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* test: gate daemon RPC wire compatibility against the last released tag (#1432) ADR 0006 fixes exactly when DAEMON_RPC_PROTOCOL_VERSION must be bumped, and nothing checked that it was. The runtime guard (readRemoteDaemonHealth) refuses a mismatched peer, but only fires when someone remembered the bump — a wire change that skipped it left both sides advertising protocol 2 while parsing different payloads, which is the failure ADR 0006 exists to prevent. Local daemons cannot skew (isReusableDaemonInfo takes over on any package version mismatch). Cross-machine is skewed by design — proxy, cloud/limrun, a remote macOS host — and ADR 0006 explicitly rules package version out as the compatibility gate there, so the one boundary where skew is intended was the one boundary with no gate. test/wire-compat/surface.ts declares the wire surface grouped by the ADR bullet each group serves, quoting it, with an `uncovered` note where a bullet is only partly digestible (the /health and /rpc literals inside http-server.ts stay reviewer-owned: a moved route 404s at connect time rather than misparsing). ledger.json records what each declaration hashes to, at which protocol version. Two gates, split for the same reason the replay-compat corpus splits: - unit-core holds the ledger to its source and prints the digest to paste; - Released-Surface Compatibility reads the ledger at the last RELEASED tag and requires the drift since then to carry a bump or a compatibleChanges ack. From one commit a bumped ledger and an unbumped one are both just an edited file, so only a released baseline can tell them apart. Acks are keyed by the digest they cover, so one "added an optional field" cannot launder later changes. Digests ignore comments and formatting; the manifest's closure is derived from the AST, so a field typed by an unlisted sibling fails rather than sitting outside the gate. CI cost: one added job (checkout + toolchain + two node scripts, ~1 min), mirroring the existing full-history replay-compat job. * test: close wire-surface overclaim and make the closure fail closed (#1432) Addresses both review P1s on #1717. P1 — the manifest materially overclaimed ADR 0006 coverage. It quoted all four bullets while digesting only the payload TYPES, so the producer and consumer seams could break a skewed peer without moving a listed digest. Now listed on both sides of every boundary: JSON-RPC method sets and the projections that turn each method's params into a DaemonRequest, createRpcError/sendJson/ writeRpcResponseEnvelope, resolveToken and the auth-hook types, upload preflight/finalize/308 handlers and the resumable ticket shape, artifact route and download/inventory framing, REST error mapping, and the client's own payload builder, lease-method mapping, response parser and error projection. 57 -> 117 declarations. What stays out is now named rather than implied: createDaemonHttpServer's dispatch wiring and the /health and /rpc literals inside it. Everything it dispatches WITH is digested individually, and a moved route 404s at connect time rather than misparsing — the loud failure, not the silent one. P1 — imported and re-exported payload shapes escaped the closure. declarationHomes() scanned only the manifest's own files and the walk continued silently when a name could not be placed, so a listed type could gain foo?: ImportedShape from a new module and stay green. Resolution is now explicit and fails closed: relative imports, workspace specifiers (through the owning package's own exports map, so a re-pointed export cannot drop a type), and facade re-export chains. Every referenced name must land on a listed declaration, a waiver with a written reason, a declared external module, or the TS/Node global set. Fixed two extractor blind spots the walk exposed: a declaration's own generic parameters and `as const` were being reported as references. Planted-red proofs (wire-mutations.test.ts): 13 cases independently mutate method naming, response serialization, response parsing, auth projection, upload ticket shape, 308 framing, artifact framing, REST error mapping, and progress framing, each asserting the digest moves; 3 probes prove the closure really reaches across a package boundary, a facade re-export, and a plain relative import. Mutations apply inside the declaration's own span — a whole-file replace silently hit a sibling sharing the substring, which is how the first draft of one case passed vacuously. The largest waiver pair (InternalRequestOptions, CommandFlags) rests on ADR 0006's own additive rule: they reach the peer inside DaemonRequest's untyped flags/input bags, and the decision says a new flag needs no bump. Digesting them would fire the gate on every new CLI flag and train reviewers to rubber-stamp acks. * test: list the consumer half of the auxiliary HTTP boundaries (#1432) Addresses the remaining review P1 on #1717. The manifest claimed both sides of response/upload/artifact framing while listing nothing from upload-client.ts, daemon-artifacts.ts, or the health consumer in daemon-client-transport.ts, so those parsers could narrow without moving a listed digest or protocol 2. Now listed (117 -> 141 declarations): - /health consumer: RemoteDaemonHealth, readHealthPayload, readDaemonHttpHealth, readRemoteDaemonHealth. This is the sharpest of the three — narrowing the reader or the comparison disables the very refusal ADR 0006 exists to guarantee, and nothing else in the repo would notice. - /upload consumer: UploadResponse, UploadPreflightResponse, UploadPreflightResult, parseUploadPreflightResult, requestUploadPreflight, uploadDirectArtifact, tryDirectUploadWithResume, shouldRetryDirectUpload, finalizeDirectUpload, uploadLegacyArtifact, ARTIFACT_HASH_ALGORITHM, isStringRecord, and PreparedUploadArtifact — whose sha256/sizeBytes/fileName/artifactType/ contentType fields ARE the preflight body the daemon parses. - /artifacts/* consumer: DaemonArtifactEndpoint, buildDaemonArtifactUrl, isRemoteDaemon, DownloadRemoteArtifactParams, downloadRemoteArtifact, materializeRemoteArtifacts, resolveMaterializedArtifactPath. Running the closure fail-closed over the new files surfaced three more stops, each decided rather than skipped: PreparedUploadArtifact listed (it is payload), UploadProgressSink waived (client-local rendering, never leaves the process), and src/daemon/types.ts#DaemonArtifact waived as a re-export alias of the listed kernel type, matching its DaemonRequest/DaemonResponse siblings. 10 more planted-red mutations cover the new seams: health version-read and mismatch-refusal defeated, RemoteDaemonHealth field dropped, preflight parser narrowed, preflight/legacy response shapes narrowed, finalize body key renamed, ticket field renamed, artifact tenant header dropped, artifact URL moved. A fourth closure probe proves the upload-consumer files are genuinely reached by the walk rather than merely listed. 22 -> 33 tests. The README now states the coverage as a producer/consumer table per boundary, so the claim is checkable at a glance instead of asserted in prose. * test: list the client half of the resumable 308 contract (#1432) Addresses the third review P1 on #1717. Listing the daemon's handleResumableUpload proved it still PRODUCES 308; nothing proved the client still CONSUMES the released one. src/remote/upload-stream.ts owns that half and was entirely outside the manifest, so a newer client could stop accepting `upload-offset`, change how it reads `Range: bytes=0-N`, or emit a different resumed `Content-Range` without moving one of the 141 listed digests. Now listed (141 -> 151): UploadStreamResponse, streamFileToHttpRequest, streamFileToHttpRequestAttempt, buildUploadRequestHeaders, isUploadResumeStatus, isUploadRedirectStatus, parseUploadResumeOffset, parseNonNegativeIntegerHeader, firstHeaderValue, MAX_UPLOAD_REDIRECTS. streamFileToHttpRequestAttempt is listed despite its size, unlike createDaemonHttpServer which stays in `uncovered`. The distinction is stated at the declaration: the HTTP server only dispatches to handlers that are each digested, while the attempt loop IS the resume state machine — it decides whether a 308 continues the upload and what the next request carries, so its sequencing alone can break a released daemon while every helper keeps its digest. 6 new planted-red mutations prove the client half moves the ledger: a dropped `upload-offset` fallback, narrowed Range parsing, a changed resumed Content-Range, 308 no longer treated as continue, a narrowed UploadStreamResponse, and dropped header-value coercion. 33 -> 39 tests. Closure fail-closed surfaced two more stops: UploadStreamProgressOptions waived (local byte-progress rendering) and URL/URLSearchParams added to the global set. README now carries a `/upload` resume row in the producer/consumer table, and names the pattern behind three rounds of review: the coverage sentence kept getting written ahead of the coverage, so the table and the `uncovered` notes are the claims to trust — they are checkable against surface.ts, prose is not. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
128 lines
4.9 KiB
TypeScript
128 lines
4.9 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* The acceptance criterion #1432 states in one sentence — "a wire-type change
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* without an RPC version bump fails" — proved from fixtures.
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*
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* It cannot be proved end-to-end yet: no released tag carries a wire ledger
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* until this lands and ships, so `run.ts` has nothing to diff against. These
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* cases pin the rule now, and `run.ts` becomes a thin git reader over them.
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*/
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import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
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import test from 'node:test';
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import type { WireLedger } from '../../test/wire-compat/ledger.ts';
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import { compareWireLedgers } from './model.ts';
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const RESPONSE = 'packages/kernel/src/contracts.ts#DaemonResponse';
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const META = 'packages/kernel/src/contracts.ts#DaemonRequestMeta';
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function ledger(overrides: Partial<WireLedger> = {}): WireLedger {
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return {
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protocolVersion: 2,
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declarations: { [RESPONSE]: 'sha256:aaa', [META]: 'sha256:bbb' },
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compatibleChanges: [],
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...overrides,
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};
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}
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function compare(current: WireLedger, digests: Record<string, string>) {
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return compareWireLedgers({
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baselineTag: 'v0.20.6',
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released: ledger(),
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current,
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digests: new Map(Object.entries(digests)),
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});
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}
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test('an unchanged wire surface passes', () => {
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const result = compare(ledger(), { [RESPONSE]: 'sha256:aaa', [META]: 'sha256:bbb' });
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assert.deepEqual(result.failures, []);
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assert.deepEqual(result.changed, []);
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});
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test('a changed wire declaration without a bump or ack fails, naming the symbol', () => {
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const current = ledger({ declarations: { [RESPONSE]: 'sha256:zzz', [META]: 'sha256:bbb' } });
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const result = compare(current, { [RESPONSE]: 'sha256:zzz', [META]: 'sha256:bbb' });
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assert.deepEqual(result.changed, [RESPONSE]);
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assert.equal(result.failures.length, 1);
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assert.match(result.failures[0]!, /DaemonResponse/);
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assert.match(result.failures[0]!, /without bumping DAEMON_RPC_PROTOCOL_VERSION \(still 2\)/);
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});
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test('the same change passes once the protocol version is bumped', () => {
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const current = ledger({
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protocolVersion: 3,
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declarations: { [RESPONSE]: 'sha256:zzz', [META]: 'sha256:bbb' },
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});
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const result = compare(current, { [RESPONSE]: 'sha256:zzz', [META]: 'sha256:bbb' });
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assert.equal(result.bumped, true);
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assert.deepEqual(result.failures, []);
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});
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test('the same change passes with a compatible-change ack at the new digest', () => {
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const current = ledger({
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declarations: { [RESPONSE]: 'sha256:zzz', [META]: 'sha256:bbb' },
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compatibleChanges: [
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{ declaration: RESPONSE, digest: 'sha256:zzz', rationale: 'Added an optional field.' },
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],
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});
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const result = compare(current, { [RESPONSE]: 'sha256:zzz', [META]: 'sha256:bbb' });
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assert.deepEqual(result.failures, []);
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});
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// The ack is keyed by the digest it covers precisely so it expires. Without
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// this, one "added an optional field" ack would launder every later change to
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// the same declaration.
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test('an ack pinned to a superseded digest does not cover the next change', () => {
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const current = ledger({
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declarations: { [RESPONSE]: 'sha256:yyy', [META]: 'sha256:bbb' },
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compatibleChanges: [
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{ declaration: RESPONSE, digest: 'sha256:zzz', rationale: 'Covered the previous change.' },
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],
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});
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const result = compare(current, { [RESPONSE]: 'sha256:yyy', [META]: 'sha256:bbb' });
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assert.equal(result.failures.length, 1);
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assert.match(result.failures[0]!, /DaemonResponse/);
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});
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test('an ack with an empty rationale does not count as an ack', () => {
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const current = ledger({
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declarations: { [RESPONSE]: 'sha256:zzz', [META]: 'sha256:bbb' },
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compatibleChanges: [{ declaration: RESPONSE, digest: 'sha256:zzz', rationale: ' ' }],
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});
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const result = compare(current, { [RESPONSE]: 'sha256:zzz', [META]: 'sha256:bbb' });
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assert.equal(result.failures.length, 1);
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});
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test('a removed wire declaration fails even when acked, because only a bump covers it', () => {
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const current = ledger({
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declarations: { [META]: 'sha256:bbb' },
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compatibleChanges: [
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{ declaration: RESPONSE, digest: 'sha256:aaa', rationale: 'Nobody used it.' },
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],
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});
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const result = compare(current, { [META]: 'sha256:bbb' });
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assert.deepEqual(result.removed, [RESPONSE]);
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assert.equal(result.failures.length, 1);
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assert.match(result.failures[0]!, /an ack cannot cover it/);
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});
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test('a removed wire declaration passes with a bump', () => {
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const current = ledger({ protocolVersion: 3, declarations: { [META]: 'sha256:bbb' } });
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const result = compare(current, { [META]: 'sha256:bbb' });
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assert.deepEqual(result.failures, []);
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});
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test('a newly added wire declaration is additive and needs nothing', () => {
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const added = 'packages/kernel/src/contracts.ts#NewEnvelope';
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const current = ledger({
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declarations: { [RESPONSE]: 'sha256:aaa', [META]: 'sha256:bbb', [added]: 'sha256:ccc' },
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});
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const result = compare(current, {
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[RESPONSE]: 'sha256:aaa',
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[META]: 'sha256:bbb',
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[added]: 'sha256:ccc',
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});
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assert.deepEqual(result.added, [added]);
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assert.deepEqual(result.failures, []);
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});
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