Previously, the compiler disallowed translation of any attribute starting with 'on' for security reasons. This incorrectly disallowed translation of the 'on' attribute itself, which is not an event handler.
This commit introduces `isPossibleEventHandler` to verify that the property name has a length greater than 2 in addition to starting with 'on'. This allows attributes like 'on' to be translated while still correctly disallowing actual event handlers like 'onerror', 'onclick', etc.
The previous fix for GHSA-692r-grfm-v8x7 was incomplete because it rejected script tags only when locating an explicit host element. Dynamic component instantiation can also infer the host element from the component selector.
Move the script-host rejection to the point where ComponentFactory has resolved the host element for either path, so createComponent rejects script hosts consistently.
(cherry picked from commit 135f3755b4)
Only cache locale data loaded from the global locale registry when an actual locale entry is found.
This prevents attacker-controlled missing locale identifiers from being retained indefinitely in SSR when locale lookup falls back to a parent locale or the built-in English locale, avoiding unbounded process memory growth in locale-aware pipes and formatters.
(cherry picked from commit ea8277ae37)
Normalize SVG animation attributeName lookup to also recognize lowercase attributename before allowing dynamic animation value bindings.
Add runtime and platform-server SSR regression coverage for lowercase attributename retargeting.
(cherry picked from commit d5e689af80)
Replace the custom 64-bit non-cryptographic combined DJB2 hashing implementation in HttpTransferCache with a robust, pure JavaScript, synchronous SHA-256 algorithm.
Using DJB2 is vulnerable to pre-image and second-preimage attacks due to its small 64-bit keyspace and mathematical simplicity. An attacker could craft colliding request inputs to poison the cache, potentially causing a CDN or the application to serve the wrong cached response to legitimate users.
SHA-256 provides strong cryptographic collision resistance, preventing cache key collision attacks. A custom synchronous implementation is required because the Web Crypto API (`crypto.subtle.digest`) is asynchronous, whereas the transfer cache state lookup and interceptor flow must operate synchronously.
Also, update the unit tests to dynamically verify the custom SHA-256 output against the native Web Crypto API.
Do not store HTTP transfer cache entries when either the request or response uses `Cache-Control: no-store`, `Cache-Control: private`, or `Cache-Control: no-cache`.
Also skip transfer cache when requests use the Fetch API `cache` option with `no-store` or `no-cache`.
Because transfer cache serializes SSR HTTP responses into the rendered HTML, Angular now treats these directives conservatively to avoid exposing sensitive or explicitly uncacheable data through `TransferState`.
(cherry picked from commit 4d150156ca)
(cherry picked from commit 64ce11fcd4)
Reject non-script elements when reading the SSR transfer state payload by id.
This prevents attacker-controlled elements with a clobbered id from spoofing
hydration state.
Synchronizes the golden symbols for router bundling and updates the host bindings sanitization integration test to use a[href] instead of blockquote[cite].
PR Close#68926
Custom XML/XHTML namespaced elements (e.g., <xhtml:a>) fall back to the standard HTML namespace during element creation at compile-time/runtime. However, their property and security context lookups inside the schema registry were incorrectly performed using the full namespaced tag name (e.g., :xhtml:a), which bypassed the default a|href sanitization registry and incorrectly returned SecurityContext.NONE instead of SecurityContext.URL.
This commit introduces tag name normalization inside DomElementSchemaRegistry for custom namespaces (other than the built-in svg and math namespaces). Custom namespaced tag names are now normalized to their simple HTML element counterparts for all registry queries, ensuring that correct property schema validation and dynamic security sanitization rules (such as URL sanitization) are enforced at runtime.
PR Close#68926
Dynamic bindings to `href` and `xlink:href` attributes on SVG `<a>` elements (`<svg:a>`) were previously unmapped in the DOM security schema. As a result, they bypassed sanitization completely, creating a potential XSS vulnerability if bound to untrusted user inputs (e.g., `javascript:` URLs).
This fix mitigates this risk by:
1. Registering `href` and `xlink:href` on `<svg:a>` elements under the `SecurityContext.URL` context in both the compiler and core DOM security schemas.
2. Enabling template compilation to output runtime URL sanitization checks (`ɵɵsanitizeUrl`) on these attributes.
3. Adding regression and verification test cases to ensure dynamic SVG link bindings are safely sanitized at runtime while static values are correctly allowed.
PR Close#68926
Removes the `should throw error on translated SVG script ResourceURL
attributes` integration test from `security_integration_spec.ts`.
This test is now obsolete because SVG `<script>` elements are stripped during
template compilation (implemented in 90494cd909). As a result, they are no
longer present in the compiled template to trigger runtime sanitization,
causing this test (which expected a sanitization error to be thrown) to fail.
PR Close#68926
Ensures that namespaced <script> elements (such as :svg:script) are correctly classified as PreparsedElementType.SCRIPT by the template preparser and stripped during compilation to prevent potential XSS vulnerabilities. Consequently, obsolete security schema mappings and runtime sanitization checks for <script> attributes have been removed since these elements are never present in compiled template outputs.
PR Close#68926
Updates `DomElementSchemaRegistry` to strip `:svg:` and `:math:` namespace prefixes
from tag names before querying `SECURITY_SCHEMA` at compile-time. This allows SVG
and MathML attributes to correctly match their security contexts during compilation.
PR Close#68926
Refactors the element security schema lookups and runtime attribute validation to
consistently account for SVG and MathML namespaces. This improves the modularity
and accuracy of security context mapping during template compilation and runtime
constant evaluation, eliminating redundant or false-positive lifecycle checks.
PR Close#68926
Moves the event attribute validation check outside of `ngDevMode` in the `elementAttributeInternal` instruction to ensure that bindings to event attributes like `on*` are always blocked at runtime.
Previously, this check was only performed when `ngDevMode` was `true`, which could allow attacker-controlled CMS data to be bound to event attributes in production mode, causing browser-executed XSS.
Fixes#68419
PR Close#68468
Fixes that we weren't sanitizing attribute bindings with interpolations if they're marked for translation, for example: `<a href="{{evilLink}}" i18n-href></a>`.
Also adds a bit more test coverage for our sanitization.
Translators are not allowed to write HTML which creates URI attributes. I opted to ban any values going into an attribute at all, to prevent even links to malicious content, rather than just sanitizing URIs.
I also converted this blocklist into an allowlist. Now, we only allowing setting known attributes (while sanitizing URI attributes). This significantly reduces risk of missing a vulnerable attribute and does not require an exhaustive list of all potential attributes.
BREAKING CHANGE: Angular now only applies known attributes from HTML in translated ICU content. Unknown attributes are dropped and not rendered.
(cherry picked from commit 03da204b6d)
This commit updates the DOM security schema and sanitization logic to properly recognize and sanitize `href` and `xlink:href` attributes on SVG `<script>` elements.
This commit implements a security fix to prevent XSS vulnerabilities where SVG animation elements (`<animate>`, `<set>`, etc.) could be used to modify the `href` or `xlink:href` attributes of other elements to `javascript:` URLs.
The fix introduces a runtime validation step:
- A new [ɵɵValidateAttribute](cci:1://file:///usr/local/google/home/alanagius/git/angular/packages/core/src/sanitization/sanitization.ts:276:0-288:1) instruction is used when `attributeName` is bound on SVG animation elements.
- If executed, a `RuntimeError` is thrown, preventing the binding.
- The compiler now identifies `attributeName` on SVG animation elements as security-sensitive and injects this validation.
Additionally, the DOM security schema has been updated to include a comprehensive list of MathML and SVG elements that accept `href` or `xlink:href` attributes, ensuring they are correctly treated as `SecurityContext.URL` and sanitized. This prevents malicious URLs from being bound to these attributes.
http://b/463880509
Although the prior commit has made more profiler events guaranteed symmetric
through the use of finally-blocks, there continue to be some situations
that could potentially result in asymmetric events, e.g. application
bootstrap doesn't guarantee symmetric events. This commit makes the profiler
lenient to these situations by unrolling the stack past the asymmetric event
data, eventually reaching the expected start event.
(cherry picked from commit da9911f2b4)
Profiler events are expected to be symmetric, yet in the case of errors this symmetry may break
if events aren't always kept in sync with their corresponding start event. This commit moves
various end events to be run from a finally-block, allowing them to notify the profiler even
when an error has occurred.
Fixes#62947
(cherry picked from commit af1ba52587)
Eliminates the unnecessary injection and usage of Platform ID in the renderer factory logic, along with related test scaffolding cleanup
(cherry picked from commit 5343001835)
We accounted for skipping leave animations during moves, but not swaps.
This accounts for the swap cases and updates how we deal with swaps and
moves. Now we always queue animations and then essentially dequeue them
if we attach them back in the same render pass.
fixes: #64818fixes: #64730
If a component template contains an icu expression it is being retained until the next change detection cycle for that template. This results in a net retention of only ever a single copy of the given lView but that creates an opportunity for compounding leaks.
Change the icu i18n_icu_container_visitor to free the IcuIteratorState retained lView when the stack is empty so that garbage collection can occur when the view is discarded.
(cherry picked from commit 59e648913c)
We were clearing duplicate nodes when `animate.enter` fired fast, but not when solely `animate.leave` is fired and rapid toggles occur. This ensures that the `cancelLeavingNodes` function is called in all cases instead of just enter animations.
fixes: #64581
PR Close#64592
In some rare cases, it seems the animation queue disappears despite being afterEveryRender. This updates the animation scheduler to be afterNextRender instead and only schedules it when we need to.
fixes: #64423
PR Close#64441
When adding and removing items in a `@for` loop, the `animate.leave` event binding instruction was not updated to use the same logic as the class function when the animation queue was added. We were not returning the correct signature for the `animate.leave` function, which caused the animation to not trigger correctly. This updates the event binding instruction to use the same logic as the class function when adding the animation to the queue.
fixes: #64336
PR Close#64413
Our code ensuring host binding composition for animations was causing the early exit and removal of
elements when multiple transitions were present on the same element. This commit fixes the issue by
ensuring that we properly keep track of all the promise resolvers on the LView and then only
call them once we've properly waited for the longest animation to finish.
fixes: #64209
PR Close#64225
These tests were not properly validating against the host binding changes due to the fact that the styles were on the wrong components in some of the host binding cases.
PR Close#64225
Content Projected nodes are not destroyed and recreated, like every other
situation. Enter and Leave animations were ephemeral and are
expected to run once, and then be cleared. This means that for content projection
cases, the animations would only ever work the first time they were shown / hid.
In order to resolve this, we move to an animation queue that re-runs the animation
functions stored in the LView. In most cases, this animation will run once on creation.
For content projection, the enter and leave animations will fire more than once. Animations
are stored on the LView, but indexed and scheduled by whichever RNode needs to be animated.
So we only run animations for an affected RNode, rather than potentially all in the LView.
This also moves the queue to afterRender, which is safer than right after template
execution in refreshView.
fixes: #63418fixes: #64065fixes: #63901
PR Close#63776
Content Projected nodes are not destroyed and recreated, like every other
situation. Enter and Leave animations were ephemeral and are
expected to run once, and then be cleared. This means that for content projection
cases, the animations would only ever work the first time they were shown / hid.
In order to resolve this, we move to an animation queue that re-runs the animation
functions stored in the LView. In most cases, this animation will run once on creation.
For content projection, the enter and leave animations will fire more than once. Animations
are stored on the LView, but indexed and scheduled by whichever RNode needs to be animated.
So we only run animations for an affected RNode, rather than potentially all in the LView.
This also moves the queue to afterRender, which is safer than right after template
execution in refreshView.
fixes: #63418fixes: #64065fixes: #63901
PR Close#63776
Jaime Burgos