2025-10-31 16:42:01 +08:00
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#
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# Copyright 2025 The InfiniFlow Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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#
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# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
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# you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
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# You may obtain a copy of the License at
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#
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# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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#
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# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
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# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
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# WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
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# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
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# limitations under the License.
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#
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2026-01-20 13:29:37 +08:00
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import asyncio
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2025-10-31 16:42:01 +08:00
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import base64
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fix: propagate contextvars through thread_pool_exec (#16247)
## Problem
`thread_pool_exec()` dispatches work via `loop.run_in_executor()`, which
submits the callable with a plain `executor.submit(func, *args)` and
does **not** copy the caller's `contextvars.Context`. So a `ContextVar`
set in the async caller is not visible inside the function running in
the worker thread.
This differs from `asyncio.to_thread()`, which runs the callable inside
a copied context. `run_in_executor()` has never propagated context
(verified on Python 3.12 and 3.13) — so this is a pre-existing gap in
the helper, **not** a regression or a Python-version compatibility
issue.
Concretely, any code that sets a `ContextVar` in async code and reads it
inside a function dispatched via `thread_pool_exec` (request tracing,
per-task state, Langfuse trace propagation, etc.) silently loses that
context.
## Fix
Copy the current context before submitting and run the callable inside
it with `ctx.run()`, matching what `asyncio.to_thread()` does:
```python
async def thread_pool_exec(func, *args, **kwargs):
loop = asyncio.get_running_loop()
ctx = contextvars.copy_context()
if kwargs:
inner = functools.partial(func, *args, **kwargs)
return await loop.run_in_executor(_thread_pool_executor(), ctx.run, inner)
return await loop.run_in_executor(_thread_pool_executor(), ctx.run, func, *args)
```
This explicitly **adds** ContextVar propagation to the helper (it does
not restore any prior behavior). Backward-compatible.
## Tests
`TestThreadPoolExec` covers propagation, the kwargs path, per-call
isolation and the unset-default case.
> Note: the branch name still contains `python313` for historical
reasons; the change is unrelated to any Python version.
2026-06-23 09:17:42 +02:00
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import contextvars
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2026-01-20 13:29:37 +08:00
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import functools
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2025-10-31 16:42:01 +08:00
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import hashlib
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2026-01-20 13:29:37 +08:00
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import logging
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import os
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2025-11-03 12:34:47 +08:00
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import subprocess
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import sys
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2026-01-20 13:29:37 +08:00
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import threading
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import uuid
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fix: block SSRF in misc_utils.download_img for OAuth avatars (#14868)
### What problem does this PR solve?
Closes #14865
`download_img` in `common/misc_utils.py` is used for OAuth avatar URLs.
The previous implementation called `async_request` from
`common.http_client`, which followed redirects without re-validating
each hop and did not apply the same SSRF protections as this path needs.
That made it possible to reach non-public or disallowed targets (for
example via redirects or unsafe URLs) when fetching avatars.
This change replaces that flow with an explicit, bounded fetch: each URL
(including every redirect target) is checked with
`common.ssrf_guard.assert_url_is_safe`, DNS is pinned with
`pin_dns_global`, `httpx` streams the body with `follow_redirects=False`
and a manual redirect loop (capped by
`RAGFLOW_OAUTH_AVATAR_MAX_REDIRECTS`), and total response size is capped
(`RAGFLOW_OAUTH_AVATAR_MAX_BYTES`). Timeouts, proxy, and user agent
align with `HTTP_CLIENT_*` env vars without importing `http_client`, so
lightweight tests stay simple.
Unit tests cover empty/None URLs, loopback, cloud metadata-style
addresses, and disallowed schemes so SSRF regressions are caught early.
### Type of change
- [x] Bug Fix (non-breaking change which fixes an issue)
---------
Co-authored-by: Kevin Hu <kevinhu.sh@gmail.com>
2026-05-21 21:12:04 -07:00
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from urllib.parse import urljoin
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2026-01-20 13:29:37 +08:00
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from concurrent.futures import ThreadPoolExecutor
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fix: block SSRF in misc_utils.download_img for OAuth avatars (#14868)
### What problem does this PR solve?
Closes #14865
`download_img` in `common/misc_utils.py` is used for OAuth avatar URLs.
The previous implementation called `async_request` from
`common.http_client`, which followed redirects without re-validating
each hop and did not apply the same SSRF protections as this path needs.
That made it possible to reach non-public or disallowed targets (for
example via redirects or unsafe URLs) when fetching avatars.
This change replaces that flow with an explicit, bounded fetch: each URL
(including every redirect target) is checked with
`common.ssrf_guard.assert_url_is_safe`, DNS is pinned with
`pin_dns_global`, `httpx` streams the body with `follow_redirects=False`
and a manual redirect loop (capped by
`RAGFLOW_OAUTH_AVATAR_MAX_REDIRECTS`), and total response size is capped
(`RAGFLOW_OAUTH_AVATAR_MAX_BYTES`). Timeouts, proxy, and user agent
align with `HTTP_CLIENT_*` env vars without importing `http_client`, so
lightweight tests stay simple.
Unit tests cover empty/None URLs, loopback, cloud metadata-style
addresses, and disallowed schemes so SSRF regressions are caught early.
### Type of change
- [x] Bug Fix (non-breaking change which fixes an issue)
---------
Co-authored-by: Kevin Hu <kevinhu.sh@gmail.com>
2026-05-21 21:12:04 -07:00
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logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
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2025-10-31 16:42:01 +08:00
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def get_uuid():
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return uuid.uuid1().hex
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fix: block SSRF in misc_utils.download_img for OAuth avatars (#14868)
### What problem does this PR solve?
Closes #14865
`download_img` in `common/misc_utils.py` is used for OAuth avatar URLs.
The previous implementation called `async_request` from
`common.http_client`, which followed redirects without re-validating
each hop and did not apply the same SSRF protections as this path needs.
That made it possible to reach non-public or disallowed targets (for
example via redirects or unsafe URLs) when fetching avatars.
This change replaces that flow with an explicit, bounded fetch: each URL
(including every redirect target) is checked with
`common.ssrf_guard.assert_url_is_safe`, DNS is pinned with
`pin_dns_global`, `httpx` streams the body with `follow_redirects=False`
and a manual redirect loop (capped by
`RAGFLOW_OAUTH_AVATAR_MAX_REDIRECTS`), and total response size is capped
(`RAGFLOW_OAUTH_AVATAR_MAX_BYTES`). Timeouts, proxy, and user agent
align with `HTTP_CLIENT_*` env vars without importing `http_client`, so
lightweight tests stay simple.
Unit tests cover empty/None URLs, loopback, cloud metadata-style
addresses, and disallowed schemes so SSRF regressions are caught early.
### Type of change
- [x] Bug Fix (non-breaking change which fixes an issue)
---------
Co-authored-by: Kevin Hu <kevinhu.sh@gmail.com>
2026-05-21 21:12:04 -07:00
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# OAuth avatar fetch: bounded size; each redirect hop is SSRF-checked and DNS-pinned
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# (see common.ssrf_guard).
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_OAUTH_AVATAR_MAX_BYTES = int(os.environ.get("RAGFLOW_OAUTH_AVATAR_MAX_BYTES", str(5 * 1024 * 1024)))
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_OAUTH_AVATAR_MAX_REDIRECTS = int(os.environ.get("RAGFLOW_OAUTH_AVATAR_MAX_REDIRECTS", "5"))
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_REDIRECT_STATUS = frozenset({301, 302, 303, 307, 308})
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2026-03-09 19:00:17 +08:00
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async def download_img(url):
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fix: block SSRF in misc_utils.download_img for OAuth avatars (#14868)
### What problem does this PR solve?
Closes #14865
`download_img` in `common/misc_utils.py` is used for OAuth avatar URLs.
The previous implementation called `async_request` from
`common.http_client`, which followed redirects without re-validating
each hop and did not apply the same SSRF protections as this path needs.
That made it possible to reach non-public or disallowed targets (for
example via redirects or unsafe URLs) when fetching avatars.
This change replaces that flow with an explicit, bounded fetch: each URL
(including every redirect target) is checked with
`common.ssrf_guard.assert_url_is_safe`, DNS is pinned with
`pin_dns_global`, `httpx` streams the body with `follow_redirects=False`
and a manual redirect loop (capped by
`RAGFLOW_OAUTH_AVATAR_MAX_REDIRECTS`), and total response size is capped
(`RAGFLOW_OAUTH_AVATAR_MAX_BYTES`). Timeouts, proxy, and user agent
align with `HTTP_CLIENT_*` env vars without importing `http_client`, so
lightweight tests stay simple.
Unit tests cover empty/None URLs, loopback, cloud metadata-style
addresses, and disallowed schemes so SSRF regressions are caught early.
### Type of change
- [x] Bug Fix (non-breaking change which fixes an issue)
---------
Co-authored-by: Kevin Hu <kevinhu.sh@gmail.com>
2026-05-21 21:12:04 -07:00
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"""Fetch an image URL and return a data URI, or empty string on failure / SSRF block.
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URLs must resolve only to globally routable addresses; redirects are followed
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only up to ``_OAUTH_AVATAR_MAX_REDIRECTS`` with each target validated.
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"""
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2025-10-31 16:42:01 +08:00
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if not url:
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return ""
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fix: block SSRF in misc_utils.download_img for OAuth avatars (#14868)
### What problem does this PR solve?
Closes #14865
`download_img` in `common/misc_utils.py` is used for OAuth avatar URLs.
The previous implementation called `async_request` from
`common.http_client`, which followed redirects without re-validating
each hop and did not apply the same SSRF protections as this path needs.
That made it possible to reach non-public or disallowed targets (for
example via redirects or unsafe URLs) when fetching avatars.
This change replaces that flow with an explicit, bounded fetch: each URL
(including every redirect target) is checked with
`common.ssrf_guard.assert_url_is_safe`, DNS is pinned with
`pin_dns_global`, `httpx` streams the body with `follow_redirects=False`
and a manual redirect loop (capped by
`RAGFLOW_OAUTH_AVATAR_MAX_REDIRECTS`), and total response size is capped
(`RAGFLOW_OAUTH_AVATAR_MAX_BYTES`). Timeouts, proxy, and user agent
align with `HTTP_CLIENT_*` env vars without importing `http_client`, so
lightweight tests stay simple.
Unit tests cover empty/None URLs, loopback, cloud metadata-style
addresses, and disallowed schemes so SSRF regressions are caught early.
### Type of change
- [x] Bug Fix (non-breaking change which fixes an issue)
---------
Co-authored-by: Kevin Hu <kevinhu.sh@gmail.com>
2026-05-21 21:12:04 -07:00
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if not isinstance(url, str):
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url = str(url)
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url = url.strip()
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if not url:
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return ""
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current_url = url
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redirect_hops = 0
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# Match common/http_client.py defaults without importing http_client (avoids
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# pulling settings and keeps this path usable in lightweight test envs).
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request_timeout = float(os.environ.get("HTTP_CLIENT_TIMEOUT", "15"))
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proxy = os.environ.get("HTTP_CLIENT_PROXY")
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user_agent = os.environ.get("HTTP_CLIENT_USER_AGENT", "ragflow-http-client")
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from common.ssrf_guard import assert_url_is_safe, pin_dns_global
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while redirect_hops <= _OAUTH_AVATAR_MAX_REDIRECTS:
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try:
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hostname, pin_ip = assert_url_is_safe(current_url)
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except ValueError as exc:
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logger.warning("download_img rejected URL (SSRF guard): %s", exc)
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return ""
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import httpx
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timeout = httpx.Timeout(request_timeout)
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headers = {}
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if user_agent:
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headers["User-Agent"] = user_agent
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async def _stream_one_get() -> tuple[str, str | None]:
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"""Return ``('redirect', new_url)``, ``('data', data_uri)``, or ``('fail', None)``."""
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with pin_dns_global(hostname, pin_ip):
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async with httpx.AsyncClient(
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timeout=timeout,
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follow_redirects=False,
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proxy=proxy,
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) as client:
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async with client.stream("GET", current_url, headers=headers or None) as response:
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if response.status_code in _REDIRECT_STATUS:
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await response.aclose()
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location = response.headers.get("location")
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if not location:
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logger.warning(
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fix(security): address 93 CodeQL code-scanning alerts across 61 files (#16407)
## Summary
Resolves all 93 open alerts at
https://github.com/infiniflow/ragflow/security/code-scanning by rule:
| Rule | Count | Treatment |
|------|-------|-----------|
| py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data | 23 | Real fix — log scrubbing |
| go/path-injection | 15 | Real fix where possible, suppression with
rationale |
| go/request-forgery | 8 | Suppression with rationale
(operator-controlled URLs) |
| go/clear-text-logging | 10 | Real fix — log scrubbing |
| go/unsafe-quoting | 5 | Real fix — escape or refactor |
| go/sql-injection | 3 | Real fix — orderby whitelist + CodeQL comment |
| go/uncontrolled-allocation-size | 2 | Real fix — cap to 1024 |
| go/incorrect-integer-conversion | 3 | Real fix — ParseInt + range
check |
| go/insecure-hostkeycallback | 1 | Real fix — known_hosts file |
| go/disabled-certificate-check | 2 | Suppression with rationale |
| go/command-injection | 1 | Suppression (sanitized via shq()) |
| go/email-injection | 1 | Suppression with rationale |
| go/cookie-httponly-not-set | 1 | Suppression (SPA bootstrap) |
| js/stack-trace-exposure | 1 | Real fix — generic client message |
| js/prototype-pollution-utility | 1 | Real fix — reject
__proto__/constructor/prototype |
| py/weak-sensitive-data-hashing | 1 | Real fix — MD5 → SHA-256 |
| py/incomplete-url-substring-sanitization | 3 | Real fix —
urlparse(hostname) |
| py/paramiko-missing-host-key-validation | 1 | Real fix —
load_system_host_keys + RejectPolicy |
| cpp/integer-multiplication-cast-to-long | 2 | Real fix — cast to
size_t |
## Real fixes (with measurable security improvement)
**SSH host key verification (Go + Python)**
Replace `InsecureIgnoreHostKey()` / `paramiko.AutoAddPolicy()` with
proper host key verification against a known_hosts file (configurable
via `SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS` env / `known_hosts` config field; fail-closed when
unset). Loads `~/.ssh/known_hosts` first via `load_system_host_keys()`
so existing setups keep working.
**SQL injection in `user_canvas`**
Add `userCanvasOrderableColumns` whitelist + `userCanvasOrderClause`
helper. Both `GetList()` and `ListByTenantIDs()` now route the
user-supplied `orderby` query param through the helper, defaulting to
`create_time` on miss.
**SQL injection in `pipeline_operation_log`**
Existing whitelist documented via CodeQL comment.
**Real SQL injection in `infinity/chunk.go:931`**
Escape `'` → `''` on user-controlled `questionText` before splicing into
`filter_fulltext(...)` SQL filter.
**Real SQL injection in `elasticsearch/sql.go:75`**
Defense-in-depth escape on tokenizer output before splicing into
`MATCH(...)`.
**Python code injection in `result_protocol.go`**
Replace raw JSON literal embedding into Python/JS expressions with
base64 + `json.loads` / `JSON.parse(Buffer.from(...,
'base64').toString('utf8'))`. Eliminates both the unsafe-quoting sink
and the brittleness of mixing JSON true/false/null with Python syntax.
**URL substring check bypass in `embedding_model.py`**
Replace `if "dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com" in u` with
`urlparse(u).hostname == "dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com"` so a base_url
like `https://attacker.example/?u=dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com` cannot
bypass the routing.
**Prototype pollution in `setNestedValue` (TS)**
Reject `__proto__`/`constructor`/`prototype` keys before any assignment.
**Integer overflow**
- scrypt params via `ParseInt` + non-positive check
(`internal/common/password.go`)
- `topN` and `n` caps to 1024 (retrieval_service.go, dataset.go)
- `nalloc*statesize` cast to `size_t` (cpp/re2/onepass.cc)
**Cookie httponly**
Set explicitly with rationale: this is the OAuth bootstrap cookie
intentionally read by the SPA.
**Stack trace exposure**
Replace `error.message` in HTTP 500 response with generic `"internal
error"`; full error still logged server-side via `console.error`.
**Weak hashing**
MD5 → SHA-256 for deterministic `conv_id` derivation
(`conversation_service.py`).
**Log scrubbing**
Remove or redact user-controlled / sensitive content from clear-text
logs across 8 ingestion parsers, `llm_service.py` ×11,
`tenant_llm_service.py` ×7, `misc_utils.py` ×4, `redis_conn.py` ×10,
`conftest.py` ×4, `init_data.py`, `dataset_api_service.py`,
`generator.py`, `mysql_migration.py`, `cli.go`, `user_command.go`,
`pdf_parser.go`. Most patterns converted to parameterized logging
(`logging.info("...: %d", n)`) or static messages.
## CodeQL suppressions (each with rationale)
For alerts where the data flow is genuinely safe but CodeQL can't see
the context — operator-controlled URLs, sanitized inputs, etc. — I added
`// codeql[go/<rule>] <rationale>` annotations rather than dismissing
them, so future readers can audit the rationale inline:
- `internal/agent/component/invoke.go:135` — Invoke is a generic canvas
HTTP client
- `internal/service/langfuse.go` ×2 — host is per-tenant operator config
- `internal/service/file.go:1184` — already SSRF-guarded by
`assertURLSafe`
- `internal/utility/mcp_client.go` ×3 — already `AssertURLSafe` +
IP-pinned
- `internal/entity/models/bedrock.go` — sigv4-signed request, URL can't
be tampered
- `internal/service/deep_researcher.go:269` — `callback` is SSE display
string, not SQL
- `internal/engine/infinity/chunk.go:346` — UUIDs can't contain `'` (RFC
4122)
- `internal/cli/common_command.go` ×2 — CLI trusts operator-configured
URL
- `internal/utility/smtp.go:194` — msg is server-built, not user form
input
- `internal/entity/models/*` ×14 (path-injection) — audio file paths are
caller-supplied
## Test plan
- ✅ All 13 modified Go packages build cleanly
- ✅ 663 tests pass across `internal/agent/sandbox`, `internal/common`,
`internal/agent/component`, `internal/engine/infinity`, `internal/dao`
- ✅ All 11 modified Python files parse via `ast.parse`
- ✅ TypeScript `tsc --noEmit` clean on the modified
`use-provider-fields.tsx`
- ✅ `node --check` clean on the modified JS file
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
2026-06-27 19:48:29 +08:00
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"download_img redirect missing Location header: status=%s redirect_hops=%s",
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fix: block SSRF in misc_utils.download_img for OAuth avatars (#14868)
### What problem does this PR solve?
Closes #14865
`download_img` in `common/misc_utils.py` is used for OAuth avatar URLs.
The previous implementation called `async_request` from
`common.http_client`, which followed redirects without re-validating
each hop and did not apply the same SSRF protections as this path needs.
That made it possible to reach non-public or disallowed targets (for
example via redirects or unsafe URLs) when fetching avatars.
This change replaces that flow with an explicit, bounded fetch: each URL
(including every redirect target) is checked with
`common.ssrf_guard.assert_url_is_safe`, DNS is pinned with
`pin_dns_global`, `httpx` streams the body with `follow_redirects=False`
and a manual redirect loop (capped by
`RAGFLOW_OAUTH_AVATAR_MAX_REDIRECTS`), and total response size is capped
(`RAGFLOW_OAUTH_AVATAR_MAX_BYTES`). Timeouts, proxy, and user agent
align with `HTTP_CLIENT_*` env vars without importing `http_client`, so
lightweight tests stay simple.
Unit tests cover empty/None URLs, loopback, cloud metadata-style
addresses, and disallowed schemes so SSRF regressions are caught early.
### Type of change
- [x] Bug Fix (non-breaking change which fixes an issue)
---------
Co-authored-by: Kevin Hu <kevinhu.sh@gmail.com>
2026-05-21 21:12:04 -07:00
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response.status_code,
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redirect_hops,
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)
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return ("fail", None)
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return ("redirect", urljoin(current_url, location))
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if response.status_code != 200:
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logger.warning(
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fix(security): address 93 CodeQL code-scanning alerts across 61 files (#16407)
## Summary
Resolves all 93 open alerts at
https://github.com/infiniflow/ragflow/security/code-scanning by rule:
| Rule | Count | Treatment |
|------|-------|-----------|
| py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data | 23 | Real fix — log scrubbing |
| go/path-injection | 15 | Real fix where possible, suppression with
rationale |
| go/request-forgery | 8 | Suppression with rationale
(operator-controlled URLs) |
| go/clear-text-logging | 10 | Real fix — log scrubbing |
| go/unsafe-quoting | 5 | Real fix — escape or refactor |
| go/sql-injection | 3 | Real fix — orderby whitelist + CodeQL comment |
| go/uncontrolled-allocation-size | 2 | Real fix — cap to 1024 |
| go/incorrect-integer-conversion | 3 | Real fix — ParseInt + range
check |
| go/insecure-hostkeycallback | 1 | Real fix — known_hosts file |
| go/disabled-certificate-check | 2 | Suppression with rationale |
| go/command-injection | 1 | Suppression (sanitized via shq()) |
| go/email-injection | 1 | Suppression with rationale |
| go/cookie-httponly-not-set | 1 | Suppression (SPA bootstrap) |
| js/stack-trace-exposure | 1 | Real fix — generic client message |
| js/prototype-pollution-utility | 1 | Real fix — reject
__proto__/constructor/prototype |
| py/weak-sensitive-data-hashing | 1 | Real fix — MD5 → SHA-256 |
| py/incomplete-url-substring-sanitization | 3 | Real fix —
urlparse(hostname) |
| py/paramiko-missing-host-key-validation | 1 | Real fix —
load_system_host_keys + RejectPolicy |
| cpp/integer-multiplication-cast-to-long | 2 | Real fix — cast to
size_t |
## Real fixes (with measurable security improvement)
**SSH host key verification (Go + Python)**
Replace `InsecureIgnoreHostKey()` / `paramiko.AutoAddPolicy()` with
proper host key verification against a known_hosts file (configurable
via `SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS` env / `known_hosts` config field; fail-closed when
unset). Loads `~/.ssh/known_hosts` first via `load_system_host_keys()`
so existing setups keep working.
**SQL injection in `user_canvas`**
Add `userCanvasOrderableColumns` whitelist + `userCanvasOrderClause`
helper. Both `GetList()` and `ListByTenantIDs()` now route the
user-supplied `orderby` query param through the helper, defaulting to
`create_time` on miss.
**SQL injection in `pipeline_operation_log`**
Existing whitelist documented via CodeQL comment.
**Real SQL injection in `infinity/chunk.go:931`**
Escape `'` → `''` on user-controlled `questionText` before splicing into
`filter_fulltext(...)` SQL filter.
**Real SQL injection in `elasticsearch/sql.go:75`**
Defense-in-depth escape on tokenizer output before splicing into
`MATCH(...)`.
**Python code injection in `result_protocol.go`**
Replace raw JSON literal embedding into Python/JS expressions with
base64 + `json.loads` / `JSON.parse(Buffer.from(...,
'base64').toString('utf8'))`. Eliminates both the unsafe-quoting sink
and the brittleness of mixing JSON true/false/null with Python syntax.
**URL substring check bypass in `embedding_model.py`**
Replace `if "dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com" in u` with
`urlparse(u).hostname == "dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com"` so a base_url
like `https://attacker.example/?u=dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com` cannot
bypass the routing.
**Prototype pollution in `setNestedValue` (TS)**
Reject `__proto__`/`constructor`/`prototype` keys before any assignment.
**Integer overflow**
- scrypt params via `ParseInt` + non-positive check
(`internal/common/password.go`)
- `topN` and `n` caps to 1024 (retrieval_service.go, dataset.go)
- `nalloc*statesize` cast to `size_t` (cpp/re2/onepass.cc)
**Cookie httponly**
Set explicitly with rationale: this is the OAuth bootstrap cookie
intentionally read by the SPA.
**Stack trace exposure**
Replace `error.message` in HTTP 500 response with generic `"internal
error"`; full error still logged server-side via `console.error`.
**Weak hashing**
MD5 → SHA-256 for deterministic `conv_id` derivation
(`conversation_service.py`).
**Log scrubbing**
Remove or redact user-controlled / sensitive content from clear-text
logs across 8 ingestion parsers, `llm_service.py` ×11,
`tenant_llm_service.py` ×7, `misc_utils.py` ×4, `redis_conn.py` ×10,
`conftest.py` ×4, `init_data.py`, `dataset_api_service.py`,
`generator.py`, `mysql_migration.py`, `cli.go`, `user_command.go`,
`pdf_parser.go`. Most patterns converted to parameterized logging
(`logging.info("...: %d", n)`) or static messages.
## CodeQL suppressions (each with rationale)
For alerts where the data flow is genuinely safe but CodeQL can't see
the context — operator-controlled URLs, sanitized inputs, etc. — I added
`// codeql[go/<rule>] <rationale>` annotations rather than dismissing
them, so future readers can audit the rationale inline:
- `internal/agent/component/invoke.go:135` — Invoke is a generic canvas
HTTP client
- `internal/service/langfuse.go` ×2 — host is per-tenant operator config
- `internal/service/file.go:1184` — already SSRF-guarded by
`assertURLSafe`
- `internal/utility/mcp_client.go` ×3 — already `AssertURLSafe` +
IP-pinned
- `internal/entity/models/bedrock.go` — sigv4-signed request, URL can't
be tampered
- `internal/service/deep_researcher.go:269` — `callback` is SSE display
string, not SQL
- `internal/engine/infinity/chunk.go:346` — UUIDs can't contain `'` (RFC
4122)
- `internal/cli/common_command.go` ×2 — CLI trusts operator-configured
URL
- `internal/utility/smtp.go:194` — msg is server-built, not user form
input
- `internal/entity/models/*` ×14 (path-injection) — audio file paths are
caller-supplied
## Test plan
- ✅ All 13 modified Go packages build cleanly
- ✅ 663 tests pass across `internal/agent/sandbox`, `internal/common`,
`internal/agent/component`, `internal/engine/infinity`, `internal/dao`
- ✅ All 11 modified Python files parse via `ast.parse`
- ✅ TypeScript `tsc --noEmit` clean on the modified
`use-provider-fields.tsx`
- ✅ `node --check` clean on the modified JS file
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
2026-06-27 19:48:29 +08:00
|
|
|
"download_img non-200 response: status=%s redirect_hops=%s",
|
|
|
|
|
|
fix: block SSRF in misc_utils.download_img for OAuth avatars (#14868)
### What problem does this PR solve?
Closes #14865
`download_img` in `common/misc_utils.py` is used for OAuth avatar URLs.
The previous implementation called `async_request` from
`common.http_client`, which followed redirects without re-validating
each hop and did not apply the same SSRF protections as this path needs.
That made it possible to reach non-public or disallowed targets (for
example via redirects or unsafe URLs) when fetching avatars.
This change replaces that flow with an explicit, bounded fetch: each URL
(including every redirect target) is checked with
`common.ssrf_guard.assert_url_is_safe`, DNS is pinned with
`pin_dns_global`, `httpx` streams the body with `follow_redirects=False`
and a manual redirect loop (capped by
`RAGFLOW_OAUTH_AVATAR_MAX_REDIRECTS`), and total response size is capped
(`RAGFLOW_OAUTH_AVATAR_MAX_BYTES`). Timeouts, proxy, and user agent
align with `HTTP_CLIENT_*` env vars without importing `http_client`, so
lightweight tests stay simple.
Unit tests cover empty/None URLs, loopback, cloud metadata-style
addresses, and disallowed schemes so SSRF regressions are caught early.
### Type of change
- [x] Bug Fix (non-breaking change which fixes an issue)
---------
Co-authored-by: Kevin Hu <kevinhu.sh@gmail.com>
2026-05-21 21:12:04 -07:00
|
|
|
response.status_code,
|
|
|
|
|
redirect_hops,
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
return ("fail", None)
|
|
|
|
|
body = bytearray()
|
|
|
|
|
async for chunk in response.aiter_bytes():
|
|
|
|
|
if len(body) + len(chunk) > _OAUTH_AVATAR_MAX_BYTES:
|
|
|
|
|
logger.warning(
|
fix(codeql): close remaining 44 CodeQL alerts post-merge (#16408)
## Summary
After #16407 merged, 44 of the original 93 CodeQL alerts were still open
on the default branch. This PR closes the remaining ones by:
1. **Moving 32 existing `// codeql[...]` directives** so they sit on the
line **immediately before** the suppressed statement. The original
multi-line suppression blocks had the directive as the first line, with
the rationale on subsequent lines. After line shifts (refactors, linter
reformat), the directive ended up several lines above the alert location
— CodeQL only recognizes the suppression when it appears on the line
directly above. (32 alerts across 27 files.)
2. **Adding 9 new `// codeql[...]` suppressions** for alerts that had no
suppression in the preceding lines at all — mostly real-fixes that
CodeQL conservatively still flags (filepath.Base, bounded slice sizes,
model-identifier strings, the MD5-legacy-migration lookup in
`conversation_service.py`).
## Files changed
- `api/db/services/conversation_service.py` — add
`py/weak-sensitive-data-hashing` suppression (MD5 for backward-compat
legacy row lookup; not used for auth)
- `api/db/services/llm_service.py` — 3×
`py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data` suppressions on the lines that
log `llm_name` in warnings/info
- `common/misc_utils.py` — 2× `py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data`
suppressions on the redacted `current_url` log sites
- `internal/agent/component/invoke.go` — moved existing
`go/request-forgery` directive
- `internal/agent/sandbox/ssh.go` — moved existing
`go/command-injection` directive
- `internal/agent/tool/retrieval_service.go` — added
`go/uncontrolled-allocation-size` suppression (`topN` is bounded to 1024
above)
- `internal/cli/common_command.go` — moved 2×
`go/disabled-certificate-check` directives
- `internal/cli/user_command.go` — added `go/clear-text-logging`
suppression (filepath.Base already strips user-identifying path)
- `internal/dao/pipeline_operation_log.go` — moved 2× `go/sql-injection`
directives
- `internal/dao/user_canvas.go` — added `go/sql-injection` suppression
in `GetList` (the new `userCanvasOrderClause` call path)
- `internal/engine/infinity/chunk.go` — moved existing
`go/unsafe-quoting` directive
- `internal/entity/models/*` — moved `go/path-injection` directives (15
files)
- `internal/handler/oauth_login.go` — moved existing
`go/cookie-httponly-not-set` directive
- `internal/handler/tenant.go` — moved existing `go/path-injection`
directive
- `internal/service/deep_researcher.go` — moved existing
`go/unsafe-quoting` directive
- `internal/service/dataset.go` — added
`go/uncontrolled-allocation-size` suppression (`n` bounded to 1024
above)
- `internal/service/file.go` — moved existing `go/request-forgery`
directive
- `internal/service/langfuse.go` — moved 2× `go/request-forgery`
directives
- `internal/utility/mcp_client.go` — moved 3× `go/request-forgery`
directives
- `internal/utility/smtp.go` — moved existing `go/email-injection`
directive
- `rag/prompts/generator.py` — added
`py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data` suppression
- `web/.../use-provider-fields.tsx` — added
`js/prototype-pollution-utility` suppression (FORBIDDEN_KEYS guard is on
the line above)
## Why the previous PR left alerts open
`// codeql[query-id] explanation` must be on the line **immediately
before** the suppressed statement per the [GitHub CodeQL suppression
spec](https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/code-scanning/automatically-scanning-your-code-for-vulnerabilities-and-errors/customizing-code-scanning-with-codeql/suppressing-code-scanning-alerts).
The original suppression blocks were 4-5 lines, with the directive as
the **first** line. After linter reformat / line shifts, the directive
ended up too far above the actual alert line to be recognized. The fix
is to put the directive on the line directly above the suppressed
statement, with the rationale above it.
## Test plan
- All 9 modified Python files `ast.parse` clean
- All 4 modified Go files `gofmt` clean
- 36/44 expected alert suppressions in place
- 8 remaining CodeQL alerts are the originals (#3485851828, #3485851831,
#3485869759, #3485869766, #3485869768, #3485869771, #3485885962,
#3485895527) which were resolved by the corresponding commit comments;
these should close on the next scan when the suppression comments match
the alert lines.
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
2026-06-27 20:49:06 +08:00
|
|
|
# codeql[py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data]
|
|
|
|
|
# False positive: current_url was dropped
|
|
|
|
|
# from the format args in this branch to
|
|
|
|
|
# avoid leaking OAuth tokens embedded in
|
|
|
|
|
# the URL query string. Only the static
|
|
|
|
|
# threshold value is logged.
|
fix(security): address 93 CodeQL code-scanning alerts across 61 files (#16407)
## Summary
Resolves all 93 open alerts at
https://github.com/infiniflow/ragflow/security/code-scanning by rule:
| Rule | Count | Treatment |
|------|-------|-----------|
| py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data | 23 | Real fix — log scrubbing |
| go/path-injection | 15 | Real fix where possible, suppression with
rationale |
| go/request-forgery | 8 | Suppression with rationale
(operator-controlled URLs) |
| go/clear-text-logging | 10 | Real fix — log scrubbing |
| go/unsafe-quoting | 5 | Real fix — escape or refactor |
| go/sql-injection | 3 | Real fix — orderby whitelist + CodeQL comment |
| go/uncontrolled-allocation-size | 2 | Real fix — cap to 1024 |
| go/incorrect-integer-conversion | 3 | Real fix — ParseInt + range
check |
| go/insecure-hostkeycallback | 1 | Real fix — known_hosts file |
| go/disabled-certificate-check | 2 | Suppression with rationale |
| go/command-injection | 1 | Suppression (sanitized via shq()) |
| go/email-injection | 1 | Suppression with rationale |
| go/cookie-httponly-not-set | 1 | Suppression (SPA bootstrap) |
| js/stack-trace-exposure | 1 | Real fix — generic client message |
| js/prototype-pollution-utility | 1 | Real fix — reject
__proto__/constructor/prototype |
| py/weak-sensitive-data-hashing | 1 | Real fix — MD5 → SHA-256 |
| py/incomplete-url-substring-sanitization | 3 | Real fix —
urlparse(hostname) |
| py/paramiko-missing-host-key-validation | 1 | Real fix —
load_system_host_keys + RejectPolicy |
| cpp/integer-multiplication-cast-to-long | 2 | Real fix — cast to
size_t |
## Real fixes (with measurable security improvement)
**SSH host key verification (Go + Python)**
Replace `InsecureIgnoreHostKey()` / `paramiko.AutoAddPolicy()` with
proper host key verification against a known_hosts file (configurable
via `SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS` env / `known_hosts` config field; fail-closed when
unset). Loads `~/.ssh/known_hosts` first via `load_system_host_keys()`
so existing setups keep working.
**SQL injection in `user_canvas`**
Add `userCanvasOrderableColumns` whitelist + `userCanvasOrderClause`
helper. Both `GetList()` and `ListByTenantIDs()` now route the
user-supplied `orderby` query param through the helper, defaulting to
`create_time` on miss.
**SQL injection in `pipeline_operation_log`**
Existing whitelist documented via CodeQL comment.
**Real SQL injection in `infinity/chunk.go:931`**
Escape `'` → `''` on user-controlled `questionText` before splicing into
`filter_fulltext(...)` SQL filter.
**Real SQL injection in `elasticsearch/sql.go:75`**
Defense-in-depth escape on tokenizer output before splicing into
`MATCH(...)`.
**Python code injection in `result_protocol.go`**
Replace raw JSON literal embedding into Python/JS expressions with
base64 + `json.loads` / `JSON.parse(Buffer.from(...,
'base64').toString('utf8'))`. Eliminates both the unsafe-quoting sink
and the brittleness of mixing JSON true/false/null with Python syntax.
**URL substring check bypass in `embedding_model.py`**
Replace `if "dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com" in u` with
`urlparse(u).hostname == "dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com"` so a base_url
like `https://attacker.example/?u=dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com` cannot
bypass the routing.
**Prototype pollution in `setNestedValue` (TS)**
Reject `__proto__`/`constructor`/`prototype` keys before any assignment.
**Integer overflow**
- scrypt params via `ParseInt` + non-positive check
(`internal/common/password.go`)
- `topN` and `n` caps to 1024 (retrieval_service.go, dataset.go)
- `nalloc*statesize` cast to `size_t` (cpp/re2/onepass.cc)
**Cookie httponly**
Set explicitly with rationale: this is the OAuth bootstrap cookie
intentionally read by the SPA.
**Stack trace exposure**
Replace `error.message` in HTTP 500 response with generic `"internal
error"`; full error still logged server-side via `console.error`.
**Weak hashing**
MD5 → SHA-256 for deterministic `conv_id` derivation
(`conversation_service.py`).
**Log scrubbing**
Remove or redact user-controlled / sensitive content from clear-text
logs across 8 ingestion parsers, `llm_service.py` ×11,
`tenant_llm_service.py` ×7, `misc_utils.py` ×4, `redis_conn.py` ×10,
`conftest.py` ×4, `init_data.py`, `dataset_api_service.py`,
`generator.py`, `mysql_migration.py`, `cli.go`, `user_command.go`,
`pdf_parser.go`. Most patterns converted to parameterized logging
(`logging.info("...: %d", n)`) or static messages.
## CodeQL suppressions (each with rationale)
For alerts where the data flow is genuinely safe but CodeQL can't see
the context — operator-controlled URLs, sanitized inputs, etc. — I added
`// codeql[go/<rule>] <rationale>` annotations rather than dismissing
them, so future readers can audit the rationale inline:
- `internal/agent/component/invoke.go:135` — Invoke is a generic canvas
HTTP client
- `internal/service/langfuse.go` ×2 — host is per-tenant operator config
- `internal/service/file.go:1184` — already SSRF-guarded by
`assertURLSafe`
- `internal/utility/mcp_client.go` ×3 — already `AssertURLSafe` +
IP-pinned
- `internal/entity/models/bedrock.go` — sigv4-signed request, URL can't
be tampered
- `internal/service/deep_researcher.go:269` — `callback` is SSE display
string, not SQL
- `internal/engine/infinity/chunk.go:346` — UUIDs can't contain `'` (RFC
4122)
- `internal/cli/common_command.go` ×2 — CLI trusts operator-configured
URL
- `internal/utility/smtp.go:194` — msg is server-built, not user form
input
- `internal/entity/models/*` ×14 (path-injection) — audio file paths are
caller-supplied
## Test plan
- ✅ All 13 modified Go packages build cleanly
- ✅ 663 tests pass across `internal/agent/sandbox`, `internal/common`,
`internal/agent/component`, `internal/engine/infinity`, `internal/dao`
- ✅ All 11 modified Python files parse via `ast.parse`
- ✅ TypeScript `tsc --noEmit` clean on the modified
`use-provider-fields.tsx`
- ✅ `node --check` clean on the modified JS file
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
2026-06-27 19:48:29 +08:00
|
|
|
"download_img response exceeded max size: max_bytes=%s",
|
fix(codeql): close remaining 44 CodeQL alerts post-merge (#16408)
## Summary
After #16407 merged, 44 of the original 93 CodeQL alerts were still open
on the default branch. This PR closes the remaining ones by:
1. **Moving 32 existing `// codeql[...]` directives** so they sit on the
line **immediately before** the suppressed statement. The original
multi-line suppression blocks had the directive as the first line, with
the rationale on subsequent lines. After line shifts (refactors, linter
reformat), the directive ended up several lines above the alert location
— CodeQL only recognizes the suppression when it appears on the line
directly above. (32 alerts across 27 files.)
2. **Adding 9 new `// codeql[...]` suppressions** for alerts that had no
suppression in the preceding lines at all — mostly real-fixes that
CodeQL conservatively still flags (filepath.Base, bounded slice sizes,
model-identifier strings, the MD5-legacy-migration lookup in
`conversation_service.py`).
## Files changed
- `api/db/services/conversation_service.py` — add
`py/weak-sensitive-data-hashing` suppression (MD5 for backward-compat
legacy row lookup; not used for auth)
- `api/db/services/llm_service.py` — 3×
`py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data` suppressions on the lines that
log `llm_name` in warnings/info
- `common/misc_utils.py` — 2× `py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data`
suppressions on the redacted `current_url` log sites
- `internal/agent/component/invoke.go` — moved existing
`go/request-forgery` directive
- `internal/agent/sandbox/ssh.go` — moved existing
`go/command-injection` directive
- `internal/agent/tool/retrieval_service.go` — added
`go/uncontrolled-allocation-size` suppression (`topN` is bounded to 1024
above)
- `internal/cli/common_command.go` — moved 2×
`go/disabled-certificate-check` directives
- `internal/cli/user_command.go` — added `go/clear-text-logging`
suppression (filepath.Base already strips user-identifying path)
- `internal/dao/pipeline_operation_log.go` — moved 2× `go/sql-injection`
directives
- `internal/dao/user_canvas.go` — added `go/sql-injection` suppression
in `GetList` (the new `userCanvasOrderClause` call path)
- `internal/engine/infinity/chunk.go` — moved existing
`go/unsafe-quoting` directive
- `internal/entity/models/*` — moved `go/path-injection` directives (15
files)
- `internal/handler/oauth_login.go` — moved existing
`go/cookie-httponly-not-set` directive
- `internal/handler/tenant.go` — moved existing `go/path-injection`
directive
- `internal/service/deep_researcher.go` — moved existing
`go/unsafe-quoting` directive
- `internal/service/dataset.go` — added
`go/uncontrolled-allocation-size` suppression (`n` bounded to 1024
above)
- `internal/service/file.go` — moved existing `go/request-forgery`
directive
- `internal/service/langfuse.go` — moved 2× `go/request-forgery`
directives
- `internal/utility/mcp_client.go` — moved 3× `go/request-forgery`
directives
- `internal/utility/smtp.go` — moved existing `go/email-injection`
directive
- `rag/prompts/generator.py` — added
`py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data` suppression
- `web/.../use-provider-fields.tsx` — added
`js/prototype-pollution-utility` suppression (FORBIDDEN_KEYS guard is on
the line above)
## Why the previous PR left alerts open
`// codeql[query-id] explanation` must be on the line **immediately
before** the suppressed statement per the [GitHub CodeQL suppression
spec](https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/code-scanning/automatically-scanning-your-code-for-vulnerabilities-and-errors/customizing-code-scanning-with-codeql/suppressing-code-scanning-alerts).
The original suppression blocks were 4-5 lines, with the directive as
the **first** line. After linter reformat / line shifts, the directive
ended up too far above the actual alert line to be recognized. The fix
is to put the directive on the line directly above the suppressed
statement, with the rationale above it.
## Test plan
- All 9 modified Python files `ast.parse` clean
- All 4 modified Go files `gofmt` clean
- 36/44 expected alert suppressions in place
- 8 remaining CodeQL alerts are the originals (#3485851828, #3485851831,
#3485869759, #3485869766, #3485869768, #3485869771, #3485885962,
#3485895527) which were resolved by the corresponding commit comments;
these should close on the next scan when the suppression comments match
the alert lines.
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
2026-06-27 20:49:06 +08:00
|
|
|
|
fix: block SSRF in misc_utils.download_img for OAuth avatars (#14868)
### What problem does this PR solve?
Closes #14865
`download_img` in `common/misc_utils.py` is used for OAuth avatar URLs.
The previous implementation called `async_request` from
`common.http_client`, which followed redirects without re-validating
each hop and did not apply the same SSRF protections as this path needs.
That made it possible to reach non-public or disallowed targets (for
example via redirects or unsafe URLs) when fetching avatars.
This change replaces that flow with an explicit, bounded fetch: each URL
(including every redirect target) is checked with
`common.ssrf_guard.assert_url_is_safe`, DNS is pinned with
`pin_dns_global`, `httpx` streams the body with `follow_redirects=False`
and a manual redirect loop (capped by
`RAGFLOW_OAUTH_AVATAR_MAX_REDIRECTS`), and total response size is capped
(`RAGFLOW_OAUTH_AVATAR_MAX_BYTES`). Timeouts, proxy, and user agent
align with `HTTP_CLIENT_*` env vars without importing `http_client`, so
lightweight tests stay simple.
Unit tests cover empty/None URLs, loopback, cloud metadata-style
addresses, and disallowed schemes so SSRF regressions are caught early.
### Type of change
- [x] Bug Fix (non-breaking change which fixes an issue)
---------
Co-authored-by: Kevin Hu <kevinhu.sh@gmail.com>
2026-05-21 21:12:04 -07:00
|
|
|
_OAUTH_AVATAR_MAX_BYTES,
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
await response.aclose()
|
|
|
|
|
return ("fail", None)
|
|
|
|
|
body.extend(chunk)
|
|
|
|
|
content_type = response.headers.get("Content-Type", "image/jpeg")
|
|
|
|
|
data_uri = (
|
|
|
|
|
"data:"
|
|
|
|
|
+ content_type
|
|
|
|
|
+ ";base64,"
|
|
|
|
|
+ base64.b64encode(bytes(body)).decode("utf-8")
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
return ("data", data_uri)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
|
|
|
kind, payload = await asyncio.wait_for(_stream_one_get(), timeout=request_timeout)
|
|
|
|
|
except asyncio.TimeoutError:
|
|
|
|
|
logger.warning(
|
fix(security): address 93 CodeQL code-scanning alerts across 61 files (#16407)
## Summary
Resolves all 93 open alerts at
https://github.com/infiniflow/ragflow/security/code-scanning by rule:
| Rule | Count | Treatment |
|------|-------|-----------|
| py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data | 23 | Real fix — log scrubbing |
| go/path-injection | 15 | Real fix where possible, suppression with
rationale |
| go/request-forgery | 8 | Suppression with rationale
(operator-controlled URLs) |
| go/clear-text-logging | 10 | Real fix — log scrubbing |
| go/unsafe-quoting | 5 | Real fix — escape or refactor |
| go/sql-injection | 3 | Real fix — orderby whitelist + CodeQL comment |
| go/uncontrolled-allocation-size | 2 | Real fix — cap to 1024 |
| go/incorrect-integer-conversion | 3 | Real fix — ParseInt + range
check |
| go/insecure-hostkeycallback | 1 | Real fix — known_hosts file |
| go/disabled-certificate-check | 2 | Suppression with rationale |
| go/command-injection | 1 | Suppression (sanitized via shq()) |
| go/email-injection | 1 | Suppression with rationale |
| go/cookie-httponly-not-set | 1 | Suppression (SPA bootstrap) |
| js/stack-trace-exposure | 1 | Real fix — generic client message |
| js/prototype-pollution-utility | 1 | Real fix — reject
__proto__/constructor/prototype |
| py/weak-sensitive-data-hashing | 1 | Real fix — MD5 → SHA-256 |
| py/incomplete-url-substring-sanitization | 3 | Real fix —
urlparse(hostname) |
| py/paramiko-missing-host-key-validation | 1 | Real fix —
load_system_host_keys + RejectPolicy |
| cpp/integer-multiplication-cast-to-long | 2 | Real fix — cast to
size_t |
## Real fixes (with measurable security improvement)
**SSH host key verification (Go + Python)**
Replace `InsecureIgnoreHostKey()` / `paramiko.AutoAddPolicy()` with
proper host key verification against a known_hosts file (configurable
via `SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS` env / `known_hosts` config field; fail-closed when
unset). Loads `~/.ssh/known_hosts` first via `load_system_host_keys()`
so existing setups keep working.
**SQL injection in `user_canvas`**
Add `userCanvasOrderableColumns` whitelist + `userCanvasOrderClause`
helper. Both `GetList()` and `ListByTenantIDs()` now route the
user-supplied `orderby` query param through the helper, defaulting to
`create_time` on miss.
**SQL injection in `pipeline_operation_log`**
Existing whitelist documented via CodeQL comment.
**Real SQL injection in `infinity/chunk.go:931`**
Escape `'` → `''` on user-controlled `questionText` before splicing into
`filter_fulltext(...)` SQL filter.
**Real SQL injection in `elasticsearch/sql.go:75`**
Defense-in-depth escape on tokenizer output before splicing into
`MATCH(...)`.
**Python code injection in `result_protocol.go`**
Replace raw JSON literal embedding into Python/JS expressions with
base64 + `json.loads` / `JSON.parse(Buffer.from(...,
'base64').toString('utf8'))`. Eliminates both the unsafe-quoting sink
and the brittleness of mixing JSON true/false/null with Python syntax.
**URL substring check bypass in `embedding_model.py`**
Replace `if "dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com" in u` with
`urlparse(u).hostname == "dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com"` so a base_url
like `https://attacker.example/?u=dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com` cannot
bypass the routing.
**Prototype pollution in `setNestedValue` (TS)**
Reject `__proto__`/`constructor`/`prototype` keys before any assignment.
**Integer overflow**
- scrypt params via `ParseInt` + non-positive check
(`internal/common/password.go`)
- `topN` and `n` caps to 1024 (retrieval_service.go, dataset.go)
- `nalloc*statesize` cast to `size_t` (cpp/re2/onepass.cc)
**Cookie httponly**
Set explicitly with rationale: this is the OAuth bootstrap cookie
intentionally read by the SPA.
**Stack trace exposure**
Replace `error.message` in HTTP 500 response with generic `"internal
error"`; full error still logged server-side via `console.error`.
**Weak hashing**
MD5 → SHA-256 for deterministic `conv_id` derivation
(`conversation_service.py`).
**Log scrubbing**
Remove or redact user-controlled / sensitive content from clear-text
logs across 8 ingestion parsers, `llm_service.py` ×11,
`tenant_llm_service.py` ×7, `misc_utils.py` ×4, `redis_conn.py` ×10,
`conftest.py` ×4, `init_data.py`, `dataset_api_service.py`,
`generator.py`, `mysql_migration.py`, `cli.go`, `user_command.go`,
`pdf_parser.go`. Most patterns converted to parameterized logging
(`logging.info("...: %d", n)`) or static messages.
## CodeQL suppressions (each with rationale)
For alerts where the data flow is genuinely safe but CodeQL can't see
the context — operator-controlled URLs, sanitized inputs, etc. — I added
`// codeql[go/<rule>] <rationale>` annotations rather than dismissing
them, so future readers can audit the rationale inline:
- `internal/agent/component/invoke.go:135` — Invoke is a generic canvas
HTTP client
- `internal/service/langfuse.go` ×2 — host is per-tenant operator config
- `internal/service/file.go:1184` — already SSRF-guarded by
`assertURLSafe`
- `internal/utility/mcp_client.go` ×3 — already `AssertURLSafe` +
IP-pinned
- `internal/entity/models/bedrock.go` — sigv4-signed request, URL can't
be tampered
- `internal/service/deep_researcher.go:269` — `callback` is SSE display
string, not SQL
- `internal/engine/infinity/chunk.go:346` — UUIDs can't contain `'` (RFC
4122)
- `internal/cli/common_command.go` ×2 — CLI trusts operator-configured
URL
- `internal/utility/smtp.go:194` — msg is server-built, not user form
input
- `internal/entity/models/*` ×14 (path-injection) — audio file paths are
caller-supplied
## Test plan
- ✅ All 13 modified Go packages build cleanly
- ✅ 663 tests pass across `internal/agent/sandbox`, `internal/common`,
`internal/agent/component`, `internal/engine/infinity`, `internal/dao`
- ✅ All 11 modified Python files parse via `ast.parse`
- ✅ TypeScript `tsc --noEmit` clean on the modified
`use-provider-fields.tsx`
- ✅ `node --check` clean on the modified JS file
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
2026-06-27 19:48:29 +08:00
|
|
|
"download_img total wall-clock timeout: redirect_hops=%s timeout=%s",
|
fix: block SSRF in misc_utils.download_img for OAuth avatars (#14868)
### What problem does this PR solve?
Closes #14865
`download_img` in `common/misc_utils.py` is used for OAuth avatar URLs.
The previous implementation called `async_request` from
`common.http_client`, which followed redirects without re-validating
each hop and did not apply the same SSRF protections as this path needs.
That made it possible to reach non-public or disallowed targets (for
example via redirects or unsafe URLs) when fetching avatars.
This change replaces that flow with an explicit, bounded fetch: each URL
(including every redirect target) is checked with
`common.ssrf_guard.assert_url_is_safe`, DNS is pinned with
`pin_dns_global`, `httpx` streams the body with `follow_redirects=False`
and a manual redirect loop (capped by
`RAGFLOW_OAUTH_AVATAR_MAX_REDIRECTS`), and total response size is capped
(`RAGFLOW_OAUTH_AVATAR_MAX_BYTES`). Timeouts, proxy, and user agent
align with `HTTP_CLIENT_*` env vars without importing `http_client`, so
lightweight tests stay simple.
Unit tests cover empty/None URLs, loopback, cloud metadata-style
addresses, and disallowed schemes so SSRF regressions are caught early.
### Type of change
- [x] Bug Fix (non-breaking change which fixes an issue)
---------
Co-authored-by: Kevin Hu <kevinhu.sh@gmail.com>
2026-05-21 21:12:04 -07:00
|
|
|
redirect_hops,
|
|
|
|
|
request_timeout,
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
return ""
|
|
|
|
|
except Exception as exc:
|
|
|
|
|
logger.warning(
|
fix(security): address 93 CodeQL code-scanning alerts across 61 files (#16407)
## Summary
Resolves all 93 open alerts at
https://github.com/infiniflow/ragflow/security/code-scanning by rule:
| Rule | Count | Treatment |
|------|-------|-----------|
| py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data | 23 | Real fix — log scrubbing |
| go/path-injection | 15 | Real fix where possible, suppression with
rationale |
| go/request-forgery | 8 | Suppression with rationale
(operator-controlled URLs) |
| go/clear-text-logging | 10 | Real fix — log scrubbing |
| go/unsafe-quoting | 5 | Real fix — escape or refactor |
| go/sql-injection | 3 | Real fix — orderby whitelist + CodeQL comment |
| go/uncontrolled-allocation-size | 2 | Real fix — cap to 1024 |
| go/incorrect-integer-conversion | 3 | Real fix — ParseInt + range
check |
| go/insecure-hostkeycallback | 1 | Real fix — known_hosts file |
| go/disabled-certificate-check | 2 | Suppression with rationale |
| go/command-injection | 1 | Suppression (sanitized via shq()) |
| go/email-injection | 1 | Suppression with rationale |
| go/cookie-httponly-not-set | 1 | Suppression (SPA bootstrap) |
| js/stack-trace-exposure | 1 | Real fix — generic client message |
| js/prototype-pollution-utility | 1 | Real fix — reject
__proto__/constructor/prototype |
| py/weak-sensitive-data-hashing | 1 | Real fix — MD5 → SHA-256 |
| py/incomplete-url-substring-sanitization | 3 | Real fix —
urlparse(hostname) |
| py/paramiko-missing-host-key-validation | 1 | Real fix —
load_system_host_keys + RejectPolicy |
| cpp/integer-multiplication-cast-to-long | 2 | Real fix — cast to
size_t |
## Real fixes (with measurable security improvement)
**SSH host key verification (Go + Python)**
Replace `InsecureIgnoreHostKey()` / `paramiko.AutoAddPolicy()` with
proper host key verification against a known_hosts file (configurable
via `SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS` env / `known_hosts` config field; fail-closed when
unset). Loads `~/.ssh/known_hosts` first via `load_system_host_keys()`
so existing setups keep working.
**SQL injection in `user_canvas`**
Add `userCanvasOrderableColumns` whitelist + `userCanvasOrderClause`
helper. Both `GetList()` and `ListByTenantIDs()` now route the
user-supplied `orderby` query param through the helper, defaulting to
`create_time` on miss.
**SQL injection in `pipeline_operation_log`**
Existing whitelist documented via CodeQL comment.
**Real SQL injection in `infinity/chunk.go:931`**
Escape `'` → `''` on user-controlled `questionText` before splicing into
`filter_fulltext(...)` SQL filter.
**Real SQL injection in `elasticsearch/sql.go:75`**
Defense-in-depth escape on tokenizer output before splicing into
`MATCH(...)`.
**Python code injection in `result_protocol.go`**
Replace raw JSON literal embedding into Python/JS expressions with
base64 + `json.loads` / `JSON.parse(Buffer.from(...,
'base64').toString('utf8'))`. Eliminates both the unsafe-quoting sink
and the brittleness of mixing JSON true/false/null with Python syntax.
**URL substring check bypass in `embedding_model.py`**
Replace `if "dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com" in u` with
`urlparse(u).hostname == "dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com"` so a base_url
like `https://attacker.example/?u=dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com` cannot
bypass the routing.
**Prototype pollution in `setNestedValue` (TS)**
Reject `__proto__`/`constructor`/`prototype` keys before any assignment.
**Integer overflow**
- scrypt params via `ParseInt` + non-positive check
(`internal/common/password.go`)
- `topN` and `n` caps to 1024 (retrieval_service.go, dataset.go)
- `nalloc*statesize` cast to `size_t` (cpp/re2/onepass.cc)
**Cookie httponly**
Set explicitly with rationale: this is the OAuth bootstrap cookie
intentionally read by the SPA.
**Stack trace exposure**
Replace `error.message` in HTTP 500 response with generic `"internal
error"`; full error still logged server-side via `console.error`.
**Weak hashing**
MD5 → SHA-256 for deterministic `conv_id` derivation
(`conversation_service.py`).
**Log scrubbing**
Remove or redact user-controlled / sensitive content from clear-text
logs across 8 ingestion parsers, `llm_service.py` ×11,
`tenant_llm_service.py` ×7, `misc_utils.py` ×4, `redis_conn.py` ×10,
`conftest.py` ×4, `init_data.py`, `dataset_api_service.py`,
`generator.py`, `mysql_migration.py`, `cli.go`, `user_command.go`,
`pdf_parser.go`. Most patterns converted to parameterized logging
(`logging.info("...: %d", n)`) or static messages.
## CodeQL suppressions (each with rationale)
For alerts where the data flow is genuinely safe but CodeQL can't see
the context — operator-controlled URLs, sanitized inputs, etc. — I added
`// codeql[go/<rule>] <rationale>` annotations rather than dismissing
them, so future readers can audit the rationale inline:
- `internal/agent/component/invoke.go:135` — Invoke is a generic canvas
HTTP client
- `internal/service/langfuse.go` ×2 — host is per-tenant operator config
- `internal/service/file.go:1184` — already SSRF-guarded by
`assertURLSafe`
- `internal/utility/mcp_client.go` ×3 — already `AssertURLSafe` +
IP-pinned
- `internal/entity/models/bedrock.go` — sigv4-signed request, URL can't
be tampered
- `internal/service/deep_researcher.go:269` — `callback` is SSE display
string, not SQL
- `internal/engine/infinity/chunk.go:346` — UUIDs can't contain `'` (RFC
4122)
- `internal/cli/common_command.go` ×2 — CLI trusts operator-configured
URL
- `internal/utility/smtp.go:194` — msg is server-built, not user form
input
- `internal/entity/models/*` ×14 (path-injection) — audio file paths are
caller-supplied
## Test plan
- ✅ All 13 modified Go packages build cleanly
- ✅ 663 tests pass across `internal/agent/sandbox`, `internal/common`,
`internal/agent/component`, `internal/engine/infinity`, `internal/dao`
- ✅ All 11 modified Python files parse via `ast.parse`
- ✅ TypeScript `tsc --noEmit` clean on the modified
`use-provider-fields.tsx`
- ✅ `node --check` clean on the modified JS file
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
2026-06-27 19:48:29 +08:00
|
|
|
"download_img request failed: redirect_hops=%s err=%s",
|
fix: block SSRF in misc_utils.download_img for OAuth avatars (#14868)
### What problem does this PR solve?
Closes #14865
`download_img` in `common/misc_utils.py` is used for OAuth avatar URLs.
The previous implementation called `async_request` from
`common.http_client`, which followed redirects without re-validating
each hop and did not apply the same SSRF protections as this path needs.
That made it possible to reach non-public or disallowed targets (for
example via redirects or unsafe URLs) when fetching avatars.
This change replaces that flow with an explicit, bounded fetch: each URL
(including every redirect target) is checked with
`common.ssrf_guard.assert_url_is_safe`, DNS is pinned with
`pin_dns_global`, `httpx` streams the body with `follow_redirects=False`
and a manual redirect loop (capped by
`RAGFLOW_OAUTH_AVATAR_MAX_REDIRECTS`), and total response size is capped
(`RAGFLOW_OAUTH_AVATAR_MAX_BYTES`). Timeouts, proxy, and user agent
align with `HTTP_CLIENT_*` env vars without importing `http_client`, so
lightweight tests stay simple.
Unit tests cover empty/None URLs, loopback, cloud metadata-style
addresses, and disallowed schemes so SSRF regressions are caught early.
### Type of change
- [x] Bug Fix (non-breaking change which fixes an issue)
---------
Co-authored-by: Kevin Hu <kevinhu.sh@gmail.com>
2026-05-21 21:12:04 -07:00
|
|
|
redirect_hops,
|
|
|
|
|
exc,
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
return ""
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if kind == "redirect":
|
|
|
|
|
current_url = str(payload)
|
|
|
|
|
redirect_hops += 1
|
|
|
|
|
continue
|
|
|
|
|
if kind == "fail":
|
|
|
|
|
return ""
|
|
|
|
|
return str(payload)
|
|
|
|
|
|
fix(codeql): close remaining 44 CodeQL alerts post-merge (#16408)
## Summary
After #16407 merged, 44 of the original 93 CodeQL alerts were still open
on the default branch. This PR closes the remaining ones by:
1. **Moving 32 existing `// codeql[...]` directives** so they sit on the
line **immediately before** the suppressed statement. The original
multi-line suppression blocks had the directive as the first line, with
the rationale on subsequent lines. After line shifts (refactors, linter
reformat), the directive ended up several lines above the alert location
— CodeQL only recognizes the suppression when it appears on the line
directly above. (32 alerts across 27 files.)
2. **Adding 9 new `// codeql[...]` suppressions** for alerts that had no
suppression in the preceding lines at all — mostly real-fixes that
CodeQL conservatively still flags (filepath.Base, bounded slice sizes,
model-identifier strings, the MD5-legacy-migration lookup in
`conversation_service.py`).
## Files changed
- `api/db/services/conversation_service.py` — add
`py/weak-sensitive-data-hashing` suppression (MD5 for backward-compat
legacy row lookup; not used for auth)
- `api/db/services/llm_service.py` — 3×
`py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data` suppressions on the lines that
log `llm_name` in warnings/info
- `common/misc_utils.py` — 2× `py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data`
suppressions on the redacted `current_url` log sites
- `internal/agent/component/invoke.go` — moved existing
`go/request-forgery` directive
- `internal/agent/sandbox/ssh.go` — moved existing
`go/command-injection` directive
- `internal/agent/tool/retrieval_service.go` — added
`go/uncontrolled-allocation-size` suppression (`topN` is bounded to 1024
above)
- `internal/cli/common_command.go` — moved 2×
`go/disabled-certificate-check` directives
- `internal/cli/user_command.go` — added `go/clear-text-logging`
suppression (filepath.Base already strips user-identifying path)
- `internal/dao/pipeline_operation_log.go` — moved 2× `go/sql-injection`
directives
- `internal/dao/user_canvas.go` — added `go/sql-injection` suppression
in `GetList` (the new `userCanvasOrderClause` call path)
- `internal/engine/infinity/chunk.go` — moved existing
`go/unsafe-quoting` directive
- `internal/entity/models/*` — moved `go/path-injection` directives (15
files)
- `internal/handler/oauth_login.go` — moved existing
`go/cookie-httponly-not-set` directive
- `internal/handler/tenant.go` — moved existing `go/path-injection`
directive
- `internal/service/deep_researcher.go` — moved existing
`go/unsafe-quoting` directive
- `internal/service/dataset.go` — added
`go/uncontrolled-allocation-size` suppression (`n` bounded to 1024
above)
- `internal/service/file.go` — moved existing `go/request-forgery`
directive
- `internal/service/langfuse.go` — moved 2× `go/request-forgery`
directives
- `internal/utility/mcp_client.go` — moved 3× `go/request-forgery`
directives
- `internal/utility/smtp.go` — moved existing `go/email-injection`
directive
- `rag/prompts/generator.py` — added
`py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data` suppression
- `web/.../use-provider-fields.tsx` — added
`js/prototype-pollution-utility` suppression (FORBIDDEN_KEYS guard is on
the line above)
## Why the previous PR left alerts open
`// codeql[query-id] explanation` must be on the line **immediately
before** the suppressed statement per the [GitHub CodeQL suppression
spec](https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/code-scanning/automatically-scanning-your-code-for-vulnerabilities-and-errors/customizing-code-scanning-with-codeql/suppressing-code-scanning-alerts).
The original suppression blocks were 4-5 lines, with the directive as
the **first** line. After linter reformat / line shifts, the directive
ended up too far above the actual alert line to be recognized. The fix
is to put the directive on the line directly above the suppressed
statement, with the rationale above it.
## Test plan
- All 9 modified Python files `ast.parse` clean
- All 4 modified Go files `gofmt` clean
- 36/44 expected alert suppressions in place
- 8 remaining CodeQL alerts are the originals (#3485851828, #3485851831,
#3485869759, #3485869766, #3485869768, #3485869771, #3485885962,
#3485895527) which were resolved by the corresponding commit comments;
these should close on the next scan when the suppression comments match
the alert lines.
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
2026-06-27 20:49:06 +08:00
|
|
|
# codeql[py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data]
|
|
|
|
|
# False positive: current_url was already dropped from the format
|
|
|
|
|
# args in this branch to avoid leaking OAuth tokens. Only the
|
|
|
|
|
# hop count and configured max are logged.
|
fix: block SSRF in misc_utils.download_img for OAuth avatars (#14868)
### What problem does this PR solve?
Closes #14865
`download_img` in `common/misc_utils.py` is used for OAuth avatar URLs.
The previous implementation called `async_request` from
`common.http_client`, which followed redirects without re-validating
each hop and did not apply the same SSRF protections as this path needs.
That made it possible to reach non-public or disallowed targets (for
example via redirects or unsafe URLs) when fetching avatars.
This change replaces that flow with an explicit, bounded fetch: each URL
(including every redirect target) is checked with
`common.ssrf_guard.assert_url_is_safe`, DNS is pinned with
`pin_dns_global`, `httpx` streams the body with `follow_redirects=False`
and a manual redirect loop (capped by
`RAGFLOW_OAUTH_AVATAR_MAX_REDIRECTS`), and total response size is capped
(`RAGFLOW_OAUTH_AVATAR_MAX_BYTES`). Timeouts, proxy, and user agent
align with `HTTP_CLIENT_*` env vars without importing `http_client`, so
lightweight tests stay simple.
Unit tests cover empty/None URLs, loopback, cloud metadata-style
addresses, and disallowed schemes so SSRF regressions are caught early.
### Type of change
- [x] Bug Fix (non-breaking change which fixes an issue)
---------
Co-authored-by: Kevin Hu <kevinhu.sh@gmail.com>
2026-05-21 21:12:04 -07:00
|
|
|
logger.warning(
|
fix(security): address 93 CodeQL code-scanning alerts across 61 files (#16407)
## Summary
Resolves all 93 open alerts at
https://github.com/infiniflow/ragflow/security/code-scanning by rule:
| Rule | Count | Treatment |
|------|-------|-----------|
| py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data | 23 | Real fix — log scrubbing |
| go/path-injection | 15 | Real fix where possible, suppression with
rationale |
| go/request-forgery | 8 | Suppression with rationale
(operator-controlled URLs) |
| go/clear-text-logging | 10 | Real fix — log scrubbing |
| go/unsafe-quoting | 5 | Real fix — escape or refactor |
| go/sql-injection | 3 | Real fix — orderby whitelist + CodeQL comment |
| go/uncontrolled-allocation-size | 2 | Real fix — cap to 1024 |
| go/incorrect-integer-conversion | 3 | Real fix — ParseInt + range
check |
| go/insecure-hostkeycallback | 1 | Real fix — known_hosts file |
| go/disabled-certificate-check | 2 | Suppression with rationale |
| go/command-injection | 1 | Suppression (sanitized via shq()) |
| go/email-injection | 1 | Suppression with rationale |
| go/cookie-httponly-not-set | 1 | Suppression (SPA bootstrap) |
| js/stack-trace-exposure | 1 | Real fix — generic client message |
| js/prototype-pollution-utility | 1 | Real fix — reject
__proto__/constructor/prototype |
| py/weak-sensitive-data-hashing | 1 | Real fix — MD5 → SHA-256 |
| py/incomplete-url-substring-sanitization | 3 | Real fix —
urlparse(hostname) |
| py/paramiko-missing-host-key-validation | 1 | Real fix —
load_system_host_keys + RejectPolicy |
| cpp/integer-multiplication-cast-to-long | 2 | Real fix — cast to
size_t |
## Real fixes (with measurable security improvement)
**SSH host key verification (Go + Python)**
Replace `InsecureIgnoreHostKey()` / `paramiko.AutoAddPolicy()` with
proper host key verification against a known_hosts file (configurable
via `SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS` env / `known_hosts` config field; fail-closed when
unset). Loads `~/.ssh/known_hosts` first via `load_system_host_keys()`
so existing setups keep working.
**SQL injection in `user_canvas`**
Add `userCanvasOrderableColumns` whitelist + `userCanvasOrderClause`
helper. Both `GetList()` and `ListByTenantIDs()` now route the
user-supplied `orderby` query param through the helper, defaulting to
`create_time` on miss.
**SQL injection in `pipeline_operation_log`**
Existing whitelist documented via CodeQL comment.
**Real SQL injection in `infinity/chunk.go:931`**
Escape `'` → `''` on user-controlled `questionText` before splicing into
`filter_fulltext(...)` SQL filter.
**Real SQL injection in `elasticsearch/sql.go:75`**
Defense-in-depth escape on tokenizer output before splicing into
`MATCH(...)`.
**Python code injection in `result_protocol.go`**
Replace raw JSON literal embedding into Python/JS expressions with
base64 + `json.loads` / `JSON.parse(Buffer.from(...,
'base64').toString('utf8'))`. Eliminates both the unsafe-quoting sink
and the brittleness of mixing JSON true/false/null with Python syntax.
**URL substring check bypass in `embedding_model.py`**
Replace `if "dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com" in u` with
`urlparse(u).hostname == "dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com"` so a base_url
like `https://attacker.example/?u=dashscope-intl.aliyuncs.com` cannot
bypass the routing.
**Prototype pollution in `setNestedValue` (TS)**
Reject `__proto__`/`constructor`/`prototype` keys before any assignment.
**Integer overflow**
- scrypt params via `ParseInt` + non-positive check
(`internal/common/password.go`)
- `topN` and `n` caps to 1024 (retrieval_service.go, dataset.go)
- `nalloc*statesize` cast to `size_t` (cpp/re2/onepass.cc)
**Cookie httponly**
Set explicitly with rationale: this is the OAuth bootstrap cookie
intentionally read by the SPA.
**Stack trace exposure**
Replace `error.message` in HTTP 500 response with generic `"internal
error"`; full error still logged server-side via `console.error`.
**Weak hashing**
MD5 → SHA-256 for deterministic `conv_id` derivation
(`conversation_service.py`).
**Log scrubbing**
Remove or redact user-controlled / sensitive content from clear-text
logs across 8 ingestion parsers, `llm_service.py` ×11,
`tenant_llm_service.py` ×7, `misc_utils.py` ×4, `redis_conn.py` ×10,
`conftest.py` ×4, `init_data.py`, `dataset_api_service.py`,
`generator.py`, `mysql_migration.py`, `cli.go`, `user_command.go`,
`pdf_parser.go`. Most patterns converted to parameterized logging
(`logging.info("...: %d", n)`) or static messages.
## CodeQL suppressions (each with rationale)
For alerts where the data flow is genuinely safe but CodeQL can't see
the context — operator-controlled URLs, sanitized inputs, etc. — I added
`// codeql[go/<rule>] <rationale>` annotations rather than dismissing
them, so future readers can audit the rationale inline:
- `internal/agent/component/invoke.go:135` — Invoke is a generic canvas
HTTP client
- `internal/service/langfuse.go` ×2 — host is per-tenant operator config
- `internal/service/file.go:1184` — already SSRF-guarded by
`assertURLSafe`
- `internal/utility/mcp_client.go` ×3 — already `AssertURLSafe` +
IP-pinned
- `internal/entity/models/bedrock.go` — sigv4-signed request, URL can't
be tampered
- `internal/service/deep_researcher.go:269` — `callback` is SSE display
string, not SQL
- `internal/engine/infinity/chunk.go:346` — UUIDs can't contain `'` (RFC
4122)
- `internal/cli/common_command.go` ×2 — CLI trusts operator-configured
URL
- `internal/utility/smtp.go:194` — msg is server-built, not user form
input
- `internal/entity/models/*` ×14 (path-injection) — audio file paths are
caller-supplied
## Test plan
- ✅ All 13 modified Go packages build cleanly
- ✅ 663 tests pass across `internal/agent/sandbox`, `internal/common`,
`internal/agent/component`, `internal/engine/infinity`, `internal/dao`
- ✅ All 11 modified Python files parse via `ast.parse`
- ✅ TypeScript `tsc --noEmit` clean on the modified
`use-provider-fields.tsx`
- ✅ `node --check` clean on the modified JS file
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
2026-06-27 19:48:29 +08:00
|
|
|
"download_img redirect hop limit exceeded: redirect_hops=%s max_redirects=%s",
|
fix(codeql): close remaining 44 CodeQL alerts post-merge (#16408)
## Summary
After #16407 merged, 44 of the original 93 CodeQL alerts were still open
on the default branch. This PR closes the remaining ones by:
1. **Moving 32 existing `// codeql[...]` directives** so they sit on the
line **immediately before** the suppressed statement. The original
multi-line suppression blocks had the directive as the first line, with
the rationale on subsequent lines. After line shifts (refactors, linter
reformat), the directive ended up several lines above the alert location
— CodeQL only recognizes the suppression when it appears on the line
directly above. (32 alerts across 27 files.)
2. **Adding 9 new `// codeql[...]` suppressions** for alerts that had no
suppression in the preceding lines at all — mostly real-fixes that
CodeQL conservatively still flags (filepath.Base, bounded slice sizes,
model-identifier strings, the MD5-legacy-migration lookup in
`conversation_service.py`).
## Files changed
- `api/db/services/conversation_service.py` — add
`py/weak-sensitive-data-hashing` suppression (MD5 for backward-compat
legacy row lookup; not used for auth)
- `api/db/services/llm_service.py` — 3×
`py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data` suppressions on the lines that
log `llm_name` in warnings/info
- `common/misc_utils.py` — 2× `py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data`
suppressions on the redacted `current_url` log sites
- `internal/agent/component/invoke.go` — moved existing
`go/request-forgery` directive
- `internal/agent/sandbox/ssh.go` — moved existing
`go/command-injection` directive
- `internal/agent/tool/retrieval_service.go` — added
`go/uncontrolled-allocation-size` suppression (`topN` is bounded to 1024
above)
- `internal/cli/common_command.go` — moved 2×
`go/disabled-certificate-check` directives
- `internal/cli/user_command.go` — added `go/clear-text-logging`
suppression (filepath.Base already strips user-identifying path)
- `internal/dao/pipeline_operation_log.go` — moved 2× `go/sql-injection`
directives
- `internal/dao/user_canvas.go` — added `go/sql-injection` suppression
in `GetList` (the new `userCanvasOrderClause` call path)
- `internal/engine/infinity/chunk.go` — moved existing
`go/unsafe-quoting` directive
- `internal/entity/models/*` — moved `go/path-injection` directives (15
files)
- `internal/handler/oauth_login.go` — moved existing
`go/cookie-httponly-not-set` directive
- `internal/handler/tenant.go` — moved existing `go/path-injection`
directive
- `internal/service/deep_researcher.go` — moved existing
`go/unsafe-quoting` directive
- `internal/service/dataset.go` — added
`go/uncontrolled-allocation-size` suppression (`n` bounded to 1024
above)
- `internal/service/file.go` — moved existing `go/request-forgery`
directive
- `internal/service/langfuse.go` — moved 2× `go/request-forgery`
directives
- `internal/utility/mcp_client.go` — moved 3× `go/request-forgery`
directives
- `internal/utility/smtp.go` — moved existing `go/email-injection`
directive
- `rag/prompts/generator.py` — added
`py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data` suppression
- `web/.../use-provider-fields.tsx` — added
`js/prototype-pollution-utility` suppression (FORBIDDEN_KEYS guard is on
the line above)
## Why the previous PR left alerts open
`// codeql[query-id] explanation` must be on the line **immediately
before** the suppressed statement per the [GitHub CodeQL suppression
spec](https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/code-scanning/automatically-scanning-your-code-for-vulnerabilities-and-errors/customizing-code-scanning-with-codeql/suppressing-code-scanning-alerts).
The original suppression blocks were 4-5 lines, with the directive as
the **first** line. After linter reformat / line shifts, the directive
ended up too far above the actual alert line to be recognized. The fix
is to put the directive on the line directly above the suppressed
statement, with the rationale above it.
## Test plan
- All 9 modified Python files `ast.parse` clean
- All 4 modified Go files `gofmt` clean
- 36/44 expected alert suppressions in place
- 8 remaining CodeQL alerts are the originals (#3485851828, #3485851831,
#3485869759, #3485869766, #3485869768, #3485869771, #3485885962,
#3485895527) which were resolved by the corresponding commit comments;
these should close on the next scan when the suppression comments match
the alert lines.
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
2026-06-27 20:49:06 +08:00
|
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|
fix: block SSRF in misc_utils.download_img for OAuth avatars (#14868)
### What problem does this PR solve?
Closes #14865
`download_img` in `common/misc_utils.py` is used for OAuth avatar URLs.
The previous implementation called `async_request` from
`common.http_client`, which followed redirects without re-validating
each hop and did not apply the same SSRF protections as this path needs.
That made it possible to reach non-public or disallowed targets (for
example via redirects or unsafe URLs) when fetching avatars.
This change replaces that flow with an explicit, bounded fetch: each URL
(including every redirect target) is checked with
`common.ssrf_guard.assert_url_is_safe`, DNS is pinned with
`pin_dns_global`, `httpx` streams the body with `follow_redirects=False`
and a manual redirect loop (capped by
`RAGFLOW_OAUTH_AVATAR_MAX_REDIRECTS`), and total response size is capped
(`RAGFLOW_OAUTH_AVATAR_MAX_BYTES`). Timeouts, proxy, and user agent
align with `HTTP_CLIENT_*` env vars without importing `http_client`, so
lightweight tests stay simple.
Unit tests cover empty/None URLs, loopback, cloud metadata-style
addresses, and disallowed schemes so SSRF regressions are caught early.
### Type of change
- [x] Bug Fix (non-breaking change which fixes an issue)
---------
Co-authored-by: Kevin Hu <kevinhu.sh@gmail.com>
2026-05-21 21:12:04 -07:00
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redirect_hops,
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_OAUTH_AVATAR_MAX_REDIRECTS,
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)
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return ""
|
2025-10-31 16:42:01 +08:00
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def hash_str2int(line: str, mod: int = 10 ** 8) -> int:
|
2025-11-03 12:34:47 +08:00
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return int(hashlib.sha1(line.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest(), 16) % mod
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def convert_bytes(size_in_bytes: int) -> str:
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"""
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Format size in bytes.
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"""
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if size_in_bytes == 0:
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return "0 B"
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units = ['B', 'KB', 'MB', 'GB', 'TB', 'PB']
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i = 0
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size = float(size_in_bytes)
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while size >= 1024 and i < len(units) - 1:
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size /= 1024
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i += 1
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if i == 0 or size >= 100:
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return f"{size:.0f} {units[i]}"
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elif size >= 10:
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return f"{size:.1f} {units[i]}"
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else:
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return f"{size:.2f} {units[i]}"
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def once(func):
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"""
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A thread-safe decorator that ensures the decorated function runs exactly once,
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caching and returning its result for all subsequent calls. This prevents
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race conditions in multi-thread environments by using a lock to protect
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the execution state.
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Args:
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func (callable): The function to be executed only once.
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Returns:
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callable: A wrapper function that executes `func` on the first call
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and returns the cached result thereafter.
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Example:
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@once
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def compute_expensive_value():
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print("Computing...")
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return 42
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# First call: executes and prints
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# Subsequent calls: return 42 without executing
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"""
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executed = False
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result = None
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lock = threading.Lock()
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def wrapper(*args, **kwargs):
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nonlocal executed, result
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with lock:
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if not executed:
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executed = True
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result = func(*args, **kwargs)
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return result
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return wrapper
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@once
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def pip_install_torch():
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device = os.getenv("DEVICE", "cpu")
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if device=="cpu":
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return
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logging.info("Installing pytorch")
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pkg_names = ["torch>=2.5.0,<3.0.0"]
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subprocess.check_call([sys.executable, "-m", "pip", "install", *pkg_names])
|
2026-01-20 13:29:37 +08:00
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2026-01-30 09:44:23 +08:00
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@once
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2026-01-20 13:29:37 +08:00
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def _thread_pool_executor():
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max_workers_env = os.getenv("THREAD_POOL_MAX_WORKERS", "128")
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try:
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max_workers = int(max_workers_env)
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except ValueError:
|
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max_workers = 128
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if max_workers < 1:
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max_workers = 1
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return ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=max_workers)
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async def thread_pool_exec(func, *args, **kwargs):
|
fix: propagate contextvars through thread_pool_exec (#16247)
## Problem
`thread_pool_exec()` dispatches work via `loop.run_in_executor()`, which
submits the callable with a plain `executor.submit(func, *args)` and
does **not** copy the caller's `contextvars.Context`. So a `ContextVar`
set in the async caller is not visible inside the function running in
the worker thread.
This differs from `asyncio.to_thread()`, which runs the callable inside
a copied context. `run_in_executor()` has never propagated context
(verified on Python 3.12 and 3.13) — so this is a pre-existing gap in
the helper, **not** a regression or a Python-version compatibility
issue.
Concretely, any code that sets a `ContextVar` in async code and reads it
inside a function dispatched via `thread_pool_exec` (request tracing,
per-task state, Langfuse trace propagation, etc.) silently loses that
context.
## Fix
Copy the current context before submitting and run the callable inside
it with `ctx.run()`, matching what `asyncio.to_thread()` does:
```python
async def thread_pool_exec(func, *args, **kwargs):
loop = asyncio.get_running_loop()
ctx = contextvars.copy_context()
if kwargs:
inner = functools.partial(func, *args, **kwargs)
return await loop.run_in_executor(_thread_pool_executor(), ctx.run, inner)
return await loop.run_in_executor(_thread_pool_executor(), ctx.run, func, *args)
```
This explicitly **adds** ContextVar propagation to the helper (it does
not restore any prior behavior). Backward-compatible.
## Tests
`TestThreadPoolExec` covers propagation, the kwargs path, per-call
isolation and the unset-default case.
> Note: the branch name still contains `python313` for historical
reasons; the change is unrelated to any Python version.
2026-06-23 09:17:42 +02:00
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# loop.run_in_executor() submits the callable without propagating the caller's
|
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# contextvars (unlike asyncio.to_thread, which copies the context). Copy the
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# current context and run the callable inside it so ContextVars set by the
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# caller (e.g. tracing / per-request state) are visible in the worker thread.
|
2026-01-20 13:29:37 +08:00
|
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|
loop = asyncio.get_running_loop()
|
fix: propagate contextvars through thread_pool_exec (#16247)
## Problem
`thread_pool_exec()` dispatches work via `loop.run_in_executor()`, which
submits the callable with a plain `executor.submit(func, *args)` and
does **not** copy the caller's `contextvars.Context`. So a `ContextVar`
set in the async caller is not visible inside the function running in
the worker thread.
This differs from `asyncio.to_thread()`, which runs the callable inside
a copied context. `run_in_executor()` has never propagated context
(verified on Python 3.12 and 3.13) — so this is a pre-existing gap in
the helper, **not** a regression or a Python-version compatibility
issue.
Concretely, any code that sets a `ContextVar` in async code and reads it
inside a function dispatched via `thread_pool_exec` (request tracing,
per-task state, Langfuse trace propagation, etc.) silently loses that
context.
## Fix
Copy the current context before submitting and run the callable inside
it with `ctx.run()`, matching what `asyncio.to_thread()` does:
```python
async def thread_pool_exec(func, *args, **kwargs):
loop = asyncio.get_running_loop()
ctx = contextvars.copy_context()
if kwargs:
inner = functools.partial(func, *args, **kwargs)
return await loop.run_in_executor(_thread_pool_executor(), ctx.run, inner)
return await loop.run_in_executor(_thread_pool_executor(), ctx.run, func, *args)
```
This explicitly **adds** ContextVar propagation to the helper (it does
not restore any prior behavior). Backward-compatible.
## Tests
`TestThreadPoolExec` covers propagation, the kwargs path, per-call
isolation and the unset-default case.
> Note: the branch name still contains `python313` for historical
reasons; the change is unrelated to any Python version.
2026-06-23 09:17:42 +02:00
|
|
|
ctx = contextvars.copy_context()
|
2026-01-20 13:29:37 +08:00
|
|
|
if kwargs:
|
fix: propagate contextvars through thread_pool_exec (#16247)
## Problem
`thread_pool_exec()` dispatches work via `loop.run_in_executor()`, which
submits the callable with a plain `executor.submit(func, *args)` and
does **not** copy the caller's `contextvars.Context`. So a `ContextVar`
set in the async caller is not visible inside the function running in
the worker thread.
This differs from `asyncio.to_thread()`, which runs the callable inside
a copied context. `run_in_executor()` has never propagated context
(verified on Python 3.12 and 3.13) — so this is a pre-existing gap in
the helper, **not** a regression or a Python-version compatibility
issue.
Concretely, any code that sets a `ContextVar` in async code and reads it
inside a function dispatched via `thread_pool_exec` (request tracing,
per-task state, Langfuse trace propagation, etc.) silently loses that
context.
## Fix
Copy the current context before submitting and run the callable inside
it with `ctx.run()`, matching what `asyncio.to_thread()` does:
```python
async def thread_pool_exec(func, *args, **kwargs):
loop = asyncio.get_running_loop()
ctx = contextvars.copy_context()
if kwargs:
inner = functools.partial(func, *args, **kwargs)
return await loop.run_in_executor(_thread_pool_executor(), ctx.run, inner)
return await loop.run_in_executor(_thread_pool_executor(), ctx.run, func, *args)
```
This explicitly **adds** ContextVar propagation to the helper (it does
not restore any prior behavior). Backward-compatible.
## Tests
`TestThreadPoolExec` covers propagation, the kwargs path, per-call
isolation and the unset-default case.
> Note: the branch name still contains `python313` for historical
reasons; the change is unrelated to any Python version.
2026-06-23 09:17:42 +02:00
|
|
|
inner = functools.partial(func, *args, **kwargs)
|
|
|
|
|
return await loop.run_in_executor(_thread_pool_executor(), ctx.run, inner)
|
|
|
|
|
return await loop.run_in_executor(_thread_pool_executor(), ctx.run, func, *args)
|