Prevent arbitrary MetaDefinition properties from writing on* handlers directly to meta elements. Browser events can execute these handlers, including on meta elements rendered in the document body.
Reject handler attributes case-insensitively before matching or mutating tags.
Fixes#70126
Represent withRequestsMadeViaParent() with an internal delegating backend so the interceptor handler can distinguish delegated clients from independent child configurations.
Normalize value-specific HttpHeaders deletions before filtering. The string overload previously used String#indexOf and removed shorter values contained within the requested deletion value, potentially widening outgoing request metadata.
Preserve delete-all behavior only when no value is supplied, and cover string, array, and empty-string deletion.
Prevent lazy HttpHeaders and HttpParams clones from reusing value arrays owned by a materialized source. Append and value-specific delete operations previously mutated those shared arrays, violating the immutable API contract and allowing request metadata to bleed into later requests.
Share value arrays until an update mutates a specific header or parameter, then copy only that array. Cover the affected append and delete paths with regression tests that materialize the source first.
Previously, the compiler disallowed translation of any attribute starting with 'on' for security reasons. This incorrectly disallowed translation of the 'on' attribute itself, which is not an event handler.
This commit introduces `isPossibleEventHandler` to verify that the property name has a length greater than 2 in addition to starting with 'on'. This allows attributes like 'on' to be translated while still correctly disallowing actual event handlers like 'onerror', 'onclick', etc.
Serialize transfer cache request parameters without comma-joining repeated values so distinct HttpClient requests cannot reuse the same cached response.
Include the XSRF interceptor in the root token factory so the automatically provided HttpClient retains the documented default protection without requiring provideHttpClient().
Preserve explicit referrer policy when the service worker reconstructs asset requests for cache-busted and redirected asset fetches.
For example, an application can load a script or image with referrerPolicy: 'same-origin' or 'origin' to limit referrer data. Dropping that policy can expose more of the current URL to that resource host.
(cherry picked from commit a7f52e5c30)
Preserve referrer metadata when the service worker reconstructs asset requests for cache-busted and redirected asset fetches.
For example, an attacker with access to asset host logs could receive a reset token embedded in a page URL if the reconstructed request falls back to default referrer behavior instead of carrying referrer: ''.
(cherry picked from commit 99ad47e58f)
Skip HttpTransferCache serialization for HTTP responses that contain a
Set-Cookie header.
Cookie-setting responses commonly represent session-specific,
user-specific, or security-sensitive state. Serializing their bodies into
SSR TransferState can embed sensitive data into the generated HTML, where
it may be reused during hydration or replayed by a shared cache/CDN.
(cherry picked from commit 80795defc6)
The previous fix for GHSA-692r-grfm-v8x7 was incomplete because it rejected script tags only when locating an explicit host element. Dynamic component instantiation can also infer the host element from the component selector.
Move the script-host rejection to the point where ComponentFactory has resolved the host element for either path, so createComponent rejects script hosts consistently.
(cherry picked from commit 135f3755b4)
Only cache locale data loaded from the global locale registry when an actual locale entry is found.
This prevents attacker-controlled missing locale identifiers from being retained indefinitely in SSR when locale lookup falls back to a parent locale or the built-in English locale, avoiding unbounded process memory growth in locale-aware pipes and formatters.
(cherry picked from commit ea8277ae37)
Normalize SVG animation attributeName lookup to also recognize lowercase attributename before allowing dynamic animation value bindings.
Add runtime and platform-server SSR regression coverage for lowercase attributename retargeting.
(cherry picked from commit d5e689af80)
XHR support in `@angular/platform-server` is deprecated because the underlying `xhr2` library does not safely handle redirects. Specifically, it can forward `Authorization` headers on cross-origin redirects (which leaks credentials) and is susceptible to denial-of-service (DoS) via redirect loops.
DEPRECATED: XHR support in `@angular/platform-server` is deprecated. Use standard `fetch` APIs instead.
Introduces a maximum length of 256 characters for date format strings.
This prevents potential Denial of Service (DoS) attacks by throwing an
`INVALID_DATE_FORMAT` error if an excessively long format string is
provided to `formatDate` or `DatePipe`, safeguarding against performance
degradation or application crashes.
(cherry picked from commit 35de6b368c)
Preserve `referrer: ''` when constructing and cloning HttpRequest.
An empty string is a valid Fetch referrer value and is documented by
Angular as the way to omit referrer information for sensitive requests.
The previous truthy checks treated it as if the option was not provided,
causing requests to fall back to the browser default referrer behavior.
(cherry picked from commit 1e54b8f5ec)
Removes `Authorization`, `Cookie`, and `Proxy-Authorization` headers when a request is redirected to a different origin. This aligns with the Fetch API's redirect algorithm to prevent sensitive information from being sent to third-party origins.
(cherry picked from commit 423a109404)
Add allowOriginChange option to ResolveUrlOptions in resolveUrl to enforce same-origin validation on resolved URLs. When set to false, it prevents any cross-origin changes (including HTTP/HTTPS URLs), aligning the emulated server-side platform location environment with browser security behavior.
Refactor ServerPlatformLocation.replaceState to use allowOriginChange: false instead of manual comparison, hardening state change validation against cross-origin URLs.
Add unit tests in url_spec.ts and platform_location_spec.ts for the origin validation changes.
Update platform-server to use Angular 's native `RuntimeError` class.
This aligns error throwing patterns in platform-server with other packages of the framework such as core, common, and platform-browser.
For URL and host errors, the error messages are configured to return only the raw dynamic URL when `ngDevMode` is false (in production) to aid in troubleshooting without bloating production bundles.
Replace the custom 64-bit non-cryptographic combined DJB2 hashing implementation in HttpTransferCache with a robust, pure JavaScript, synchronous SHA-256 algorithm.
Using DJB2 is vulnerable to pre-image and second-preimage attacks due to its small 64-bit keyspace and mathematical simplicity. An attacker could craft colliding request inputs to poison the cache, potentially causing a CDN or the application to serve the wrong cached response to legitimate users.
SHA-256 provides strong cryptographic collision resistance, preventing cache key collision attacks. A custom synchronous implementation is required because the Web Crypto API (`crypto.subtle.digest`) is asynchronous, whereas the transfer cache state lookup and interceptor flow must operate synchronously.
Also, update the unit tests to dynamically verify the custom SHA-256 output against the native Web Crypto API.
Do not store HTTP transfer cache entries when either the request or response uses `Cache-Control: no-store`, `Cache-Control: private`, or `Cache-Control: no-cache`.
Also skip transfer cache when requests use the Fetch API `cache` option with `no-store` or `no-cache`.
Because transfer cache serializes SSR HTTP responses into the rendered HTML, Angular now treats these directives conservatively to avoid exposing sensitive or explicitly uncacheable data through `TransferState`.
(cherry picked from commit 4d150156ca)
(cherry picked from commit 64ce11fcd4)
Treat HttpClient requests using `credentials: 'include'` and `same-origin` as credentialed when deciding whether a response can be stored in the HTTP transfer cache.
The transfer cache already skips requests with `withCredentials`, `Cookie`, `Authorization`, or `Proxy-Authorization` because those responses may contain user-specific data. Fetch-backed requests can express the same credentialed behavior through the `credentials` option, so these responses must not be serialized into the SSR HTML.
This keeps credentialed SSR responses out of TransferState and aligns the cache eligibility check with the fetch request options supported by HttpClient.
(cherry picked from commit 8ec01970d2)
Apply schema-derived sanitizer resolution to TwoWayProperty ops so native two-way DOM bindings emit the same sanitizer as one-way property bindings.
Add compiler compliance coverage for innerHTML, srcdoc, URL, resource URL, and security-sensitive attribute cases.
(cherry picked from commit 9ca51ab0e4)
Reject non-script elements when reading the SSR transfer state payload by id.
This prevents attacker-controlled elements with a clobbered id from spoofing
hydration state.
Stop inheritance traversal before built-in prototype objects and only read `ɵcmp`/`ɵdir` when they are own properties of a super type. This prevents polluted inherited properties from being treated as Angular defs during inheritance merging.
Also adds regression tests covering polluted `Object.prototype.ɵdir` and `Object.prototype.ɵcmp` to ensure polluted host metadata is not inherited.
(cherry picked from commit e695379354)
Currently, the platform-server attempts to neutralize URL hijacking and SSRF
bypasses by collapsing multiple leading slashes in relative paths. However,
sophisticated bypasses using obfuscated protocols (e.g., carriage returns or
newlines) or relative-like backslash paths can still lead to unexpected
origin takeovers.
This commit improves security by doing the following:
- Rejects protocol-relative URLs by throwing an error if they are not
explicitly permitted via `allowProtocolRelative`.
- Strictly validates resolved URLs against the provided origin using
`isSafeOriginChange`. If a URL unexpectedly shifts origins, an error
is thrown.
- Permits origin changes only when standard absolute http/https protocols are
explicitly declared in the input URL.
(cherry picked from commit 0b19c92d44)
Prior to this commit, `LOCALE_DATA` was initialized as a plain object literal:
```typescript
let LOCALE_DATA: {[localeId: string]: any} = {};
```
While `__proto__` is neutralized by the `replace(/_/g, '-')` sanitization step (becoming `--proto--`), keys like `constructor` and `prototype` pass through unchanged and would modify special properties on `Object.prototype` if used as bracket notation keys on a plain object.
**Example attack through the public API:**
```typescript
// attacker calls the public registerLocaleData API with a crafted localeId
registerLocaleData(data, 'constructor');
// internally becomes:
LOCALE_DATA['constructor'] = data;
// → modifies Object.prototype.constructor for every object in the process
// or with extraData:
registerLocaleData(data, 'constructor', extraData);
// LOCALE_DATA['constructor'][LocaleDataIndex.ExtraData] = extraData;
// → Object.prototype[LocaleDataIndex.ExtraData] = extraData
// → every plain object in the process now has this property
// → affects JSON serialization, property enumeration, and framework internals
// consequence — any subsequent object created in the process is affected:
const user = getUserFromSession();
console.log(user[LocaleDataIndex.ExtraData]); // → attacker-controlled value
```
In a long-running SSR server this pollution persists for the lifetime of the process and affects all subsequent requests from all users.
**The fix** initializes `LOCALE_DATA` with `Object.create(null)`:
```typescript
let LOCALE_DATA: {[localeId: string]: any} = Object.create(null);
```
A null-prototype object has no prototype chain, so any key is treated as a plain string with no special behavior, making prototype pollution impossible regardless of input — without relying on the sanitization step as the sole protection.
(cherry picked from commit 0deac976f3)
Previously, `__Zone_symbol_prefix` was read directly from `globalThis` without validating its type:
const symbolPrefix = global['__Zone_symbol_prefix'] || '__zone_symbol__';
This made it possible for DOM clobbering to interfere with Zone’s internal symbol handling. If an attacker injected a DOM element with the same name (for example via a form field or anchor ID), `global['__Zone_symbol_prefix']` could resolve to a DOM element instead of a string. Because DOM elements are truthy, the fallback would not be used, and Zone would construct invalid internal keys (e.g. “[object HTMLFormElement]...”), breaking patching and lookup logic in subtle ways.
This prevents DOM clobbering from influencing Zone’s internal symbol generation and keeps the patching system stable even in the presence of malicious or unexpected global values.
(cherry picked from commit e50f504b2f)
Hit this while exercising `Location.normalize` with route paths that end in non-`.html` suffixes.
The unescaped `.` in the strip regex inside `_stripIndexHtml` matches any character, so e.g. `/foo/indexXhtml` and `/foo/index_html` both collapse to `/foo` before the base-path strip and end up resolving to the wrong route.
Escape the dot so only the literal `/index.html` suffix is stripped.
(cherry picked from commit d109bf90d5)
Updates the template preparser to exclude namespaced SVG style tags (':svg:style') from the style elements set.
Previously, ':svg:style' elements were incorrectly classified as PreparsedElementType.STYLE, which caused them to be completely stripped from the final template DOM tree during the Render3 template transform and pushed into standard component stylesheets. By limiting the style element parsing to standard 'style' tags, namespaced SVG style tags remain safely in the template AST as normal DOM elements, preserving local SVG styling.
Closes#68977
(cherry picked from commit ec138c3645)
Update the transfer cache check to safely exclude all requests sent with the `withCredentials` flag.
By default, the HTTP transfer cache avoids caching user-specific responses to prevent sensitive data exposure or incorrect caching. While requests with explicit headers like `Cookie` or `Authorization` are excluded by default, requests can also be sent with credentials via the `withCredentials` flag without having those headers explicitly declared on the request object.
To keep user-specific responses from being cached, exclude `withCredentials` requests unconditionally, even when the `includeRequestsWithAuthHeaders` option is set to true.
(cherry picked from commit 34090cb12e)
Treat requests with a Cookie header like other auth-bearing requests and skip TransferCache caching them by default.
This preserves the explicit opt-in path via includeRequestsWithAuthHeaders, adds regression coverage for cookie-bearing requests, and updates the SSR guide to document the behavior.
(cherry picked from commit ab459798d9)
Ensure that when a custom object with a 'rejection' property is thrown as a raw promise rejection, the unhandled promise rejection error logger does not crash with a TypeError while trying to access undefined zone properties.
Also wrap microtask queue draining and task frame counter updates with defensive try-finally blocks to guarantee internal scheduler states are properly reset under any potential call stack exception unwinding scenarios.
(cherry picked from commit fa7580061b)
Ensures explicit HTTP cache mode from incoming requests is forwarded and maintained when creating fetch requests for assets, aligning with expected fetch behavior and preventing unintended cache handling.
(cherry picked from commit 31399c2171)
Ensures that explicitly provided `credentials: 'omit'` options are preserved
when creating new requests, preventing unintended credential inclusion.
(cherry picked from commit 5b0e9663e5)
Removes the `should throw error on translated SVG script ResourceURL
attributes` integration test from `security_integration_spec.ts`.
This test is now obsolete because SVG `<script>` elements are stripped during
template compilation (implemented in 90494cd909). As a result, they are no
longer present in the compiled template to trigger runtime sanitization,
causing this test (which expected a sanitization error to be thrown) to fail.
PR Close#68925
Ensures that namespaced <script> elements (such as :svg:script) are correctly classified as PreparsedElementType.SCRIPT by the template preparser and stripped during compilation to prevent potential XSS vulnerabilities. Consequently, obsolete security schema mappings and runtime sanitization checks for <script> attributes have been removed since these elements are never present in compiled template outputs.
PR Close#68925
Alan Agius