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19e4277e12
* docs(adr): ADR-164 — AgentBBS federated business-management autopilot Draft ADR proposing agentbbs@0.1.0 integration as a federation-peer kind + business pod scaffolding. Covers the 4 new MCP tools, 7 domain pod templates (sales/marketing/finance/ops/support/hr/exec), upstream changes required in both ruflo and ruvnet/agentbbs, 5-phase rollout, and 7 honest risks. Builds on the optional-dep + graceful-degraded pattern shipped today in PR #2500 (agenticow) and ADR-150 (metaharness). Status: Draft. Implementation gated on upstream confirmation of agentbbs persistence semantics + latency baseline. Co-Authored-By: RuFlo <ruv@ruv.net> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WbBa4nccx5aGhXphoHxcni * docs(adr): amend ADR-164 + add ADR-164.1 (budget atomicity) ADR-164 amendments (Draft v2, 1193 → 1412 lines, +219 net): - Rewrite agentbbs maturity assessment — it's a 13-crate Rust workspace with 7 existing CI workflows + 30+ release tags + existing federation crate, NOT a 16h-old greenfield. The npm package is the launcher only. - §3.2.4 — two-phase auth: 15-min token is handshake-only; long-lived stream sessions persist past expiry until idle-close. - §3.5.4 — new "Founder-bootstrap trust elevation" admin escape hatch so #exec cross-pod synthesis works on Day 1 without 500-interaction wait. - §4.4 — Ops pod gets aidefence_*, terminal_execute, agent_execute, new http_fetch tool, cloud-provider MCP servers; concrete bench scenario. - §5.1.8 — new MCP tool `http_fetch` (URL allowlist, timeout, size cap). - §5.2 — survey-first upstream changes; many requirements may already exist in crates/agentbbs-federation and crates/agentbbs-mcp. - §7.3 + §9.5 — forward-reference to ADR-164.1 for race resolution. - §9.1 — risk #1 rewritten: real risks are npm/Rust version drift, FSL license implications, cargo first-run requirement, MCP server compatibility. ADR-164.1 (new, 724 lines): - Atomic reserve-and-commit token bucket against AgentDB-style SQLite store with BEGIN IMMEDIATE serialization. - Schema: bbs_budget_reservations + bbs_budget_rooms tables. - Three-op API: reserve / commit / release with discriminated returns. - 5 concurrency tests (vitest-implementable) closing the race window. - Migration plan: feature-flagged rollout behind CLAUDE_FLOW_BBS_ATOMIC_BUDGET, default flip after 1 week zero incidents. - p99 < 5ms target with ~1000 reserves/sec throughput ceiling honestly documented (partition-per-pod as the scale-out path, not replacing SQLite). Both Draft status. Phase 1 implementation gated on these. Co-Authored-By: RuFlo <ruv@ruv.net> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WbBa4nccx5aGhXphoHxcni * docs(adr): ADR-164.1 amendments — close the Expired Commit Leak Peer review (2026-06-29) identified three issues: 1. CRITICAL — Expired Commit Leak (§8.1, §5.3, §4.1) Original draft rejected commit() of an expired reservation, so the actual API spend went unrecorded. A high-latency loop could silently burn unbounded $ past the monthly cap. Fixed: commit() now ACCEPTS the spend, transitions state to new 'committed_post_expiry' value, records actual_usd, returns { ok: true, warned: 'COMMIT_AFTER_EXPIRY' }, and emits a reservation.committed_post_expiry audit envelope. 2. SQLite locking clarification (§3.2 _lock_bump field note) BEGIN IMMEDIATE itself acquires the RESERVED lock; _lock_bump is now documented as belt-and-suspenders + code-review visibility, not the primary serialization primitive. 3. Per-pod reservationExpiryMs (§3.2 expires_at field note) Default 60s is too short for local large-model pods. Pod templates may now set reservationExpiryMs in [5_000, 300_000] ms; ceiling defends against unbounded runaway. Plus new Test 6 in §9: load-bearing proof that COMMIT_AFTER_EXPIRY captures the real spend and the room's subsequent gate-check reflects it. Co-Authored-By: RuFlo <ruv@ruv.net> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WbBa4nccx5aGhXphoHxcni * feat(mcp): Phase 1 — agentbbs integration scaffold (4 MCP tools) Implements ADR-164 §3.2 + §5.1 with the same architectural pattern as PR #2500 (agenticow): optional-dep + graceful-degraded fallback. New MCP tools (4): - federation_bbs_register register a BBS room as a federation peer - federation_bbs_publish publish a typed envelope to a room - federation_bbs_watch poll recent envelopes (streaming = Phase 4) - federation_bbs_human_join single-use Ed25519 token + web/SSH handshake Phase 1 scope (scaffolding the surface, not the wire): - loadAgentbbs() checks importability; degrades to {degraded:true, reason:'agentbbs-not-found'} when missing — never throws - Validation runs BEFORE the optional-dep check so path-traversal / label / msgType rejection is deterministic regardless of install state - Backing store: local JSON-lines in <basePath>/room-<id>.jsonl + rooms.json registry. The Rust agentbbs-federation crate will replace this with signed wire envelopes in Phase 2. - Ed25519 keypair is per-process ephemeral; real federation keypair wiring is Phase 2 (documented inline at the call site). Gates (all PASS): - Build: clean (v3/@claude-flow/cli npm run build) - Vitest: 8 pass + 4 skip-conditional (agentbbs binary not built locally) - ADR-112 audit: 349/349 tools with Use-when guidance (was 345; +4 new) - Bash smoke: 8/8 (end-to-end register→publish→watch cycle via dist handlers) Plus: - .github/workflows/no-agentbbs-smoke.yml — CI guard mirroring no-metaharness-smoke.yml; asserts agentbbs stays in optionalDependencies and runtime drill exits 0 with --ignore-optional install - plugins/ruflo-bbs-federation/.claude-plugin/plugin.json — plugin metadata Co-Authored-By: RuFlo <ruv@ruv.net> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WbBa4nccx5aGhXphoHxcni * docs(adr-164): replace §5.2 hypotheticals with concrete agentbbs survey findings Phase 1 survey of ruvnet/agentbbs @ ca3c6e0 resolved each compatibility check in §5.2 against the live upstream source. Six "VERIFY FIRST / if- exists / if-missing" branches are replaced with definite answers: - §5.2.1 FederationPayload — already covers ruflo's needs (4 variants, Ed25519-sealed); map publish→ReplicateMessage, register→AnnounceBoard. No upstream PR. - §5.2.2 MCP tool registration — static 4-tool surface (list_boards, read_board, post_message, search_memory). Re-scoped from "web UI rendering" to the actual MCP shape concern. Gap #1 filed for missing create_board tool. No upstream PR for Phase 1. - §5.2.3 Subscription/streaming — genuinely missing (subscribe=false hardcoded), but matches ruflo's Phase 1 polling design. Gap #2 filed for Phase 4 streaming. No upstream PR for Phase 1. - §5.2.4 Integration seam — surprise finding: agentbbs already drives `npx ruflo federation` via RufloAdapter (other direction). Ruflo's CLI now has a contract obligation to keep init/join/status alive. - §5.2.5 Durable retention — postgres backend exists in CI but `agentbbs mcp` defaults to MemoryStore; gap #3 filed for Phase 3. - §5.2.6 CI regression coverage — no existing end-to-end agentbbs↔ruflo test. Closed by ruvnet/AgentBBS#3 regression guard (PR opened upstream in this same Phase 1 cycle). The regression guard at ruvnet/AgentBBS#3 asserts the four MCP tool names, four FederationPayload variants, and three RufloAdapter subcommand names continue to exist on every agentbbs PR + nightly cron. Cross-ref: - Upstream PR: https://github.com/ruvnet/AgentBBS/pull/3 - Survey commit: ruvnet/AgentBBS@ca3c6e0 * feat(pods): Phase 2 — sales pod end-to-end (dry-run + validator + smoke) Implements ADR-164 Phase 2: scaffold the first concrete business pod (sales) end-to-end with a typed validator, a tick runner, and full smoke coverage. Dry-run mode is the Phase 2 default; --live mode exits 3 with a "Phase 3" message until Managed Agent + claude-p wiring lands. New surface (~1,597 LOC): v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/business-pods/pod-schema.ts — PodTemplate type + validatePodTemplate() + KNOWN_AGENT_TYPES mirror v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/mcp-tools/business-pod-tools.ts — 1 new MCP tool (business_pod_validate) plugins/ruflo-business-pods/ .claude-plugin/plugin.json templates/sales.json — Phase 2 sales pod template (matches ADR-164 §4.1 + §3.3 schema) scripts/pod-tick.mjs — dry-run tick runner + file-based budget ledger (TODO(adr-164.1): swap to atomic SQLite tracker) scripts/pod-tick.test.mjs — 15 node:test tests scripts/smoke.sh — 8-step smoke contract skills/pod-sales/SKILL.md .github/workflows/business-pods-smoke.yml — CI gate Gates (all PASS): - Build: clean - vitest business-pod-tools: 19/19 PASS - node:test pod-tick: 15/15 PASS - ADR-112 audit: 350/350 with guidance (was 349; +1 new tool) - business-pods smoke: 8/8 PASS - agentbbs regression smoke: 8/8 PASS (no regression from Phase 1) - agenticow regression smoke: 8/8 PASS (no regression from PR #2500) Honest Phase 2 deviations: - Schema validator duplicated TS / JS (single canonical TS in cli/src/, JS copy in pod-tick.mjs so script runs without prebuilt CLI). Phase 3 consolidates via shared agents/registry.ts. - Budget ledger is file-based JSON stub; ADR-164.1 atomic SQLite tracker swap deferred to Phase 3. - agentbbs subprocess wiring not invoked; envelopes go directly to the Phase 1 JSONL backing store (matches ADR-164 §5.2.2 phase plan). Phase 3 follow-ups inline-marked TODO(adr-164.1) / TODO(phase-3). Co-Authored-By: RuFlo <ruv@ruv.net> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WbBa4nccx5aGhXphoHxcni * feat(pods): Phase 3 — remaining 6 pods + domain-affinity router policy Implements ADR-164 Phase 3: templates for marketing/finance/ops/support/hr/exec + the @metaharness/router domain-affinity policy hook. New templates (6) at plugins/ruflo-business-pods/templates/: marketing.json SOC2, $40/mo, cloud-tolerant finance.json GDPR, $80/mo, local-pinned, expiryMs=180_000 (3min) ops.json SOC2, $50/mo, local-pinned, synthetic-HTTP bench scenario; TODO(phase-3-http-fetch) for the unbuilt http_fetch tool support.json SOC2, $40/mo, cloud-tolerant hr.json GDPR, $30/mo, local-pinned (employee PII = finance-grade) exec.json GDPR, $60/mo, local-pinned, references §3.5.4 founder-bootstrap trust elevation for share-context on Day 1 New code: v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/business-pods/domain-affinity-policy.ts (86 LOC) - selectAgentBackend(pod): {backend, reason} - rules: preferLocalExecution=true → local-stdio else if budget.monthlyUsd >= 50 → cloud-managed else → remote-peer v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/mcp-tools/business-pod-tools.ts (+107 LOC) - new MCP tool: business_pod_route_backend - shared loadTemplate(input: object | string) helper Schema mirror in lockstep: added `base-template-generator` to KNOWN_AGENT_TYPES in BOTH TS (pod-schema.ts) and JS (pod-tick.mjs) copies. Gates (all PASS): - Build: clean - vitest business-pod-tools: 44/44 PASS (was 19; +18 Phase 3 cases) - node:test pod-tick: 21/21 PASS (was 15; +6 happy-path tests) - ADR-112 audit: 351/351 with guidance (was 350; +1 new tool) - business-pods smoke: 11/11 PASS (was 8; +3 Phase 3 steps) - agentbbs regression smoke: 8/8 PASS - agenticow regression smoke: 8/8 PASS Phase 4 follow-ups (inline TODOs): - http_fetch MCP tool implementation (referenced by ops.json) - @metaharness/router wire point in policy-engine.ts - ruflo federation trust elevate ... --to TRUSTED CLI escape hatch - Live-mode dispatch (Managed Agent + claude -p wiring) - Atomic SQLite budget tracker swap (ADR-164.1) Per ADR-164 §3.4, all rules codified verbatim; smoke step 11 + 4 vitest cases assert what the rules produce per template. Live mode still exits 3 with "Phase 4" message — Phase 3 is templates + validator + routing-policy only. Co-Authored-By: RuFlo <ruv@ruv.net> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WbBa4nccx5aGhXphoHxcni * feat: Phase 4 — http_fetch + atomic budget tracker + federation trust elevate Three Phase 4 deliverables landing per ADR-164: A. http_fetch MCP tool (ADR-164 §5.1.8) - 1 new tool (#352) for ops-pod's synthetic-endpoint bench - Security-default-rejects: private IPs (RFC-1918, localhost), auth headers (Authorization/Cookie/X-Auth-*) unless env vars opt-in - URL allowlist + timeout + response-size cap (256 KB default, 1 MB max) - 25/25 vitest pass (URL allowlist, timeout abort, truncation, auth-header rejection, happy path against node:http mock) B. Atomic SQLite budget tracker (ADR-164.1 §3-§5) - bbs_budget_rooms + bbs_budget_reservations tables - reserve/commit/release with BEGIN IMMEDIATE + _lock_bump - committed_post_expiry state machine (Expired Commit Leak fix from peer review 2026-06-29) implemented - expires_at clamped to [5_000, 300_000] ms per-pod override - Behind CLAUDE_FLOW_BBS_ATOMIC_BUDGET=1 — file-based stub remains the default until next flip; pod-tick.mjs migration deferred to Phase 5 - 15/15 vitest pass (Tests 1, 2, 3, 6 from ADR-164.1 §9, skipping Test 5 clock-skew which would require system-clock manipulation) - reservationId is randomUUID v4 (ADR-164.1 §3.2 notes v7 is purely aesthetic — v7 generator would add a transitive dep we don't need) C. ruflo federation trust elevate CLI (ADR-164 §3.5.4) - New subcommand: bypasses 500-interaction TRUST_TRANSITION_THRESHOLDS - Mandatory --reason + --audit flags (both required by spec) - Refuses unknown peer node-ids - Reuses existing trust_level_changed audit envelope with metadata.tag='bootstrap_elevation' + metadata.operatorBypass=true (cheapest path — keeps SEVERITY_BY_EVENT_TYPE / CATEGORY_BY_EVENT_TYPE stable rather than introducing a new event-type that needs propagation through downstream consumers) Gates (all PASS): - Build: clean (tsc) - vitest http-fetch + bbs-budget-tracker: 40/40 PASS (25 + 15) - vitest business-pod-tools regression: 44/44 PASS (Phase 3 still green) - ADR-112 audit: 352/352 with guidance (was 351; +1 http_fetch) - business-pods smoke: 11/11 PASS - agentbbs smoke: 8/8 PASS - agenticow smoke: 8/8 PASS Phase 5 follow-ups (explicit deferrals): - Live-mode dispatch (pod-tick --live still exits 3) - Sweeper timer integration site (daemon worker, not pod-tick) - Spend-reporter audit adapter (write to federation_spend namespace BEFORE BEGIN IMMEDIATE per ADR-164.1 §6.1) - pod-tick.mjs migration from file-based to atomic tracker - ACL gate on `federation trust elevate` (currently consistent with `federation evict` / `reactivate` — no founder-only crypto check yet) - http_fetch wiring into pod-tick live-mode for ops bench Co-Authored-By: RuFlo <ruv@ruv.net> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WbBa4nccx5aGhXphoHxcni * chore(lock): regen v3/pnpm-lock.yaml with agentbbs entry (PR #2503 CI fix) Same fix as we did on the agenticow PR #2500 push — pnpm install at root regenerates pnpm-lock.yaml (the npm workspace), but the real workspace is v3/pnpm-workspace.yaml and its sibling v3/pnpm-lock.yaml. CI uses --frozen-lockfile so the v3 lockfile must be in sync with v3/@claude-flow/cli's package.json (which declares agentbbs: ~0.1.0 as optional). * fix(ci): re-export-tolerant agentbbs guard + skip business-pods smoke under --ignore-optional PR #2503 CI surfaced 2 ADR-164 issues: 1. no-agentbbs-smoke Rule 2 false-positive on mcp-tools/index.ts. The static-grep treated `export { agentbbsTools } from './agentbbs-tools.js';` as an unguarded agentbbs reference. The agentbbsTools symbol itself contains the loadAgentbbs() guard — the index.ts re-export is benign. Fixed: strip re-export + spread + import-of-agentbbsTools patterns + all comments before the unguarded-reference check. 2. ruflo-business-pods smoke 9/11 under no-metaharness-smoke's runtime drill (which does `npm install --ignore-optional`). Without optional deps, vitest may be absent AND the cli dist may not exist. Steps 4 (vitest) and 11 (call into dist) now SKIP cleanly when those are missing instead of failing — the main test-suite jobs still gate the full vitest + build runs. Co-Authored-By: RuFlo <ruv@ruv.net> * fix(ci): business-pods-smoke uses pnpm (root npm chokes on workspace:*) The root package.json declares some workspace deps with the pnpm `workspace:*` protocol that npm doesn't support. Symptom: `npm install` step exited with EUNSUPPORTEDPROTOCOL. The v3/ tree is a real pnpm workspace (v3/pnpm-workspace.yaml). Switch the workflow to install + build from there using pnpm + frozen-lockfile, then fall through to vitest / node:test / smoke contract. Pattern matches the existing v3-ci.yml install steps. Co-Authored-By: RuFlo <ruv@ruv.net> * fix(ci): pnpm --filter '@claude-flow/cli...' to include workspace deps The previous `pnpm --filter @claude-flow/cli build` didn't build workspace dependencies first, so the cli's tsc step failed with TS2307 errors looking for @claude-flow/memory, @claude-flow/neural, @claude-flow/cli-core types. The `...` suffix tells pnpm to include all of the cli's workspace dependencies in the build graph. Applied to both business-pods-smoke.yml and no-agentbbs-smoke.yml's runtime drill. Co-Authored-By: RuFlo <ruv@ruv.net> * fix(ci): pnpm -r build (whole workspace, dep-first) — pnpm filter can't discover cross-package dist/ imports Round 4 surfaced two pre-existing fragilities in the workspace's build wiring: 1. business-pods-smoke: @claude-flow/cli imports from @claude-flow/swarm/dist/ not via package.json deps but via direct file path. `--filter "@claude-flow/cli..."` doesn't traverse those. Fixed: `pnpm -r --no-bail build` builds the whole workspace dep-first, with a fallback to a direct cli build. 2. no-agentbbs-smoke runtime drill: `--no-optional` stripped agentdb, which is a transitive consumer of @claude-flow/neural and breaks neural's tsc even though neural has its own optional-degradation path internally. Fixed: install everything, then SURGICALLY rm node_modules/agentbbs only, so only the dep we're testing graceful-degradation for is missing. Co-Authored-By: RuFlo <ruv@ruv.net>
272 lines
9.8 KiB
TypeScript
272 lines
9.8 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* Tests for http_fetch MCP tool (ADR-164 §5.1.8, Phase 4).
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*
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* Coverage:
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* - URL allowlist (default-blocks file://, ftp://, RFC-1918, loopback, link-local)
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* - Opt-in via CLAUDE_FLOW_HTTP_FETCH_ALLOW_PRIVATE=1 reaches a local server
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* - Header sanitization (default-rejects Authorization / Cookie / X-Auth-*)
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* - Opt-in via CLAUDE_FLOW_HTTP_FETCH_ALLOW_AUTH=1 passes the header
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* - Hard timeout aborts via AbortController
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* - Response truncation honours maxResponseBytes
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* - Happy path against a local mock node:http server
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* - Default User-Agent injected if caller did not provide one
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*/
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import { describe, it, expect, beforeAll, afterAll, beforeEach, afterEach } from 'vitest';
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import http from 'node:http';
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import type { AddressInfo } from 'node:net';
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import {
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httpFetchTools,
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httpFetchExecute,
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validateUrl,
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validateHeaders,
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HttpFetchValidationError,
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} from '../src/mcp-tools/http-fetch-tools.js';
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function findTool(name: string) {
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const t = httpFetchTools.find((x) => x.name === name);
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if (!t) throw new Error(`tool not found: ${name}`);
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return t;
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}
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// ---------- mock server for happy-path + truncation + timeout tests --------
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let server: http.Server;
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let port: number;
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let lastUA: string | undefined;
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let lastAuth: string | undefined;
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let lastMethod: string | undefined;
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let lastBody: string | undefined;
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beforeAll(async () => {
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await new Promise<void>((resolve) => {
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server = http.createServer((req, res) => {
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lastUA = req.headers['user-agent'] as string | undefined;
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lastAuth = req.headers['authorization'] as string | undefined;
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lastMethod = req.method;
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// Collect body
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const chunks: Buffer[] = [];
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req.on('data', (c) => chunks.push(c));
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req.on('end', () => {
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lastBody = Buffer.concat(chunks).toString('utf-8');
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const url = req.url ?? '/';
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if (url === '/ok') {
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res.writeHead(200, { 'content-type': 'text/plain', 'x-server': 'mock' });
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res.end('hello-world');
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} else if (url === '/big') {
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// 1MB+ body — should trigger truncation when maxResponseBytes < 1MB
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res.writeHead(200, { 'content-type': 'application/octet-stream' });
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res.end(Buffer.alloc(2 * 1024 * 1024, 0x41));
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} else if (url === '/slow') {
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// Never respond — caller must abort
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// Keep connection open. Don't write headers either.
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// Will be terminated when the test server closes.
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} else if (url === '/echo') {
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res.writeHead(200, { 'content-type': 'application/json' });
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res.end(JSON.stringify({ method: req.method, body: lastBody }));
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} else if (url === '/500') {
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res.writeHead(500, { 'content-type': 'text/plain' });
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res.end('server-error');
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} else {
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res.writeHead(404);
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res.end('not-found');
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}
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});
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});
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server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', () => {
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port = (server.address() as AddressInfo).port;
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resolve();
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});
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});
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});
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afterAll(async () => {
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// Force-close to terminate any lingering /slow request
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await new Promise<void>((resolve) => {
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server.closeAllConnections?.();
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server.close(() => resolve());
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});
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});
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// ---------- env-flag isolation -----------------------------------
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const originalEnv = { ...process.env };
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beforeEach(() => {
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delete process.env.CLAUDE_FLOW_HTTP_FETCH_ALLOW_PRIVATE;
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delete process.env.CLAUDE_FLOW_HTTP_FETCH_ALLOW_AUTH;
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});
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afterEach(() => {
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process.env = { ...originalEnv };
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});
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// ---------- URL allowlist tests ----------------------------------
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describe('http_fetch — URL allowlist (default-deny)', () => {
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it('rejects file:// URLs', () => {
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expect(() => validateUrl('file:///etc/passwd')).toThrow(HttpFetchValidationError);
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});
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it('rejects ftp:// URLs', () => {
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expect(() => validateUrl('ftp://example.com/x')).toThrow(/protocol/);
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});
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it('rejects localhost', () => {
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expect(() => validateUrl('http://localhost/foo')).toThrow(/loopback|private/i);
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});
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it('rejects 127.0.0.1', () => {
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expect(() => validateUrl('http://127.0.0.1/foo')).toThrow(/loopback|private/i);
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});
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it('rejects 10.x RFC1918', () => {
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expect(() => validateUrl('http://10.0.0.5/foo')).toThrow(/loopback|private/i);
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});
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it('rejects 192.168.x.x RFC1918', () => {
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expect(() => validateUrl('http://192.168.1.1/foo')).toThrow(/loopback|private/i);
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});
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it('rejects 172.16.x.x RFC1918', () => {
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expect(() => validateUrl('http://172.20.0.1/foo')).toThrow(/loopback|private/i);
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});
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it('rejects 169.254.x.x link-local', () => {
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expect(() => validateUrl('http://169.254.169.254/latest')).toThrow(/loopback|private/i);
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});
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it('allows public host (example.com) by hostname check alone', () => {
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expect(() => validateUrl('https://example.com/foo')).not.toThrow();
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});
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it('opt-in CLAUDE_FLOW_HTTP_FETCH_ALLOW_PRIVATE=1 unlocks private addresses', () => {
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process.env.CLAUDE_FLOW_HTTP_FETCH_ALLOW_PRIVATE = '1';
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expect(() => validateUrl('http://127.0.0.1/foo')).not.toThrow();
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expect(() => validateUrl('http://10.0.0.5/foo')).not.toThrow();
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});
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});
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// ---------- header sanitization tests ----------------------------
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describe('http_fetch — header sanitization (default-deny auth)', () => {
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it('rejects Authorization header by default', () => {
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expect(() => validateHeaders({ Authorization: 'Bearer abc' })).toThrow(/not allowed/i);
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});
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it('rejects Cookie header by default', () => {
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expect(() => validateHeaders({ Cookie: 'sid=abc' })).toThrow(/not allowed/i);
|
|
});
|
|
it('rejects X-Auth-Token by default', () => {
|
|
expect(() => validateHeaders({ 'X-Auth-Token': 'abc' })).toThrow(/not allowed/i);
|
|
});
|
|
it('accepts benign headers', () => {
|
|
const h = validateHeaders({ Accept: 'application/json', 'X-Pod': 'ops' });
|
|
expect(h.Accept).toBe('application/json');
|
|
expect(h['X-Pod']).toBe('ops');
|
|
});
|
|
it('opt-in CLAUDE_FLOW_HTTP_FETCH_ALLOW_AUTH=1 unlocks auth headers', () => {
|
|
process.env.CLAUDE_FLOW_HTTP_FETCH_ALLOW_AUTH = '1';
|
|
expect(() => validateHeaders({ Authorization: 'Bearer abc' })).not.toThrow();
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
// ---------- happy path / timeout / truncation --------------------
|
|
|
|
describe('http_fetch — execution path against a mock server', () => {
|
|
it('happy-path GET returns 200 and body', async () => {
|
|
process.env.CLAUDE_FLOW_HTTP_FETCH_ALLOW_PRIVATE = '1';
|
|
const result = await httpFetchExecute({ url: `http://127.0.0.1:${port}/ok` });
|
|
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
|
|
expect(result.status).toBe(200);
|
|
expect(result.body).toBe('hello-world');
|
|
expect(result.bodyTruncated).toBe(false);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('default User-Agent is sent when caller omits it', async () => {
|
|
process.env.CLAUDE_FLOW_HTTP_FETCH_ALLOW_PRIVATE = '1';
|
|
lastUA = undefined;
|
|
await httpFetchExecute({ url: `http://127.0.0.1:${port}/ok` });
|
|
expect(lastUA).toMatch(/^ruflo-http-fetch\//);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('aborts on timeout', async () => {
|
|
process.env.CLAUDE_FLOW_HTTP_FETCH_ALLOW_PRIVATE = '1';
|
|
const result = await httpFetchExecute({
|
|
url: `http://127.0.0.1:${port}/slow`,
|
|
timeoutMs: 100,
|
|
});
|
|
expect(result.success).toBe(false);
|
|
expect(result.errorCode).toBe('TIMEOUT');
|
|
expect(result.durationMs).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(80);
|
|
expect(result.durationMs).toBeLessThan(5_000);
|
|
}, 10_000);
|
|
|
|
it('truncates the response when body exceeds maxResponseBytes', async () => {
|
|
process.env.CLAUDE_FLOW_HTTP_FETCH_ALLOW_PRIVATE = '1';
|
|
const result = await httpFetchExecute({
|
|
url: `http://127.0.0.1:${port}/big`,
|
|
maxResponseBytes: 1024,
|
|
});
|
|
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
|
|
expect(result.bodyTruncated).toBe(true);
|
|
expect(result.bytesRead).toBeLessThanOrEqual(1024);
|
|
expect(result.body.length).toBeLessThanOrEqual(1024);
|
|
}, 10_000);
|
|
|
|
it('refuses to call when URL is private and flag is off', async () => {
|
|
const result = await httpFetchExecute({ url: `http://127.0.0.1:${port}/ok` });
|
|
expect(result.success).toBe(false);
|
|
expect(result.errorCode).toBe('PRIVATE_ADDRESS');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('refuses Authorization header without env flag', async () => {
|
|
process.env.CLAUDE_FLOW_HTTP_FETCH_ALLOW_PRIVATE = '1';
|
|
const result = await httpFetchExecute({
|
|
url: `http://127.0.0.1:${port}/ok`,
|
|
headers: { Authorization: 'Bearer abc' },
|
|
});
|
|
expect(result.success).toBe(false);
|
|
expect(result.errorCode).toBe('FORBIDDEN_HEADER');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('POST with body echoes back through /echo', async () => {
|
|
process.env.CLAUDE_FLOW_HTTP_FETCH_ALLOW_PRIVATE = '1';
|
|
const result = await httpFetchExecute({
|
|
url: `http://127.0.0.1:${port}/echo`,
|
|
method: 'POST',
|
|
body: 'hello',
|
|
});
|
|
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
|
|
expect(result.status).toBe(200);
|
|
const parsed = JSON.parse(result.body);
|
|
expect(parsed.method).toBe('POST');
|
|
expect(parsed.body).toBe('hello');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('reports non-2xx status without throwing', async () => {
|
|
process.env.CLAUDE_FLOW_HTTP_FETCH_ALLOW_PRIVATE = '1';
|
|
const result = await httpFetchExecute({ url: `http://127.0.0.1:${port}/500` });
|
|
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
|
|
expect(result.status).toBe(500);
|
|
expect(result.body).toBe('server-error');
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
// ---------- MCP tool wiring -------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
describe('http_fetch — MCP tool registration', () => {
|
|
it('exports http_fetch tool with required schema fields', () => {
|
|
const tool = findTool('http_fetch');
|
|
expect(tool.description.length).toBeGreaterThan(80);
|
|
expect(tool.description).toMatch(/Use when/i);
|
|
expect(tool.inputSchema.required).toEqual(['url']);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('tool.handler dispatches to httpFetchExecute', async () => {
|
|
process.env.CLAUDE_FLOW_HTTP_FETCH_ALLOW_PRIVATE = '1';
|
|
const tool = findTool('http_fetch');
|
|
const result = (await tool.handler({ url: `http://127.0.0.1:${port}/ok` })) as { status: number };
|
|
expect(result.status).toBe(200);
|
|
});
|
|
});
|