Every Playwright install in CI passed `--with-deps`, which runs `apt-get
update` before downloading the browser. apt on the runners cannot always
reach azure.archive.ubuntu.com; when it can't it retries for many minutes,
which is long enough to burn a job's whole `timeout-minutes` budget before
a single test runs. GitHub renders that kill as "The operation was
canceled", so it reads as a test failure rather than an infrastructure hang.
Chromium's system libraries are already present on the Ubuntu runner
images, and every one of these steps installs chromium only, so the browser
download is all they need. Six jobs lose their apt dependency:
test_unit, test_e2e-legacy-v1, test_e2e-showcase-on-demand,
test_showcase-frontend-matrix, showcase_eval and showcase_capture-previews.
Ports CopilotKit/website#529 to this repo.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
## What
Adds a **LangSmith Platform** deploy guide to the CopilotKit docs,
modeled after the existing AWS AgentCore deploy page.
It's a self-contained, agent-side guide: deploy a **LangGraph** or
**Google ADK** agent to the LangSmith Platform, then point the
CopilotKit Runtime at it. LangSmith has no frontend-hosting offering, so
the guide covers only the agent side plus wiring the runtime.
## Pages
- **Canonical:** `deploy/langsmith.mdx` — renders in the Overview →
Deploy sidebar.
- **Per-framework wrappers** (thin, like AgentCore):
- `integrations/langgraph/deploy-langsmith.mdx` → `<Content
framework="langgraph" .../>`
- `integrations/adk/deploy-langsmith.mdx` → `<Content framework="adk"
.../>`
- Both registered in their `meta.json` under a new `---Deploy---`
section.
- **Shared walkthrough snippet:**
`snippets/integrations/langsmith/index.mdx` — single source of truth for
all three pages; framework-aware via the `Content` loader scope. Reuses
the existing `langgraph-platform-deployment-tabs` snippet for the "grab
your deployment URL" step.
## Structure (mirrors agentcore.mdx)
Intro → How it works (ASCII flow `Browser → CopilotKit Runtime →
LangSmith deployment → your agent`) → What you get → Quickstart
`<Steps>` inside a `<TailoredContent>` (deploy-new vs already-deployed)
→ `<Callout>`s for the API key/URL and the LangSmith docs authority →
framework tabs (LangGraph / Google ADK) for the deployable-app step →
Troubleshooting `<Accordions>` → What's next `<Cards>`.
## Registry glue
- Generalized the `Content` MDX component to accept an optional
`partial` prop (defaults to the AgentCore partial; existing AgentCore
wrappers unchanged).
- Registered a `LangGraphPlatformDeploymentTabs` stub so the existing
deployment-tabs snippet is reusable.
## Verification
- Commands/flags (`uv tool install langgraph-cli`, `langgraph new
--template new-langgraph-project-python`, `langgraph deploy
--name/--deployment-type dedicated`, deployment API URL) verified
against the live LangChain quickstart.
- ADK path (`pip install "deployments-wrap-sdk[google-adk]"`,
`saf_sdk.adk` `wrap()` + `LangsmithSessionService`, `langgraph.json`
export) verified against the live [Deploy Google ADK
agents](https://docs.langchain.com/langsmith/deploy-google-adk) guide.
- Runtime wiring (`LangGraphAgent` from `@copilotkit/runtime/langgraph`
with `deploymentUrl` / `graphId` / `langsmithApiKey`) matches the repo's
LangGraph quickstart.
- `oxfmt` (format) clean, `oxlint` exits 0, `tsc` clean; registry /
search-href / link-rewrite tests pass. (Pre-existing failures in this
worktree from an uninstalled `react-icons` and unfetched git-LFS assets
are unrelated.)
## Note (small extra)
The LangGraph `deploy-agentcore.mdx` wrapper already existed but was
orphaned (not in any `meta.json`). The new `---Deploy---` section
surfaces it alongside `deploy-langsmith`, matching how AWS Strands
already exposes it.
Ticket: GROW-540
dispatch-gate hardcoded --scope affected, so a manual dispatch always
ran the affected set. On a large PR that touches shared files, affected
resolves to every integration, and the eval's fleet bring-up then tries
to build 20+ images on one runner and dies (docker compose up -d exit
255). The comment path already supports targeting one slug
(/eval d5 mastra -> --slug mastra); this gives workflow_dispatch the same
lever via an optional `slug` input, validated with the same ^[a-z0-9-]+$
rule and read as untrusted env. Empty slug keeps the affected default.
This also makes the /eval fix validatable pre-merge: dispatch with
`-f slug=<one>` reproduces the real targeted comment path with a bounded
bring-up instead of the pathological affected=all case.
Dropping --ci moved the /eval job onto the CLI's Docker lifecycle, but
that immediately fails on a bare runner: docker-compose.local.yml declares
`env_file: .env` on every service and showcase/.env is gitignored, so
`docker compose` errors with "env file .../showcase/.env not found" before
any container starts. Validated: dispatch runs 29846236558 and 29845135213
both died ~6s into the eval step on exactly this.
Add a step that writes showcase/.env with dummy values before the eval.
aimock serves the recorded fixtures and never validates tokens, and the
aimock base URLs are already hardcoded in the compose environment block,
so the keys/URLs here just satisfy env_file and document intent.
The /eval job runs on a bare depot runner with no step that starts the
showcase fleet, but passed --ci to the eval CLI. --ci makes the CLI skip
the Docker lifecycle and assume services are already running, so it found
no healthy container and failed in ~1s with zero test results.
Drop --ci so the CLI's non-ci path builds + starts the in-scope slug(s) +
aimock and health-checks them before running. Safe with --json retained:
compose() uses piped (captured) stdio and all progress logs are
!opts.json-guarded, so stdout stays clean JSON for the post-result job.
Comprehensive CI/CD security hardening pass over all 33 workflows.
Action pinning
- Every `uses:` is now pinned to a 40-char commit SHA with a `# vX.Y.Z`
comment alongside (167 occurrences resolved). Tag-style refs like `@v4`
are mutable and have been used in past supply-chain attacks (e.g.
tj-actions/changed-files in March 2025) to repoint widely-used actions
to malicious commits.
- Removed redundant `version: "10.13.1"` hardcodes from `pnpm/action-setup`
call sites so the action inherits from package.json `packageManager`
(one source of truth).
Automated maintenance
- Added `.github/dependabot.yml` for the `github-actions` ecosystem so
SHA pins stay current. Without this, pins go stale fast and new
upstream advisories never reach us. Minor/patch bumps are grouped;
major bumps stay separate so they get a real review.
Static analysis
- Added `.github/zizmor.yml` configuration and
`.github/workflows/security_zizmor.yml` (blocking on PR, runs on push
to main, weekly schedule for advisory drift). zizmor catches the
well-known classes of Actions footguns: template injection from
untrusted input, dangerous triggers, unpinned uses, excessive token
scopes, secret exfil patterns.
- All 28 high-severity and 54 medium-severity findings from the baseline
scan are remediated. Each suppression in zizmor.yml carries a
per-finding justification comment so future maintainers can audit the
trust assumption.
Workflow hardening (from zizmor + manual audit)
- Added `persist-credentials: false` to every `actions/checkout` except
the 7 workflows that legitimately push back to the repo via the
workflow token (release tagging, auto-formatting, docs-sync, registry
updates). Each retained credential persistence carries a
`persist-credentials required: ...` comment explaining the call site.
- Routed every attacker-controllable expansion (`github.head_ref`,
`github.event.pull_request.head.repo.full_name`, `inputs.*`,
step outputs) through `env:` and referenced as quoted shell variables.
Eliminates 17 template-injection vectors in fork-PR-reachable
workflows.
- Added per-job `permissions:` blocks across 14 workflows; demoted
broad workflow-level `id-token: write` to the specific Depot-runner
jobs that need it; narrowed `pull-requests: write` /
`actions: write` to the jobs that actually call those APIs.
Audit-driven fixes
- `publish-release.yml` build job: dropped `token:` and added
`persist-credentials: false`. The subsequent `Upload workspace` step
was packing `.git/config` (with the persisted GITHUB_TOKEN) into a
1-day-retention artifact downloadable by anyone with `actions:read`.
- `auto_merge_showcases.yml`: team-membership check now authorizes on
the PR AUTHOR (`pull_request.user.login`), never `context.actor` —
the actor is whoever triggered the latest event, so a team member
synchronizing or reopening an outsider's PR would otherwise
green-light auto-merge of code they didn't author.
- `static_quality.yml`: pinned ruff to a specific version so a
compromised release can't land on the next PR run with the
persisted-credentials write token in the format job.
- `showcase_capture-previews.yml`: switched the args-string construction
to a bash array so a slug or demo value containing whitespace or shell
metacharacters stays a single argument rather than being re-tokenized
by the shell.
The eval workflow was missing --ci, causing it to try Docker Compose
lifecycle in CI (which fails because there's no .env file). The --ci
flag skips Docker and assumes services are already running or uses
native execution.
New showcase_eval_check.yml creates a Check Run with "Run Showcase
Eval" action button on every PR. Modified showcase_eval.yml adds
workflow_dispatch trigger with dispatch-gate job, Check Run update
in post-result, and devops bot token for Checks API calls.
PR #4449 removed the eval tier system while unaware #4448 had just
merged. Restoring orchestrator, matrix, scope, config, GHA workflow,
and CLI wiring with all 8 CR fixes intact.
Benjamin Taylor