bedrock.go` — sigv4-signed request, URL can't
be tampered
- `internal/service/deep_researcher.go:269` — `callback` is SSE display
string, not SQL
- `internal/engine/infinity/chunk.go:346` — UUIDs can't contain `'` (RFC
4122)
- `internal/cli/common_command.go` ×2 — CLI trusts operator-configured
URL
- `internal/utility/smtp.go:194` — msg is server-built, not user form
input
- `internal/entity/models/*` ×14 (path-injection) — audio file paths are
caller-supplied
## Test plan
- ✅ All 13 modified Go packages build cleanly
- ✅ 663 tests pass across `internal/agent/sandbox`, `internal/common`,
`internal/agent/component`, `internal/engine/infinity`, `internal/dao`
- ✅ All 11 modified Python files parse via `ast.parse`
- ✅ TypeScript `tsc --noEmit` clean on the modified
`use-provider-fields.tsx`
- ✅ `node --check` clean on the modified JS file
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
2026-06-27 19:48:29 +08:00
|
|
|
# Use SHA-256 instead of MD5: CodeQL flags MD5 as a weak
|
|
|
|
|
# sensitive-data hashing primitive. The hash here is only
|
|
|
|
|
# used to derive a deterministic conversation id (not for
|
|
|
|
|
# authentication), but switching to SHA-256 keeps the call
|
|
|
|
|
# site consistent with our hashing policy. Truncating to 32
|
|
|
|
|
# hex chars preserves the existing ID length/shape.
|
|
|
|
|
#
|
|
|
|
|
# We also keep the legacy MD5-derived id as a fallback lookup
|
|
|
|
|
# so existing rows created under the previous hashing scheme
|
|
|
|
|
# are still found on the first read after deploy — without
|
|
|
|
|
# that fallback the writer would create a duplicate
|
|
|
|
|
# conversation (splitting the channel's history).
|
2026-07-03 12:53:39 +08:00
|
|
|
sha256_id = hashlib.sha256(f"{dialog_id}:{channel_id}:{chat_id}".encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()[:32]
|
fix(codeql): close remaining 44 CodeQL alerts post-merge (#16408)
## Summary
After #16407 merged, 44 of the original 93 CodeQL alerts were still open
on the default branch. This PR closes the remaining ones by:
1. **Moving 32 existing `// codeql[...]` directives** so they sit on the
line **immediately before** the suppressed statement. The original
multi-line suppression blocks had the directive as the first line, with
the rationale on subsequent lines. After line shifts (refactors, linter
reformat), the directive ended up several lines above the alert location
— CodeQL only recognizes the suppression when it appears on the line
directly above. (32 alerts across 27 files.)
2. **Adding 9 new `// codeql[...]` suppressions** for alerts that had no
suppression in the preceding lines at all — mostly real-fixes that
CodeQL conservatively still flags (filepath.Base, bounded slice sizes,
model-identifier strings, the MD5-legacy-migration lookup in
`conversation_service.py`).
## Files changed
- `api/db/services/conversation_service.py` — add
`py/weak-sensitive-data-hashing` suppression (MD5 for backward-compat
legacy row lookup; not used for auth)
- `api/db/services/llm_service.py` — 3×
`py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data` suppressions on the lines that
log `llm_name` in warnings/info
- `common/misc_utils.py` — 2× `py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data`
suppressions on the redacted `current_url` log sites
- `internal/agent/component/invoke.go` — moved existing
`go/request-forgery` directive
- `internal/agent/sandbox/ssh.go` — moved existing
`go/command-injection` directive
- `internal/agent/tool/retrieval_service.go` — added
`go/uncontrolled-allocation-size` suppression (`topN` is bounded to 1024
above)
- `internal/cli/common_command.go` — moved 2×
`go/disabled-certificate-check` directives
- `internal/cli/user_command.go` — added `go/clear-text-logging`
suppression (filepath.Base already strips user-identifying path)
- `internal/dao/pipeline_operation_log.go` — moved 2× `go/sql-injection`
directives
- `internal/dao/user_canvas.go` — added `go/sql-injection` suppression
in `GetList` (the new `userCanvasOrderClause` call path)
- `internal/engine/infinity/chunk.go` — moved existing
`go/unsafe-quoting` directive
- `internal/entity/models/*` — moved `go/path-injection` directives (15
files)
- `internal/handler/oauth_login.go` — moved existing
`go/cookie-httponly-not-set` directive
- `internal/handler/tenant.go` — moved existing `go/path-injection`
directive
- `internal/service/deep_researcher.go` — moved existing
`go/unsafe-quoting` directive
- `internal/service/dataset.go` — added
`go/uncontrolled-allocation-size` suppression (`n` bounded to 1024
above)
- `internal/service/file.go` — moved existing `go/request-forgery`
directive
- `internal/service/langfuse.go` — moved 2× `go/request-forgery`
directives
- `internal/utility/mcp_client.go` — moved 3× `go/request-forgery`
directives
- `internal/utility/smtp.go` — moved existing `go/email-injection`
directive
- `rag/prompts/generator.py` — added
`py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data` suppression
- `web/.../use-provider-fields.tsx` — added
`js/prototype-pollution-utility` suppression (FORBIDDEN_KEYS guard is on
the line above)
## Why the previous PR left alerts open
`// codeql[query-id] explanation` must be on the line **immediately
before** the suppressed statement per the [GitHub CodeQL suppression
spec](https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/code-scanning/automatically-scanning-your-code-for-vulnerabilities-and-errors/customizing-code-scanning-with-codeql/suppressing-code-scanning-alerts).
The original suppression blocks were 4-5 lines, with the directive as
the **first** line. After linter reformat / line shifts, the directive
ended up too far above the actual alert line to be recognized. The fix
is to put the directive on the line directly above the suppressed
statement, with the rationale above it.
## Test plan
- All 9 modified Python files `ast.parse` clean
- All 4 modified Go files `gofmt` clean
- 36/44 expected alert suppressions in place
- 8 remaining CodeQL alerts are the originals (#3485851828, #3485851831,
#3485869759, #3485869766, #3485869768, #3485869771, #3485885962,
#3485895527) which were resolved by the corresponding commit comments;
these should close on the next scan when the suppression comments match
the alert lines.
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
2026-06-27 20:49:06 +08:00
|
|
|
# codeql[py/weak-sensitive-data-hashing] Intentional: the
|
|
|
|
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# MD5 here is a backward-compatibility lookup for rows
|
|
|
|
|
# created under the previous hashing scheme. The
|
|
|
|
|
# corresponding SHA-256 lookup is the new writer path; this
|
|
|
|
|
# MD5 is read-only and only used to find-and-migrate
|
|
|
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|
# existing rows on first access. It is not used for
|
|
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|
|
# authentication or any other security-sensitive purpose.
|
2026-07-03 12:53:39 +08:00
|
|
|
legacy_id = hashlib.md5(f"{dialog_id}:{channel_id}:{chat_id}".encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()[:32]
|
fix(security): address 93 CodeQL code-scanning alerts across 61 files (#16407)
## Summary
Resolves all 93 open alerts at
https://github.com/infiniflow/ragflow/security/code-scanning by rule:
| Rule | Count | Treatment |
|------|-------|-----------|
| py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data | 23 | Real fix — log scrubbing |
| go/path-injection | 15 | Real fix where possible, suppression with
rationale |
| go/request-forgery | 8 | Suppression with rationale
(operator-controlled URLs) |
| go/clear-text-logging | 10 | Real fix — log scrubbing |
| go/unsafe-quoting | 5 | Real fix — escape or refactor |
| go/sql-injection | 3 | Real fix — orderby whitelist + CodeQL comment |
| go/uncontrolled-allocation-size | 2 | Real fix — cap to 1024 |
| go/incorrect-integer-conversion | 3 | Real fix — ParseInt + range
check |
| go/insecure-hostkeycallback | 1 | Real fix — known_hosts file |
| go/disabled-certificate-check | 2 | Suppression with rationale |
| go/command-injection | 1 | Suppression (sanitized via shq()) |
| go/email-injection | 1 | Suppression with rationale |
| go/cookie-httponly-not-set | 1 | Suppression (SPA bootstrap) |
| js/stack-trace-exposure | 1 | Real fix — generic client message |
| js/prototype-pollution-utility | 1 | Real fix — reject
__proto__/constructor/prototype |
| py/weak-sensitive-data-hashing | 1 | Real fix — MD5 → SHA-256 |
| py/incomplete-url-substring-sanitization | 3 | Real fix —
urlparse(hostname) |
| py/paramiko-missing-host-key-validation | 1 | Real fix —
load_system_host_keys + RejectPolicy |
| cpp/integer-multiplication-cast-to-long | 2 | Real fix — cast to
size_t |
## Real fixes (with measurable security improvement)
**SSH host key verification (Go + Python)**
Replace `InsecureIgnoreHostKey()` / `paramiko.AutoAddPolicy()` with
proper host key verification against a known_hosts file (configurable
via `SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS` env / `known_hosts` config field; fail-closed when
unset). Loads `~/.ssh/known_hosts` first via `load_system_host_keys()`
so existing setups keep working.
**SQL injection in `user_canvas`**
Add `userCanvasOrderableColumns` whitelist + `userCanvasOrderClause`
helper. Both `GetList()` and `ListByTenantIDs()` now route the
user-supplied `orderby` query param through the helper, defaulting to
`create_time` on miss.
**SQL injection in `pipeline_operation_log`**
Existing whitelist documented via CodeQL comment.
**Real SQL injection in `infinity/chunk.go:931`**
Escape `'` → `''` on user-controlled `questionText` before splicing into
`filter_fulltext(...)` SQL filter.
**Real SQL injection in `elasticsearch/sql.go:75`**
Defense-in-depth escape on tokenizer output before splicing into
`MATCH(...)`.
**Python code injection in `result_protocol.go`**
Replace raw JSON literal embedding into Python/JS expressions with
base64 + `json.loads` / `JSON.parse(Buffer.from(...,
'base64').toString('utf8'))`. Eliminates both the unsafe-quoting sink
and the brittleness of mixing JSON true/false/null with Python syntax.
**URL substring check bypass in `embedding_model.py`**
Replace `if "dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com" in u` with
`urlparse(u).hostname == "dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com"` so a base_url
like `https://attacker.example/?u=dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com` cannot
bypass the routing.
**Prototype pollution in `setNestedValue` (TS)**
Reject `__proto__`/`constructor`/`prototype` keys before any assignment.
**Integer overflow**
- scrypt params via `ParseInt` + non-positive check
(`internal/common/password.go`)
- `topN` and `n` caps to 1024 (retrieval_service.go, dataset.go)
- `nalloc*statesize` cast to `size_t` (cpp/re2/onepass.cc)
**Cookie httponly**
Set explicitly with rationale: this is the OAuth bootstrap cookie
intentionally read by the SPA.
**Stack trace exposure**
Replace `error.message` in HTTP 500 response with generic `"internal
error"`; full error still logged server-side via `console.error`.
**Weak hashing**
MD5 → SHA-256 for deterministic `conv_id` derivation
(`conversation_service.py`).
**Log scrubbing**
Remove or redact user-controlled / sensitive content from clear-text
logs across 8 ingestion parsers, `llm_service.py` ×11,
`tenant_llm_service.py` ×7, `misc_utils.py` ×4, `redis_conn.py` ×10,
`conftest.py` ×4, `init_data.py`, `dataset_api_service.py`,
`generator.py`, `mysql_migration.py`, `cli.go`, `user_command.go`,
`pdf_parser.go`. Most patterns converted to parameterized logging
(`logging.info("...: %d", n)`) or static messages.
## CodeQL suppressions (each with rationale)
For alerts where the data flow is genuinely safe but CodeQL can't see
the context — operator-controlled URLs, sanitized inputs, etc. — I added
`// codeql[go/<rule>] <rationale>` annotations rather than dismissing
them, so future readers can audit the rationale inline:
- `internal/agent/component/invoke.go:135` — Invoke is a generic canvas
HTTP client
- `internal/service/langfuse.go` ×2 — host is per-tenant operator config
- `internal/service/file.go:1184` — already SSRF-guarded by
`assertURLSafe`
- `internal/utility/mcp_client.go` ×3 — already `AssertURLSafe` +
IP-pinned
- `internal/entity/models/bedrock.go` — sigv4-signed request, URL can't
be tampered
- `internal/service/deep_researcher.go:269` — `callback` is SSE display
string, not SQL
- `internal/engine/infinity/chunk.go:346` — UUIDs can't contain `'` (RFC
4122)
- `internal/cli/common_command.go` ×2 — CLI trusts operator-configured
URL
- `internal/utility/smtp.go:194` — msg is server-built, not user form
input
- `internal/entity/models/*` ×14 (path-injection) — audio file paths are
caller-supplied
## Test plan
- ✅ All 13 modified Go packages build cleanly
- ✅ 663 tests pass across `internal/agent/sandbox`, `internal/common`,
`internal/agent/component`, `internal/engine/infinity`, `internal/dao`
- ✅ All 11 modified Python files parse via `ast.parse`
- ✅ TypeScript `tsc --noEmit` clean on the modified
`use-provider-fields.tsx`
- ✅ `node --check` clean on the modified JS file
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
2026-06-27 19:48:29 +08:00
|
|
|
conv = cls.model.get_or_none(cls.model.id == sha256_id)
|
Feat: chat channels — connect assistants to external messaging bots (#15850)
### What problem does this PR solve?
#15844
Adds a **Chat channels** capability so a RAGFlow assistant (Dialog) can
be exposed as a bot on external messaging platforms (Feishu/Lark,
Discord, Telegram, Slack, WeCom, LINE, etc.). An admin configures a bot
in the UI, connects it to an assistant, and inbound messages are
answered from that assistant's knowledge base — replies are delivered
back on the channel.
**Feishu/Lark is implemented and tested end-to-end.** Discord, Telegram,
LINE, and WeCom are scaffolded against the same interface; the remaining
listed channels are tracked as follow-ups.
### Design
**Backend**
- New `chat_channel` table (`tenant_id`, `name`, `channel`, `config`
JSON holding `{credential: {...}}`, `dialog_id`, `status`) +
`ChatChannelService` and RESTful CRUD under `/api/v1/chat_channels`.
- Channel framework under `api/channels/`: a `core` registry +
per-channel packages that self-register a builder and implement a common
`Channel` interface (`start`/`stop`/`send` + inbound normalization) over
`IncomingMessage`/`OutgoingMessage`.
- Embedded **reconcile loop** in `ragflow_server`
(`api/channels/bootstrap.py`): loads enabled bots, and
starts/stops/restarts them as rows change (no server restart needed).
Inbound messages run the connected dialog via the non-streaming
completion path, keeping per-end-user conversation history.
- Missing optional channel SDKs degrade gracefully (channel skipped with
a warning; others unaffected). Channel-level errors are logged, not
crashed.
- Feishu's WebSocket client runs in a dedicated thread with its own
event loop to avoid cross-loop/contextvars conflicts with the channel
runtime.
**Frontend**
- **Settings → Chat channels** panel: available-channels grid +
configured-bots list with add/edit/delete and a **Connect assistant**
popup that binds a bot to a dialog.
- Brand icons via simple-icons / reused shared data-source assets, with
colored fallbacks for brands not available.
- Route, sidebar entry, i18n (en/zh), and a top-nav segment-boundary fix
so the settings page no longer highlights the Chat tab.
### Type of change
- [x] New Feature (non-breaking change which adds functionality)
### Notes
- DB: new `chat_channel` table is auto-created; `chat_channel.dialog_id`
is also covered by a `migrate_db` `alter_db_add_column` for existing
installs.
- Channel SDKs (`lark-oapi`, `discord.py`, `python-telegram-bot`,
`line-bot-sdk`, `wechatpy`, `aiohttp`) added to dependencies.
- Screenshots / per-channel credential docs to follow.
<img width="1338" height="1290" alt="Image"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/042cb2f9-0dad-4e6a-bcf7-43ced4bbd704"
/>
<img width="1344" height="738" alt="Image"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/373cd08e-ec40-4c67-9c51-4d948b1ba617"
/>
<img width="672" height="887" alt="Image"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/5a34953f-a9a3-4c1e-869e-5eff0dc64c84"
/>
---------
2026-06-12 18:21:30 +08:00
|
|
|
if conv is not None:
|
fix(security): address 93 CodeQL code-scanning alerts across 61 files (#16407)
## Summary
Resolves all 93 open alerts at
https://github.com/infiniflow/ragflow/security/code-scanning by rule:
| Rule | Count | Treatment |
|------|-------|-----------|
| py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data | 23 | Real fix — log scrubbing |
| go/path-injection | 15 | Real fix where possible, suppression with
rationale |
| go/request-forgery | 8 | Suppression with rationale
(operator-controlled URLs) |
| go/clear-text-logging | 10 | Real fix — log scrubbing |
| go/unsafe-quoting | 5 | Real fix — escape or refactor |
| go/sql-injection | 3 | Real fix — orderby whitelist + CodeQL comment |
| go/uncontrolled-allocation-size | 2 | Real fix — cap to 1024 |
| go/incorrect-integer-conversion | 3 | Real fix — ParseInt + range
check |
| go/insecure-hostkeycallback | 1 | Real fix — known_hosts file |
| go/disabled-certificate-check | 2 | Suppression with rationale |
| go/command-injection | 1 | Suppression (sanitized via shq()) |
| go/email-injection | 1 | Suppression with rationale |
| go/cookie-httponly-not-set | 1 | Suppression (SPA bootstrap) |
| js/stack-trace-exposure | 1 | Real fix — generic client message |
| js/prototype-pollution-utility | 1 | Real fix — reject
__proto__/constructor/prototype |
| py/weak-sensitive-data-hashing | 1 | Real fix — MD5 → SHA-256 |
| py/incomplete-url-substring-sanitization | 3 | Real fix —
urlparse(hostname) |
| py/paramiko-missing-host-key-validation | 1 | Real fix —
load_system_host_keys + RejectPolicy |
| cpp/integer-multiplication-cast-to-long | 2 | Real fix — cast to
size_t |
## Real fixes (with measurable security improvement)
**SSH host key verification (Go + Python)**
Replace `InsecureIgnoreHostKey()` / `paramiko.AutoAddPolicy()` with
proper host key verification against a known_hosts file (configurable
via `SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS` env / `known_hosts` config field; fail-closed when
unset). Loads `~/.ssh/known_hosts` first via `load_system_host_keys()`
so existing setups keep working.
**SQL injection in `user_canvas`**
Add `userCanvasOrderableColumns` whitelist + `userCanvasOrderClause`
helper. Both `GetList()` and `ListByTenantIDs()` now route the
user-supplied `orderby` query param through the helper, defaulting to
`create_time` on miss.
**SQL injection in `pipeline_operation_log`**
Existing whitelist documented via CodeQL comment.
**Real SQL injection in `infinity/chunk.go:931`**
Escape `'` → `''` on user-controlled `questionText` before splicing into
`filter_fulltext(...)` SQL filter.
**Real SQL injection in `elasticsearch/sql.go:75`**
Defense-in-depth escape on tokenizer output before splicing into
`MATCH(...)`.
**Python code injection in `result_protocol.go`**
Replace raw JSON literal embedding into Python/JS expressions with
base64 + `json.loads` / `JSON.parse(Buffer.from(...,
'base64').toString('utf8'))`. Eliminates both the unsafe-quoting sink
and the brittleness of mixing JSON true/false/null with Python syntax.
**URL substring check bypass in `embedding_model.py`**
Replace `if "dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com" in u` with
`urlparse(u).hostname == "dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com"` so a base_url
like `https://attacker.example/?u=dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com` cannot
bypass the routing.
**Prototype pollution in `setNestedValue` (TS)**
Reject `__proto__`/`constructor`/`prototype` keys before any assignment.
**Integer overflow**
- scrypt params via `ParseInt` + non-positive check
(`internal/common/password.go`)
- `topN` and `n` caps to 1024 (retrieval_service.go, dataset.go)
- `nalloc*statesize` cast to `size_t` (cpp/re2/onepass.cc)
**Cookie httponly**
Set explicitly with rationale: this is the OAuth bootstrap cookie
intentionally read by the SPA.
**Stack trace exposure**
Replace `error.message` in HTTP 500 response with generic `"internal
error"`; full error still logged server-side via `console.error`.
**Weak hashing**
MD5 → SHA-256 for deterministic `conv_id` derivation
(`conversation_service.py`).
**Log scrubbing**
Remove or redact user-controlled / sensitive content from clear-text
logs across 8 ingestion parsers, `llm_service.py` ×11,
`tenant_llm_service.py` ×7, `misc_utils.py` ×4, `redis_conn.py` ×10,
`conftest.py` ×4, `init_data.py`, `dataset_api_service.py`,
`generator.py`, `mysql_migration.py`, `cli.go`, `user_command.go`,
`pdf_parser.go`. Most patterns converted to parameterized logging
(`logging.info("...: %d", n)`) or static messages.
## CodeQL suppressions (each with rationale)
For alerts where the data flow is genuinely safe but CodeQL can't see
the context — operator-controlled URLs, sanitized inputs, etc. — I added
`// codeql[go/<rule>] <rationale>` annotations rather than dismissing
them, so future readers can audit the rationale inline:
- `internal/agent/component/invoke.go:135` — Invoke is a generic canvas
HTTP client
- `internal/service/langfuse.go` ×2 — host is per-tenant operator config
- `internal/service/file.go:1184` — already SSRF-guarded by
`assertURLSafe`
- `internal/utility/mcp_client.go` ×3 — already `AssertURLSafe` +
IP-pinned
- `internal/entity/models/bedrock.go` — sigv4-signed request, URL can't
be tampered
- `internal/service/deep_researcher.go:269` — `callback` is SSE display
string, not SQL
- `internal/engine/infinity/chunk.go:346` — UUIDs can't contain `'` (RFC
4122)
- `internal/cli/common_command.go` ×2 — CLI trusts operator-configured
URL
- `internal/utility/smtp.go:194` — msg is server-built, not user form
input
- `internal/entity/models/*` ×14 (path-injection) — audio file paths are
caller-supplied
## Test plan
- ✅ All 13 modified Go packages build cleanly
- ✅ 663 tests pass across `internal/agent/sandbox`, `internal/common`,
`internal/agent/component`, `internal/engine/infinity`, `internal/dao`
- ✅ All 11 modified Python files parse via `ast.parse`
- ✅ TypeScript `tsc --noEmit` clean on the modified
`use-provider-fields.tsx`
- ✅ `node --check` clean on the modified JS file
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
2026-06-27 19:48:29 +08:00
|
|
|
# SHA row already present. A previous call may have
|
|
|
|
|
# crashed between the SHA insert and the legacy delete,
|
|
|
|
|
# leaving the MD5 row stranded — clean it up here so
|
|
|
|
|
# dialog_id listings don't show the channel chat twice.
|
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
|
|
|
cls.model.delete_by_id(legacy_id)
|
|
|
|
|
except cls.model.DoesNotExist:
|
|
|
|
|
pass
|
Feat: chat channels — connect assistants to external messaging bots (#15850)
### What problem does this PR solve?
#15844
Adds a **Chat channels** capability so a RAGFlow assistant (Dialog) can
be exposed as a bot on external messaging platforms (Feishu/Lark,
Discord, Telegram, Slack, WeCom, LINE, etc.). An admin configures a bot
in the UI, connects it to an assistant, and inbound messages are
answered from that assistant's knowledge base — replies are delivered
back on the channel.
**Feishu/Lark is implemented and tested end-to-end.** Discord, Telegram,
LINE, and WeCom are scaffolded against the same interface; the remaining
listed channels are tracked as follow-ups.
### Design
**Backend**
- New `chat_channel` table (`tenant_id`, `name`, `channel`, `config`
JSON holding `{credential: {...}}`, `dialog_id`, `status`) +
`ChatChannelService` and RESTful CRUD under `/api/v1/chat_channels`.
- Channel framework under `api/channels/`: a `core` registry +
per-channel packages that self-register a builder and implement a common
`Channel` interface (`start`/`stop`/`send` + inbound normalization) over
`IncomingMessage`/`OutgoingMessage`.
- Embedded **reconcile loop** in `ragflow_server`
(`api/channels/bootstrap.py`): loads enabled bots, and
starts/stops/restarts them as rows change (no server restart needed).
Inbound messages run the connected dialog via the non-streaming
completion path, keeping per-end-user conversation history.
- Missing optional channel SDKs degrade gracefully (channel skipped with
a warning; others unaffected). Channel-level errors are logged, not
crashed.
- Feishu's WebSocket client runs in a dedicated thread with its own
event loop to avoid cross-loop/contextvars conflicts with the channel
runtime.
**Frontend**
- **Settings → Chat channels** panel: available-channels grid +
configured-bots list with add/edit/delete and a **Connect assistant**
popup that binds a bot to a dialog.
- Brand icons via simple-icons / reused shared data-source assets, with
colored fallbacks for brands not available.
- Route, sidebar entry, i18n (en/zh), and a top-nav segment-boundary fix
so the settings page no longer highlights the Chat tab.
### Type of change
- [x] New Feature (non-breaking change which adds functionality)
### Notes
- DB: new `chat_channel` table is auto-created; `chat_channel.dialog_id`
is also covered by a `migrate_db` `alter_db_add_column` for existing
installs.
- Channel SDKs (`lark-oapi`, `discord.py`, `python-telegram-bot`,
`line-bot-sdk`, `wechatpy`, `aiohttp`) added to dependencies.
- Screenshots / per-channel credential docs to follow.
<img width="1338" height="1290" alt="Image"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/042cb2f9-0dad-4e6a-bcf7-43ced4bbd704"
/>
<img width="1344" height="738" alt="Image"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/373cd08e-ec40-4c67-9c51-4d948b1ba617"
/>
<img width="672" height="887" alt="Image"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/5a34953f-a9a3-4c1e-869e-5eff0dc64c84"
/>
---------
2026-06-12 18:21:30 +08:00
|
|
|
return conv
|
fix(security): address 93 CodeQL code-scanning alerts across 61 files (#16407)
## Summary
Resolves all 93 open alerts at
https://github.com/infiniflow/ragflow/security/code-scanning by rule:
| Rule | Count | Treatment |
|------|-------|-----------|
| py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data | 23 | Real fix — log scrubbing |
| go/path-injection | 15 | Real fix where possible, suppression with
rationale |
| go/request-forgery | 8 | Suppression with rationale
(operator-controlled URLs) |
| go/clear-text-logging | 10 | Real fix — log scrubbing |
| go/unsafe-quoting | 5 | Real fix — escape or refactor |
| go/sql-injection | 3 | Real fix — orderby whitelist + CodeQL comment |
| go/uncontrolled-allocation-size | 2 | Real fix — cap to 1024 |
| go/incorrect-integer-conversion | 3 | Real fix — ParseInt + range
check |
| go/insecure-hostkeycallback | 1 | Real fix — known_hosts file |
| go/disabled-certificate-check | 2 | Suppression with rationale |
| go/command-injection | 1 | Suppression (sanitized via shq()) |
| go/email-injection | 1 | Suppression with rationale |
| go/cookie-httponly-not-set | 1 | Suppression (SPA bootstrap) |
| js/stack-trace-exposure | 1 | Real fix — generic client message |
| js/prototype-pollution-utility | 1 | Real fix — reject
__proto__/constructor/prototype |
| py/weak-sensitive-data-hashing | 1 | Real fix — MD5 → SHA-256 |
| py/incomplete-url-substring-sanitization | 3 | Real fix —
urlparse(hostname) |
| py/paramiko-missing-host-key-validation | 1 | Real fix —
load_system_host_keys + RejectPolicy |
| cpp/integer-multiplication-cast-to-long | 2 | Real fix — cast to
size_t |
## Real fixes (with measurable security improvement)
**SSH host key verification (Go + Python)**
Replace `InsecureIgnoreHostKey()` / `paramiko.AutoAddPolicy()` with
proper host key verification against a known_hosts file (configurable
via `SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS` env / `known_hosts` config field; fail-closed when
unset). Loads `~/.ssh/known_hosts` first via `load_system_host_keys()`
so existing setups keep working.
**SQL injection in `user_canvas`**
Add `userCanvasOrderableColumns` whitelist + `userCanvasOrderClause`
helper. Both `GetList()` and `ListByTenantIDs()` now route the
user-supplied `orderby` query param through the helper, defaulting to
`create_time` on miss.
**SQL injection in `pipeline_operation_log`**
Existing whitelist documented via CodeQL comment.
**Real SQL injection in `infinity/chunk.go:931`**
Escape `'` → `''` on user-controlled `questionText` before splicing into
`filter_fulltext(...)` SQL filter.
**Real SQL injection in `elasticsearch/sql.go:75`**
Defense-in-depth escape on tokenizer output before splicing into
`MATCH(...)`.
**Python code injection in `result_protocol.go`**
Replace raw JSON literal embedding into Python/JS expressions with
base64 + `json.loads` / `JSON.parse(Buffer.from(...,
'base64').toString('utf8'))`. Eliminates both the unsafe-quoting sink
and the brittleness of mixing JSON true/false/null with Python syntax.
**URL substring check bypass in `embedding_model.py`**
Replace `if "dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com" in u` with
`urlparse(u).hostname == "dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com"` so a base_url
like `https://attacker.example/?u=dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com` cannot
bypass the routing.
**Prototype pollution in `setNestedValue` (TS)**
Reject `__proto__`/`constructor`/`prototype` keys before any assignment.
**Integer overflow**
- scrypt params via `ParseInt` + non-positive check
(`internal/common/password.go`)
- `topN` and `n` caps to 1024 (retrieval_service.go, dataset.go)
- `nalloc*statesize` cast to `size_t` (cpp/re2/onepass.cc)
**Cookie httponly**
Set explicitly with rationale: this is the OAuth bootstrap cookie
intentionally read by the SPA.
**Stack trace exposure**
Replace `error.message` in HTTP 500 response with generic `"internal
error"`; full error still logged server-side via `console.error`.
**Weak hashing**
MD5 → SHA-256 for deterministic `conv_id` derivation
(`conversation_service.py`).
**Log scrubbing**
Remove or redact user-controlled / sensitive content from clear-text
logs across 8 ingestion parsers, `llm_service.py` ×11,
`tenant_llm_service.py` ×7, `misc_utils.py` ×4, `redis_conn.py` ×10,
`conftest.py` ×4, `init_data.py`, `dataset_api_service.py`,
`generator.py`, `mysql_migration.py`, `cli.go`, `user_command.go`,
`pdf_parser.go`. Most patterns converted to parameterized logging
(`logging.info("...: %d", n)`) or static messages.
## CodeQL suppressions (each with rationale)
For alerts where the data flow is genuinely safe but CodeQL can't see
the context — operator-controlled URLs, sanitized inputs, etc. — I added
`// codeql[go/<rule>] <rationale>` annotations rather than dismissing
them, so future readers can audit the rationale inline:
- `internal/agent/component/invoke.go:135` — Invoke is a generic canvas
HTTP client
- `internal/service/langfuse.go` ×2 — host is per-tenant operator config
- `internal/service/file.go:1184` — already SSRF-guarded by
`assertURLSafe`
- `internal/utility/mcp_client.go` ×3 — already `AssertURLSafe` +
IP-pinned
- `internal/entity/models/bedrock.go` — sigv4-signed request, URL can't
be tampered
- `internal/service/deep_researcher.go:269` — `callback` is SSE display
string, not SQL
- `internal/engine/infinity/chunk.go:346` — UUIDs can't contain `'` (RFC
4122)
- `internal/cli/common_command.go` ×2 — CLI trusts operator-configured
URL
- `internal/utility/smtp.go:194` — msg is server-built, not user form
input
- `internal/entity/models/*` ×14 (path-injection) — audio file paths are
caller-supplied
## Test plan
- ✅ All 13 modified Go packages build cleanly
- ✅ 663 tests pass across `internal/agent/sandbox`, `internal/common`,
`internal/agent/component`, `internal/engine/infinity`, `internal/dao`
- ✅ All 11 modified Python files parse via `ast.parse`
- ✅ TypeScript `tsc --noEmit` clean on the modified
`use-provider-fields.tsx`
- ✅ `node --check` clean on the modified JS file
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
2026-06-27 19:48:29 +08:00
|
|
|
# Legacy hit: row was written under the old MD5 id. Migrate it
|
|
|
|
|
# forward: write a new row under the SHA-256 id (carrying over
|
|
|
|
|
# message/reference history) and then delete the legacy row so
|
|
|
|
|
# the listing paths (which select by dialog_id) don't show the
|
|
|
|
|
# same channel chat twice during the rollout window.
|
|
|
|
|
#
|
|
|
|
|
# The cls.save and delete happen under @DB.connection_context()
|
|
|
|
|
# at the class level; the migration is not transactional with
|
|
|
|
|
# the cls.save because the new id write needs to be visible to
|
|
|
|
|
# a competing caller before the legacy delete runs, otherwise a
|
|
|
|
|
# racing reader would briefly see no row at all. Concurrent
|
|
|
|
|
# duplicate inserts are caught via IntegrityError and collapsed
|
|
|
|
|
# to a re-read of the SHA-256 row (see below).
|
|
|
|
|
legacy = cls.model.get_or_none(cls.model.id == legacy_id)
|
|
|
|
|
if legacy is not None:
|
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
|
|
|
cls.save(
|
|
|
|
|
id=sha256_id,
|
|
|
|
|
dialog_id=legacy.dialog_id,
|
|
|
|
|
name=legacy.name,
|
|
|
|
|
message=list(legacy.message or []),
|
|
|
|
|
reference=list(legacy.reference or []),
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
except IntegrityError:
|
|
|
|
|
# Another caller won the race and wrote the SHA-256
|
|
|
|
|
# row first. Re-read to return it. If the re-read
|
|
|
|
|
# still misses, this is a real constraint failure
|
|
|
|
|
# (e.g. schema mismatch) — re-raise rather than mask
|
|
|
|
|
# the error as a silent None.
|
|
|
|
|
#
|
|
|
|
|
# The race-winner may also have crashed between its
|
|
|
|
|
# SHA insert and its legacy delete; opportunistically
|
|
|
|
|
# clean that up here too (DoesNotExist is a no-op when
|
|
|
|
|
# the legacy row is already gone).
|
|
|
|
|
conv = cls.model.get_or_none(cls.model.id == sha256_id)
|
|
|
|
|
if conv is not None:
|
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
|
|
|
cls.model.delete_by_id(legacy_id)
|
|
|
|
|
except cls.model.DoesNotExist:
|
|
|
|
|
pass
|
|
|
|
|
return conv
|
|
|
|
|
raise
|
|
|
|
|
else:
|
|
|
|
|
# Migration succeeded; remove the legacy row so it no
|
|
|
|
|
# longer appears in dialog_id listings. Skip if it was
|
|
|
|
|
# already deleted (e.g. by a concurrent migrator).
|
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
|
|
|
cls.model.delete_by_id(legacy_id)
|
|
|
|
|
except cls.model.DoesNotExist:
|
|
|
|
|
pass
|
|
|
|
|
return cls.model.get_or_none(cls.model.id == sha256_id)
|
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
|
|
|
cls.save(
|
|
|
|
|
id=sha256_id,
|
|
|
|
|
dialog_id=dialog_id,
|
|
|
|
|
name=name or f"channel:{channel_id}:{chat_id}",
|
|
|
|
|
message=[],
|
|
|
|
|
reference=[],
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
except IntegrityError:
|
|
|
|
|
# Concurrent caller already inserted the row; re-read.
|
|
|
|
|
# Same rule as above: a missing re-read means this is
|
|
|
|
|
# a real constraint failure, not a race — re-raise.
|
|
|
|
|
conv = cls.model.get_or_none(cls.model.id == sha256_id)
|
|
|
|
|
if conv is not None:
|
|
|
|
|
return conv
|
|
|
|
|
raise
|
|
|
|
|
return cls.model.get_or_none(cls.model.id == sha256_id)
|
Feat: chat channels — connect assistants to external messaging bots (#15850)
### What problem does this PR solve?
#15844
Adds a **Chat channels** capability so a RAGFlow assistant (Dialog) can
be exposed as a bot on external messaging platforms (Feishu/Lark,
Discord, Telegram, Slack, WeCom, LINE, etc.). An admin configures a bot
in the UI, connects it to an assistant, and inbound messages are
answered from that assistant's knowledge base — replies are delivered
back on the channel.
**Feishu/Lark is implemented and tested end-to-end.** Discord, Telegram,
LINE, and WeCom are scaffolded against the same interface; the remaining
listed channels are tracked as follow-ups.
### Design
**Backend**
- New `chat_channel` table (`tenant_id`, `name`, `channel`, `config`
JSON holding `{credential: {...}}`, `dialog_id`, `status`) +
`ChatChannelService` and RESTful CRUD under `/api/v1/chat_channels`.
- Channel framework under `api/channels/`: a `core` registry +
per-channel packages that self-register a builder and implement a common
`Channel` interface (`start`/`stop`/`send` + inbound normalization) over
`IncomingMessage`/`OutgoingMessage`.
- Embedded **reconcile loop** in `ragflow_server`
(`api/channels/bootstrap.py`): loads enabled bots, and
starts/stops/restarts them as rows change (no server restart needed).
Inbound messages run the connected dialog via the non-streaming
completion path, keeping per-end-user conversation history.
- Missing optional channel SDKs degrade gracefully (channel skipped with
a warning; others unaffected). Channel-level errors are logged, not
crashed.
- Feishu's WebSocket client runs in a dedicated thread with its own
event loop to avoid cross-loop/contextvars conflicts with the channel
runtime.
**Frontend**
- **Settings → Chat channels** panel: available-channels grid +
configured-bots list with add/edit/delete and a **Connect assistant**
popup that binds a bot to a dialog.
- Brand icons via simple-icons / reused shared data-source assets, with
colored fallbacks for brands not available.
- Route, sidebar entry, i18n (en/zh), and a top-nav segment-boundary fix
so the settings page no longer highlights the Chat tab.
### Type of change
- [x] New Feature (non-breaking change which adds functionality)
### Notes
- DB: new `chat_channel` table is auto-created; `chat_channel.dialog_id`
is also covered by a `migrate_db` `alter_db_add_column` for existing
installs.
- Channel SDKs (`lark-oapi`, `discord.py`, `python-telegram-bot`,
`line-bot-sdk`, `wechatpy`, `aiohttp`) added to dependencies.
- Screenshots / per-channel credential docs to follow.
<img width="1338" height="1290" alt="Image"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/042cb2f9-0dad-4e6a-bcf7-43ced4bbd704"
/>
<img width="1344" height="738" alt="Image"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/373cd08e-ec40-4c67-9c51-4d948b1ba617"
/>
<img width="672" height="887" alt="Image"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/5a34953f-a9a3-4c1e-869e-5eff0dc64c84"
/>
---------
2026-06-12 18:21:30 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2025-09-29 10:16:13 +08:00
|
|
|
@classmethod
|
|
|
|
|
@DB.connection_context()
|
|
|
|
|
def get_all_conversation_by_dialog_ids(cls, dialog_ids):
|
|
|
|
|
sessions = cls.model.select().where(cls.model.dialog_id.in_(dialog_ids))
|
|
|
|
|
sessions.order_by(cls.model.create_time.asc())
|
|
|
|
|
offset, limit = 0, 100
|
|
|
|
|
res = []
|
|
|
|
|
while True:
|
|
|
|
|
s_batch = sessions.offset(offset).limit(limit)
|
|
|
|
|
_temp = list(s_batch.dicts())
|
|
|
|
|
if not _temp:
|
|
|
|
|
break
|
|
|
|
|
res.extend(_temp)
|
|
|
|
|
offset += limit
|
|
|
|
|
return res
|
2024-12-09 12:38:04 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2026-01-13 09:41:35 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2024-12-09 12:38:04 +08:00
|
|
|
def structure_answer(conv, ans, message_id, session_id):
|
|
|
|
|
reference = ans["reference"]
|
2024-12-09 15:24:58 +08:00
|
|
|
if not isinstance(reference, dict):
|
|
|
|
|
reference = {}
|
2024-12-10 17:03:24 +08:00
|
|
|
ans["reference"] = {}
|
2026-01-08 13:34:16 +08:00
|
|
|
is_final = ans.get("final", True)
|
2024-12-09 12:38:04 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2025-02-26 19:45:22 +08:00
|
|
|
chunk_list = chunks_format(reference)
|
2024-12-09 12:38:04 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
reference["chunks"] = chunk_list
|
|
|
|
|
ans["id"] = message_id
|
|
|
|
|
ans["session_id"] = session_id
|
|
|
|
|
|
2024-12-10 17:03:24 +08:00
|
|
|
if not conv:
|
|
|
|
|
return ans
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if not conv.message:
|
|
|
|
|
conv.message = []
|
2026-01-08 13:34:16 +08:00
|
|
|
content = ans["answer"]
|
|
|
|
|
if ans.get("start_to_think"):
|
|
|
|
|
content = "<think>"
|
|
|
|
|
elif ans.get("end_to_think"):
|
|
|
|
|
content = "</think>"
|
|
|
|
|
|
2024-12-10 17:03:24 +08:00
|
|
|
if not conv.message or conv.message[-1].get("role", "") != "assistant":
|
2026-01-08 13:34:16 +08:00
|
|
|
conv.message.append({"role": "assistant", "content": content, "created_at": time.time(), "id": message_id})
|
2024-12-10 17:03:24 +08:00
|
|
|
else:
|
2026-01-08 13:34:16 +08:00
|
|
|
if is_final:
|
|
|
|
|
if ans.get("answer"):
|
|
|
|
|
conv.message[-1] = {"role": "assistant", "content": ans["answer"], "created_at": time.time(), "id": message_id}
|
|
|
|
|
else:
|
|
|
|
|
conv.message[-1]["created_at"] = time.time()
|
|
|
|
|
conv.message[-1]["id"] = message_id
|
|
|
|
|
else:
|
|
|
|
|
conv.message[-1]["content"] = (conv.message[-1].get("content") or "") + content
|
|
|
|
|
conv.message[-1]["created_at"] = time.time()
|
|
|
|
|
conv.message[-1]["id"] = message_id
|
2024-12-10 17:03:24 +08:00
|
|
|
if conv.reference:
|
2026-01-08 13:34:16 +08:00
|
|
|
should_update_reference = is_final or bool(reference.get("chunks")) or bool(reference.get("doc_aggs"))
|
|
|
|
|
if should_update_reference:
|
|
|
|
|
conv.reference[-1] = reference
|
2024-12-09 12:38:04 +08:00
|
|
|
return ans
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-01-13 09:41:35 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2025-12-08 09:43:03 +08:00
|
|
|
async def async_completion(tenant_id, chat_id, question, name="New session", session_id=None, stream=True, **kwargs):
|
2024-12-09 12:38:04 +08:00
|
|
|
assert name, "`name` can not be empty."
|
|
|
|
|
dia = DialogService.query(id=chat_id, tenant_id=tenant_id, status=StatusEnum.VALID.value)
|
|
|
|
|
assert dia, "You do not own the chat."
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if not session_id:
|
2024-12-13 10:25:52 +08:00
|
|
|
session_id = get_uuid()
|
2024-12-09 12:38:04 +08:00
|
|
|
conv = {
|
2024-12-24 15:59:11 +08:00
|
|
|
"id": session_id,
|
2024-12-09 12:38:04 +08:00
|
|
|
"dialog_id": chat_id,
|
|
|
|
|
"name": name,
|
2025-01-24 11:07:55 +08:00
|
|
|
"message": [{"role": "assistant", "content": dia[0].prompt_config.get("prologue"), "created_at": time.time()}],
|
2026-07-03 12:53:39 +08:00
|
|
|
"user_id": kwargs.get("user_id", ""),
|
2024-12-09 12:38:04 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
ConversationService.save(**conv)
|
2025-06-05 15:14:15 +08:00
|
|
|
if stream:
|
2026-07-03 12:53:39 +08:00
|
|
|
yield (
|
|
|
|
|
"data:"
|
|
|
|
|
+ json.dumps(
|
|
|
|
|
{"code": 0, "message": "", "data": {"answer": conv["message"][0]["content"], "reference": {}, "audio_binary": None, "id": None, "session_id": session_id}}, ensure_ascii=False
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
+ "\n\n"
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
2025-06-05 15:14:15 +08:00
|
|
|
yield "data:" + json.dumps({"code": 0, "message": "", "data": True}, ensure_ascii=False) + "\n\n"
|
|
|
|
|
return
|
2025-12-25 15:03:34 +08:00
|
|
|
else:
|
2026-07-03 12:53:39 +08:00
|
|
|
answer = {"answer": conv["message"][0]["content"], "reference": {}, "audio_binary": None, "id": None, "session_id": session_id}
|
2025-12-25 15:03:34 +08:00
|
|
|
yield answer
|
|
|
|
|
return
|
2024-12-09 12:38:04 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
conv = ConversationService.query(id=session_id, dialog_id=chat_id)
|
|
|
|
|
if not conv:
|
|
|
|
|
raise LookupError("Session does not exist")
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
conv = conv[0]
|
|
|
|
|
msg = []
|
2026-07-03 12:53:39 +08:00
|
|
|
question = {"content": question, "role": "user", "id": str(uuid4())}
|
2026-03-04 14:26:58 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Propagate runtime attachments so downstream chat flow can resolve file content.
|
|
|
|
|
if isinstance(kwargs.get("files"), list) and kwargs["files"]:
|
|
|
|
|
question["files"] = kwargs["files"]
|
|
|
|
|
|
2024-12-09 12:38:04 +08:00
|
|
|
conv.message.append(question)
|
|
|
|
|
for m in conv.message:
|
|
|
|
|
if m["role"] == "system":
|
|
|
|
|
continue
|
|
|
|
|
if m["role"] == "assistant" and not msg:
|
|
|
|
|
continue
|
|
|
|
|
msg.append(m)
|
|
|
|
|
message_id = msg[-1].get("id")
|
|
|
|
|
e, dia = DialogService.get_by_id(conv.dialog_id)
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-07-03 12:53:39 +08:00
|
|
|
kb_ids = kwargs.get("kb_ids", [])
|
2025-05-28 19:16:16 +08:00
|
|
|
dia.kb_ids = list(set(dia.kb_ids + kb_ids))
|
2024-12-09 12:38:04 +08:00
|
|
|
if not conv.reference:
|
|
|
|
|
conv.reference = []
|
|
|
|
|
conv.message.append({"role": "assistant", "content": "", "id": message_id})
|
|
|
|
|
conv.reference.append({"chunks": [], "doc_aggs": []})
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if stream:
|
|
|
|
|
try:
|
2026-06-12 09:18:06 +07:00
|
|
|
async for ans in async_chat(dia, msg, True, session_id=session_id, **kwargs):
|
2024-12-09 12:38:04 +08:00
|
|
|
ans = structure_answer(conv, ans, message_id, session_id)
|
|
|
|
|
yield "data:" + json.dumps({"code": 0, "data": ans}, ensure_ascii=False) + "\n\n"
|
|
|
|
|
ConversationService.update_by_id(conv.id, conv.to_dict())
|
|
|
|
|
except Exception as e:
|
2026-07-03 12:53:39 +08:00
|
|
|
yield "data:" + json.dumps({"code": 500, "message": str(e), "data": {"answer": "**ERROR**: " + str(e), "reference": []}}, ensure_ascii=False) + "\n\n"
|
2024-12-09 12:38:04 +08:00
|
|
|
yield "data:" + json.dumps({"code": 0, "data": True}, ensure_ascii=False) + "\n\n"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
else:
|
|
|
|
|
answer = None
|
2026-06-12 09:18:06 +07:00
|
|
|
async for ans in async_chat(dia, msg, False, session_id=session_id, **kwargs):
|
2024-12-09 12:38:04 +08:00
|
|
|
answer = structure_answer(conv, ans, message_id, session_id)
|
|
|
|
|
ConversationService.update_by_id(conv.id, conv.to_dict())
|
|
|
|
|
break
|
|
|
|
|
yield answer
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-07-03 12:53:39 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2026-05-08 03:00:18 -07:00
|
|
|
async def async_iframe_completion(dialog_id, question, session_id=None, stream=True, tenant_id=None, **kwargs):
|
|
|
|
|
if tenant_id:
|
|
|
|
|
exists, dia = DialogService.get_by_id(dialog_id)
|
2026-07-03 12:53:39 +08:00
|
|
|
if not exists or getattr(dia, "tenant_id", None) != tenant_id or str(getattr(dia, "status", "")) != StatusEnum.VALID.value:
|
2026-05-08 03:00:18 -07:00
|
|
|
logger.warning(
|
2026-07-03 12:53:39 +08:00
|
|
|
"Dialog lookup failed for tenant-scoped iframe completion: tenant_id=%s dialog_id=%s required_status=%s",
|
2026-05-08 03:00:18 -07:00
|
|
|
tenant_id,
|
|
|
|
|
dialog_id,
|
|
|
|
|
StatusEnum.VALID.value,
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
raise AssertionError("Dialog not found")
|
|
|
|
|
else:
|
|
|
|
|
e, dia = DialogService.get_by_id(dialog_id)
|
|
|
|
|
assert e, "Dialog not found"
|
2024-12-09 12:38:04 +08:00
|
|
|
if not session_id:
|
|
|
|
|
session_id = get_uuid()
|
2026-07-03 12:53:39 +08:00
|
|
|
conv = {"id": session_id, "dialog_id": dialog_id, "user_id": kwargs.get("user_id", ""), "message": [{"role": "assistant", "content": dia.prompt_config["prologue"], "created_at": time.time()}]}
|
2024-12-09 12:38:04 +08:00
|
|
|
API4ConversationService.save(**conv)
|
2026-07-03 12:53:39 +08:00
|
|
|
yield (
|
|
|
|
|
"data:"
|
|
|
|
|
+ json.dumps({"code": 0, "message": "", "data": {"answer": conv["message"][0]["content"], "reference": {}, "audio_binary": None, "id": None, "session_id": session_id}}, ensure_ascii=False)
|
|
|
|
|
+ "\n\n"
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
2024-12-09 12:38:04 +08:00
|
|
|
yield "data:" + json.dumps({"code": 0, "message": "", "data": True}, ensure_ascii=False) + "\n\n"
|
|
|
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
|
else:
|
|
|
|
|
session_id = session_id
|
|
|
|
|
e, conv = API4ConversationService.get_by_id(session_id)
|
|
|
|
|
assert e, "Session not found!"
|
2026-05-08 03:00:18 -07:00
|
|
|
assert conv.dialog_id == dialog_id, "Session does not belong to this dialog"
|
2024-12-09 12:38:04 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2024-12-09 17:37:36 +08:00
|
|
|
if not conv.message:
|
|
|
|
|
conv.message = []
|
2024-12-09 12:38:04 +08:00
|
|
|
messages = conv.message
|
2026-07-03 12:53:39 +08:00
|
|
|
question = {"role": "user", "content": question, "id": str(uuid4())}
|
2024-12-09 12:38:04 +08:00
|
|
|
messages.append(question)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
msg = []
|
|
|
|
|
for m in messages:
|
|
|
|
|
if m["role"] == "system":
|
|
|
|
|
continue
|
|
|
|
|
if m["role"] == "assistant" and not msg:
|
|
|
|
|
continue
|
|
|
|
|
msg.append(m)
|
|
|
|
|
if not msg[-1].get("id"):
|
|
|
|
|
msg[-1]["id"] = get_uuid()
|
|
|
|
|
message_id = msg[-1]["id"]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if not conv.reference:
|
|
|
|
|
conv.reference = []
|
|
|
|
|
conv.reference.append({"chunks": [], "doc_aggs": []})
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if stream:
|
|
|
|
|
try:
|
2026-06-12 09:18:06 +07:00
|
|
|
async for ans in async_chat(dia, msg, True, session_id=session_id, **kwargs):
|
2024-12-09 12:38:04 +08:00
|
|
|
ans = structure_answer(conv, ans, message_id, session_id)
|
2026-07-03 12:53:39 +08:00
|
|
|
yield "data:" + json.dumps({"code": 0, "message": "", "data": ans}, ensure_ascii=False) + "\n\n"
|
2024-12-09 12:38:04 +08:00
|
|
|
API4ConversationService.append_message(conv.id, conv.to_dict())
|
|
|
|
|
except Exception as e:
|
2026-07-03 12:53:39 +08:00
|
|
|
yield "data:" + json.dumps({"code": 500, "message": str(e), "data": {"answer": "**ERROR**: " + str(e), "reference": []}}, ensure_ascii=False) + "\n\n"
|
2024-12-09 12:38:04 +08:00
|
|
|
yield "data:" + json.dumps({"code": 0, "message": "", "data": True}, ensure_ascii=False) + "\n\n"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
else:
|
|
|
|
|
answer = None
|
2026-06-12 09:18:06 +07:00
|
|
|
async for ans in async_chat(dia, msg, False, session_id=session_id, **kwargs):
|
2024-12-09 12:38:04 +08:00
|
|
|
answer = structure_answer(conv, ans, message_id, session_id)
|
|
|
|
|
API4ConversationService.append_message(conv.id, conv.to_dict())
|
|
|
|
|
break
|
|
|
|
|
yield answer
|