Comprehensive CI/CD security hardening pass over all 33 workflows.
Action pinning
- Every `uses:` is now pinned to a 40-char commit SHA with a `# vX.Y.Z`
comment alongside (167 occurrences resolved). Tag-style refs like `@v4`
are mutable and have been used in past supply-chain attacks (e.g.
tj-actions/changed-files in March 2025) to repoint widely-used actions
to malicious commits.
- Removed redundant `version: "10.13.1"` hardcodes from `pnpm/action-setup`
call sites so the action inherits from package.json `packageManager`
(one source of truth).
Automated maintenance
- Added `.github/dependabot.yml` for the `github-actions` ecosystem so
SHA pins stay current. Without this, pins go stale fast and new
upstream advisories never reach us. Minor/patch bumps are grouped;
major bumps stay separate so they get a real review.
Static analysis
- Added `.github/zizmor.yml` configuration and
`.github/workflows/security_zizmor.yml` (blocking on PR, runs on push
to main, weekly schedule for advisory drift). zizmor catches the
well-known classes of Actions footguns: template injection from
untrusted input, dangerous triggers, unpinned uses, excessive token
scopes, secret exfil patterns.
- All 28 high-severity and 54 medium-severity findings from the baseline
scan are remediated. Each suppression in zizmor.yml carries a
per-finding justification comment so future maintainers can audit the
trust assumption.
Workflow hardening (from zizmor + manual audit)
- Added `persist-credentials: false` to every `actions/checkout` except
the 7 workflows that legitimately push back to the repo via the
workflow token (release tagging, auto-formatting, docs-sync, registry
updates). Each retained credential persistence carries a
`persist-credentials required: ...` comment explaining the call site.
- Routed every attacker-controllable expansion (`github.head_ref`,
`github.event.pull_request.head.repo.full_name`, `inputs.*`,
step outputs) through `env:` and referenced as quoted shell variables.
Eliminates 17 template-injection vectors in fork-PR-reachable
workflows.
- Added per-job `permissions:` blocks across 14 workflows; demoted
broad workflow-level `id-token: write` to the specific Depot-runner
jobs that need it; narrowed `pull-requests: write` /
`actions: write` to the jobs that actually call those APIs.
Audit-driven fixes
- `publish-release.yml` build job: dropped `token:` and added
`persist-credentials: false`. The subsequent `Upload workspace` step
was packing `.git/config` (with the persisted GITHUB_TOKEN) into a
1-day-retention artifact downloadable by anyone with `actions:read`.
- `auto_merge_showcases.yml`: team-membership check now authorizes on
the PR AUTHOR (`pull_request.user.login`), never `context.actor` —
the actor is whoever triggered the latest event, so a team member
synchronizing or reopening an outsider's PR would otherwise
green-light auto-merge of code they didn't author.
- `static_quality.yml`: pinned ruff to a specific version so a
compromised release can't land on the next PR run with the
persisted-credentials write token in the format job.
- `showcase_capture-previews.yml`: switched the args-string construction
to a bash array so a slug or demo value containing whitespace or shell
metacharacters stays a single argument rather than being re-tokenized
by the shell.
pull_request runs in the fork context with restricted permissions, which
would block the updateBranch API call. pull_request_target runs in the
base repo with full permissions — the label trigger is safe since no
checkout of PR code happens here.
Also treat 422 responses (already up to date, nothing to merge) as
informational rather than job failures.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Triggers on the qa:update-branch label being added to a PR, calls the
GitHub update-branch API to merge the base into the PR, and removes the
label so it can be re-applied. Enables the QA bot to keep PRs current
without human intervention.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Alem Tuzlak