Files
copilotkit__copilotkit/.github/workflows/cleanup_pr-caches.yml
Alem Tuzlak edf10769ac chore(ci): pin actions to SHA, add zizmor + dependabot, tighten permissions
Comprehensive CI/CD security hardening pass over all 33 workflows.

Action pinning
- Every `uses:` is now pinned to a 40-char commit SHA with a `# vX.Y.Z`
  comment alongside (167 occurrences resolved). Tag-style refs like `@v4`
  are mutable and have been used in past supply-chain attacks (e.g.
  tj-actions/changed-files in March 2025) to repoint widely-used actions
  to malicious commits.
- Removed redundant `version: "10.13.1"` hardcodes from `pnpm/action-setup`
  call sites so the action inherits from package.json `packageManager`
  (one source of truth).

Automated maintenance
- Added `.github/dependabot.yml` for the `github-actions` ecosystem so
  SHA pins stay current. Without this, pins go stale fast and new
  upstream advisories never reach us. Minor/patch bumps are grouped;
  major bumps stay separate so they get a real review.

Static analysis
- Added `.github/zizmor.yml` configuration and
  `.github/workflows/security_zizmor.yml` (blocking on PR, runs on push
  to main, weekly schedule for advisory drift). zizmor catches the
  well-known classes of Actions footguns: template injection from
  untrusted input, dangerous triggers, unpinned uses, excessive token
  scopes, secret exfil patterns.
- All 28 high-severity and 54 medium-severity findings from the baseline
  scan are remediated. Each suppression in zizmor.yml carries a
  per-finding justification comment so future maintainers can audit the
  trust assumption.

Workflow hardening (from zizmor + manual audit)
- Added `persist-credentials: false` to every `actions/checkout` except
  the 7 workflows that legitimately push back to the repo via the
  workflow token (release tagging, auto-formatting, docs-sync, registry
  updates). Each retained credential persistence carries a
  `persist-credentials required: ...` comment explaining the call site.
- Routed every attacker-controllable expansion (`github.head_ref`,
  `github.event.pull_request.head.repo.full_name`, `inputs.*`,
  step outputs) through `env:` and referenced as quoted shell variables.
  Eliminates 17 template-injection vectors in fork-PR-reachable
  workflows.
- Added per-job `permissions:` blocks across 14 workflows; demoted
  broad workflow-level `id-token: write` to the specific Depot-runner
  jobs that need it; narrowed `pull-requests: write` /
  `actions: write` to the jobs that actually call those APIs.

Audit-driven fixes
- `publish-release.yml` build job: dropped `token:` and added
  `persist-credentials: false`. The subsequent `Upload workspace` step
  was packing `.git/config` (with the persisted GITHUB_TOKEN) into a
  1-day-retention artifact downloadable by anyone with `actions:read`.
- `auto_merge_showcases.yml`: team-membership check now authorizes on
  the PR AUTHOR (`pull_request.user.login`), never `context.actor` —
  the actor is whoever triggered the latest event, so a team member
  synchronizing or reopening an outsider's PR would otherwise
  green-light auto-merge of code they didn't author.
- `static_quality.yml`: pinned ruff to a specific version so a
  compromised release can't land on the next PR run with the
  persisted-credentials write token in the format job.
- `showcase_capture-previews.yml`: switched the args-string construction
  to a bash array so a slug or demo value containing whitespace or shell
  metacharacters stays a single argument rather than being re-tokenized
  by the shell.
2026-05-14 18:21:57 +02:00

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YAML

name: cleanup / pr-caches
on:
pull_request:
types:
- closed
permissions:
contents: read
jobs:
pr-caches:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
permissions:
contents: read
# Needed to delete repository actions caches via `gh cache delete`
actions: write
steps:
- name: Cleanup
run: |
echo "Fetching list of cache key"
cacheKeysForPR=$(gh cache list --ref $BRANCH --limit 100 --json id --jq '.[].id')
## Setting this to not fail the workflow while deleting cache keys.
set +e
echo "Deleting caches..."
for cacheKey in $cacheKeysForPR
do
gh cache delete $cacheKey
done
echo "Done"
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
GH_REPO: ${{ github.repository }}
BRANCH: refs/pull/${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}/merge