Stop inheritance traversal before built-in prototype objects and only read `ɵcmp`/`ɵdir` when they are own properties of a super type. This prevents polluted inherited properties from being treated as Angular defs during inheritance merging.
Also adds regression tests covering polluted `Object.prototype.ɵdir` and `Object.prototype.ɵcmp` to ensure polluted host metadata is not inherited.
(cherry picked from commit e695379354)
Currently, the platform-server attempts to neutralize URL hijacking and SSRF
bypasses by collapsing multiple leading slashes in relative paths. However,
sophisticated bypasses using obfuscated protocols (e.g., carriage returns or
newlines) or relative-like backslash paths can still lead to unexpected
origin takeovers.
This commit improves security by doing the following:
- Rejects protocol-relative URLs by throwing an error if they are not
explicitly permitted via `allowProtocolRelative`.
- Strictly validates resolved URLs against the provided origin using
`isSafeOriginChange`. If a URL unexpectedly shifts origins, an error
is thrown.
- Permits origin changes only when standard absolute http/https protocols are
explicitly declared in the input URL.
(cherry picked from commit 0b19c92d44)
Prior to this commit, `LOCALE_DATA` was initialized as a plain object literal:
```typescript
let LOCALE_DATA: {[localeId: string]: any} = {};
```
While `__proto__` is neutralized by the `replace(/_/g, '-')` sanitization step (becoming `--proto--`), keys like `constructor` and `prototype` pass through unchanged and would modify special properties on `Object.prototype` if used as bracket notation keys on a plain object.
**Example attack through the public API:**
```typescript
// attacker calls the public registerLocaleData API with a crafted localeId
registerLocaleData(data, 'constructor');
// internally becomes:
LOCALE_DATA['constructor'] = data;
// → modifies Object.prototype.constructor for every object in the process
// or with extraData:
registerLocaleData(data, 'constructor', extraData);
// LOCALE_DATA['constructor'][LocaleDataIndex.ExtraData] = extraData;
// → Object.prototype[LocaleDataIndex.ExtraData] = extraData
// → every plain object in the process now has this property
// → affects JSON serialization, property enumeration, and framework internals
// consequence — any subsequent object created in the process is affected:
const user = getUserFromSession();
console.log(user[LocaleDataIndex.ExtraData]); // → attacker-controlled value
```
In a long-running SSR server this pollution persists for the lifetime of the process and affects all subsequent requests from all users.
**The fix** initializes `LOCALE_DATA` with `Object.create(null)`:
```typescript
let LOCALE_DATA: {[localeId: string]: any} = Object.create(null);
```
A null-prototype object has no prototype chain, so any key is treated as a plain string with no special behavior, making prototype pollution impossible regardless of input — without relying on the sanitization step as the sole protection.
(cherry picked from commit 0deac976f3)
Previously, `__Zone_symbol_prefix` was read directly from `globalThis` without validating its type:
const symbolPrefix = global['__Zone_symbol_prefix'] || '__zone_symbol__';
This made it possible for DOM clobbering to interfere with Zone’s internal symbol handling. If an attacker injected a DOM element with the same name (for example via a form field or anchor ID), `global['__Zone_symbol_prefix']` could resolve to a DOM element instead of a string. Because DOM elements are truthy, the fallback would not be used, and Zone would construct invalid internal keys (e.g. “[object HTMLFormElement]...”), breaking patching and lookup logic in subtle ways.
This prevents DOM clobbering from influencing Zone’s internal symbol generation and keeps the patching system stable even in the presence of malicious or unexpected global values.
(cherry picked from commit e50f504b2f)
Hit this while exercising `Location.normalize` with route paths that end in non-`.html` suffixes.
The unescaped `.` in the strip regex inside `_stripIndexHtml` matches any character, so e.g. `/foo/indexXhtml` and `/foo/index_html` both collapse to `/foo` before the base-path strip and end up resolving to the wrong route.
Escape the dot so only the literal `/index.html` suffix is stripped.
(cherry picked from commit d109bf90d5)
Updates the template preparser to exclude namespaced SVG style tags (':svg:style') from the style elements set.
Previously, ':svg:style' elements were incorrectly classified as PreparsedElementType.STYLE, which caused them to be completely stripped from the final template DOM tree during the Render3 template transform and pushed into standard component stylesheets. By limiting the style element parsing to standard 'style' tags, namespaced SVG style tags remain safely in the template AST as normal DOM elements, preserving local SVG styling.
Closes#68977
(cherry picked from commit ec138c3645)
Update the transfer cache check to safely exclude all requests sent with the `withCredentials` flag.
By default, the HTTP transfer cache avoids caching user-specific responses to prevent sensitive data exposure or incorrect caching. While requests with explicit headers like `Cookie` or `Authorization` are excluded by default, requests can also be sent with credentials via the `withCredentials` flag without having those headers explicitly declared on the request object.
To keep user-specific responses from being cached, exclude `withCredentials` requests unconditionally, even when the `includeRequestsWithAuthHeaders` option is set to true.
(cherry picked from commit 34090cb12e)
Treat requests with a Cookie header like other auth-bearing requests and skip TransferCache caching them by default.
This preserves the explicit opt-in path via includeRequestsWithAuthHeaders, adds regression coverage for cookie-bearing requests, and updates the SSR guide to document the behavior.
(cherry picked from commit ab459798d9)
Ensure that when a custom object with a 'rejection' property is thrown as a raw promise rejection, the unhandled promise rejection error logger does not crash with a TypeError while trying to access undefined zone properties.
Also wrap microtask queue draining and task frame counter updates with defensive try-finally blocks to guarantee internal scheduler states are properly reset under any potential call stack exception unwinding scenarios.
(cherry picked from commit fa7580061b)
Ensures explicit HTTP cache mode from incoming requests is forwarded and maintained when creating fetch requests for assets, aligning with expected fetch behavior and preventing unintended cache handling.
(cherry picked from commit 31399c2171)
Ensures that explicitly provided `credentials: 'omit'` options are preserved
when creating new requests, preventing unintended credential inclusion.
(cherry picked from commit 5b0e9663e5)
Removes the `should throw error on translated SVG script ResourceURL
attributes` integration test from `security_integration_spec.ts`.
This test is now obsolete because SVG `<script>` elements are stripped during
template compilation (implemented in 90494cd909). As a result, they are no
longer present in the compiled template to trigger runtime sanitization,
causing this test (which expected a sanitization error to be thrown) to fail.
PR Close#68925
Ensures that namespaced <script> elements (such as :svg:script) are correctly classified as PreparsedElementType.SCRIPT by the template preparser and stripped during compilation to prevent potential XSS vulnerabilities. Consequently, obsolete security schema mappings and runtime sanitization checks for <script> attributes have been removed since these elements are never present in compiled template outputs.
PR Close#68925
Normalize namespaced tag names (e.g., :xhtml:a to a) inside i18nResolveSanitizer before looking up their security context. This ensures custom namespaced tag attributes undergo correct translation sanitization at runtime.
PR Close#68925
Custom XML/XHTML namespaced elements (e.g., <xhtml:a>) fall back to the standard HTML namespace during element creation at compile-time/runtime. However, their property and security context lookups inside the schema registry were incorrectly performed using the full namespaced tag name (e.g., :xhtml:a), which bypassed the default a|href sanitization registry and incorrectly returned SecurityContext.NONE instead of SecurityContext.URL.
This commit introduces tag name normalization inside DomElementSchemaRegistry for custom namespaces (other than the built-in svg and math namespaces). Custom namespaced tag names are now normalized to their simple HTML element counterparts for all registry queries, ensuring that correct property schema validation and dynamic security sanitization rules (such as URL sanitization) are enforced at runtime.
PR Close#68925
Dynamic bindings to `href` and `xlink:href` attributes on SVG `<a>` elements (`<svg:a>`) were previously unmapped in the DOM security schema. As a result, they bypassed sanitization completely, creating a potential XSS vulnerability if bound to untrusted user inputs (e.g., `javascript:` URLs).
This fix mitigates this risk by:
1. Registering `href` and `xlink:href` on `<svg:a>` elements under the `SecurityContext.URL` context in both the compiler and core DOM security schemas.
2. Enabling template compilation to output runtime URL sanitization checks (`ɵɵsanitizeUrl`) on these attributes.
3. Adding regression and verification test cases to ensure dynamic SVG link bindings are safely sanitized at runtime while static values are correctly allowed.
PR Close#68925
Updates `DomElementSchemaRegistry` to strip `:svg:` and `:math:` namespace prefixes
from tag names before querying `SECURITY_SCHEMA` at compile-time. This allows SVG
and MathML attributes to correctly match their security contexts during compilation.
PR Close#68925
Encoding backslashes ensures that they are not normalized to slashes and where they could generate a protocol relative URL.
(cherry picked from commit 140c4d04cb)
Normalizes the URL and path parsing logic inside platform-server by consolidating security checks and normalizations into a single, unified parseUrl helper function.
This includes:
- Collapsing multiple consecutive leading slashes and backslashes (e.g., // or /\) to a single forward slash to avoid protocol-relative parsing of path-like & relative inputs.
- Rejecting malformed absolute URLs that are otherwise accepted by lenient DOM parsers like Domino but rejected by standard WHATWG parsers, preventing SSRF / allowedHosts validation bypasses.
- Ensuring parseDocument gets the fully parsed and normalized URL instead of raw, unvalidated configuration values, preventing virtual document hostname adoption/origin hijack.
- Moving parseUrl unit tests into a dedicated url_spec.ts test file to keep platform_location_spec.ts clean and decoupled.
(cherry picked from commit 1307ff355c)
The `@param` JSDoc for `FormBuilder.group()` previously described the argument only as “a collection of child controls”, without explaining the four supported value shapes:
* a raw value
* a `FormControlState`
* a `ControlConfig` tuple
* a pre-built `AbstractControl`
The fact that the second element of a `ControlConfig` tuple can accept `AbstractControlOptions` (for example to configure per-control `updateOn`) was especially non-obvious and undocumented.
This change adds a `@usageNotes` section with concrete examples covering each supported shape.
Closes#43984
(cherry picked from commit 3b8503f960)
The previous documentation for `DoCheck` / `ngDoCheck` implied that the
default change-detector had run on the directive itself, which is
misleading. `ngDoCheck` is actually invoked when the *parent's*
change-detector checks the directive's input bindings — meaning it fires
even for `OnPush` components whose own change detection was skipped.
Updated three places in lifecycle_hooks.ts:
- Interface description: scopes "the check" to input bindings in the
parent template and adds an explicit OnPush callout.
- "detects changes" clarified to "detects changes to the directive's
input bindings".
- Method description: "after the default change-detector runs" →
"after the default change-detector has checked the directive's input
bindings in the parent template".
Fixes#48140
(cherry picked from commit ca44055166)
Ensures that namespaced <script> elements (such as :svg:script) are correctly classified as PreparsedElementType.SCRIPT by the template preparser and stripped during compilation to prevent potential XSS vulnerabilities. Consequently, obsolete security schema mappings and runtime sanitization checks for <script> attributes have been removed since these elements are never present in compiled template outputs.
(cherry picked from commit 90494cd909)
When scrollPositionRestoration is enabled and the app hydrates an
SSR-rendered page, RouterScroller was unconditionally scrolling the
viewport to [0, 0] on the first imperative navigation. This discards
any scroll position the user established while the server-rendered
page was loading.
Fix by injecting IS_HYDRATION_DOM_REUSE_ENABLED into RouterScroller
and suppressing the scroll-to-top for the initial navigation only.
Subsequent navigations are unaffected.
Closes#64578
(cherry picked from commit 8ec0d1eee8)
Exclude `**/*.spec.ts` files from the `srcs` glob of the `full_sources` target.
Previously, `module.spec.ts` was compiled as part of the application's main sources because the glob pattern only excluded `**/*_spec.ts` (E2E specs). Consequently, `module.spec.js` was generated and included in the runfiles of the E2E test target, causing the Protractor runner to load and execute it. This failed since the E2E testing runner does not have access to unit testing imports like `@angular/core/testing`.
(cherry picked from commit 7390af78b1)
The following:
`@Output() someChange = new EventEmitter<void>();`
is correctly migrated to:
`readonly someChange = output<void>();`
However, a TODO is incorrectly inserted for subsequent emissions from
`someChange`, stating that an argument is expected.
(cherry picked from commit 16fe27bfef)
To enhance application security and prevent accidental or malicious script execution, this change ensures that dynamically mounting a component via createComponent directly onto a <script> element throws a runtime error in development mode. SVG <script> elements are also rejected. The error message is designed to be fully tree-shakable under production builds where ngDevMode is disabled.
(cherry picked from commit 0011664d1c)
Refactors the element security schema lookups and runtime attribute validation to
consistently account for SVG and MathML namespaces. This improves the modularity
and accuracy of security context mapping during template compilation and runtime
constant evaluation, eliminating redundant or false-positive lifecycle checks.
(cherry picked from commit cef4a095a2)
Ensures the resource map for URL sanitization is queried using lowercase tag and property names, improving robustness by handling case variations consistently.
(cherry picked from commit 00c284015c)
The getters and setters for jsDocParsingMode in `host.ts` and
`ts_create_program_driver.ts` were suppressed with @ts-ignore to
support TypeScript 5.2, which lacked the property on `ts.CompilerHost`.
The minimum supported TypeScript is now 6.0, and `jsDocParsingMode`
is part of the public TypeScript API, so the suppressions can go.
(cherry picked from commit 7a146238ba)
Errors thrown by BEFORE_APP_SERIALIZED callbacks were previously logged
via console.warn and silently ignored. This meant failures such as
TransferState.toJson() encountering a circular reference would go
unreported in apps that use a custom ErrorHandler (e.g. Sentry).
Errors are now forwarded to the application's ErrorHandler, making them
visible through whatever reporting mechanism the app has configured.
The render continues to completion after the error is reported.
Closes#65811
(cherry picked from commit 7623580378)
In server-side rendering (SSR) setups, passing request URLs directly to the lower-level rendering APIs `renderModule` or `renderApplication` can expose applications to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) or Host Header Injection attacks via absolute-form request URLs.
To mitigate these vulnerabilities at the framework layer, this commit introduces the `allowedHosts` option to `PlatformConfig` (supporting exact hostnames, wildcards like `*.example.com`, or `*` to allow all).
During platform initialization inside `createServerPlatform`, the hostname of the request `url` is validated against the `allowedHosts` list. If the hostname is not authorized, bootstrap immediately throws a host validation error, preventing unauthorized rendering and silent SSRF bypasses.
Closes#68436
(cherry picked from commit 60552a73e8)
These tests happened to use garbage "{c}" declaration lists which caused
the parser to choke. Given that we already have tests demonstrating
similar behavior and that's not what these tests were meant to
demonstrate, I've updated them to use empty declaration lists.
(cherry picked from commit b1699da827)
Moves the event attribute validation check outside of `ngDevMode` in the `elementAttributeInternal` instruction to ensure that bindings to event attributes like `on*` are always blocked at runtime.
(cherry picked from commit 5b421c61cd)
Rather than requiring TS AST in the indexer API, this update makes it generic with adapters to provide necessary information. This allows other analysis pipelines that don't use TS AST to work with the indexer.
(cherry picked from commit bc655d006f)
Several user-facing docs, tooltips, and tutorial code samples used
non-canonical spellings of product names. This normalizes them to
the form each project uses for its own brand.
(cherry picked from commit ed333c3992)
"AngularJS" is the official product name for the v1.x line and is
written as a single word. A few places in the docs and package
READMEs used "Angular JS" with a space. This normalizes those
references to the canonical spelling.
(cherry picked from commit 8a7f955f0f)
Prohibit concurrent submits in signal forms to prevent duplicate actions and side effects when a submission is already in progress.
If `submit()` is called while a prior submit is in progress for the same field or any of its parents, it returns `false` immediately without running the action again.
This commit also updates the documentation in `form-submission.md` to reflect this behavior.
Fixes#68317
(cherry picked from commit 708631f2c4)
Matthieu Riegler