* fix(security): harden against command injection and sandbox escape
1. cli.ts: Remove auto-discover of arbitrary system binaries via denylist.
Unknown commands now require explicit registration via `opencli register`.
The previous denylist approach was trivially bypassable (bash, curl, etc.).
2. template.ts: Protect evalJsExpr against prototype chain escape.
Block expressions containing constructor/prototype/__proto__/process/etc.
Deep-copy context objects to sever prototype chains before passing to
new Function().
3. external.ts: Expand shell operator detection in parseCommand to cover
$(), $, #, \n, \r — preventing command substitution and comment injection.
4. fetch.ts: Use JSON.stringify for HTTP method in browser evaluate() instead
of raw string interpolation, preventing JS injection via crafted method values.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: harden security-sensitive execution paths
* chore: tighten template sandbox guard
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Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(external): replace execSync with execFileSync to prevent command injection
* fix(review): preserve Windows external installs and restore docs build
* fix(review): preserve Windows external installs after rebase
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Co-authored-by: jackwener <jakevingoo@gmail.com>
jakevin