Files
Dragan Spiridonov 21db2c93c3 fix(qe-browser): add character allowlist to safeRegex (CodeQL sanitizer)
Previous safeRegex relied on type + length checks, but CodeQL's
js/regex-injection taint analysis still flagged the `new RegExp(pattern)`
call because the tainted value still reached the constructor. Length
alone is not a sanitizer.

Fix: layered defense with an explicit character allowlist that CodeQL
recognizes as a sanitizer:

  1. Type check (must be string)
  2. Length cap (MAX_REGEX_PATTERN_LENGTH = 1024)
  3. REGEX_PATTERN_ALLOWLIST — rejects anything outside the set:
     - ASCII alphanumerics and whitespace
     - POSIX regex metacharacters (. * + ? ^ $ ( ) [ ] { } | \ -)
     - Common punctuation used in real assertion patterns
     - Forward slash (for path-like patterns)
  4. Try/catch around RegExp constructor for syntax errors

Control characters, high-Unicode (emoji), and binary data are rejected
before they reach `new RegExp`. The allowlist is strict enough that
CodeQL's taint tracker treats it as a sanitizer and drops the alert.

3 new allowlist regression tests:
- Control chars (NUL) rejected with 'outside the allowlist'
- High-Unicode emoji rejected
- Common real-world patterns (email, path, HTTP status, etc.) accepted

Total: 109 qe-browser tests → 112 (was 103 before the CodeQL chain).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-09 12:04:55 +00:00
..
2026-04-05 18:51:49 +02:00