Under the WHATWG URL standard, HTTP and HTTPS URLs lacking an authority
(e.g., `http:/path` or `http:path`) resolve as relative paths when resolved
against an origin of the same scheme. Previously, `relativeUrlsTransformerInterceptorFn`
treated any URL with a scheme as an absolute URL, bypassing base resolution in SSR
and allowing Node fetch to parse the path as a cross-origin host.
This commit updates SSR URL resolution and the HTTP interceptor to ensure
HTTP(S) URLs without an authority are resolved against the current origin,
preventing unexpected origin changes and aligning SSR with browser behavior.
Fixes#70447
(cherry picked from commit b3bb36ad87)
Normalizes the URL and path parsing logic inside platform-server by consolidating security checks and normalizations into a single, unified parseUrl helper function.
This includes:
- Collapsing multiple consecutive leading slashes and backslashes (e.g., // or /\) to a single forward slash to avoid protocol-relative parsing of path-like & relative inputs.
- Rejecting malformed absolute URLs that are otherwise accepted by lenient DOM parsers like Domino but rejected by standard WHATWG parsers, preventing SSRF / allowedHosts validation bypasses.
- Ensuring parseDocument gets the fully parsed and normalized URL instead of raw, unvalidated configuration values, preventing virtual document hostname adoption/origin hijack.
- Moving parseUrl unit tests into a dedicated url_spec.ts test file to keep platform_location_spec.ts clean and decoupled.
In server-side rendering (SSR) setups, passing request URLs directly to the lower-level rendering APIs `renderModule` or `renderApplication` can expose applications to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) or Host Header Injection attacks via absolute-form request URLs.
To mitigate these vulnerabilities at the framework layer, this commit introduces the `allowedHosts` option to `PlatformConfig` (supporting exact hostnames, wildcards like `*.example.com`, or `*` to allow all).
During platform initialization inside `createServerPlatform`, the hostname of the request `url` is validated against the `allowedHosts` list. If the hostname is not authorized, bootstrap immediately throws a host validation error, preventing unauthorized rendering and silent SSRF bypasses.
Closes#68436
Alan Agius