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juliusbrussee__caveman/proxy/AGENTS.md
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Zsolt f73d98fc8e fix(proxy): send x-api-key on compat /v1/messages (#969)
* fix(proxy): send x-api-key on compat /v1/messages

A named compat mount mapped every credential to Authorization: Bearer.
The Anthropic client in Pi sends x-api-key to /v1/messages. OpenCode Go
rejects a Bearer header on that path with 401 "Missing API key.". Thus
the opencode-go anthropic-messages models failed through the proxy.

The named adapter now maps the credential by the wire protocol of the
path. A request to /compat/<name>/v1/messages gets x-api-key and a
default anthropic-version. Every other path keeps Bearer. The gateway
env fallback puts the key in the header that the adapter emitted, so
the upstream never gets two credentials.

New tests cover the header mapping at the adapter, the gateway fallback,
and the full standalone handler with the /w/pi prefix. A test also
shows that a user compat.opencode-go entry replaces the built-in
upstream on the adapter path. The docs describe the header rule.

Fixes #967
Fixes #968

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Zsolt Gaspar <17578237+zsltg@users.noreply.github.com>

* docs(proxy): add the compat header rule to AGENTS.md

proxy/AGENTS.md carries the same auth bullet as proxy/CLAUDE.md. This
commit adds the same header rule to both files.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Zsolt Gaspar <17578237+zsltg@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(proxy): keep a real bearer on compat /v1/messages

Review of #969 found two risks. The Anthropic-path remap relabeled a
real inbound Bearer token as x-api-key on every named compat mount.
This broke the rule that an inbound credential keeps its auth scheme.
The remap now skips a real Bearer token. The gateway placeholder is not
a real credential, so the remap still moves it to x-api-key, and the
env fallback replaces it in that header.

The fallback test for x-api-key used a direct map lookup that depends
on canonical header keys. It now uses Header.Get. The openai and
openai_compatible fallback cases are separate, so each guard list
names only the headers that its adapter can emit.

New tests show that a real Bearer stays Bearer on /v1/messages at the
adapter, in the gateway fallback, and through the standalone handler.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Zsolt Gaspar <17578237+zsltg@users.noreply.github.com>

---------

Signed-off-by: Zsolt Gaspar <17578237+zsltg@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Zsolt Gaspar <17578237+zsltg@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-03 20:29:36 +02:00

8.1 KiB

proxy — the byte-safe standalone caveman proxy (commercial, binary-distributed)

A base-URL-swap reverse proxy: match → authenticate → inspect → byte-safe transform → upstream → meter. Single-operator, BYOK, zero cloud dependencies. It shares its provider adapters with the managed gateway (the managed gateway imports them from here). caveman start launches the caveman-proxy binary.

Layout

  • providers/ — the shared, public byte-safe adapter set: Adapter interface + Base embed + UsageScanner/ParseUsageBytes (adapter.go), and anthropic/openai/gemini/azureopenai/bedrock/vertex/openaicompat. ResolveUpstreamURL takes providers.RouteContext (no control-plane coupling). Anthropic + OpenAI carry both prefixed and bare routes (/v1/messages, /v1/chat/completions). vertex is a bearer pass-through proxy for Gemini + Claude on Vertex AI (no signing, no custom usage parser).
  • internal/gateway/ — the request lifecycle (server.go + proxy.go) behind three injected seams: Authenticator, CredentialResolver, TelemetrySink. Ports the managed loop with the fail-open fix.
  • internal/config/ — caveman.yaml loader + BYOK env-key resolution; unknown mode fails closed to record.
  • internal/store/ — ~/.caveman/caveman.db SQLite spend store (modernc.org/sqlite, cgo-free); implements TelemetrySink.
  • internal/standalone/ — wiring: static Auth, BYOK Creds, adapter set, and the always-on SSRF-guarded client.
  • cmd/caveman-proxy/ — binary: serve (default), stats, and content-blind agent-evidence --session --build --plan. Evidence query returns only exact provider usage, request hashes, declared context/plan identity, ordered provider-prefix component hashes, actual transform IDs/counts, and CCR handle; basis is always inferred, verified dollars always zero.

Conventions

  • Build/test: make product-build PRODUCT=proxy / make product-test PRODUCT=proxy.
  • Tests inject a plain *http.Client to reach loopback stubs; the binary uses the SSRF-guarded client.
  • New provider/optimizer work goes in providers/ (shared) — change it once, both proxies get it.

Gotchas (honesty invariants — correctness, not style)

  • byte-safe: record mode never transforms; on transform error the ORIGINAL bytes are forwarded (HTTP 200, fail-open) — never a 400.
  • request-wide opt-out: x-cave-transforms: caveman.pass-through.v1 suppresses every request transform path — compress, pixel, and provider-native — not only compiled plan routes. Tests cover all three modes.
  • no-fake-savings: standalone records Basis: "inferred" on every row; it never writes verified and never re-projects to a monthly figure.
  • practice join: local learn sinks carry additive practice_id; one fail-closed mapping table owns sink→practice and unknown sinks keep "". The historical subagent_overuse sink is count-only and deliberately has no practice id: spawn count cannot reactivate the retired context-exploration-offload opportunity or prove any spawn unnecessary.
  • local trial heuristics are not actuation evidence: a model name never emits the retired model-right-sizing id, and provider plus positive cost never emits a cache move because neither proves stable-prefix eligibility. Legacy rows for those identities are hidden at read time. Compression replay reports one trial's local engine estimated_engine_o200k before/after shape with zero dollars and low confidence; it is not provider-counted, a rate, an invoice, causal/verified savings, or task-outcome evidence.
  • Anthropic automatic caching is experimental observation only: anthropic-automatic-prompt-cache is a typed, default-off manual policy experiment and may add only Anthropic's top-level 5-minute marker on direct Messages API requests. Managed traffic additionally requires server-attested official Anthropic origin; custom or provenance-unknown origins lose the flag before the adapter. It is mutually exclusive with the explicit anthropic-cache-breakpoints transform and any caller cache_control; Bedrock and count-tokens requests stay byte-identical. An applied marker records only its optimizer id plus actual provider usage and cost. It has no practice, recipe, generic mode/candidate activation, ledger tuple, inferred savings, or verified-savings path (cache-only and forged IDs are excluded from the counted-baseline method too); evaluate it by manual paired observation because shared provider cache state can contaminate an A/B.
  • SSRF always on: standalone.StandaloneHTTPClient guards every upstream dial (not gated on CAVE_ENV) using ssrf.SelfHostedConfig — NOT ManagedConfig, which ignores the allowlist and would make the escape hatch a silent no-op. CAVE_SSRF_ALLOWLIST opts loopback/private hosts back in (local model servers like Ollama; localhost as an entry covers 127.0.0.0/8 + ::1); metadata/link-local stay blocked in every mode.
  • Auth scheme is preserved: a key from an inbound Authorization: Bearer keeps Scheme:"bearer" on the providers.Credential; Anthropic and Gemini forward bearer credentials as bearer credentials (Claude/Gemini OAuth breaks if remapped to an API-key header). BYOK env keys and inbound x-api-key keep provider API-key mapping. On a named compat mount the header follows the wire protocol of the path: /compat/<name>/v1/messages gets x-api-key plus a default anthropic-version, every other path gets Bearer. A real inbound Bearer stays Bearer on every path. OpenCode Go rejects Bearer on /v1/messages (401 Missing API key., 2026-09-03). The gateway env fallback puts the key in the header that the adapter emitted, so the upstream never gets two credentials.
  • fail-closed: unknown route → 404; unknown mode → record.
  • subscription AND oauth compression is NOT account-gated: non-PAYG sessions from Claude Code, Codex ChatGPT, Gemini CLI, and other routed clients take live-zone compression with no Caveman account, entitlement, or seat. CAVEMAN_WRAP_ENTITLED and every WrapEntitled field are deleted, not merely ignored — do not reintroduce them. Exactly four conditions remain, all technical and all fail-closed (liveZoneCompressionAllowed): the operator subscription_compress switch (empty/live_zone allow, off and any unknown value close it), the adapter must implement schema-aware PrefixStabilizer zones, recovery must run through the agent's own MCP caveman_retrieve, and a durable prefix cache must be wired. The dedicated Codex /chatgpt/responses route uses the OpenAI Responses stabilizer while preserving OAuth and ChatGPT-Account-ID headers; transformed 4xx responses retry once with exact original bytes. Rows are tokens-only — compression_tokens_before/after + estimated_engine_o200k, never compression dollars. LOCAL wrap only; managed gateway non-PAYG behavior is unchanged.
  • cache safety is byte-stable replacement: a compressed live-zone turn becomes prefix on next request, so same logical message must re-serialize to deterministically identical bytes every time. Replacement is pure function of segment content (deterministic compressor + content-hash CCR marker), held in durable replacement cache and re-substituted below cache floor; new compression stays live-zone-only. Cache miss/write failure forwards original bytes. Cross-turn stability covers anthropic, openai, azureopenai/openaicompat, and gemini through ExtractStabilizable; bedrock and vertex expose no compressible blocks and stay pass-through. Anthropic uses declared cache_control; OpenAI/Gemini use latest-user/latest-tool zones against implicit provider caches. Replacement cache is SQLite spend store and must retain journal_mode(WAL) + busy_timeout.
  • pixel mode: S4 lossy text→PNG (pxpipe port). Default allowlist is claude-fable-5,gpt-5.6 via CAVE_PIXEL_MODELS; original request is always in CCR before transformed bytes are sent; savings stay inferred-only; any error is byte-identical pass-through.
  • boundary: this is public code — it must never import the managed-cloud lane. make check-boundaries enforces it.

See ../../CLAUDE.md (root)