8 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Shuaib Hasan Akib 13b6bbd6a0 docs(platform-server): add error reference page for NG05703 and wire up RuntimeError
Add a dedicated error reference page for NG05703 (suspicious URL origin
change during SSR) and update the error to use RuntimeError with a
negative code so the error message automatically includes a link to the
docs page in both dev and production builds.

Update affected tests in url_spec.ts, platform_location_spec.ts, and
integration_spec.ts to match the new NG05703-prefixed error message
format.

Fixes: #69667
2026-07-09 11:56:01 -07:00
Alan Agius cf9d7fa0f8 fix(platform-server): harden platform location origin validation during SSR (#69184)
Add allowOriginChange option to ResolveUrlOptions in resolveUrl to enforce same-origin validation on resolved URLs. When set to false, it prevents any cross-origin changes (including HTTP/HTTPS URLs), aligning the emulated server-side platform location environment with browser security behavior.

Refactor ServerPlatformLocation.replaceState to use allowOriginChange: false instead of manual comparison, hardening state change validation against cross-origin URLs.

Add unit tests in url_spec.ts and platform_location_spec.ts for the origin validation changes.

PR Close #69184
2026-06-05 17:20:43 +00:00
Alan Agius abfb04a342 refactor(platform-server): replace standard Error with RuntimeError (#69184)
Update platform-server to use Angular 's native `RuntimeError` class.
This aligns error throwing patterns in platform-server with other packages of the framework such as core, common, and platform-browser.

For URL and host errors, the error messages are configured to return only the raw dynamic URL when `ngDevMode` is false (in production) to aid in troubleshooting without bloating production bundles.

PR Close #69184
2026-06-05 17:20:43 +00:00
Alan Agius 0b19c92d44 fix(platform-server): throw on suspicious URLs and restrict protocol-relative URLs
Currently, the platform-server attempts to neutralize URL hijacking and SSRF
bypasses by collapsing multiple leading slashes in relative paths. However,
sophisticated bypasses using obfuscated protocols (e.g., carriage returns or
newlines) or relative-like backslash paths can still lead to unexpected
origin takeovers.

This commit improves security by doing the following:
- Rejects protocol-relative URLs by throwing an error if they are not
  explicitly permitted via `allowProtocolRelative`.
- Strictly validates resolved URLs against the provided origin using
  `isSafeOriginChange`. If a URL unexpectedly shifts origins, an error
  is thrown.
- Permits origin changes only when standard absolute http/https protocols are
  explicitly declared in the input URL.
2026-06-01 20:03:22 +02:00
Alan Agius 1307ff355c fix(platform-server): secure location and document initialization against SSRF and path hijack
Normalizes the URL and path parsing logic inside platform-server by consolidating security checks and normalizations into a single, unified parseUrl helper function.

This includes:
- Collapsing multiple consecutive leading slashes and backslashes (e.g., // or /\) to a single forward slash to avoid protocol-relative parsing of path-like & relative inputs.
- Rejecting malformed absolute URLs that are otherwise accepted by lenient DOM parsers like Domino but rejected by standard WHATWG parsers, preventing SSRF / allowedHosts validation bypasses.
- Ensuring parseDocument gets the fully parsed and normalized URL instead of raw, unvalidated configuration values, preventing virtual document hostname adoption/origin hijack.
- Moving parseUrl unit tests into a dedicated url_spec.ts test file to keep platform_location_spec.ts clean and decoupled.
2026-05-27 10:22:36 -07:00
Alan Agius 2a6b6fafb0 fix(platform-server): ensure origin has a trailing slash when parsing url
The origin did not have a trailing slash, which caused parsing issues for relative URLs.

Fixes #68322
2026-04-27 17:08:36 -07:00
Alan Agius ede7c58a2a fix(platform-server): prevent SSRF bypasses via protocol-relative and backslash URLs
The `parseUrl` function in `ServerPlatformLocation` uses `new URL(urlStr, origin)` to parse incoming request URLs during SSR. Per the WHATWG URL specification, protocol-relative URLs (`//evil.com`) and backslash-prefixed URLs (`/\evil.com`) can override the hostname component of the base URL.

This vulnerability typically manifests in SSR setups (e.g., Express) where `req.url` is passed directly to `renderApplication` or `renderModule`:

```typescript
// Example usage in an Express server handling: http://localhost:4000//evil.com
app.get('*', async (req, res) => {
  const html = await renderApplication(bootstrap, {
    document: template,
    url: req.url, // req.url is "//evil.com"
  });
  res.send(html);
});
```
2026-04-15 10:23:52 -04:00
Alan Agius 062a696673 refactor(platform-server): use URL constructor for robust parsing (#64494)
The existing implementation of `PlatformLocation` uses a custom URL parsing mechanism that can be brittle and doesn't properly update the `href` property. This change refactors the URL parsing to use the native `URL` constructor, providing more robust and accurate parsing of URLs, which also correctly updates the `href` property.

The tests for `PlatformLocation` have also been moved to a dedicated file to improve organization and clarity.

PR Close #64494
2025-10-17 18:17:15 +00:00