Files
Jordan Ritter 7897be4a95 feat(runtime): configurable inbound-header forwarding policy with default infra/platform denylist (#5783)
## Problem — the leak

The v2 runtime's `shouldForwardHeader` forwarded `authorization` **and
any header whose name starts with `x-`** onto the outgoing agent call.
In a real deployment the inbound request has already traversed a
browser, CDN/edge, load balancer, and hosting platform — each stamping
its own `x-*` headers — so the wide `x-*` wildcard silently forwarded:

- **Hop-by-hop / topology:** `x-forwarded-for`, `x-real-ip`,
`x-forwarded-proto/host/port`
- **Cloud / CDN tracing:** `x-amzn-trace-id`, `x-amz-cf-id`,
`x-cloud-trace-context`, `x-azure-*`, `x-fastly-*`, `x-request-id`
- **Platform-injected:** `x-vercel-*`, `x-middleware-*`
- **CopilotKit Cloud platform credential:**
`x-copilotcloud-public-api-key`

The last item is a real credential-exfiltration concern: a platform key
scoped to Copilot Cloud reaching a third-party agent URL. This is the
**breadth** half of #5712 (option 3); the **precedence** half was fixed
in #5782.

## Design — denylist default + config knob, both paths

- **Default denylist (safe default).** Keep the `authorization` + `x-*`
base eligibility, but strip a curated, greppable set of known
infra/proxy/platform headers (exact names + prefix families) before
forwarding. Legitimate custom `x-*` application headers (`x-tenant-id`,
`x-api-key`, …) keep flowing untouched. The authoritative list is a
single exported constant in `header-utils.ts`.
- **Configurable policy (`forwardHeaders` runtime option).**
- `useDefaultDenylist?: boolean` (default **true**) — `false` restores
the previous wide-open behavior.
  - `deny?` / `denyPrefixes?` — extend the default denylist.
- `allow?` — opt into strict allowlist mode (only listed headers
forward).
- **Resolve once.** The constructor resolves `forwardHeaders` into a
`forwardHeadersPolicy: ResolvedForwardHeadersPolicy` field (mirroring
the existing `debug` → `ResolvedDebugConfig` resolve-once), exposed on
`CopilotRuntimeLike` / `BaseCopilotRuntime` with a passthrough getter on
the `CopilotRuntime` shim.
- **Both paths.** The resolved policy is read at **/run**
(`configureAgentForRequest`) and **/connect** (`handleSseConnect`) via
`mergeForwardableHeaders`, so the two can never diverge. Server-wins
precedence and server-self case-dedup from #5782 are untouched.

## Semver

**Minor with an opt-out.** Removing a leak is a fix, not a contract
change, and we ship a documented escape hatch: `new CopilotRuntime({
agents, forwardHeaders: { useDefaultDenylist: false } })` restores the
prior behavior. Custom-header forwarders (the common case) are
unaffected.

## Red-green proof (real surface, both paths)

RED — with the predicate reverted to the old wide-open `authorization ||
x-*` (policy ignored), the new behavior assertions fail; the leak
reproduces (`x-forwarded-for: 203.0.113.7` forwards on both /run and
/connect):

```
 ❯ header-utils.test.ts (19 tests | 8 failed)
   × strips known infra/proxy/platform headers by exact name → expected true to be false
   × strips known infra/platform header families by prefix   → expected true to be false
   × strips denylisted headers case-insensitively            → expected true to be false
   × deny extends the default set                            → expected true to be false
   × denyPrefixes extends the default set                    → expected true to be false
   × allow switches to allowlist mode                        → expected true to be false
   × extractForwardableHeaders drops denylisted x-* infra    → expected {…4} to deeply equal {…1}
 ❯ agent-utils-header-forwarding.test.ts (/run) (10 tests | 1 failed)
   × strips denylisted infra/platform headers (#5712 breadth) → expected '203.0.113.7' to be undefined
 ❯ sse-connect-agent-id.test.ts (/connect) (5 tests | 1 failed)
   × strips denylisted infra/platform headers                → expected '203.0.113.7' to be undefined
```

GREEN — with the real policy in place:

```
 ✓ header-utils.test.ts (19 tests)
 ✓ agent-utils-header-forwarding.test.ts (10 tests)   # /run path
 ✓ sse-connect-agent-id.test.ts (5 tests)             # /connect path
 ✓ agent-header-precedence.test.ts (2 tests)
 Test Files  4 passed (4)
      Tests  36 passed (36)
```

Full `@copilotkit/runtime` suite: **113 files / 1593 tests passed.**
Typecheck, oxlint (0 errors), oxfmt, and build all green.

## Builds on #5782

This branches off #5782's head (`636bcad05`) and reuses that PR's
`mergeForwardableHeaders` (server-wins precedence + server-self
case-dedup). It should land **after #5782**. It addresses the
**forwarding-breadth half of #5712** — #5712's precedence core is fixed
by #5782; this is the breadth follow-up (not `Fixes #5712`).
2026-07-06 09:41:07 -07:00
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