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supabase__server/docs
Matt Johnston b8b086c021 feat(errors): add self-identifying errors with hints and diagnostics (#130)
* feat: specific, self-identifying errors with hints and diagnostics

Nearly every failure returned `{ message: "Invalid credentials", code:
"INVALID_CREDENTIALS" }` — naming neither the cause nor the library it
came from.

Provenance. All errors now share a `SupabaseServerError` base carrying
`source: "@supabase/server"`, a `[@supabase/server]` message prefix (the
convention `deprecation.ts` already used for warnings), a `docs` link to
the matching `docs/error-handling.md` section, an optional `hint`, and
non-sensitive `details`. `toJSON()` renders the wire payload and is picked
up by `JSON.stringify`, so logging no longer yields `{}`. One
`errorResponse()` helper renders it everywhere, repeating the code in an
`x-supabase-server-error` header and adding that to
`Access-Control-Expose-Headers` so cross-origin callers can read it.
Top-level `message` and `code` are unchanged, so existing consumers and
the adapters keep working.

Diagnosis. `verifyUserJwt` now returns *why* a token failed instead of
`null`, and the mode chain records why each mode fell through, so the
final error names the real cause: `MISSING_CREDENTIALS`,
`INVALID_API_KEY`, `INVALID_JWT`, plus `JWKS_NOT_CONFIGURED`,
`JWKS_FETCH_FAILED` and `NO_KEYS_CONFIGURED` for states where no request
could ever have succeeded. `INVALID_CREDENTIALS` stays exported as the
fallback. Hints cover the mistakes people actually make — a secret key
sent to a publishable-only endpoint, a legacy anon/service_role key, an
`Authorization` header without the `Bearer` scheme, a JWT with no `kid`,
an expired token, a JWKS from the wrong project.

The middleware that answer directly get the same treatment rather than
their own hand-rolled bodies: `withClaims` / `withRequiredClaims` report
`MISSING_JWKS`, `MISSING_CREDENTIALS`, `INVALID_JWT`;
`withPostgresClient` / `withPostgresAdminClient` report
`MISSING_CONNECTION_STRING` and a catalogued `UNSUPPORTED_ROLE`.

`details` never carries key values or token payloads: API keys are
reported by prefix format, named keys by name, JWTs by `alg`/`kid` only.

Note: server misconfiguration now surfaces as 500 rather than 401. A
missing or unreachable JWKS, or an auth mode no configured key can match,
are not the caller's fault.

* feat: add `errors: { detailed: false }` to trim the error response body

`hint`, `docs`, and `details` are written for whoever is building against
the endpoint, and not everyone wants them on the wire. `errors.detailed`
(default `true`) reduces the body to `code` and `message` alone.

Provenance survives the trim: `message` keeps its `[@supabase/server]`
prefix, and the code is still sent as the `x-supabase-server-error`
header — so the error stays identifiable without the `source` field.

Response-only. The HTTP status is unaffected and the error object keeps
`hint`, `docs`, and `details` in full, so `createSupabaseContext` callers
and the framework adapters see everything.

Documented as a verbosity control rather than a security boundary — `code`
and `message` still name the failure specifically. Formatting the response
by hand via `createSupabaseContext` remains the way to disclose nothing.

* feat: distinguish UNUSABLE_CREDENTIAL from MISSING_CREDENTIALS

Review feedback on #130: the top-level code was `MISSING_CREDENTIALS`
even when a credential had arrived, just the wrong kind. `received.
authorization: 'api-key'` and the hint carried the diagnosis, but
`errors: { detailed: false }` strips both — leaving a caller who is
demonstrably sending a key staring at a bare `MISSING_CREDENTIALS`.

That mode makes the code the only thing a caller can rely on, so it has
to be true standing alone. `UNUSABLE_CREDENTIAL` (401) now covers "a
credential arrived that no accepted mode can use", partitioning the space
exactly against `MISSING_CREDENTIALS` ("nothing arrived"). It has two
shapes, named in the `message` so the diagnosis survives the trim:

  - wrong kind: an `sb_*` API key in the Authorization header
  - unreadable: wrong scheme, wrong casing, bare value, empty token

The unreadable shapes had the same defect and are fixed with it — a
`Basic` or lowercase-`bearer` header is not a missing credential either.

Classification moves into one shared `diagnoseAuthorizationHeader`, since
only the raw header separates "sent nothing" from "sent something
unreadable" and both `verifyAuth` and the `withRequiredClaims` gate need
that distinction. Previously the gate could not make it at all, so the
two disagreed on every scheme case. A parity matrix over all six header
shapes now pins gate and `withSupabase({ auth: 'user' })` to the same
status and code.

* fix: preserve error cause when client creation fails

* fix: report API keys as UNUSABLE_CREDENTIAL on user-only endpoints

Review feedback on #130: `supabase-js` sends the publishable key in both
the `apikey` and `Authorization` headers, so an unauthenticated browser
call to an `auth: 'user'` endpoint arrives with a key in each slot. The
`apikey !== 'absent'` branch in `explainFallthrough` was read first, so
the caller got `INVALID_API_KEY` — "check you are pointing at the right
Supabase project" — for a key that was never going to be looked up. With
`errors: { detailed: false }` the code is all they get, and it sent them
hunting for a key mismatch that does not exist.

`INVALID_API_KEY` means "matched none of the configured keys", which only
says something when a mode was doing that lookup. It is now gated on an
attempted `publishable` / `secret` mode; where no mode reads keys, a key
in either header is `UNUSABLE_CREDENTIAL` — not wrong, just the wrong
kind of credential. The apikey-header-only case had the same defect and
is fixed with it: "matched no key configured for auth mode(s): "user""
described a lookup that never happened.

The new diagnosis is shared as `apiKeyOnUserOnlyEndpoint`, so the
`withRequiredClaims` gate stops answering with "API keys belong in the
`apikey` header" for callers who already sent it there — that gate only
ever accepts a user JWT, so moving the key would not help. It keeps the
parity the gate is built for: an identical request, worded identically
from both paths. `ApiKeyInAuthorizationHeader` still covers the case
where the advice is right — a mixed `['user', 'publishable']` endpoint
with a key in `Authorization` alone.

* docs: add MissingConnectionStringError documentation and clarify credential error handling
2026-08-31 17:16:38 +03:00
..
2026-05-27 11:03:56 -05:00