Updates the template preparser to exclude namespaced SVG style tags (':svg:style') from the style elements set.
Previously, ':svg:style' elements were incorrectly classified as PreparsedElementType.STYLE, which caused them to be completely stripped from the final template DOM tree during the Render3 template transform and pushed into standard component stylesheets. By limiting the style element parsing to standard 'style' tags, namespaced SVG style tags remain safely in the template AST as normal DOM elements, preserving local SVG styling.
Closes#68977
(cherry picked from commit ec138c3645)
Normalize namespaced tag names (e.g., :xhtml:a to a) inside i18nResolveSanitizer before looking up their security context. This ensures custom namespaced tag attributes undergo correct translation sanitization at runtime.
PR Close#68925
Custom XML/XHTML namespaced elements (e.g., <xhtml:a>) fall back to the standard HTML namespace during element creation at compile-time/runtime. However, their property and security context lookups inside the schema registry were incorrectly performed using the full namespaced tag name (e.g., :xhtml:a), which bypassed the default a|href sanitization registry and incorrectly returned SecurityContext.NONE instead of SecurityContext.URL.
This commit introduces tag name normalization inside DomElementSchemaRegistry for custom namespaces (other than the built-in svg and math namespaces). Custom namespaced tag names are now normalized to their simple HTML element counterparts for all registry queries, ensuring that correct property schema validation and dynamic security sanitization rules (such as URL sanitization) are enforced at runtime.
PR Close#68925
Dynamic bindings to `href` and `xlink:href` attributes on SVG `<a>` elements (`<svg:a>`) were previously unmapped in the DOM security schema. As a result, they bypassed sanitization completely, creating a potential XSS vulnerability if bound to untrusted user inputs (e.g., `javascript:` URLs).
This fix mitigates this risk by:
1. Registering `href` and `xlink:href` on `<svg:a>` elements under the `SecurityContext.URL` context in both the compiler and core DOM security schemas.
2. Enabling template compilation to output runtime URL sanitization checks (`ɵɵsanitizeUrl`) on these attributes.
3. Adding regression and verification test cases to ensure dynamic SVG link bindings are safely sanitized at runtime while static values are correctly allowed.
PR Close#68925
Updates `DomElementSchemaRegistry` to strip `:svg:` and `:math:` namespace prefixes
from tag names before querying `SECURITY_SCHEMA` at compile-time. This allows SVG
and MathML attributes to correctly match their security contexts during compilation.
PR Close#68925
Refactors the element security schema lookups and runtime attribute validation to
consistently account for SVG and MathML namespaces. This improves the modularity
and accuracy of security context mapping during template compilation and runtime
constant evaluation, eliminating redundant or false-positive lifecycle checks.
(cherry picked from commit cef4a095a2)
These tests happened to use garbage "{c}" declaration lists which caused
the parser to choke. Given that we already have tests demonstrating
similar behavior and that's not what these tests were meant to
demonstrate, I've updated them to use empty declaration lists.
(cherry picked from commit b1699da827)
Moves the `ClassPropertyMapping` into the compiler, rather than having to pass around the limited `InputOutputPropertySet` interface that is only implemented by `ClassPropertyMapping`.
SVG animation elements (`animate` and `set`) can be used to animate sensitive attributes like `href` or `xlink:href`. Binding to these animation attributes (like `to`, `from`, or `values`) with a sensitive target creates an XSS vector.
This change mitigates this risk by:
1. Classifying `to`, `from`, and `values` on `<animate>` and `<set>` elements as `ATTRIBUTE_NO_BINDING` in the DOM security schema to prevent standard dynamic bindings.
2. Adding runtime validations in `ɵɵvalidateAttribute` to verify that `attributeName` is not a sensitive attribute (such as `href` or `xlink:href`) when processed by a set of `SECURITY_SENSITIVE_ATTRIBUTE_NAMES`. If it is, a runtime error `UNSAFE_ATTRIBUTE_BINDING` is thrown.
3. Adding regression tests in `integration_spec.ts` to ensure unsafe bindings throw an error while safe ones pass correctly.
PR Close#67797
This change is a security hardening measure to prevent potentially unsafe attribute value manipulation through SVG animations. By mapping `animate|to`, `animate|from`, `animate|values`, and `set|to` to the `SecurityContext.URL`, Angular will now automatically sanitize these attributes.
PR Close#67797
The comment placeholder restoration in `shimCssText` appended an unconditional
`+ '\n'` to each non-hash comment replacement. Because `_commentRe` does not
consume the newline that follows a comment in the source, that newline already
remains in `cssText`. The extra `'\n'` was therefore inserted on top of the
existing one, shifting every line after each comment down by one. In files with
many comments (e.g. large SCSS preambles) this shifts all subsequent CSS rules
far enough that the CSS sourcemap — generated before `shimCssText` runs —
points to completely wrong source locations in browser DevTools.
The fix is to drop the `+ '\n'`; internal newlines within a multi-line comment
are still preserved via `_newLinesRe`, and the trailing newline that follows the
comment in `cssText` is already present without any extra injection.
(cherry picked from commit 5a712d42d1)
The lexer's isNamedEntityEnd function stopped scanning entity names
when encountering a digit character, causing 24 valid HTML named
entities with digits in their names (e.g. ¹, ½, ▓)
to be treated as plain text instead of decoded to their corresponding
Unicode characters.
Fixes#51323
(cherry picked from commit 75560ce43d)
RecursiveVisitor.visitIfBlockBranch was permanently mutating the children array by pushing the expressionAlias into it. This change clones the array before pushing to avoid this side effect.
(cherry picked from commit 72a17afaf3)
Updates the expression parser to handle arrow functions. Since arrow functions share syntax with other AST nodes, we have to detect them by looking ahead and then potentially jumping backwards depending on what we see.
Back in #39323, I added a new `ThisReceiver` node to represent accesses done through `this` and I ended up making it inherit from `ImplicitReceiver`. The logic was that in most cases accessing through `this` was the same as the implicit access.
Over the years this has proven to not be a great idea, because no other AST nodes do this and one has to keep it in mind whenever dealing with `ImplicitReceiver`.
These changes remove the inheritance and update all of the usage sites accordingly.
This commit implements a security fix to prevent XSS vulnerabilities where SVG animation elements (`<animate>`, `<set>`, etc.) could be used to modify the `href` or `xlink:href` attributes of other elements to `javascript:` URLs.
Following https://github.com/angular/angular/pull/64509 we started
choking on unbalanced closing parentheses in declaration blocks,
specifically in quoted background-image urls. This was reported in
https://github.com/angular/angular/issues/65137.
This occured because we previously (and now again) traverse the entire
declaration block when selecting for :host-context() selectors to shim.
This is an oddity of how we parse styles today, and is likely something
we'd want to remove if we parsed selectors properly.
This change adds a new flag to _splitOnTopLevelCommas which allows it to
continue past unbalanced closing parentheses in the declaration block,
returning _convertColonHostContext to its previous behavior while
keeping support for the extra nesting in :host-context().
:nth-child() (and its siblings) support complex expressions, e.g.
`:nth-child(2n of :is(.foo, .bar))`. Previously we'd choke because of
the `:is()`. Now, we reuse the `_parenSuffix` subexpression to match
nested parentheses the same way we do for :host() and :host-context().
Note that we only support 3 levels of nesting, so a selector like
`:nth-child(n of :is(:has(:not(.foo))))` will still break.
I'll say yet again that we really should add a proper parser so we stop
getting bug reports like this :)
Fixes#64913
Alan Agius